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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
 My dissertation has three main aims. The first is to specify and defend a normative 
baseline for environmental ethics. By “baseline” I mean a minimally acceptable level of conduct 
in our collective interactions with nature. In Chapter 1, I argue that we should specify the 
baseline in terms of maintaining (or restoring) ecological health. At least some areas of 
biological integrity must also be maintained (or restored) because these areas are instrumentally 
important to the maintenance of ecological health. I clarify the concepts of health and integrity, 
and address various complexities and objections that arise with respect to these concepts.  
 The second aim is to illuminate normative considerations that are important for an 
environmental ethic, but that do not reduce to the baseline considerations defended in Chapter 
1. In Chapter 2, I consider two ways of thinking about environmental values, namely, end-state 
and historical views. To value nature in an end-state way is to value it because it embodies 
certain desirable properties, such as complexity or resilience. In contrast, an historical view says 
that an important determinant of nature’s value is its particular history and genesis. I explore in 
detail two contemporary versions of an historical view—Robert Elliot’s and the view defended 
in recent work by John O’Neill, Alan Holland, and Andrew Light. My focus is on clarifying 
what the normatively relevant history is, and on assessing the claim that historical 
considerations function, in practice, to block certain types of land use. In Chapter 3, I turn to 
the question of how animals fit into my account. I argue that animals are ontologically 
distinctive in the order of nature in virtue of the fact that there is something it is like to be an 
animal. I consider various reasons for thinking that being an animal is ethically significant, 
including the fact that humans and other animals share a way of being an animal. Concern for 
animals complicates and enriches the account of why nature matters, for nature includes a 
variety of beings that experience first-personally their own natural good, or its thwarting. 
 The third aim of the dissertation is to suggest how the various normative considerations 
adduced in Chapters 1-3 might be integrated into a coherent view that can clarify the meaning 
of sustainability. I regard debates about sustainability as aiming to specify the nature we should 
care about, and the relative importance of concern for nature and for human welfare. In 
Chapter 4, I argue for a conception of sustainability that specifies the normatively relevant sense 
of nature in terms of ecological health and a non-instrumental view of biological integrity. My 
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view is sensitive to humans being able to meet their needs from nature, and hence sensitive to 
anthropocentric considerations. But my view also includes a robust defense of nature and 
nonhuman animals as valuable in ways that do not reduce to human needs or interests. Further, 
I outline a justice-based compensation argument to address the issue that already disadvantaged 
people and nations may have to forego certain development opportunities for the sake of 
environmental protection. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
NATURE AS STANDARD?  
IN SEARCH OF A NORMATIVE BASELINE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 
 
 
Contents 
1.1 Introduction: The Need for a Baseline for Environmental Ethics 
1.2 Biological Integrity, Ecological Health, and Biodiversity: Between Concept and Norm 
1.2.1 The Concept of Biological Integrity 
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1.2.3 An Initial Reason to Care about Integrity 
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1.2.5 A Second Reason to Care about Integrity 
1.2.6 Difficulties for the Defense of Health 
1.2.7 Biodiversity: Important, But Not a Stand-Alone Conservation Concept 
1.3 Valuing Nature: The Resource View and Its Discontents 
1.4 Conclusion: Which Nature Are We Trying to Preserve, and Why? 
1.4.1 Needs as a Focal Point for Moral and Political Deliberation 
1.4.2 Needs and the Specification of a Baseline of Environmental Concern 
1.4.3 Nature’s Complexity and Precaution 
1.4.4 Concluding Remark on the Anthropocentric Defense of Ecological Health 
 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION: THE NEED FOR A BASELINE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
ETHICS 
 In this chapter, I argue that we need a baseline to help us distinguish between the 
appropriate use and the abuse of nature. Judging by the collective behavior of contemporary 
societies, the protection of nature is regarded as, at best, only one possible value or goal—one 
that is weighed against, and routinely abandoned for, other goals. There are many reasons for 
this situation, and the specification of a baseline wouldn’t address all of these. Rather, a baseline 
is meant to indicate an absolute minimum of acceptable conduct in our (i.e. humanity’s) 
collective interactions with nature. The idea is to specify a threshold of environmental 
preservation below which we should never, or at least rarely and only temporarily, fall. 
 When one recognizes that we need a baseline to guide our thinking about the minimally 
appropriate use of nature, then several questions come into focus. The two most important are 
how to specify the threshold of environmental preservation, and how to justify it. With respect 
to the first question, the view I defend has two complementary aspects: maintaining (or 
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restoring1) ecological health and biological integrity. Ecological health (or health for short) 
refers to two main properties of natural (or partly natural) systems: the counteractive capacity to 
withstand stress or change (resilience), and the capacity to function normally over the long 
term, thereby providing a range of ecosystem services (e.g. nutrient cycling, etc.). Biological 
integrity (or integrity for short) is a property of landscapes that are relatively unmodified by 
human activity and that have their native biota largely intact. “Native biota” refers to the native 
plant and animal life in a given place, and whatever ecological relationships these instantiate. In 
those areas of the world occupied by human beings, and which we need to use to meet our 
needs, the appropriate conservation norm is ecological health.2 For reasons discussed below, at 
least some areas of integrity must also be maintained (or restored) because these areas are 
instrumentally important to the maintenance of health.3 In the literature, there is disagreement 
about exactly what ecological health and biological integrity mean, both conceptually and 
practically. The purpose of section 1.2 is to define and explore these concepts in detail. I also 
address how the concept of biodiversity fits into my account.   
 With regard to ethical justification, it is sufficient to care about the minimum of 
environmental preservation for farsighted anthropocentric reasons. Of course, the reasons to 
care here could be grounded in a rich and textured account of our obligations to present and 
future generations, to nonhuman animals, and to nature considered in its own right. Here “rich 
and textured” could include virtue-theoretic and/or nonanthropocentric justifications.4 While 
such accounts are philosophically interesting, and in many respects ethically appealing, we don’t 
                                                
1 I will follow convention and employ the term “restoring” (and its correlates) to cover the range of practical 
projects whose aim is the deliberate transformation of degraded landscapes so as to return them to a state of 
ecological functioning, health, flourishing, or some such ecologically-grounded normative notion. Some authors 
(e.g. Attfield 1994) refer to such projects as “rehabilitating,” rather than “restoring,” nature. But this nuance in 
usage is not necessary to observe here.  
2 My use of “ecological health” should be viewed as essentially interchangeable with what others refer to as 
“ecosystem health” or “land health.” 
3 This dual defense of health and integrity has been anticipated by Callicott and Mumford 1997 and Callicott et al. 
1999.  
4 By “virtue-theoretic,” I mean ethical justifications grounded in a concern for how certain dispositions, attitudes, 
beliefs, and actions embody and express desirable character traits—traits whose possession enables human 
flourishing. So, for example, from a virtue-theoretic perspective vandalizing a native ecosystem might be bad 
because such behavior (with its supporting attitudes and beliefs) indicates a deficiency of character traits we have 
reason to value in ourselves and in each other. This kind of argument is distinguished from an argument that says  
(e.g.) the wrongness of the vandalism consists in the defilement of something that is valuable in its own right (i.e. 
“intrinsically valuable”); it also contrasts with a view that sees the wrongness here as consisting in a wrong done to 
someone else, say, a wrong committed when one defiles another’s property, or denies others (present and future) 
the opportunity to enjoy said native ecosystems in a non-vandalized state. 
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need to agree about such views in order to endorse the baseline of environmental concern. I 
consider this a virtue of how the baseline is specified: any number of minimally acceptable 
ethical views can support it. However, to the extent that the ethical and prudential reasons to 
care about health and integrity are clear and pressing, they are perhaps less interesting, 
philosophically speaking. The more difficult task is to clarify how we should understand health 
and integrity, what it means to view these as complementary, and why my way of specifying a 
baseline is preferable to other views. This chapter is primarily concerned with these matters.  
 That said, I do consider various ethical reasons for caring about the relevant minimum 
of environmental preservation. In 1.3, I explore the uses and limits of viewing nature as 
valuable in virtue of the fact that it provides a variety of goods and services for us (what I refer 
to as “the resource view of nature”). Further, I argue in 1.4 for two considerations that any 
minimally acceptable ethical view must be sensitive to. First, I assume that any such view will 
endorse, or at least not be practically inconsistent with, the principle that we must meet our 
needs in the present without compromising the ability of future generations to do the same.5 
What counts as a “need” is theory-dependent, as is the question of whether needs merit special 
weight in our moral and political deliberations. I address both of these issues in 1.4. However, if 
we don’t have a baseline for what we ought to preserve as a matter of basic environmental 
concern, it is unclear how we would know whether we are compromising the ability of future 
generations in the relevant sense. In this respect, the specification of a baseline and the 
clarification of our obligations to future generations are complementary projects. An account of 
the baseline is critical for clarifying our obligations to future generations, and our obligations to 
future generations help to clarify why the baseline is important.  
 Second, any ethical view that purports to deal with contemporary realities should be 
rejected if it does not acknowledge nature’s complexity, dynamism, and unpredictability, as well 
as the (ostensibly) unavoidable limits to our collective capacity to understand how nature works. 
Acknowledging nature’s complexity and our limits suggests that intellectual humility is a 
necessary virtue for any minimally acceptable ethical view that aims to address contemporary 
realities. As a practical expression of intellectual humility, we need to leave room for error in 
                                                
5 As stated, for example, in the famous 1987 report put out by the World Commission on Environment and 
Development (WCED), the so-called Brundtland Report (named after the report’s lead author, Gro Harlem 
Brundtland). See WCED 1987: 8. 
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our dealings with nature. Hence the appropriateness of a precautionary principle to guide 
environmental policy, though the meaning of such a principle needs to be clarified.  
 There is one further issue I should note. It might be thought that focusing on a baseline 
is the wrong place to begin an account of environmental ethics. Why not start instead by 
clarifying the overarching ideal or goal for a contemporary environmentalism? I have chosen 
my starting point for two reasons. First, as noted above, I believe any plausible environmental 
ethic needs to specify a baseline that distinguishes between the use and abuse of nature. This 
will be so regardless of what ideal different (minimally acceptable) ethical views may assume or 
posit. While the specification of a baseline might suggest a range of answers to the question of 
appropriate use, depending on which normative considerations are viewed as critical, I believe 
we should strive to reach agreement about a basic minimum. The question of how exactly we 
should understand the minimum requires an answer. Clarifying this inevitably takes us into 
complicated debates about the specification and practical significance of competing 
conservation concepts (e.g. biological integrity, ecological health, and biodiversity). It seems to 
me we need to be clear about these concepts, for they (or concepts like them) are indispensable 
to the articulation of any viable environmental ethic.  
 Second, any nontrivial characterization of an ideal for environmentalism is bound to be 
very controversial. Starting with a discussion of the ideal generates needless controversy, thus 
potentially obscuring the very strong reasons we have to endorse certain minimum goals as a 
matter of basic environmental and social concern. Needless to say, specifying a baseline, and 
sorting out what concern for it requires practically, is only one part of what a fully fleshed out 
environmental ethic consists in. I discuss other dimensions in the chapters that follow. 
 Although I will focus in this chapter on clarifying a baseline of environmental concern, 
it seems to me we can’t entirely postpone questions about overall goals for environmentalism. 
For example, even if one agreed with my focus on ecological health (with a supportive role 
played by biological integrity) one might think that the significance and practical import of this 
focus will vary depending on one’s overall view of ethical desiderata with respect to the 
environment. If one thought our overall goal should be to increase the proportion of the earth 
that has the property of integrity, then the way in which one seeks to maintain and restore 
health in human-occupied areas would be constrained in certain ways, compared to a case in 
which one has no overall goal of increasing the proportion of areas that manifest integrity. 
Moreover, many conservation concepts are presented as an overall goal, or as part of such a 
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goal, rather than merely as an attempt to specify a baseline. This is true of some defenses of 
integrity and biodiversity. I will address this issue as it surfaces in the discussion that follows. 
The important point is that conservation concepts may be normatively interesting or 
compelling in ways that do not reduce to the concern to specify a baseline for environmental 
ethics. This will become evident in the case of my own defense of a robust non-instrumental 
view of integrity in Chapter 4. 
 
1.2 BIOLOGICAL INTEGRITY, ECOLOGICAL HEALTH, AND BIODIVERSITY: 
BETWEEN CONCEPT AND NORM  
 A multitude of concepts are appealed to in public and scholarly discussions of 
environmental concern. However, three concepts merit special attention: biological integrity, 
ecological health, and biodiversity. These concepts are defined and deployed variously by 
different writers. I defined above the way in which I will use the terms biological integrity and 
ecological health. Biodiversity refers both to a diversity of specific compositions (species, 
ecosystem types), but also to various biological and ecological functions (nutrient recycling, 
etc.). In the discussion that follows, my interest is not to track all the nuances and variations in 
how these three concepts are conceptualized and employed. I have several more specific aims. 
One is to explore how these concepts help us to answer the basic question of what it is we’re 
trying to preserve (or restore) when we aim to preserve (or restore) “nature.” A related, but 
more specific, aim is to consider how these concepts help us to determine a baseline for 
environmental protection. More generally, I want to explore these conservation concepts to see 
if they hold up to philosophical scrutiny. My view is that they do hold up to scrutiny, but 
philosophical analysis helps us to clarify these concepts in a number of ways.   
 Part of the motivation for clarifying these concepts is practical: environmental 
protection will not likely succeed with ill-defined concepts. But I have a more general 
motivation as well. Different conservation concepts suggest different answers to a basic 
philosophical question: How should we think about the human place in nature?6 One of the 
features of a good conservation concept might be having a plausible and attractive answer to 
this question. Many think ecological health, and its associated glossary of terms,7 offers a 
                                                
6 The dimension is noted in Callicott et al. 1999. 
7 I.e. a focus on ecological functioning as more important than a focus on particular, historically contingent, 
ecological compositions (populations of species, native biotic communities); and a focus on ecological rehabilitation 
  6 
particularly attractive answer here. But this fact does not invalidate the importance of biological 
integrity, or biodiversity.8  
 In what follows, I will begin by considering biological integrity. Of the three 
conservation concepts I am considering, integrity is arguably the most stringent and 
controversial. This concept is of limited but vital importance for helping us to clarify a baseline 
of environmental concern. (The concept of integrity makes a significant contribution to our 
thinking about an overall goal for environmentalism—a claim I’ll explore and defend in Chapter 
4.) After discussing integrity, I turn next to ecological health which is particularly useful with 
respect to conceptualizing a baseline of environmental concern.9 Lastly, I consider biodiversity. 
I argue that this is not best viewed as a stand-alone conservation concept, but as a part of a 
concept such as integrity or health.  
 
1.2.1 The Concept of Biological Integrity  
 Any plausible conservation concept will be defined in terms of both compositions and 
functions.10 The relevant compositions refer to various species and biotic assemblages, while the 
relevant functions refer to such ecological processes as nutrient cycling, soil production, and the 
like. It is tempting to categorize conservation concepts, following Callicott et al. (1999), as 
employing either a “compositionalist” or a “functionalist” glossary. However, this way of 
categorizing concepts can leave one with the impression that functions (and related processes) 
are not important or central to the specification of a concept like biological integrity—which 
Callicott et al. regard as a paradigm compositionalist concept. On the other hand, according to 
the compositionalist/functionalist dichotomy, one might be led to think that particular 
structures or compositions are irrelevant to a paradigm functionalist concept like ecological 
                                                                                                                                                 
when appropriate (i.e. rehabilitating nature to a state of ecological health), rather than a focus on ecological 
restoration (i.e. restoring nature to a state of biological integrity). 
8 In Chapter 2 (2.2.7), I consider the normative appeal of conceiving of nature as that which is paradigmatically not 
human, i.e. that which does not bear the marks or intentional designs of human activity. My comments on this 
matter are relevant to a defense of integrity as a conservation concept. In Chapter 4, I defend integrity as part of a 
rich conception of sustainability.  
9 I believe maintaining ecological health is also important for sorting out what a minimally acceptable account of 
sustainability is. For discussion, see 4.4. 
10 For helpful discussion, see Callicott et al. 1999. 
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health. But such an impression would be misleading in both cases.11 I’ve never read or talked to 
an ecologist or conservation biologist who thinks it’s appropriate to frame things as a choice 
between either compositions or functions. Rather, both compositions and functions are 
important to any viable conservation concept—whether one’s focus is integrity, health, 
biodiversity, or some other notion. That said, important differences between alternative 
concepts emerge when we attend to the question of whether particular elements, such as 
particular compositions or functions, are emphasized or somehow thought to be crucial to 
defining the nature we should care about. 
 Concern for particular elements is a critical dimension of the focus on biological 
integrity.12 Whether a given site has integrity is partly a question of whether that site has certain 
appropriate compositional and functional elements.13 Before turning to how “appropriate” is to 
be understood here, we should note that integrity is partly defined in an “end-state” way.14 The 
relevant contrast is between end-state and historical ways of thinking about the value of 
something, in this case nature. An end-state view regards nature as valuable in virtue of certain 
properties it exhibits, such as the presence of certain biological compositions or functions. An 
historical view, in contrast, holds that the specific origin and history of nature is an important 
                                                
11 Callicott et al. agree, so I do not mean this as a criticism of their view. The authors sharply distinguish 
compositionalism and functionalism only for expository purposes. They acknowledge that these two ways of 
thinking about nature “in fact constitute two ends of a continuum” (1999: 24). 
12 The most prominent defender of biological integrity in the literature is the biologist, James Karr. See Karr 1996 
and 2000; also Angermeier and Karr 1994. Karr characterizes biological integrity as follows: “Biological integrity 
refers to the condition of places at one end of a continuum of human influence, places that support a biota that is 
the product of evolutionary and biogeographic processes with little or no influence from industrial society. This 
biota is a balanced, integrated, adaptive system having its full range of elements (genes, species, assemblages) and 
processes (mutation, demography, biotic interactions, nutrient and energy dynamics, and metapopulation 
processes) expected in areas with minimal human influence” (2000: 212). This characterization seems to me 
needlessly verbose. I view my characterization of integrity as sufficient for definitional purposes. But to be clear, 
my characterization is intended to refer to the same condition of natural systems that Karr is referring to in the 
above statement.  
 A variety of conservation thinkers and philosophers have endorsed Karr’s view, or something like it. In 
particular, see Westra 1995 and Holland 2000; Soulé 1995 (where Soulé speaks of “living nature” not integrity, but 
living nature is defined as “the native species of plants and animals in their native settings” [at 137], which is 
essentially what Karr means by integrity) and Soulé 1996 (where Soulé defends “ecological integrity”). One might 
also regard the work of Elliot (1982, 1997) as relevant to the question of how integrity might be specified and what 
its value might consist in. However, Elliot places almost exclusive emphasis on the first of the two properties 
noted (being relatively unmodified by human activity), which is an inadequate way of conceptualizing integrity. 
13 “Biological integrity refers to a system’s wholeness, including presence of all appropriate elements and occurrence 
of all processes at appropriate rates” (Angermeier and Karr 1994: 692).  
14 I’m adopting vocabulary from O’Neill et al. 2008: 144.  
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determinant of its value.15 If we understand integrity as consisting partly in the presence of 
certain compositions and functions, then this is an end-state way of conceptualizing integrity. It 
follows that integrity does not consist merely in the historical property of being unmodified by 
human activity.  
 Understanding integrity as partly an end-state concept avoids certain problems that arise 
if we define integrity exclusively in terms of the absence of human impacts on a given site. For 
example, if integrity consists partly in the presence of certain compositions and functions, then 
integrity can reemerge as a property of sites even after these sites have been modified, perhaps 
significantly, by human activity.16 Further, if integrity is partly understood in an end-state way, 
then integrity is compatible with human impacts, provided the human impacts do not make it 
impossible for the relevant compositions and functions to continue their development in a 
more or less spontaneous way.  
 While the reliance on appropriate elements indicates an end-state dimension of integrity, 
a complication is that these elements themselves have an inescapably historical dimension. 
Typically, integrity theorists view the relevant elements as those that are “native” to a given site. 
If we assume, following conservation biologist Michael Soulé, that ecological processes and 
functions are largely generic, in the sense that they occur in nearly every terrestrial or aquatic 
ecosystem on Earth, then a plausible candidate for the most important elements are native plant 
and animal species.17 A native species refers to a species that is long-standing in a given place, 
and that is the product of nature’s own processes as these have played out in that place. By 
definition, then, native species, and whatever ecological relationships they instantiate, are those 
that are not the product of human design, but instead the product of nonhuman nature. 
Importantly, species could be native and the product of nature and still co-exist with human 
activity in a given place.  
                                                
15 In Chapter 2, I discuss in detail the normative significance of these two different ways of thinking about the 
value of nature. 
16 Whether or not this is so in any case will depend on various particularities of the site in question—a point I 
won’t discuss further here. 
17 Soulé writes: “The processes, including photosynthesis, nutrient transport, fixation of nitrogen, the water cycle, 
the decomposition of organic matter by invertebrates and microorganisms, the sequence of seasonal events (like 
budding, flowering, and seed dispersal), and disturbances by fire and floods—occur in nearly every terrestrial or 
aquatic ecosystem on Earth. They are generic. They can be performed by weedy [i.e. non-native or exotic] species” 
(1996: 59). 
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 The contrast class to native species is exotic species, and the integrity theorist avails of 
the native/exotic dichotomy. This dichotomy has been attacked by a number of writers.18 One 
motivation for the attack is that any exotic species is a candidate for a future native or 
naturalized species, given enough time and readjustment in the relevant biotic community. To 
insist, then, on the native/exotic dichotomy in order to exclude exotic species from a system 
that is said to have integrity risks “freezing” nature in a questionable sense. The integrity 
theorist needs to somehow avoid this.  
 A possible move here has been suggested by Callicott, Crowder and Mumford (1999: 
27). Rather than view any exotic species as necessarily integrity compromising, we should ask 
whether the so-called exotic is potentially a “good citizen” of its new biotic community. For 
example, if the species in question displaces and adversely affects its native or naturalized 
neighbors, then it could be considered problematic according to this ecological and context-
dependent criterion. It follows that if an exotic species is problematic, it’s not because it is an 
exotic, but because it negatively impacts other native species, or is disruptive of the ecological 
relationships that obtain in a given place.  
 Of course, people can argue about how much disruption is too much. There is no easy 
way to answer this given a host of contingent factors and the problem of which temporal scale 
is appropriate for making this judgment. Thus, even if one appeals to something like a criterion 
of “good biotic citizenship” in judging newcomer or introduced species, this criterion will 
remain somewhat recalcitrant to precision and will inevitably be based on a judgment call given 
the particularities of the case. This reiterates the fact that integrity is a normative idea; it is not 
something we simply “read off” from nature. 
 A different, and perhaps deeper, question that arises here is whether the reliance on a 
“good biotic citizenship” criterion is at odds with a post-Darwinian view of natural systems as 
radically contingent assemblages of different species. “Good biotic citizenship” is judged 
relative to a given community of plants and animals. The worry is that the citizenship criterion 
relies too heavily on what is merely a contingent product, one that will no doubt change in the 
future, becoming a different community. Here I anticipate an issue I’ll discuss later. At the 
moment, it’s sufficient to see that the motivation for viewing the native/exotic distinction more 
loosely is precisely to avoid attributing to any given biotic community more permanence and 
                                                
18 See, e.g., Callicott et al. 1999: 26-7, and Jamieson 1995: 221.  
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stability than is natural. Yet contingent biotic communities in nature do obtain, and from the 
perspective of a human time scale these communities are quite enduring. Therefore it does not 
seem inappropriate to use such communities as the context that sets the standard for whether a 
newcomer or introduced species is disruptive in a problematic sense. But we need to keep in 
mind that this context is a moving target.  
 Let me note one final dimension of how integrity is defined. This is the idea that the 
property of integrity can be understood as one that admits of degrees. It follows that even if 
integrity in the fullest sense does not—and in the contemporary world probably cannot—obtain, 
the concept would not be rendered irrelevant. For one could still specify significant degrees of 
integrity for conservation purposes. The question of degree would have to be judged along two 
axes. One axis is the extent of human influence on a given site; the second is the presence or 
absence of appropriate compositions and functions (as defined above). Obviously, any attempt 
to assign a degree of integrity is a judgment call and may be imprecise. If integrity were 
understood entirely in terms of the absence of human activity in a given place, then things 
might be easier. Once humans have modified a place, integrity would be by definition 
compromised. Although even if human impact were the sole criterion, we could still argue 
about how much integrity is compromised given the degree and/or kind of human impact. But 
because integrity is partly an end-state concept, one that refers to the presence of certain 
compositional and functional elements, then the fact of human impact is not decisive for 
determining when integrity obtains.  
 In light of these considerations, attributions of degrees of integrity are clearly subject to 
revision over time. Even in cases where human impacts have occurred, and were agreed by all 
to be very significant in degree and/or kind, nature in many places may still be able to “reclaim” 
the site for itself. Moreover, human restoration activities may assist nature in this reclamation. 
There is no contradiction here, given the way integrity has been defined.19 
 
1.2.2 Three Objections to Integrity 
 A number of philosophers, social critics, and scientists, have objected to integrity as a 
conservation concept. Some of these objections concern integrity as a concept, while others 
                                                
19 Even if one thought that integrity should be understood primarily, or even exclusively, in terms of the historical 
property of being unmodified by human activity, it is still plausible to think that human impacts could so to speak 
“wash out” from the site, given enough time. I borrow here a notion from Robert Elliot (1997: 93). I discuss 
Elliot’s view in detail in Chapter 2. 
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concern the practical implementation of integrity. In this section I will consider three objections 
in particular that have been made. The first two objections take aim at the concept of integrity. 
The first of these objects to the idealization of the absence of humans in nature that is implied 
by the concept of integrity. The second claims that the idea of integrity presupposes a notion of 
design and purpose in nature that assumes an outdated ecology, or perhaps one that is 
theologically inclined. The third objection is practical and focuses on the difficulty of 
determining an historical benchmark for when integrity obtains. All three objections have been 
articulated forcefully in the literature. Many seem to think that these objections are compelling, 
even decisive. This seems especially so among environmental philosophers today. For my part, I 
think all three objections miss their mark, and therefore fail to give us a reason to abandon 
integrity as a conservation concept.   
*          *          * 
 The first objection concerns the idealization of the absence of humans in nature that is 
implied by the concept of integrity. Critics like Ramachandra Guha and William Cronon have 
argued that accounts of environmental ethics that marginalize our modifications of nature in 
order to meet our needs and create culture are theoretically deficient.20 Such accounts, critics 
argue, threaten to turn nature into a museum piece, rather than a living totality of which we are 
a part.21  
 The first thing to note in response is that it’s not accurate to say humans are idealized as 
absent by the defender of integrity. This would only be true if integrity were defined as 
consisting solely in the absence of humans. But this is not how integrity was defined above. 
Further, the definition of integrity need not depend on excluding human activities as such, but 
only those activities that are at odds with the continued existence of the appropriate 
compositional and functional elements outlined above.  
 But this response doesn’t address a different construal of the objection about how 
humans fit into the ideal of integrity. There is no question that humans are allotted a very 
humble place in landscapes that exhibit integrity. Yet a growing human population has a moral 
claim to meet its basic needs from nature. This claim seems in tension with the aim of 
                                                
20 Guha and Cronon never quite put the objection in the way I do here. But I think my statement of the objection 
gives expression to the concerns articulated in Guha 1997a: 16-21, 1997b, 1997c, and Cronon 1996b. 
21 See Berry 1996: Ch. 2 (esp. 27-30) for related sentiments and critique.  
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respecting integrity. For example, it’s implausible to think that intensive agriculture could 
possibly be consistent with the maintenance of integrity.  
 I think two different issues need to be separated here. First, the claim that humans need 
to meet their needs from nature is not an objection to integrity per se, but an objection to the 
importance of integrity relative to other things that matter. No one, to my knowledge, defends 
the view that integrity can stand on its own either as a way of specifying a baseline for 
environmental ethics and policy, or as a way of specifying an overall goal for environmentalism. 
Integrity needs to be supplemented by appeal to other considerations, such as the aim of 
maintaining ecological health in areas where people live and work (a point I’ll discuss later). 
That said, integrity might be the right way to specify the baseline for some places, such as actual 
or potential wildlife preserves, wilderness areas, and the like.22 
 Secondly, integrity can be defended on human-centered grounds. If it is true, as James 
Karr and others have argued, that areas of integrity are necessary as part of an integrated view 
of healthy functioning landscapes, then to pit human needs against the preservation of integrity 
is misleading. The preservation of integrity may actually be a necessary element of a land use 
regime whose aim is precisely to meet human needs, now and in the future.23 The worry, of 
course, is that if the human population is or becomes too large, it won’t be practically feasible to 
maintain healthy functioning landscapes, let alone areas that have their integrity intact. It seems 
to me that the immediate problem we face here is unconstrained consumption by the global 
rich and a maldistribution of resources, not overpopulation per se. If we were serious about 
protecting nature, then shifting away from consumptive lifestyles, and aiming for a more 
socially just world, would be the obvious solution.24  
*          *          * 
 Let me turn to a second objection that has been made against integrity. This is the idea 
that integrity, understood as a property of natural systems, presupposes a notion of design and 
purpose in nature that assumes an outdated ecology—or perhaps a theologically inclined 
                                                
22 As argued for in Callicott 1995, Callicott and Mumford 1997, and Callicott et al. 1999.  
23 The reasoning is that the productivity and life-support properties of the environments we intensively use are 
directly or indirectly connected to the existence of landscapes that have their biological integrity intact. See Karr 
1996: 101. Though usually defending nonanthropocentrism, Westra (1995) could also be read as providing an 
anthropocentric defense of integrity similar to Karr’s. See also Freyfogle 2007: Ch. 1.  
24 See Chapter 4 for further discussion.  
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ecology. The philosopher Mark Sagoff has been most forceful in making this criticism.25 I want 
to consider two representative statements from Sagoff that give expression to his line of 
objection:  
(1) “To be sure, species are shaped by natural selection. Evolution accounts for 
their structural and functional properties. No such organizing force or principle, 
however, applies to the arrangement of plants and animals in communities or 
ecosystems. From this perspective, nature pursues no purpose, embodies no end, 
and develops in no direction. Unifying principles and concepts in ecology, such 
as ‘autocatalysis,’26 ‘homeostasis,’ ‘exergy,’27 and ‘integrity,’ may have theological 
but not biological significance.” (2000: 62)28  
(2) “Ecologists in this century—like theologians and poets in previous 
centuries—have argued that the diversity of living things results not from mere 
contingency or chaos but serves larger purposes, instantiates universal principles 
and ideas, follows law-like general principles, or expresses an intelligible order or 
plan.” (1995: 168)29  
Two claims are especially important here. The first is the claim that living systems do not have 
an innate tendency to develop toward some goal, such as homeostasis, integrity, climax states, 
or greater complexity and diversity. For Sagoff, the attribution of such tendencies to nature is a 
form of bogus teleological thinking. A second claim is that ecologists do not discern law-like 
principles that govern living systems. This fact, as I understand Sagoff, makes implausible any 
attribution of design or purpose to nature.   
 Several points can be made to defuse this line of objection. First, the question of 
whether or not ecologists discern law-like principles is separate from the question of whether or 
not nature aims at some goal, or serves a larger purpose. There doesn’t seem to be any 
                                                
25 See Sagoff 1995, 1997, 2000.  
26 An autocatalytic process is one that catalyzes itself in a positive feedback cycle (cf. Rees 2000: 144, discussing 
Diamond 1997). Robert Ulanowicz speaks of autocatalysis “as an agency that drives ecosystem development (the 
increase of organization)” (2000: 104). This idea is what Sagoff is targeting (although Sagoff doesn’t say exactly 
who his target is). “[W]hen autocatalysis acts against a background of indeterminate kinetics,” writes Ulanowicz, “it 
comes to exhibit properties that are decidedly nonmechanical in nature. Among other traits, autocatalysis is a 
source for what physicists call ‘symmetry-breaking’ that establishes the direction in which the system will develop” 
(ibid.; references omitted). 
27 “The exergy of an energy form or a substance is a measure of its usefulness or quality or potential to cause 
change” (Dincer and Rosen 2007: 36). 
28 “The difference between Linneaus and contemporary theorists, is that the latter have dropped references to a 
Creator but left everything else as it was; they continue to argue that nature exemplifies a purposive design—an 
equilibrium, homeostasis, or orderly strategy of development—that humans beings disrupt at their peril” (Sagoff 
1997: 939-40). 
29 Elsewhere, Sagoff writes: “The faith that the ecological is orderly—that it manifests an intelligible design to be 
captured by general mathematical models—is consistent with centuries of theological doctrine” (2000: 72). 
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contradiction in holding that ecological phenomena are law-like, while rejecting the idea that 
ecological systems “aim at” or tend toward some particular goal, such as homeostasis, or greater 
complexity and diversity. The relevant laws can simply govern what happens next without there 
being any “final” state to which things are heading.  
 That said, I think Sagoff is right to point out that ecology does not identify, or has yet to 
anyway, law-like general principles that can explain biological and ecological phenomena and 
predict with certainty the possible futures of these phenomena.30 This point has been made 
clearly by conservation biologist, E. O. Wilson. Wilson emphasizes that law-destroying 
idiosyncrasies are common in living systems. A consequence is that the future of such systems 
remains unpredictable.31 But it doesn’t follow from this that the contingency of living systems is 
so profound that there are no stability regimes, emergent patterns, or operative physical 
principles that constrain how nature functions in particular places. Just to give one example: 
food webs almost invariably exhibit a pyramidal structure due to available energy as it moves 
through the food chain.32  
 Let me turn to the idea that regarding nature as exhibiting design and purpose is akin to 
a theological commitment. It seems to me that Sagoff’s real target here, or at least a central part 
of it, is the belief in the idea that there is a way things are supposed to be in nature. Sagoff 
appears to view the belief that there is a way things are supposed to be as conceptually allied 
with the belief that nature aims at homeostasis, greater complexity, or some such goal. But, 
once again, these two beliefs need not occur together. For example, there is no contradiction 
between holding the belief that nature is radically contingent and chaotic while also holding the 
                                                
30 Do we assume that if there are law-like general principles that we can make predictions? An affirmative answer 
assumes we can understand such principles. But should we assume this? 
31 According to Wilson, any study of biological and ecological phenomena yields at best principles that can be 
written in the form of rules or statistical trends, but not in the form of laws as understood by physicists or chemists 
(1999: 163). This means, for example, that the future trajectories of ecosystems remain in important respects 
unpredictable. For Wilson, this is a consequence of the particularity of the species that compose any ecosystem 
(1999: 182). “Each species,” writes Wilson, “is an entity with a unique evolutionary history and set of genes, and so 
each species responds to the rest of the community in a special way” (ibid.). 
32 Or to take an example from Stephen Jay Gould, the physical principle of surfaces and volumes constrains the 
relations between size, shape, and surface area from the level of organisms to planets. Both points are made in 
Holland 2000: 49; see Gould 1977: Ch. 21 and 24. Also relevant is Ernest Partridge’s remarks on “the universal 
pattern that describes the relationship between producers, consumers, and decomposers,” and the way the 
genomes of individual organisms (e.g. wolves) are shaped by ecosystems, and how, in turn, individual organisms 
shape the ecosystems of which they are a part. A paradigm case is the cooperative symbioses between the bee and 
the blossom (2000: 86). Partridge concludes: “All this is described by rules and concepts of ecology that are 
falsifiable” (2000: 86). In this regard, it seems right to say, as Alan Holland does, that what the study of nature 
reveals “is not contingency merely, but contingency constrained” (2000: 49). 
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belief that whatever states of affairs have emerged from contingent and chaotic natural 
processes are just the way things are supposed to be. So Sagoff’s objection does not seem aimed 
at the idea that there is a way things are supposed to be, but rather at the idea that nature has a 
tendency toward homeostasis, complexity, or some such telos. But while we can distinguish two 
elements here, probably Sagoff wants to oppose both.   
 I think the most important point to make in response to Sagoff’s line of objection is 
this: our view of integrity should be consistent with what science is telling us about the way the 
world is. This requirement will rule out certain beliefs that some who are attracted to the 
concept of integrity may associate with it. This includes the belief that ecosystems aim at 
homeostasis, climax states, and so on. It also includes the belief that such goals—homeostasis, 
etc.—constitute the way things are supposed to be. Further, it includes any mistaken 
assumptions about the role of laws in complex ecosystems. My main contention is that what we 
have here is an argument against outdated or wrongheaded ideas being incorporated into a 
conception of integrity. But it is not an argument against integrity per se; at least not a good one.  
*          *          * 
 The two objections considered above are objections to integrity as a concept. The third 
objection is different. This objection arises when we are considering implementing integrity, for 
example, when we aim to restore nature to a state of integrity. The problem here is one of 
defining an historical benchmark for when integrity obtains in nature. It’s easy to see how the 
problem is generated. Nature is dynamic, therefore any landscape we might consider has 
undergone change. The change may be considerable, particularly when we take an extended 
temporal view. So what exactly is the benchmark condition we’re supposed to be using to 
define when integrity obtains?33  
 There are various implausible responses that might be made here, such as appealing to 
hypothetical integrity, but I want to explore a response that I think holds some promise. The 
strategy is to distinguish between different types of human impact on nature, and thereby 
attempt to establish an historical benchmark in that way. Thus, we might distinguish between 
integrity compatible and integrity compromising impacts. The integrity compatible criterion 
would be satisfied if we imagined humans inhabiting and using landscapes in such a way that 
                                                
33 Different writers touch on the problem of defining the benchmark. See, for example, Higgs 1997: 339, 343, 345 
(though Higgs is writing on the issue of ecological restoration, not integrity per se); Callicott et al. 1999: 26; Sagoff 
2000: 74; and O’Neill et al. 2008: 158 (discussing the idea of a “natural state,” not integrity per se; but there are 
similar issues at stake in each case). 
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the elements noted above—the appropriate compositions and functions—can continue to 
develop and evolve in their own way. In contrast, integrity compromising impacts refer to those 
impacts whose character and scale are destructive of the relevant elements. Clearly, this 
distinction requires that we invoke end-state criteria in our understanding of integrity. 
Employing this distinction, we could say that integrity compromising activities begin in earnest 
with industrialization. This supports the view that nature in the pre-industrial era provides an 
historical benchmark for judging integrity.34  
 How plausible is this view? One initial stumbling block is that identifying integrity 
compromising impacts with industrialization overlooks the fact that prior to industrialization 
humans have had very significant impacts on their environments. Just to give one example, 
there was a mass extinction of North American mammals 11,000-12,000 years ago by Siberian 
big-game hunters.35 To this, however, one could reply that such human-caused extinction events 
were relatively rare and geographically isolated, compared to the more pervasive compromising 
of integrity brought about by industrialization and its various social forms. Acknowledging this 
does not mean pre-industrial humans are assimilated into the operations of nature and viewed 
like wildlife.36 Rather, it means acknowledging that a range of human activities may be 
consistent with integrity, and other may not.37 Interacting with nature in ways that intentionally 
mimic natural processes that we have disrupted can be understood as compatible with integrity. 
Hunting as a way of mimicking predation of deer by wolves is an example. Another is 
deliberately setting forest fires in order to mimic naturally occurring fires that contribute to the 
restoration of the biota in question. If these considerations are plausible, then there is no 
inherent incompatibility between landscapes having integrity and humans using or interfering 
with those landscapes.  
 Another reason that favors a pre-industrial era benchmark is that this sidesteps the 
indeterminacy problem that would be generated by appeal to a benchmark far back in the 
                                                
34 Although he’s not explicit about this, I think this is Karr’s view. Karr writes of “the pristine environments of the 
pre-industrial era,” implying that it is plausible to appeal to the pre-industrial era as the benchmark for 
environments that have their integrity intact (1996: 101; cf. 2000: 212). 
35 Thirty-one genera of large mammals are thought to have been rendered extinct (Callicott et al. 1999: 26). See also 
Wilson 1999: 249.  
36 As, for example, Callicott contends (1995: 362).  
37 I would go further and say that a defender of integrity could endorse the apparently paradoxical view that some 
of nature’s own events can be integrity compromising. I have in mind meteor strikes that wipe out whole species or 
ecosystems. 
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recesses of natural or human history. The indeterminacy problem is generated by understanding 
integrity as some specified initial condition (or conditions), then trying to sort out what nature 
would be like on a particular site had it not been modified by human activity. This generates 
indeterminacy because of the myriad contingent factors that would inevitably have a hand in 
what nature would be like now. The problem here can be avoided by appealing to a pre-
industrial benchmark, since we actually have enclaves of pre-industrial nature left. In cases 
where this is not so, one might lean more heavily on the end-state criteria noted above when 
considering how to facilitate the return of integrity. Here the idea of integrity as a property that 
admits of degrees might be especially useful to keep in mind.  
 Further support for the pre-industrial benchmark comes from the fact that after the 18th 
century the character of the natural world began to be altered in ways that set in motion the 
widespread destruction of native species populations, their habitat, and the various ecological 
relationships and functions instantiated by species interactions and natural processes. To be 
sure, the natural world immediately prior to industrialization differs, perhaps substantially, in 
composition, perhaps also in function, from the natural world 10,000 or 50,000 years ago. But 
it’s implausible to take as a standard for integrity nature 10,000 or 50,000 years ago.  
 Admittedly, there is a certain arbitrariness in setting the benchmark at nature in the pre-
industrial era. I don’t think this can be avoided. But for the reasons given, setting the 
benchmark at pre-industrial nature is neither totally impractical, nor otherwise ill-advised. No 
assumption is being made here that one is identifying an “original” state of nature. There 
doesn’t seem to be any plausible way to define such a state of nature. But the integrity theorist 
doesn’t need to. What is needed is an historical benchmark that exhibits the relevant end-state 
elements, and that exhibits a sufficient degree of freedom from human modification, so as to 
provide a sense, albeit imperfect, of how nature responds in its own way.   
 
1.2.3 An Initial Reason to Care about Integrity 
 For the integrity theorist, there is one clear sense in which nature is taken as a standard. 
The reason is a bluntly evolutionary one: “The complex biological systems that evolved at a 
site,” writes James Karr, “have already demonstrated their ability to persist in, even modify, the 
region’s physical and chemical environment. Their very presence means that they are resilient to 
the normal variation in that environment” (1996: 101). It follows that a basic reason to care 
about integrity is that landscapes with their integrity intact provide paradigms for how nature 
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functions “successfully,” i.e. resiliently, in a given place. The point here is an epistemological 
one: we need areas of integrity so that we can assess the ecological functioning of areas we use 
and inhabit.38 If this is plausible, then it is important to preserve a range of different ecosystem 
or landscape types that have integrity since nature is not everywhere the same. I will consider a 
second reason to care about integrity later. But before we can appreciate the second reason, I 
first need to introduce the concept of ecological health. 
 
1.2.4 The Concept of Ecological Health 
 The first important defender of the concept of ecological health was the conservation 
great, Aldo Leopold.39 “Health,” wrote Leopold, “is the capacity of the land for self-renewal” 
(1949: 22140). Leopold employed an inclusive sense of “land” (or the “land community”): this 
refers to the collection of soils, rocks, waters, plants, animals, microorganisms, and sustaining 
processes.41 In contemporary parlance, the land’s capacity for self-renewal is often glossed in 
terms of “resilience.”42 The fundamental idea is one of counteractive capacity, that is, the 
capacity of natural systems to withstand stress and perturbation (whether human-caused or 
not). This capacity can be identified and measured by considering the speed and completeness 
of a given landscape’s recovery to a state of normal functioning after disturbance (e.g. after a 
                                                
38 See Karr 2000: 215; also Leopold 1941: 288-9.  
39 Leopold defended what he called “land health.” I view this as synonymous with “ecosystem health” or 
“ecological health” (the latter two being more common expressions among contemporary writers). 
40 See also 1949: 194-6, 214. 
41 See Leopold 1949: 204; Freyfogle 2007: 1. It may be that the notion of the “land,” or the “land community,” is a 
more comprehensive notion than that of an ecosystem. It is common to highlight the challenge of specifying the 
boundary conditions of ecosystems: the inner ear is an ecosystem, as is a small pond in a rotting tree trunk; 
scientists also speak of the Great Lakes as an ecosystem, or the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem, or even the Earth 
as an integrated ecosystem. There are empirical and conceptual questions about the relation of these different 
ecosystems to one another. It seems the Leopoldian notion of “the land” embodies a more comprehensive 
perspective, which may sidestep some of the difficulties associated with the appeal to “ecosystems.” That said, the 
common meaning of “ecosystem” presupposes a nontrivial scale of analysis. It seems to me that ecosystems of a 
nontrivial size can be understood as meaning more or less what Leopold understood by “the land.” 
42 See Holling 1996; also Rapport 1995 and 2007. Holling (1996) discusses two different conceptions of 
resilience—“engineering resilience” and “ecological resilience.” “Engineering resilience,” as Holling defines this, 
“concentrates on stability near an equilibrium steady state, where resistance to disturbance and speed of return to 
the equilibrium are used to measure the property [citations omitted]” (1996: 33). “Ecological resilience,” on the 
other hand, “emphasizes conditions far from any equilibrium steady state, where instabilities can flip a system into 
another regime of behavior—that is, to another stability domain [citation omitted]. In this case the measurement of 
resilience is the magnitude of disturbance that can be absorbed before the system changes its structure by changing 
the variables and processes that control behavior” (ibid.). Holling defends the latter view as the best way to 
understand resilience. These two characterizations raise questions of their own. It is sufficient for my purposes that 
Holling’s preferred notion—ecological resilience—is essentially compatible with how I understand ecological 
health. 
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fire, flood, wind storm, etc.).43 As such, ecological health partly consists in nature retaining its 
resilience, understood as its counteractive capacity, or capacity for self-renewal, over time.  
 The other crucial element of ecological health—the “positive” element, if you will—
refers to the capacity of natural systems to function “well” or “normally” (these two can be 
treated synonymously here). Scientists specify different spatial scales at which normal ecological 
functioning occurs—that of ecosystems, landscapes, and the biosphere as a whole.44 (For 
convenience, I will speak of “natural systems” when I want to speak generally of nature at these 
different scales.) In addition to the maintenance of counteractive capacity (resilience), perhaps 
the clearest indication of the presence of normal ecological functioning is the continued 
provision over time of various ecosystem services (efficient cycling of nutrients, waste 
absorption, maintenance of soil fertility, production of biomass, etc.). I should add that in 
speaking of the capacity for normal functioning I am not presupposing that there is one 
equilibrial (or homeostatic, stable, balanced) state that natural systems, if left alone, will attain. 
In this respect, I follow the view of most contemporary scientists who reject the idea that 
natural systems can be said to achieve or manifest one equilibrial state if left to themselves.45 
Rather, for any given natural ecosystem we might consider, this system may attain a number of 
different, yet still stable and productive, states that exhibit the property of “normal ecological 
functioning” or “well-functioning.” (Later I will elaborate on some complexities that 
accompany the specification of “normal ecological functioning.”) 
                                                
43 See, in particular, Rapport 1995: 291. I leave aside here further complexities relating to the resilience of different 
ecosystems under different types of disturbance. 
44 There are a number of complexities regarding the appropriate scale at which we should understand the property 
of ecological health. This is a complicated issue that requires more elaboration than I will give here.  
45 Here are three brief representative statements from three important contemporary scientists—Michael Soulé, 
Daniel Botkin, and C. S. Holling. (1) “Living nature [i.e. the native species of plants and animals in their native 
settings] is not equilibrial—at least not on a scale that is relevant to the persistence of species. Nor do homeostatic 
systems such as Gaia buffer life on a relevant spatiotemporal scale—that of plant and animal species in real 
ecosystems—particularly when confronted with a species such as Homo sapiens. In a sense, the science of ecology 
has been hoist on its own petard by maintaining, as many did during the middle of this century, that natural 
communities tend toward equilibrium. Current ecological thinking argues that nature at the level of local biotic 
assemblages has never been homeostatic” (Soulé 1995: 143). (2) “Unfortunately, the Balance of Nature myth is not 
true. During the past 30 years, this has been demonstrated as part of the revolution in environmental sciences. One 
of the central findings of this scientific revolution is that Nature is characterized by change, not constancy. The 
environment has always changed, and species have adapted to those changes. If we are to conserve and manage 
our living resources, then we must understand the naturalness of changes, and this requires that we move away 
from the ancient and pervading myth of the Balance of Nature” (Botkin 1996: 27). (3) “Ecosystems do not have 
single equilibria with functions controlled to remain near them. Rather, destabilizing forces far from equilibria, 
multiple equilibria, and disappearance of equilibria define functionally different states, and movement between 
states maintains structure and diversity” (Holling 1996: 32). 
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 To summarize, when I speak of ecological health, I intend this to refer to two basic 
properties of natural systems of nontrivial size: (1) the counteractive capacity (resilience) of 
natural systems to withstand stress or change, whether human-caused or not; and (2) the 
capacity of natural systems to function normally over the long term, hence providing a variety 
of ecosystem (or ecological) services.46 Empirically, (2) depends on (1)47; yet (2) is not reducible 
to (1). Therefore we should keep both properties in mind whenever we speak of ecological 
health. The fact that ecosystems can collapse—i.e. can undergo cascading declines in species 
diversity, with negative implications for ecological functioning and a resultant loss or 
impairment of various ecosystem services—underscores the fundamental importance of 
ecological health as a basic concept for environmental ethics.48   
 
1.2.5 A Second Reason to Care about Integrity 
 Aldo Leopold argued that we should aim to maintain land (or ecological) health in 
human-occupied areas. Several contemporary scholars also defend health as the appropriate 
                                                
46 Rapport (2007) distinguishes three main elements of healthy ecosystems, rather than only two: resilience 
(counteractive capacity), organization, and vitality. In Rapport’s usage, “organization” refers to the interactions 
between biota and their environment, such as the various specialized interactions that link species together (e.g. 
predatory-prey relationships, symbioses, parasitism) (2007: 81). “Vitality” is measured in terms of the activity, 
metabolism or primary productivity of ecosystems (ibid.). Because it seems to me common in the scientific 
literature to include various species interactions (such as dynamic predator-prey relations), as well as processes like 
primary production, as constitutive of normal ecological functioning, I think it is justified to speak of ecological 
functioning (and the accompanying provision of ecosystem services) as constituting one core component of 
ecological health. But we should keep in mind that the ecosystem “services,” and the various processes that 
undergird them, are diverse and heterogeneous. 
47 On the link between resilience and the provision of ecosystem services, Holling writes: “There are different 
stability domains in nature, and variation in critical variables tests the limits of those domains. Thus, a near-
equilibrium focus seems myopic and attention shifts to determining the constructive role of instability in 
maintaining diversity and persistence and to designs of management that maintain ecosystem function in the face 
of unexpected disturbances. Such designs would maintain or expand ecological resilience. It is those ecosystem 
functions and ecological resilience that provide the ecological ‘services’ that invisibly provide the foundations for 
sustaining economic activity” (1996: 38).   
48 Conservation biologist, E. O. Wilson, characterizes ecosystem collapse as the sapping of the resiliency of 
ecosystems, thus leading to a loss of ecosystem functions (e.g. loss of the efficiency of food webs and nutrient 
flows, etc.). Here is Wilson in his own words: “Most communities of organisms are held together by redundancies 
in the system. In many cases two or more ecologically similar species live in the same area, and any one can fill the 
niches of others extinguished, more or less. But inevitably the resiliency would be sapped, efficiency of the food 
webs would drop, nutrient flow would decline, and eventually one of the elements deleted would prove to be a 
keystone species. Its extinction would bring down other species with it, possibly so extensively as to alter the 
physical structure of the habitat itself. Because ecology is still a primitive science, no one is sure of the identity of 
most keystone species” (1999: 309). For general discussion, see Wilson 1999: Ch. 13, esp. 308-310. Wilson’s 
discussion on 181-2 is also instructive regarding the great difficulties of predicting the course of ecosystems, and 
hence predicting ecosystem collapse, given the tremendous complexity of ecosystems. 
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normative baseline for those areas in which we live and work.49 I think Leopold and his 
contemporary defenders are right about this. And for the record, we are currently not 
maintaining ecological health in most human-dominated areas, and to do so would require some 
serious changes in the status quo.  
 Earlier I suggested that one reason to care about integrity was epistemological: areas 
with their integrity (or something like it) intact provide a paradigm of what successfully 
functioning nature looks like. This point was clearly recognized by Leopold. In his 1941 essay, 
“Wilderness as a land laboratory,” Leopold writes:  
A science of land health needs, first of all, a base-datum of normality, a picture of 
how healthy land maintains itself as an organism. We have two available norms. 
One is found where land physiology remains normal despite centuries of human 
occupation […] The other and most perfect norm is wilderness. Paleontology 
offers abundant evidence that wilderness maintained itself for immensely long 
periods; that its component species were rarely lost, neither did they get out of 
hand; that weather and water built soil as fast or faster than it was carried away. 
Wilderness, then, assumes unexpected importance as a land-laboratory. (1941: 
288-9)50 
Wilderness, in Leopold’s usage, is the conceptual predecessor of the contemporary concept of 
integrity. Leopold is therefore clearly arguing that wilderness/integrity is very important even if 
our focus is on maintaining land health.  
 Here I want to suggest a second reason to care about integrity, one that is also 
connected to health. Landscapes with their integrity intact are thought to have causally effective 
properties that human dominated systems lack, or might lack.51 The idea is that integrity areas 
are a storehouse of resources that health areas might need in order to be replenished, and kept 
vital over time. In this respect, integrity is instrumentally important to health.52  
 It’s common to defend ecological health as instrumentally important to human well-
being. But this is not a necessary normative commitment. Health can be defended for non-
instrumental reasons. So if one is arguing that integrity is instrumentally important to health, 
                                                
49 See, e.g., Callicott 1995; Callicott and Mumford 1997; Callicott et al. 1999; and Freyfogle 2006: 20-23, 180-2. 
50 See also Callicott et al. 1999: 30. 
51 See Holland 2000: 51. Karr also suggests an argument along these lines when he writes: “Human society depends 
on both elements and processes of living systems” (2000: 212). The context of this remarks makes clear that “living 
systems” refer to those that have integrity. See also Karr 1996: 101. 
52 Indeed, one of the rationales Leopold gave for preserving large wilderness areas is that, in the event that 
civilization collapses, some remnant people will have a place to go where they can renew the search for a durable 
scale of values. I’m grateful to Eric Freyfogle for bringing this point to my attention. 
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this is not the same as arguing that integrity is instrumentally important for human well-being. 
That would only be the case if health were viewed in a purely instrumental way. The important 
point here is that even if one thought preserving ecological health was the right answer to the 
question of what nature we should care about—and many people do think this—maintaining 
integrity would still be important because it is instrumentally important to health.53   
 
1.2.6 Difficulties for the Defense of Health 
 The functional focus of ecological health appears to sidestep the difficulties of 
establishing an historical benchmark for how to understand biological integrity. This might be 
regarded as a conceptual and practical advantage in favor of ecological health as a conservation 
norm. But things are not quite so easy for the defender of health. The appeal to a criterion of 
normal (ecological) functioning faces challenges not unlike those faced by the integrity 
theorist.54 Is the benchmark for normal functioning set by a particular state of functioning that 
obtained in the past? If so, then this view faces similar problems to those faced by the integrity 
theorist. For ecological processes and functions change over time (cf. Callicott et al. 1999: 29). 
Therefore we would need to know what the correct benchmark condition is for judging when 
the relevant sort of ecological functioning obtains, or is lacking. And as we just saw, prominent 
defenders of health, such as Aldo Leopold, suggest the importance of wilderness as a criterion 
for judging normal functioning. This appears to exacerbate the problem at hand. For this 
suggests that ecological functioning might only be a coherent notion judged relative to areas of 
the world (of nontrivial size) in which integrity is intact (again, assuming here that what Leopold 
means by wilderness is more or less what contemporary theorists mean by integrity).55 But if 
this is so, then we meet some of the practical difficulties that defenders of integrity face. 
 Let me suggest the shape of a reply to this challenge facing the defender of health. First, 
a concession: it is true that the natural history of a given landscape is relevant to determining 
what ecological health would consist in for that landscape. There is no getting around this. 
However, there is an important difference in how history is availed by the defender of 
                                                
53 In Chapter 4, I will argue for something stronger than this. 
54 I’m referring to the third objection to integrity considered above. 
55 Remarking on the significance of counteractive capacity (resilience), Rapport notes that “[o]ne may hypothesize 
[…] that stressed ecosystems should exhibit slower and less complete recovery compared with reference systems 
which are relatively unstressed [citation omitted]” (1995: 291). Are the relevant reference systems areas in which 
biological integrity is more or less intact? If so, this reiterates the importance of biological integrity even if one’s 
primary interest is to defend ecological health as a conservation norm. 
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ecological health, compared to the way history figures for the integrity theorist. The functional 
orientation of ecological health is essentially hierarchical and top-down. It starts from solar 
energy and considers how this drives various ecological processes. The focus on processes is 
importantly different from the focus on particular species and biotic communities—i.e. native 
species in their native settings. The focus on native species and native biotic communities is the 
distinctive focus of advocates of integrity. Viewed historically, however, biotic communities and 
their component species can both change considerably. Most obviously, all species are the 
product of historical-evolutionary processes, and presumably a great many of the species that 
have existed are now extinct.56 History, change, and the flux of species can bedevil the integrity 
theorist.  
 In contrast to the integrity theorist’s focus on native biotic assemblages and their 
component species, the appeal to ecological health focuses attention on the ecological processes 
and functions—energy capture, primary production, soil production, nutrient cycling, 
modulation of water flows, and so on. These processes and functions that underlie particular 
biotic communities and their constituent species are more stable and enduring compared to the 
particular biotic communities and species.57 The history appealed to by the health theorist is 
therefore that of the relatively enduring ecological processes and functions, not that of the more 
ephemeral biotic communities and their constituent species. Normal ecological functioning, 
then, consists in the unimpeded activity of the “deep” processes that sustain the functioning of 
natural systems over the long term.  
                                                
56 Estimates vary and are based on grossly incomplete data. The highest estimate is 99.9%, given by Roberts and 
Newman. “Of all the species that have existed since life first appeared here several billion years ago, only about one 
in a thousand still exists today. All the rest became extinct, typically within about ten million years of their first 
appearance” (1996: 39). Something to keep in mind here is that estimates of the number of currently existing 
species vary from 3.6 million to 100 million or more (see Wilson 2002: 14). Scientists have discovered and classified 
between 1.5 and 1.8 million (ibid.). If we are unable to accurately determine the number of species living today, one 
might question how likely we are to be right about the number of species that have gone extinct. 
57 “Ecosystem processes and functions certainly change over time—for example, a lake undergoes nutrient-cycle 
changes as it passes from an oligotrophic to a eutrophic state or a forest goes through bioenergetic phase changes 
from early succession to old growth—but they do not typically change as rapidly as species populations fluctuate in 
their associated biotic communities. Primary production, trophic structure, nutrient retention, hydrology, and rates 
of erosion (in terrestrial ecosystems) are more constant in normally functioning ecosystems than are the elements 
(species populations) in natural biotic communities” (Callicott et al. 1999: 29; citations omitted). For further 
discussion, see Callicott 1995: 349-51, and Soulé 1996: 59-60.  
 Callicott (1995) highlights a telling example (from Allen and Hoekstra), in which a blight in the 
southeastern U.S. removed the American chestnut as a critical component of the eastern deciduous biome. Despite 
such a significant change in community composition, Allen and Hoekstra note that the ecosystem function in those 
same places—i.e. primary production and energy capture—was not altered, even at the height of the epidemic 
(1992: 92). This illustrates how ecological functions can be relatively stable and enduring, despite significant 
fluctuations in composition or structure. 
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 Although I believe this response does mitigate the problem of how to understand 
normal functioning, there is a different problem faced by the defender of health. According to 
functional criteria, very different landscapes may exemplify the property of health. This means 
that different landscape types may exhibit qualitatively different “stable states,” that is, states of 
nature that are self-maintaining and self-perpetuating.58 A given landscape may turn (“flip”) 
from one ecosystem type manifesting health to another under pressure from climate change or 
other disturbances (Callicott et al. 1999: 30). For example, mixed-grass-and-tree savannas 
became shrub-dominated semideserts in the southwestern United States due to fire suppression 
and livestock grazing (ibid.). One might think this sort of change constitutes a clear case of 
biotic impoverishment, given the loss of the distinctive character of the landscape in question. 
However, from the standpoint of ecological health, both states—the savanna and the 
semidesert—are ecologically stable, and hence healthy.  
 The fact that this can be so may indicate a shortcoming of the appeal to health: it is 
insensitive to certain types of environmental change, which we might have reason to regard as 
change from a better to a worse state. While it is undoubtedly true that two different 
ecologically healthy landscapes may not be equally favorable to our ends, or to those of other 
valued wildlife, this fact need not be a problem for the health theorist. What this shows is 
merely that there is no specifically scientific reason to seek rehabilitation of an environment that 
has changed from one healthy state to another. But there may be other reasons, say, economic 
or aesthetic or ethical reasons, to prefer one healthy ecosystem type over another. But in such 
cases the criterion of ecological health still provides a meaningful ecological constraint and goal 
for how we should be using landscapes, or, as appropriate, rehabilitating degraded landscapes. 
In this regard, ecological health refers to a scientifically grounded concept that aims to describe 
certain objective requirements or parameters for the resilience and ongoing functioning of 
natural systems at different scales.59  
                                                
58 “A complication arises owing to the fact that for many ecosystems there exist alternative states which may be 
self-perpetuating. Good examples may be found in the history of the Laurentian Lower Great Lakes. In various 
periods these lakes have sustained a fishery dominated by large benthics, and in other periods these lakes have been 
dominated by small pelagics. Presently there is a fish community delicately balanced among introduced species: 
salmon (Oncorhynchus spp.), alewife (Alosa pseudoharengus) and smelt (Osmerus mordax). The present state appears self-
perpetuating” (Rapport 1995: 297, citations omitted). 
59 “Ecosystem health is partly a matter of social values and partly a matter of the requirements for persistence or 
resilience of ecosystems” (Rapport 1995: 13). See also the discussion in Callicott 1995: 353.  
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 However, this reply can motivate the objection, which might be made by defenders of 
integrity, that the focus on ecological health is too accommodating, and as such, susceptible to 
manipulation by the current power structure (which is—let’s face it—basically anti-
environmental protection). For example, imagine someone arguing that there would be no need 
to mitigate climate change if it were the case that climate change would only transform one 
ecologically healthy ecosystem type (which we can assume for the sake of argument) into 
another, perhaps radically different yet still ecologically healthy, ecosystem type. In reply, the 
health theorist can say that even if this were true, there would likely be other reasons, not 
specifically ecological in character, to mitigate climate change. For example, if a given 
community depended on a certain ecosystem type, and would be harmed were this ecosystem 
type to shift to a different, though still ecologically healthy, ecosystem type, then this would be a 
reason to mitigate climate change. Needless to say, it is empirically dubious to suppose that 
climate change would uniformly have the benign effect of merely transforming one type of 
ecologically healthy landscape into a different type. 
 The health theorist’s response to the exotic versus native species debate might be 
another source of concern regarding ecological health as a conservation norm. From the 
standpoint of ecological health, one need not be preoccupied with clarifying which species are 
(or were) “natives,” and which “exotics.” The important question is whether a given species 
contributes, or can be expected to contribute, to the healthy functioning of the ecosystem or 
landscape in question. It is widely regarded that so-called exotics may do this just as well as 
natives.60 However, it is precisely this fact that might make integrity theorists suspicious of 
advocates of ecological health. After all, we’re a clever species; if we found a way to engineer a 
functional substitute for a given species or natural process, there seems to be no in principle 
reason for the ecological health theorist (i.e. someone who thinks that health is the only goal) to 
object to our making the substitution.   
 We don’t have to imagine fantastic high-tech substitutes—say, the deployment of robot 
keystone species or a “biosphere 2.1”61—to see the contrast of views here. Consider two cases. 
                                                
60 Though they may also not do this just as well—a point anticipated by Leopold. In summarizing his sketch of land 
as an energy circuit in A Sand County Almanac, Leopold remarks: “the native plants and animals kept the energy 
circuit open; others may or may not” (1949: 218).   
61 “2.1” given the abysmal failure of the real-life, two year experiment called “Biosphere 2,” which cost $200 
million to create, and had a multimillion dollar operating budget. For summary discussion of the project, see 
Cohen and Tilman 1996.  
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The first, the case of the Brent Spar, suggests how a functional understanding of nature could 
be deployed in a way that might yield unsavory, but not unecological, results. Alan Holland 
describes the case:  
Shell (U.K.) [proposed] to sink the Brent Spar oil platform into the North Sea. A 
major problem with the proposal was the amount of metals contained in the 
tanks and ballast. In an article published in Nature (1995), Nisbet and Fowler 
observe that metals abound naturally on the ocean floor, especially around 
midocean-ridge hydrothermal systems. Accordingly, they argue that the metals of 
the Brent Spar “would not be out of the ordinary, and indeed might be beneficial 
as a mimic of vent activity.” They claim as a result that “the addition of extra 
dumped metals would probably act as a nutrient to the local ecosystem.” (2000: 
53)  
The language of Nisbet and Fowler is speculative and measured. But suppose it is true, as a 
matter of empirical fact, that the dumped metals would act as a nutrient to the local ecosystem. 
Add to this the (perhaps empirically questionable) assumption that there would be no other 
serious negative side effects of sinking the Brent Spar in the ocean.62 It looks like advocates of 
ecological health would have no reason to resist this proposal. In fact, it seems they have a 
positive reason to support it. Not so for the integrity theorist. For it’s hard to see how sinking a 
spent oil rig out in the ocean would be consistent with the idea of respecting nature’s integrity, 
as defined earlier. The difference of view here reflects a difference of underlying commitment 
about what “nature” we are supposed to be protecting (or restoring) as a matter of 
environmental concern.  
 Consider a second case, a hypothetical (and, admittedly, polemical) one presented by 
Michael Soulé: 
Assume that our job is to preserve a forest in Canada or the northern United 
States. There are two extreme approaches. We could try to maintain all of the 
native species—including Gray Wolves, Grizzly Bears, American (Pine) Martens, 
all the native fish, amphibians, molluscs, insects, meadow perennials, the entire 
range of tree species, and habitat for all the Neotropical migrant songbirds. 
Alternatively, we could follow the “process” directive. The latter is much easier. 
We could replace the native plants with an insect-resistant strain of Scots Pine; 
we could substitute alien annual grasses and thistles for the native meadow 
perennials. Instead of native fish, we could have Brown Trout and carp. Molluscs 
would not be essential. Feral dogs and ravens would do the job of native 
carnivores and raptors. In other words, with a short list of species, the forest 
would still produce wood and oxygen, the streams would still produce 
                                                
62 Hypothetical cases notwithstanding, the city of New York has been sinking its obsolete subway cars for years out 
in the Atlantic. 
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entertainment for fisherfolks, carrion would still be recycled, and nutrients would 
still circulate from the trees to the soil and back again, as they do in most of the 
plantation forests of Germany and Scandinavia. In summary, it is technically 
possible to maintain ecological processes, including a high level of economically 
beneficial productivity, by replacing the hundreds of native plants, invertebrates 
with about 15 or 20 introduced, weedy species. Now, I’m sure this is not what 
most ecosystem ecologists want, but this is what many appear to be saying. The 
message of ecological simplification by substitution is music to the ears of strip 
miners, strip loggers, strip grazers and others who see native species, particularly 
endangered ones, as impediments to profit. WARNING! Be suspicious of 
“ecologists” who are pitching ecological services (for people) and who speak of 
“redundant” species or “hyperdiversity.” Their idea of ecological integrity may be 
a lot different from yours. (1996: 60)   
A few points merit comment. As is clear in the final sentence, Soulé is defending integrity 
against a functionalist view like ecological health (though ecological health is not explicitly 
mentioned here or in the article). Moreover, Soulé appears to be wary, specifically, of an 
anthropocentric defense of a functionalist view of environmental preservation. This is indicated 
by the call for readers to be suspicious of “ecological services (for people)” as the selling point 
for preservation efforts. Worries about anthropocentrism are also evident in the account of the 
various amenities that a functionally intact, though not native, ecosystem would provide. 
However, this particular strand of the argument is not decisive, for defenders of ecological 
health need not be narrowly focused on ecosystem services which are beneficial only to us. The 
conventional view among advocates of ecological health is that the preservation of ecosystem 
services is beneficial both for us and for other species. Or more to the point: we can’t neatly 
separate what is ecologically beneficial to human beings from what is beneficial to other species. 
This is probably one of the reasons the appeal to ecosystem services has achieved such 
prominence in the contemporary conservation literature: it can satisfy anthropocentrists and (at 
least some) nonanthropocentrists at the same time.   
 The more serious question posed by Soulé is whether a focus on ecological health might 
support, in practice, ecological simplification (or at least a move in this direction). The reason 
for this (as already touched on in my remarks regarding the Brent Spar case) is that advocates of 
ecological health have no in principle objection to various substitutions of non-native species 
(what Soulé refers to as “weedy species”) for natives. However, there may be strong prudential 
and precautionary reasons for resisting substitution even in cases that might seem to favor 
substitution under the banner of promoting ecological health. Moreover, defenders of health 
may be just as concerned about avoiding ecological simplification as any defender of integrity. 
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 What is clear, however, is the ecological health theorist generally employs a more 
flexible, yet still ecological, criterion when assessing appropriate ways of using nature. This is 
clearest I think in the differing attitudes, held by integrity and health theorists respectively, 
toward invasive or exotic species. For the integrity theorist, the relevant question is: “Is a given 
species a member of the historical biotic community for the area in question?” If the answer is 
no, then one has at least a prima facie reason to try to remove the exotic species for the sake of 
restoring biological integrity. However, earlier I suggested that the integrity theorist can employ 
a looser, more context-dependent, sense of “native” and “exotic” in order to address difficulties 
that would arise for any dogmatic use of the native/exotic distinction. This would seem 
especially necessary since so-called exotic species are pervasive in our not-pristine world. 
Nonetheless, it does seem fair to say that the imperative of restoring biological integrity would 
be demanding as a conservation goal, especially in many parts of the world. In this regard, Soulé 
is certainly right when he notes that a process-based conservation directive—such as that 
defended by health theorists—“is much easier” than one based on preserving native species in 
their native settings. This raises a question of whether the worldview of those who defend 
integrity is too demanding for us to follow. There is no question that maintaining or restoring 
integrity would be demanding. But if it is found to be an ethically appealing ideal, then the 
demands might be worth the trouble. (I discuss this further in Chapter 4, where I consider 
integrity as part of a rich conception of sustainability that has, to my mind, much to recommend 
it.) 
 The advocate of ecological health can sidestep some of the demands here. For the 
defender of health, the only relevant question is whether exotics can functionally replace native 
species. In most cases, though probably not all, the answer is yes. Further, the health theorist 
can avoid what might be an untoward consequence of focusing on the preservation or 
restoration of native species in their native settings. Philosopher Dale Jamieson states the issue 
in a provocative way: 
[I]t is not implausible to suppose that we may come to see our preference for 
isolated, indigenous ecosystems as anachronistic; and instead come to favour 
ecosystems that are more cosmopolitan, in much the same way in which many 
people now prefer multicultural experiences to those which are provincial. A 
celebration of alien plants and surprising biological juxtapositions may be more 
in tune with the post-modern world than attempts to protect native species. 
Indeed, some social constructionists may even see the struggle between native 
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and exotic species as more or less the same conflict as that between world culture 
and “ethnic cleansing.” (1995: 221)63 
Jamieson’s remarks here might be convincing to some people, and it’s worth noting that the 
health theorist would have a much easier time affirming “cosmopolitan ecosystems” compared 
to the integrity theorist. This point might be especially relevant when we consider the politics of 
conservation concepts. If defenders of health can avoid certain perils that are faced by 
defenders of integrity, then this might be a reason to appeal to health as a norm when pushing 
an environmental agenda. Personally, I don’t see why this consideration would count decisively 
in favor of health. But it might indicate a strategic advantage of appealing to health, rather than 
integrity, in certain contexts.   
 One last issue merits mention here. In contrast to advocates of integrity, defenders of 
ecological health can point to a positive and far less demanding vision of what it would mean 
for humans to live as a part of, and in harmony with, nature. For this to be the case, no appeal 
needs to be made to minimal human impact (which is an aspect of the concept of integrity). 
Landscapes may reflect profound transformations due to human use and occupation, while still 
exhibiting the property of ecological health. What is distinctive about setting the baseline for 
acceptable uses of nature at maintaining health is that this focuses our attention on the way in 
which human culture and economy are embedded within a more enduring “economy of 
nature.” The basic challenge is thus “to adapt human economies to ecological exigencies, thus 
achieving a mutually sustaining relationship between human cultures and the ecosystems in 
which they are situated and on which they depend” (Callicott et al. 1999: 32). This basic picture 
of a symbiotic or harmonious relationship between humans and nature helps to clarify what it 
means to attain “sustainability,”64 though I won’t elaborate on this issue here.65 Of course, the 
vision of Homo sapiens living in such a way that they are deeply cognizant of ecological 
constraints needs to be fleshed out. But the direction of thought is clear.    
 
                                                
63 Jamieson offers this reflection as a critique of those who defend “ecosystem health.” But for reasons already 
given, it should be clear that Jamieson’s real target here is those who defend biological integrity. Jamieson, for his 
part, is skeptical that ecological health is a sufficiently objective concept to be useful for environmentalists. I think 
he is mistaken about this. In this article, Jamieson is also insensitive to the possibility that native species may play 
functional roles within natural systems that cannot be played by exotics. In general, I believe it is mistaken to think 
that the only normatively relevant issue here is our preferences for different types of ecosystems, as Jamieson 
seems to believe. 
64 A point emphasized in the recent work of Rapport (2007: 82-3).  
65 For further discussion, see 1.4 and Chapter 4. 
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1.2.7 Biodiversity: Important, but Not a Stand-Alone Conservation Concept 
 I have deliberately held off discussing biodiversity, and I need to say something about 
how this concept fits into the account. Biodiversity is a complex concept that includes things 
we can count (species, populations within species, genetic diversity within a population, habitat 
types), as well as the evolutionary and ecological processes that generate and sustain these 
countable entities.66 There is considerable overlap between concern for biodiversity and concern 
for ecological health and/or biological integrity. Any plausible interpretation of biological 
integrity or ecological health will have to include concern for the preservation of species and 
habitat diversity as crucial elements in maintaining nature’s integrity or health. A variety of 
species is critical to the provision of various ecosystem services, and habitat diversity is 
important as a source of plants and animals that can rejuvenate (e.g. through colonization) 
degraded landscapes. But the central claim of this section is that the concept of biodiversity, 
which is primarily focused on biological elements and compositions, does not stand well on its 
own. It is best viewed as part of a broader conservation concept, either biological integrity or 
ecological health. While preserving biodiversity is of obvious importance to any contemporary 
environmental ethic, biodiversity is not a good candidate for a stand-alone conservation 
concept. In what follows I will try to show why this is so.   
 Let me begin by offering a few conceptual clarifications. Several writers argue that 
biodiversity, given its focus on discrete biological elements, such as species and habitat types, is 
best construed as a compositionalist conservation concept.67 This view will be compelling to the 
extent that one de-emphasizes the importance of ecological and evolutionary processes in one’s 
conceptualization of biodiversity. One reason this de-emphasis might seem appropriate is the 
“universal” or “generic” character of many ecological processes, in contrast to the special 
character of species, and perhaps other biological elements (such as particular habitat types). 
According to conservation biologist Michael Soulé, as I noted above in the discussion of 
integrity, “the processes of ecosystems are universal, but the species are not.” Soulé continues: 
“The processes, including photosynthesis, nutrient transport, fixation of nitrogen, the water 
cycle, the decomposition of organic matter by invertebrates and microorganisms, the sequence 
of seasonal events (like budding, flowering, and seed dispersal), and disturbances by fire and 
floods—occur in nearly every terrestrial or aquatic ecosystem on Earth. They are generic. They 
                                                
66 See, in particular, Wood 1997, Wilson 1999, and Karr 1996 (esp. at 101). 
67 This is the view of Callicott et al. 1999: 25, following Angermeier and Karr 1994. 
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can be performed by weedy [i.e. non-native or exotic] species” (Soulé 1996: 59). If this is right, 
then there may be a reason to focus attention on the non-generic elements of biodiversity. 
Accordingly, biodiversity would be best understood primarily as a compositional concept, rather 
than as a functional one (i.e. a concept concerned primarily with ecological functioning). This 
would distinguish the focus on biodiversity from the focus on ecological health, and it would 
make biodiversity more or less coincide with the focus on biological integrity.  
 But this way of conceptualizing biodiversity might seem objectionably stipulative. For 
many defenders of biodiversity regard ecological and evolutionary processes as crucial to any 
adequate conceptualization of biodiversity (see, in particular, Wood 1997). Thus, even if 
ecological and evolutionary processes are “generic,” this fact hardly makes them unimportant. 
Further, those who claim we should not include ecological processes and functions as essential 
to a proper understanding of biodiversity are usually defending an alternative view—one that 
does include processes, and is thought to be superior to biodiversity on this count.68 Such 
posturing and power-plays may needlessly distort how biodiversity is being conceptualized.   
 Nonetheless, it’s hard to deny that many discussions of biodiversity tend to focus on 
those elements and compositions which are thought to be not only critical to maintaining 
nature’s variety but constitutive of such variety. This is reflected in public discussions of 
biodiversity, which have been largely informed by the discipline of conservation biology. Such 
discussions focus on “red lists” of endangered species, or on “hot spots” of biodiversity. This 
reinforces a compositionalist understanding of biodiversity: the fundamental object of 
environmental concern is countable entities—genes, populations, species, habitat types. In light 
of this usage, it does not seem objectionably stipulative to regard biodiversity as primarily 
concerned with certain biological and ecological elements or compositions, understood at 
different scales.   
 The compositionalist focus of common defenses of biodiversity raises a number of 
problems. The first is whether the concept of biodiversity, understood compositionally, has the 
resources for adequately illuminating biotic impoverishment. Let’s return to the case of native 
versus exotic species, which has exercised many environmentalists in recent years. Suppose a 
given habitat becomes dominated by an exotic species, and this species decimates what had 
                                                
68 This is the case for Angermeier and Karr (1994), who defend biological integrity over biodiversity, arguing that 
the former is a more comprehensive, and hence superior, conservation concept. Callicott (1995) and Callicott et al. 
(1999) also interpret biodiversity as a compositionalist concept, thus viewing it as less comprehensive than the 
appeal to biological or ecological integrity. 
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been the native species. This is a perfectly familiar situation, as exotic or non-native species are 
frequently introduced by human activity. But if an area shifted from one species composition to 
another, would this change in itself indicate a form of biotic impoverishment? How would the 
compositionalist focus of biodiversity advocates help us think about this situation?  
 There might be cases where a given native species becomes seriously threatened, or is 
rendered extinct, by an invasive or exotic species. If the native in question has few or no 
representative examples elsewhere in the world, then the focus on biodiversity may be helpful 
in drawing attention to a relevant form of biotic impoverishment. But let’s set aside this kind of 
case. In general, does the mere fact of losing a given native species, or losing one community 
structure to another, indicate an objectionable form of biotic impoverishment? It’s not clear 
how a focus on biodiversity—understood in terms of the diversity of genes, populations, 
species and habitat types—would itself help us understand problematic biological or ecological 
change, rather than merely describing a change from one state of biological diversity to a 
different one. The problem here would be exacerbated if the introduction of exotics actually 
increased the biological diversity within a given environment or landscape.69  
 It seems the advocate of biodiversity needs to invoke some notion of integrity or health 
in order to make a judgment about biotic impoverishment. For example, one might argue that 
the shift from one species or habitat composition to another is problematic with reference to a 
historical baseline. Accordingly, one could argue that a particular species or habitat composition 
which continues historical lineages is important in its own right, or for scientific reasons, or 
because preserving the lineage leaves options to future people, or for some other reason. But 
this argument is basically an appeal to biological integrity, given how this notion was 
understood above.  
 Suppose instead that the advocate of biodiversity viewed changes in species or habitat 
composition in terms of the overall effects of such changes on the ecosystems or landscapes in 
question. The claim here is that biodiversity is important because it bears some critical relation 
to the continued resilience, functioning, etc., of ecosystems of nontrivial size. Put differently, 
maintaining biodiversity is important so that ecosystems do not collapse. This is the reasoning 
                                                
69 The case of Repossari on the south-west coast of Finland provides an example. Repossari has a very unique 
flora, based on the combination of the area’s biology and a number of exotic species introduced by human activity. 
The introduction of the exotic species increased (as far as I know) the species and habitat diversity in Finland while 
appearing not to have caused any discernible form of biotic impoverishment. For discussion, see O’Neill et al. 
2008: 160-1. 
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of one prominent defender of biodiversity, E. O. Wilson. “Every species is part of an 
ecosystem,” writes Wilson, “an expert specialist of its kind, tested relentlessly as it spreads its 
influence through the food web. To remove it is to entrain changes in other species, raising the 
populations of some, reducing or even extinguishing others, risking a downward spiral of the 
larger assemblage” (1999: 308). The worry, in short, is that cascading declines in biodiversity can 
occur if a certain minimum threshold of biological diversity is not maintained. Scientists may 
argue about where the threshold is exactly, whether we have passed it already, and so forth. But 
the notion of a threshold of biological diversity is thought to be critical.70   
 But it’s not clear what the distinction is between this appeal to the importance of 
biodiversity and the appeal to ecological health. That is, there doesn’t seem to be an 
independent reason to focus on biodiversity as such, as a norm for environmental preservation 
or restoration. To be clear, I think it makes perfectly good sense to understand biodiversity as 
referring to critical biological elements or compositions (e.g. “keystone species”). But the sense 
of “critical” is only perspicuous in the context of a conceptual framework which biodiversity 
itself does not seem to provide. In different ways, biological integrity and ecological health each 
provide such a framework.  
 I am not arguing that it would be a problem if concern for biodiversity were 
understood, upon analysis, to be reducible to the set of concerns that make up the ideas of 
ecological health or biological integrity. My claim is that if this were the case, this would show 
that the concept of biodiversity does not seem like the best focus for environmental 
conservation. Rather, ecological health or biological integrity seem to provide better focal 
concepts. The concern for biodiversity makes most sense under the umbrella of these other 
concepts.  
 There is a different, though related, problem here. An apparent virtue of focusing on 
discrete biological elements or compositions is that this fits well with everyday expressions of 
environmental concern. For example, people are concerned about the fate of polar bears in the 
Arctic, or about the Maple trees of the Northeastern United States, both of which are 
threatened by anthropogenic climate change. Such expressions of environmental concern seem 
to favor, and partly explain I think, the continued salience of biodiversity in public discussions 
                                                
70 One could distinguish a non-threshold account of biodiversity, which holds that more species, variety of 
habitats, etc., is better than less. This might be so either for prudential reasons, or because variety is thought to be a 
good in its own right, or for some other reason. Untethered from a threshold account, however, such a view of 
biodiversity seems suspect. 
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of environmental goals. However, it seems to me this apparent virtue is actually not a virtue of 
the concept of biodiversity per se. Rather, the attraction of these expressions of environmental 
concern can be better explained by appealing to something other than biodiversity. Concern for 
polar bears is a concern for polar bears, meaning, the concern in question seems to me better 
explained as an ethical concern for animals.71 Explaining such concern in terms of biodiversity 
seems derivative, even if still intelligible. The case is similar for those who are concerned about 
the present threats to Maple trees. This concern might be explained according to biocentric 
intuitions about value,72 or perhaps more likely in this particular case, concern for the loss of a 
way of life and one of its important symbols.73 Whether we are talking about concern for polar 
bears, Maple trees, or some other species, this form of concern seems better explained in terms 
of a conceptual-evaluative framework that biodiversity itself does not provide, but rather 
assumes.  
 Another problem with the focus on biodiversity—and the final one I’ll mention here—
concerns the way in which this focus can reinforce a problematic way of valuing nature. The 
tendency of defenders of biodiversity to focus on discrete biological elements can play into the 
hands of what we could call “a resource view of nature.” Such a view tries to quantify and 
itemize the value of nature by regarding it as a bundle of discrete “resources.” As I argue in the 
next section, the problem with the resource view is a general one of how nature is valued. It is 
therefore not only a problem for defenders of biodiversity. But the biodiversity theorist’s 
compositionalist focus makes the appeal to preserving biodiversity particularly vulnerable to the 
problems that accompany the resource view.   
 
1.3 VALUING NATURE: THE RESOURCE VIEW AND ITS DISCONTENTS  
 A common way of valuing the natural world is to regard it as a bundle of resources for 
us to use. Nature is said to provide many goods and services for us. Plants and animals provide 
food, fuel, useful fibers, medicines. Nonhuman species can serve as early warning indicators of 
adverse (or potentially adverse) environmental change, which could pose threats to human 
health, or human welfare more generally. Taking a broader view of biological entities, 
ecosystems provide various services such as carbon sequestration, efficient nutrient cycling, 
                                                
71 It might also be a concern for the Arctic ecosystems of which polar bears are a vital element. 
72 As in, for example, Taylor 1986. 
73 See Belluck 2007. 
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regulation of hydrological cycles and local climates, production of soil, and much more. Once 
we admit that many of these goods and services are not just actual but potential, then even a 
narrow resource view of nature might be thought to provide very strong reasons for the 
protection of nature. Public appeals to protect “natural capital” (or “critical natural capital”) are 
paradigmatic of the resource view.  
 Railing against the narrow anthropocentrism of this way of valuing nature has been a 
favored pastime in environmental philosophy. But we have to be clear about what the problem 
is. The problem can’t be that considerations of human needs or welfare are marginal to a proper 
understanding of environmental values. If this is the ground for rejecting anthropocentrism, 
then the nonanthropocentric alternative is irrelevant. For human welfare depends—in all sorts 
of ways, some just described above—on nature.74 It’s not “shallow” to admit this fact. For we 
necessarily live in and from nature. That is, we necessarily live in particular environments, 
modifying them to make homes, cities, and so on. Moreover, like other species we derive 
various use-values from nature to meet our needs. It is misguided to articulate an environmental 
ethic that marginalizes these facts. The problem with the resource view is not its 
anthropocentrism per se. The problem is the way the resource view obscures important 
dimensions of nature and its value, thus leading us to misunderstand a fundamental aspect of 
environmental concern.   
 In what follows, my argument will proceed in two steps. First, I will take the resource 
view on its own terms and criticize it from the inside. I argue that if one is serious about valuing 
nature as a resource, one is led to a view of the value of nature that cannot be understood as a 
resource (or as capital). In short, the resource view, by its own internal logic, points beyond 
itself. That is, the resource view lacks the conceptual resources for adequately understanding the 
complex nature of nature, therefore the resource view fails to adequately appreciate the value 
nature has. Once I’ve established this, I turn to an external critique of the resource view. This 
critique exploits the distinction between natural resources (or natural capital) and the natural world. 
This distinction allows us to see important environmental values (or dimensions of 
environmental value) that do not show up on the resource view.   
                                                
74 See also the contributions to Chivian and Bernstein 2008 (esp. Ch. 3-5, 7-9), and Rapport 2007: 81-2. 
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 A common approach to environmental protection involves compiling a list of the goods 
and services nature is thought to provide.75 Different elements are presented as discrete 
“items”—nature-derived pharmaceuticals, useful fibers, sources of energy, and so on. These 
items are then assigned an increment of value according to their currently understood or 
imagined benefits. The value can be assigned in a number of ways, but some sort of economic 
valuation is usually thought to be crucial. The general approach is characteristic of the 
neoclassical economic paradigm that predominates in environmental decision-making. There 
are four main valuation methods used by economists: (1) quantifying what it would cost us, in 
social and economic terms, to provide for ourselves the various goods or services we currently 
receive from nature; (2) looking to proxy goods, like private property, to price what people are 
willing to pay for certain environmental goods; (3) using time cost methods, such as the time 
consumers are willing to spend to visit a wilderness area; and (4) employing various contingent 
valuation methods, for example, measuring consumer willingness-to-pay for various 
environmental values.76  
 While I believe this approach has problems, it is attractive in certain respects. For one 
thing, the motivation for the view is understandable. We receive many benefits from nature for 
free, and we take these for granted. A crucial aspect of nature—its biological resources—is 
under serious threat. One way to help people see the value of what is threatened is to try to 
itemize and quantify this value in some way. In addition, itemization and quantification of 
nature’s value is thought to be necessary if we are to operationalize a social decision procedure 
that can account for, and seek to preserve, nature’s value. The formation of sound 
environmental policy, and the allocation of scarce resources for environmental protection, both 
seem to depend on operationalization.  
 So where’s the problem? A beginning difficulty is that it’s not clear we can find a 
suitable metric for assigning the correct value to the items in question. Ecologically-minded 
economists suggest the medium of money can do the trick.77 That is, we can assign a monetary 
value to the various items, thus enabling us to put them on the same scale for purposes of 
                                                
75 In what follows, my argument is indebted to the discussion in Wood 1997: 261-2, and O’Neill et al. 2008: 170-2. 
See also the prescient discussion in Leopold 1939: 266-7. 
76 I won’t elaborate on these contingent valuation methods here except to say that these are not narrowly 
economic. For helpful discussion of the economic valuation methods introduced above, see O’Neill 1993: 76-81, 
O’Neill et al. 2008: 21-3, Norton 2001: 494-500, Norton 2003b: 425-32, and Melillo and Sala 2008: 102-6. 
77 See Pearce et al. 1989: Ch. 3.  
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assessing the benefits and costs of protection.78 This attempt to measure the value of nature is 
plausible in some cases. For example, we can quantify the monetary value of certain wild species 
that provide pharmaceuticals. We can also arrive at a rough measure of the value of ecosystem 
services, such as the pollination of cash crops by insects, or the provision of water purification 
by non-degraded watersheds. We can assign an economic value to such services by estimating 
what the social and economic costs would be if we were to have to provide these services 
ourselves, rather than receive them from nature for free.79  
 While this accounting procedure is plausible in the cases just described, it is less clear 
that other goods and services provided by nature can be quantified in this way. For example, 
there are numerous existing species that might contribute in some way to the (by hypothesis) 
quantifiable value of other species or ecosystem services. How much are these partial 
contributions worth? Quantifications of the contributory value of different species are 
notoriously difficult to make.80 The problem, in short, is the complex and subtle character of 
ecological interdependence and the limits to our capacity to understand how nature works. 
Scientists lack the capacity to adequately understand ecological relationships. With the exception 
of a few “keystone species,” it appears doubtful that we can judge the contribution of particular 
species to ecological functioning and resilient ecosystems. Part of the problem is that any 
ecological function we might consider is performed by a multitude of species, some of which 
are therefore redundant. Such redundancy is a common property of naturally evolved systems, 
in effect, a form of precaution on the part of nature.  
 The challenges to our judgment here were clearly seen by conservationist Aldo Leopold 
writing in the 1930s:  
                                                
78 The usual criterion used to measure the value in question is consumer willingness-to-pay for the goods in 
question, or for their protection (see Pearce et al. 1989: 55-7). But willingness-to-pay (hereafter WTP) has several 
noteworthy problems. (1) WTP discounts the preferences of those who may be willing to pay but who cannot, 
thereby disproportionately representing the preferences of the rich over the poor. This is so, for example, when 
proxy goods like private property are used to assess consumer WTP for certain environmental amenities. (2) WTP 
discounts the preferences of inarticulate nonhuman others. (3) WTP may discount the preferences of future 
generations who are not present to bid. (4) WTP implicitly assumes potential payers are ecologically enlightened, 
morally sensitive to the complexity of issues at play in environmental matters, and motivated to pay given this 
enlightened sensitivity—all empirically questionable assumptions. (5) Lastly, WTP assumes we could, in principle, 
put a price on all environmental goods that matter, but this is debatable, to say the least. For excellent critical 
discussion of these matters, see O’Neill 1993: 118-22; and O’Neill et al. 2008: 55-68, 77-9. 
79 See, for example, Melillo and Sala (2008: 102-6) for discussion of the economic value of the watershed for New 
York City’s water supply, and the economic value of the pollination of cash crops in Costa Rica and Malaysia. 
80 See Norton 1987: Ch. 3, esp. 60-72. 
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The emergence of ecology has placed the economic biologist in a peculiar 
dilemma: with one hand he points out the accumulated findings of his search for 
utility, or lack of utility, in this or that species; with the other he lifts the veil from 
a biota so complex, so conditioned by interwoven cooperations and 
competitions, that no man can say where utility begins and ends. No species can 
be “rated” without the tongue in the cheek […] The only sure conclusion is that 
the biota as a whole is useful, and biota includes not only plants and animals, but 
soils and waters as well […] The function of species is largely inscrutable, and 
may remain so. (1939: 266-7)  
The difficulty here is amplified when we consider the potential contributions of different species 
to other species, or their contribution to a healthy functioning biota over the long-term. The 
converse holds as well: attempts to assess the disvalue, actual or potential, of losing a species to 
extinction are marked by profound uncertainties.81  
 Faced with such empirical challenges, combined with what may be inherent limits to our 
collective capacity to understand how nature functions, a defender of the resource view could 
retreat to cases in which the measurement of benefits provided by nonhuman species and 
ecosystems is possible. But such a list of benefits would be, at best, very incomplete. One 
reason is that potential, yet very difficult to measure, benefits might be great. Likewise, the 
potential ecological—and, as a result, social—costs of degrading landscapes might be great. By 
the logic of the resource view, one would presumably want to be very careful not to undervalue 
potential biological resources while focusing on the value of those already known. Yet the limits 
of our scientific knowledge and of our capacities to quantify the value in question forces us to 
defer to known benefits, thus discounting the value of potential benefits.82 
 But even if these difficulties could somehow be resolved, there is a different problem 
with the resource view. Accounting for the value of nature in terms of the various resources it 
provides assumes that nature’s value is reducible to the value of certain discrete entities. This is 
a fundamental assumption implicit in the view that nature is valuable in virtue of being a 
stockpile of “resources.” Such an assumption fits particularly well with compositionalist 
understandings of nature, for example, understandings of nature as genetic resources, various 
useful species, or biotic assemblages (e.g. tropical rainforests). But the assumption might also fit 
                                                
81 See Norton 1987: 60-72; also Wilson 1999: 308-10. 
82 One might be committed to the resource view while also believing this view is only helpful in certain situations 
of environmental valuation, and not helpful in others. Accordingly, one could believe we should use the resource 
view where it works, and find some other approach where the resource view fails. The problem, however, is 
defenders of the resource view often, though perhaps not always, seem to think we can sufficiently value nature by 
viewing it as a resource. My claim is that this assumption is questionable. 
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with certain functional understandings of nature, for example, a focus on ecosystem services, 
which are viewed as the “product” of healthy functioning natural systems. Of course, these 
services are more diffuse, and hence less discrete, compared (e.g.) to genes and species. But in 
both cases the resource view functions to obscure nature in its totality. Nature is a complex 
interdependent whole, not just an array of useful resources. This whole, which we do not and 
may never adequately understand, is constituted by a web of ecological relationships—
symbioses, interdependencies, forms of parasitism, predatory-prey dynamics—which are 
manifest at varied spatial and temporal scales. Moreover, any existing complex of biological-
ecological structures and functions is supported by “deep” evolutionary and ecological 
processes that maintain and perpetuate the whole.83  
 As a shorthand, I will refer to these generative-supportive natural processes as “nature 
as source.” Drawing attention to nature as source foregrounds the essential preconditions for 
any diversity of life forms. In this respect, we can also refer to nature as source as an essential 
environmental condition.84 For nature as source refers to one of the necessary preconditions for 
the diversity of life forms, and the continued adaptive evolution of such forms.85 In this respect, 
nature as source is a fundamental precondition for the maintenance and self-augmentation over 
                                                
83 Considered as wholes, we can ascribe to ecosystems the property of being “self-sustaining” or “self-
maintaining.” There is no question here of these systems being conscious or self-concerned, for example, in the 
manner of an animal. An ecosystem is not an organism. But it is a complex system that appears to be greater than 
the sum of its parts. The “self-sustaining” property of ecosystems is a function of multiple species behaviors, 
including the various relationships between species and between species and their local environments. These 
species behaviors and relationships issue in, and are supported by, a variety of ecological processes. The 
fundamental ecological processes here are varied and numerous. Some notable examples include: the processes of 
colonization in disturbed areas by fast-growing, but short-lived, plant species; the supplanting of these species with 
others which have longer life spans, and which therefore contribute to the production of biomass; the creation of 
microhabitats, due to selective pressures, and the subsequent “packing” of more and more species within a given 
ecological locale; the numerous (unconscious) adaptations of different species to secure and maintain different 
niches (e.g. success over competitors through complex biochemical adaptations); the varied symbioses between 
different species at different trophic levels (e.g. the way grazing herbivores can increase plant diversity). All of these 
processes play out in ecological time scales (i.e. relatively brief), but can have effects on evolutionary time scales 
(i.e. temporally extended time scales). For a useful overview of the scientific knowledge regarding these various 
ecological and evolutionary processes thought to support self-augmenting diversity spirals, see Norton 1987: 50-60. 
For a more comprehensive overview, see Wilson 1999: Ch. 6-7, 9-10 (esp. Ch. 9). 
84 Paul Wood’s distinction between biodiversity as such and biological resources is relevant here. Wood refers to the 
former as “an essential environmental condition” (1997: 262), meaning, “biodiversity is […] a necessary 
precondition for the long term maintenance of biological resources” (ibid.). What I mean by nature as source is 
basically what Wood means by biodiversity. However, I do not employ Wood’s vocabulary because I think there 
are problems with appealing to biodiversity as a concept to guide conservation (for reasons given in 1.2.7).  
85 Other essential environmental conditions include a consistent rate of solar influx, the earth’s orbit around the 
sun, and gravitational pull (Wood 1997: 262). However, what is special about nature as source (or biodiversity as 
such in Wood’s usage) is that human beings have the ability to change and degrade this essential environmental 
condition, unlike the other essential environmental conditions just noted.  
  40 
time of the diversity of life.86 Although it has some rhetorical inadequacies, we may speak of 
“nature as resource” to refer to those parts of nature that are straightforwardly useful to us, 
such as various other species, minerals, energy sources, ecosystem services, and so on. I’m not 
attached to these labels; what is important is that we have some way of marking the contrast 
between the diversity of useful entities and services nature provides, on the one hand, and the 
generative-supportive conditions for the continued existence of such things and services, on the 
other.87 The idea of nature as referring to various resources is concrete, practical, and familiar. 
While the idea of nature as referring to an essential environmental condition for the existence of 
natural resources is abstract and unfamiliar. But both senses are important if we are to have an 
adequate concept of nature to guide our thinking about environmental values. 
 Insofar as the assessment of environmental values continues to be dominated by a 
neoclassical economic paradigm, it is difficult to keep nature as source in view. Indeed, insofar 
as nature as source is acknowledged at all it is apt to be confused with being just another 
resource. The problem is generated by the fact that a central goal of the paradigm that 
dominates in environmental decision-making is to optimize aggregate value, or at least optimize 
efficiency. In a given situation where we might try to optimize efficiency, different natural 
resources are assigned a value and weighed against other values. For example, the value of a 
certain natural resource (e.g. fertile soils) might be weighed against the value of economic 
development, or against the social benefits that would come from depleting the resource in 
question. Nature as source may not enter the calculus at all. Or if it does it is apt to be entered 
as just another natural resource, with the consequence that the benefits and costs of preserving 
nature as source is opened to possible trade-offs with other social or economic goals. It is also 
opened to possible substitutions by human-made capital (an issue I’ll discuss further in 
Chapters 2 and 4).88  
 This pattern of decision-making might seem utterly inadequate and implausible. But 
unfortunately it is more or less the norm among modern nation states for how to make 
                                                
86 See Wood 1997: 258-60. 
87 Some writers on biodiversity emphasize total diversity (in contrast to focusing on within-habitat and cross-
habitat diversity) in order to bring into focus the environmental conditions thought to be essential to the 
maintenance and/or augmentation of biological diversity over time. See, in particular, Norton 1987: Ch. 3, Wood 
1997: 259-61, and Norton 2001: 501-5. 
88 Overstating things only slightly, I believe visions of substitution are driven by contemporary (Western) culture’s 
fantasy that we will be able to find technological fixes for whatever problems we create (not to mention, “fixes” 
that promise the transcendence of natural limits). 
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environmental policy. It seems our thinking and policies have not yet become serious about 
nature and our dependence on it. My concern here is how a certain pattern of valuing nature 
obscures nature understood as a source—i.e. as a constellation of dynamic forces, processes, 
and capacities that issue in the “self-maintenance” over time of any diversity of natural 
resources, whether actual or potential. This dimension of nature is not just another resource. 
Which is to say, the costs and benefits of preserving nature as source cannot be weighed 
against, and possibly traded off with, the costs and benefits of depleting/preserving other 
natural resources, or of pursuing other social goals. Conceptually, to think in terms of possible 
trade-offs here is to make a category mistake.89 This is so on account of the structural or 
foundational value of nature as source, that is, as a generator of whatever natural resources we 
might consider. Nature as a source should not be conflated with nature as a resource; both are 
important, yet they are conceptually distinct. It follows that a minimally appropriate way to view 
the value of nature as source is as a constraint on our collective decision-making, not as 
something that can be traded off with other values or goals in the game of cost-benefit analysis.   
 Let me take stock of the argument so far. I have agreed, up to a point, with advocates of 
the resource view. We can plausibly view nature as valuable because it provides various 
quantifiable biological resources for us to use and enjoy. However, the resource view of nature 
offers at best only a partial account of why, and in what respects, nature is valuable. The 
resource view is unable to properly value nature understood as a source of the diversity of life 
forms. This foundational sense of nature is inappropriately conceptualized as a resource; it 
refers instead to the necessary conditions for the continued flourishing of a diversity of living 
beings. The implication is that the resource view of nature points beyond itself—to a source of 
value that the resource view cannot value in its own terms. One cannot be serious about valuing 
natural resources if one does not value the source of these resources. But the source of natural 
resources is itself not a resource, but a condition of the possibility for there to be resources at 
all.   
 Nothing about the argument just summarized requires that one view the source of 
natural resources in a nonanthropocentric way. In this respect, I have offered the foregoing 
argument as an internal criticism of the resource view. At issue is acknowledging what a sincere 
commitment to the resource view of nature implies. Were such an acknowledgement to occur, 
                                                
89 This is the upshot of Wood’s distinction (in Wood 1997) between biodiversity as such and biological resources. 
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this would mark an improvement in our collective thinking about environmental values. That 
said, it seems to me the familiar framework of anthropocentrism probably cannot do justice to 
the significance of nature understood as a source, or an essential environmental condition for 
the continued flourishing of life. I understand anthropocentrism as referring to views that 
regard nonhuman nature (including nonhuman animals) as valuable only because, and insofar 
as, it directly or indirectly serves human interests.90 Understood as an essential environmental 
condition for the flourishing of life, nature is a source of significance that is absolutely 
fundamental. It is the sort of object of concern that might animate a “religious” view, or 
modern science understood as an attempt to understand the fundamental nature of the world 
for its own sake, rather than as something to be manipulated for its use-values (as in techno-
science). The sense of nature as source seems too basic and deep to be responded to adequately 
by the form of sensitivity embodied in anthropocentricism (even in its “richest” forms). Some 
other form of regard seems merited, something more akin to (nonprudential) respect, awe, or 
wonder at a great mystery. I’m not sure this means we are forced into nonanthropocentrism 
about the value of this source. Although it does seem to me that, generally speaking, 
nonanthropocentric views can more readily appreciate the value of nature in this deep sense. 
But I won’t further defend this claim here (see Chapters 2 and 4).   
 Let me close this section by noting two other problems with the resource view, both of 
which exhibit its inadequacy. If nature is valued primarily in terms of its provision of useful 
things, then there is in principle no reason not to substitute human-made capital for natural 
capital, supposing we could. Such a substitution may be practically difficult, given our current 
technologies. But what if we could develop better technologies? If we could, maybe we should? 
After all, such development could grow the economy and provide jobs, while still meeting 
human needs.91 This points to a fundamental instability in the resource view of nature. Viewing 
nature in terms of natural capital, combined with the right level of technological development, 
could actually accelerate the human domination and degradation of the natural world. Indeed, 
this problem is acute when the development in question is precisely the means to our accessing 
or unlocking natural capital.92 In the beginning of this section I suggested one of the reasons we 
might view nature as natural capital, or as a resource, might be that this provides a meaningful 
                                                
90 In defining anthropocentrism in this way, I follow Katie McShane (2007: 170-1). 
91 In Chapter 4, I return to some of the issues raised here regarding substitution and development. 
92 My discussion here is indebted to Holland 1997: 127-8. 
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way of valuing and protecting nature. Instead, however, it appears the resource view obscures 
its object, and is thus unable to measure, or even understand, the loss incurred when the natural 
world is developed in certain ways.   
 In failing to see the natural world as an object of value not reducible to natural capital, 
the resource view has an additional problem, one relating specifically to the fate of sentient 
animals. The natural world is the supportive context for a diversity of sentient beings which 
make a moral claim on us in their own right. I won’t defend the ground and possible 
implications of this view here (see Chapter 3). But if certain nonhuman others merit our moral 
consideration, part of what it would mean to see the natural world as an object of value would 
have to include the fact that it is the home for these other respect-worthy beings. Allowing the 
natural world to be reduced to natural capital leaves no conceptual space for this recognition. 
Moreover, if nonhuman animals have moral standing, then viewing them as resources, on a par, 
say, with medicinal plants or natural minerals, indicates considerable moral insensitivity.   
 
1.4 CONCLUSION: WHICH NATURE ARE WE TRYING TO PRESERVE, AND WHY? 
 Let’s be honest: There is a sense in which we can’t really destroy nature. That is, 
nature—understood as a shifting constellation of different species and dynamic ecological and 
evolutionary processes and potentials—will do its thing, with or without us. The forests 
reclaiming the abandoned city of Chernobyl provide a vivid illustration of this fact.  
 The thought of this indestructibility of nature, of this capacity for regeneration, can be 
exhilarating and humbling. It may even seem to offer a bit of hope when nature in its everyday 
aspect—as living forests, unpolluted waterways, abundant wildlife, and so on—is succumbing 
to the onslaught of humanity. Yet this idea of nature as indestructible and regenerative is easily 
misconstrued. While it may be true that we cannot destroy nature in an ultimate sense, we can 
surely destroy the conditions of existence for a diversity of life forms to flourish. While some 
might believe we are exempt, as a species, from the constraints imposed by physical and 
biological reality, this is a questionable view to hold. No people are returning to live in 
Chernobyl. More generally, we are—and are likely to remain—inescapably dependent on nature 
as a source of diverse goods and services, and also as a “sink” for our wastes.93  
                                                
93 Those committed to a robust technological optimism might disagree with the claim that we are inescapably 
dependent on nature. I would urge those tempted by such a view to recall the lessons of the “Biosphere 2” 
experiment. “Biosphere 2” was a well-funded, multi-million dollar endeavor, which sought to create a self-
contained ecosystem that could provide adequate food, water, and air for eight human beings to live within the 
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 The idea that human culture and economy are rooted in the physical world, and hence 
bound by its constraints, is hardly a new insight. This has been a first principle of agrarian 
writers for centuries. But modern ecology has provided us with a more precise vocabulary for 
describing our situation. The laws of thermodynamics are particularly noteworthy here.94 It 
seems we need to continually remind ourselves of the reality of physical constraints; not exactly 
a sexy topic, but important nonetheless. For we often seem over-impressed by our power, and 
this has a tendency to obscure the reality of nature. 
 The thought that we live in a world of constraints leads naturally to the thought that 
there must be a sense in which we can degrade or impoverish natural systems. Conversely, there 
must be a positive state of non-degraded and flourishing nature. In this chapter I have aimed to 
clarify, albeit partially and incompletely, what this positive state is, and why it matters. In 
clarifying this, we make progress toward answering a basic question: which nature should we be 
trying to preserve as a matter of basic environmental concern?    
 I have argued that a minimally acceptable answer to this question is ecological health, 
with a supporting role played by biological integrity. Ecological health refers to two 
fundamental properties of natural systems of nontrivial size: (1) the counteractive capacity 
(resilience) of natural systems to withstand stress or change, whether human-caused or not; and 
(2) the capacity of natural systems to function normally over the long term, hence providing a 
variety of ecosystem services. These ecosystem services are vital to, and also indicative of, the 
flourishing of a variety of life forms, human and nonhuman.  
                                                                                                                                                 
enclosure for a period of two years. The experiment was more or less a complete failure. (For summary discussion, 
see Cohen and Tilman 1996.) We might also reflect on the more recent, though less grandiose, case of the oil spill 
in the Gulf of Mexico. British Petroleum, the company responsible for this environmental catastrophe, has ample 
financial resources and access to technological expertise. Yet the company was unable to squelch the flow from the 
gushing oil well in the Gulf for nearly four months. And some people (e.g. Stephen Hawking) think we could 
successfully colonize space as a solution to our environmental problems? (On Stephen Hawking’s view, see 
Hawking’s interview with Charlie Rose, “A Conversation with Dr. Stephen Hawking & Lucy Hawking.” I saw a 
replay of this interview on WILL TV, Channel 12, Urbana, IL, 7 March 2008. The interview was originally 
recorded in England in 2002, I believe.) 
94 “We do not,” as Herman Daly succinctly puts it, “use up matter and energy per se (first law of thermodynamics), 
but we do irrevocably use up the quality of usefulness as we transform matter and energy to achieve our purposes 
(second law of thermodynamics)” (2002: 184). In a critical response to Daly, Alan Holland has remarked that 
“[t]here is no such thing as usefulness per se,” for usefulness is dependent on the end a given thing is designed (or 
acquired, mined, extracted, etc.) to serve (2002: 200). One can grant this point while nonetheless acknowledging 
that there are certain basic uses of the natural world we as a species are not likely to outgrow. In this sense, it is 
true that new technologies may enable us to discover a new “usefulness” in something seemingly degraded or only 
recently discovered to be “useful” (both points made by Holland). However, assuming that such new technologies 
will always be developed, without further unwanted side effects, is far less clear. I return to these issues later in my 
discussion of uncertainty and the necessity of precaution when dealing with natural systems. 
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 With regard to biological integrity, I argued that the importance of integrity to ecological 
health is instrumental: the former provides a criterion of normality given by nature when left to 
itself. This “most perfect” base-datum of normality, as Leopold put it, supplements the base-
datum grounded in functional criteria developed by contemporary ecologists and conservation 
biologists. It is empirically useful to have a control environment to see how nature would 
function if left alone. Such an environment is provided by areas that have their integrity intact. 
In addition, such areas provide a multitude of useful wild species and genetic resources for 
restoring degraded ecosystems and landscapes, and also for improving agricultural products, 
developing pharmaceuticals, and the like. 
 Including integrity as part of an overall conservation goal is complicated by the fact that 
human beings have become, for the first time in history, a significant geological agent.95 Less 
obvious, due to its insidious character, is the fact that we are living in a time of anthropogenic 
climate change. This means, among other things, that there are no longer any pristine 
ecosystems or landscapes left on earth (where “pristine” refers to landscapes that are the 
product of processes and forces that have been minimally influenced by human activity). It 
follows that appeals to biological integrity must employ a degreed notion of integrity. Viewed as 
instrumentally important to the assessment and maintenance of ecological health, it is an 
empirical question how much of the world should be preserved in a state of biological integrity. 
Estimates vary considerably, ranging from a low of 12 percent of landscapes to 25-75 percent 
of all landscapes.96 Obviously, the higher the estimate, the more practically demanding it would 
be for us to achieve. I would add that if one thought integrity was plausible as an overarching 
goal for environmentalism, then there is the question of how much of the world should be 
maintained or restored to a state of integrity. I discuss this issue further in Chapter 4, where I 
defend integrity as part of a rich and demanding conception of sustainability.  
 In 1.3, I employed a distinction between “nature as source” and “nature as resource.” 
One might wonder how this distinction maps onto to my defense of ecological health as a 
                                                
95 “Humankind moved mountains in the twentieth century and for the first time became a significant geological 
agent. Our most consequential impacts occurred in the soil: we simultaneously corroded and enriched the substrate 
of civilization, so that some could soon bear nothing at all, while others eventually seemed able to bear, if not all 
things, at least a lot more of many different things” (McNeill 2000: 21). For general discussion see McNeill 2000: 
Ch. 2. 
96 For discussion, see Westra 1995: 13. The lower figure, as Westra notes, is from an estimate by the World Wildlife 
Fund (Canada), and was provided for Canadian landscapes. The 25-75 percent estimate is given by Noss and 
Cooperrider 1994.  
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conservation concept. I see the relation as follows. That part of ecological health that refers to 
the provision of various ecosystem services more or less maps onto the notion of “nature as 
resource.” Although this is not a perfect fit, for ecosystem services, as I have noted at different 
points, should not be conceived solely in terms of being services for us. They are that, of course; 
but they also beneficial for myriad other organisms. In fact, the flourishing of a diversity of 
organisms (from soil microorganisms to larger animals) is constitutive of ecological functioning, 
and hence impossible to disentangle from nature’s provision of various ecosystem services.  
 The ideas of resilience and ecological functioning, which are essential to a proper 
understanding of ecological health, map onto the notion of “nature as source.” This follows 
from my characterization of “nature as source” as referring to an essential environmental 
condition for the continued flourishing of a diversity of life forms, and hence for the continued 
productivity of nature (i.e. the provision of various goods and services) over time. The reason 
to highlight this essential condition, rather than others such as a continuous rate of solar influx 
or the operation of gravity, is that we are in a position to protect or impair this condition, 
depending on how we collectively choose to live. This is not so with respect to the existence of 
solar influx or the operation of gravity.   
 In this chapter I have viewed my primary task as one of clarifying the nature we have 
reasons to care about as a matter of basic environmental concern. Thus, my focus has been to 
specify a baseline for environmental ethics—a minimum of environmental preservation below 
which we ought not to fall in our collective interactions with nature. I have said comparatively 
less about the ethical rationale for caring about nature, and the various complexities this raises. 
Let me elaborate on this here, noting that a host of additional ethical considerations will be 
discussed in Chapters 2-4. I believe there are two considerations any minimally acceptable 
ethical view must be sensitive to if it aims to instruct us with respect to environmental issues. 
First, I assume any such view will endorse, or at least not be practically inconsistent with, the 
principle that we must meet our needs in the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to do the same.97 Second, such a view must acknowledge nature’s complexity, 
dynamism and unpredictability, as well as the (ostensibly) unavoidable limits to our collective 
capacity to understand how nature works. I will elaborate on each of these points in turn. 
 
                                                
97 As stated in WCED 1987: 8. 
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1.4.1 Needs as a Focal Point for Moral and Political Deliberation  
 What counts as a “need” is theory-dependent, as is the question of whether needs merit 
special weight in our moral and political deliberations. These questions merit more discussion 
than I will give here. But I do want to situate my view within the spectrum of philosophical 
views regarding needs (focusing on human needs) and their importance. Broadly speaking, 
philosophical accounts of needs tend to endorse, or at least lean toward, one of two positions: a 
naturalistic (or essentialist) conception of needs, or a constructivist (or conventionalist) one.98 A 
naturalistic conception assumes an account of basic or vital needs is rooted in some aspect, or 
aspects, of our social and biological nature. Advocates of a naturalistic account assume we can 
make a meaningful distinction between basic or vital needs and nonbasic or non-vital needs. 
While there is room for disagreement among defenders of naturalistic accounts, advocates of 
such accounts agree that we have a sufficiently good working sense of what counts as a basic or 
vital need and what doesn’t, thus making the contrast meaningful and serviceable. As James 
Sterba writes: “Basic needs, if not satisfied, lead to significant lacks and deficiencies with respect 
to a standard of mental and physical well-being. Thus, a person’s needs for food, shelter, 
medical care, protection, companionship, and self-development are, at least in part, needs of 
this sort” (1988: 45-6).  
 The description of basic or vital needs is not wholly independent of context or 
circumstance. As Judith Lichtenberg remarks, “[i]n a society in which strenuous physical 
exertion is important—either because physical activity is socially valued or because scarcity 
requires strength or speed to acquire necessities—a greater caloric intake might be needed to 
function effectively or well” (1998: 157). Obviously, what someone needs may vary according 
to a number of circumstances or developmental stages: a pregnant woman or nursing mother 
needs more calories than a woman who is not pregnant or nursing; a growing child or 
adolescent may need more calories or more of certain vitamins and minerals compared to an 
adult.99 There are additional complexities here owing to the fact that the satisfaction of certain 
basic needs may depend on contextual factors, such as what others around you have, or on the 
                                                
98 L. W. Sumner employs a distinction between “naturalist” and “constructivist” conceptions of need (1996: 55), 
which I co-opt here in slightly modified form. 
99 This is an issue that can be relevant in debates about the ethics of eating meat. For example, Kathryn Paxton 
George (1994) argues that moral vegetarianism is problematic because it is premised on a male physiological norm 
that is insensitive to sexual difference. Paxton’s nutritional argument has been contested, and I think shown to be 
questionable. For discussion, see Donovan 1995, and Pluhar 1992 and 1994. 
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economic system, infrastructure, and so on (see Lichtenberg 1998: 157-8; Sen 1983). Some basic 
needs are nonrelative, while others basic needs may be more relative or context-dependent. The 
need for air, food, shelter, and a minimum of healthcare, seem to be nonrelative in a clear sense. 
While other needs that might be considered basic, such as the need for mobility (which may be 
necessary to secure food, shelter, etc.), may have an inescapably relative dimension. For 
example, in many modern communities whether one can secure basic goods like food requires 
that one have access to public transportation, and if there is none, then some form of private 
transportation. 
 In contrast to defenders of naturalistic accounts of need, defenders of constructivist 
accounts regard as dubious the goal of grounding a conception of needs in a conception of 
human nature. Instead, needs—basic or nonbasic—are viewed as grounded in, and indeed 
constituted by, the discursive practices of a given society or culture. Oversimplifying somewhat, 
constructivists view needs as ultimately determined by whatever a society or culture says needs 
are. Generally speaking, constructivists are deeply skeptical of any attempt to ground a 
conception of needs (or of desire, sexuality, social roles, etc.) in a conception of human nature, 
or a conception of what is “natural” or “biological.”  
 Naturalism and constructivism are idealized philosophical positions.100 We can imagine a 
number of intermediary positions between these two extremes. For example, constructivist 
accounts may be extreme or moderate. Extreme forms of constructivism deny that there is any 
natural or extra-discursive dimension at all to human life.101 On such a view, we have no 
essential nature, and hence no essential needs (or interests, instincts, desires, etc.).102 Or, if we 
have a “nature,” it is to be essentially plastic—that is, constituted by the play of cultural 
                                                
100 For defenses of a naturalistic and objectivist account of needs, see O’Neill 1993; Wiggins 2005; Thomson 2005; 
O’Neill et al. 2008: 24-6, 192-5; and Sterba 1988: 45-8, 2000a, and 2005. A good critical discussion of the 
objectivity of naturalistic accounts of needs can be found in Sumner 1996: 53-60. Michel Foucault’s work is a 
paradigm of constructivism (see, e.g., Foucault 1978). Much contemporary social or cultural theory which takes its 
bearings from Foucault is constructivist in the sense I am using the term. For a good example of the latter, see 
Bordo 1988.  
101 In a critique of the idea that the body is a set of natural “instincts” that might be repressed or distorted by 
culture, Susan Bordo writes: “[T]here is no ‘natural’ body. Cultural practises, far from exerting their power against 
spontaneous needs, ‘basic’ pleasures or instincts, or ‘fundamental’ structures of bodily experience, are already and 
always inscribed, as Foucault puts it, ‘on our bodies and their materiality, their forces, energies, sensations and 
pleasures’. Our bodies, no less than anything else that is human, are constituted by culture” (1988: 90). For 
insightful criticism of this sort of view, see in particular Soper 1995: Ch. 4. I will not comment here on the issue of 
whether Bordo’s view does justice to Foucault’s insights, though it seems to me an affirmative answer is not 
obvious.   
102 The anti-essentialism of extreme constructivism makes the view basically a form of nominalism. It may also 
represent a form of neo-Gnosticism. For a statement of this critique, see Peterson 2001: Ch. 3. 
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conditioning and discursive practices all the way down. In contrast, a moderate constructivist 
emphasizes the crucial role of cultural ideas and discursive practices in any definition and 
conceptualization of needs. But such a view does not deny the basic idea that we have a social 
and biological nature and that nonhuman nature has a nature, both of which provide objective 
parameters and constraints for the varied cultural interpretations of, and attributions of 
meaning to, human and nonhuman nature.103 It seems to me only an extreme constructivist 
position would deny that there is or could be an objective and cross-culturally valid conception 
of basic or vital needs; while a moderate constructivist could, and defenders of naturalistic 
accounts presumably would, endorse such a view. 
 While there are various intermediary positions between extreme and moderate 
constructivism, there is also overlap between some moderate forms of constructivism and 
naturalism. For example, Peterson (2001: 73-6) defends what she calls a “chastened 
constructionism.” Although I think Peterson’s view might just as readily be described as a form 
of non-reductive naturalism, or non-reductive realism about nature and human nature (where 
“realism” is defined as Kate Soper defines this104). I regard this kind of view as essentially right. 
The view entails, for example, the belief that we have natural needs and that we depend on 
natural systems for meeting these needs.105 Further, the view acknowledges the reality that 
human power and actions can harm things like human bodies, ozone layers, and nonhuman 
animals.106 That said, “chastened constructionists” like Peterson, or non-reductive realists like 
                                                
103 For views situated on the line between naturalism and constructivism, and which may therefore be categorized 
as a moderate constructivism, see the discussions in Peterson 2001: Ch. 3, Soper 1995: Ch. 4-5, and Hayles 1995. 
Both Peterson and Soper are concerned with the social construction of nature and human nature, which is relevant 
to the question of needs, though needs are not the primary focus in either of the discussions. For a less moderate 
constructivist view, but one that rejects extreme constructivism and its eschewal of a non-discursive grounding for 
claims about sex, bodies, nature, and the world, see Haraway 1991. 
104 Peterson’s view is substantively very similar to the view presented by Soper (1995: Ch. 4-5), and Soper’s view 
seems best categorized as a non-reductive realism. According to Soper’s definition, a “realist” sense of nature refers 
to “that ‘nature’ whose properties and causal processes are the object of the biological and natural sciences. To 
speak of ‘nature’ in this conception is to speak of those material structures and processes that are independent of 
human activity (in the sense that they are not a humanly created product), and whose forces and causal powers are 
the necessary condition of every human practice, and determine the possible forms it can take. Such a concept of 
nature as the permanent ground of environmental action is clearly indispensable to the coherence of ecological 
discourse about the ‘changing face of nature’ and the need to revise the forms of its exploitation. But it is also 
essential to the coherence of any discourse about the culturally ‘constructed’ body and its continually changing 
gender ‘significations’” (1995: 132-3; cf. 155-6).   
105 See Peterson 2001: 73; Soper 1995: 132-3, 138, 144.  
106 See Peterson 2001: 74. In a concise critique of what I have called extreme constructivist views, Soper writes: “In 
short, it is not language that has a hole in its ozone layer; and the ‘real’ thing continues to be polluted and degraded 
even as we refine our deconstructive insights at the level of the signifier” (Soper 1995: 151). However, Soper goes 
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Soper, are very sensitive to the ideological uses of appeals to “nature”—such as reactionary 
moral and political views that seek to root individuals’ social roles in their biology, or that try to 
ground “appropriate” sexual practices in appeals to what is natural (sex is “for” procreation, 
etc.). Perhaps this sensitivity is what distinguishes a naturalistic constructivism, such as 
Peterson’s “chastened constructionism” or Soper’s “realism,”107 from the naturalistic views 
defended by many philosophers. For the accounts of philosophers often fail to thematize the 
possible misuses of naturalistic accounts of need.108   
 Concerning the question of whether needs merit special weight in our collective moral 
and political deliberations, I think the answer is clearly yes. One reason is that whether or not 
one’s basic or vital needs are met is an issue that is especially “close to home.”109 Being 
chronically hungry, thirsty, filthy, too hot or too cold, plagued by avoidable illness, unable to 
find shelter, constantly exposed to violence or the threat of violence, and so on, is a bad way to 
be, particularly from the first-person standpoint.110 As such, the satisfaction of our basic or vital 
needs is partly constitutive of our being able to live minimally decent lives. It follows that if a 
person’s needs are not met, we may judge such a person to be living below a morally acceptable 
threshold. Here I leave aside cases of persons freely choosing to live below the threshold, say, 
out of a commitment to asceticism. An account of needs can accommodate individual 
discretion in need satisfaction without thereby giving up on the significance of basic or vital 
needs as a category useful for moral and political thought. 
                                                                                                                                                 
on to caution realists—who would assent to the sentiment just expressed—to be sensitive to the ideological and 
potentially reactionary representations of nature, including some representations favored by environmentalists. 
107 Or Hayles’s “constrained constructivism” (see Hayles 1995). 
108 I think this is so, for example, in the accounts developed in O’Neill 1993; Wiggins 2005; Thomson 2005; 
O’Neill et al. 2008; and Sterba 1995, 2000a, and 2005. Perhaps these philosophers would agree with all of the 
worries expressed by Peterson (and by Soper), and hence agree with Peterson’s reasons for describing her view as a 
form of “constructionism,” rather than a form of naturalism. But the fact that these philosophers do not explicitly 
acknowledge the worries Peterson raises does seem to me an important gap in their discussions. 
109 See Nagel 1986: 166-73, esp. 171 (where Nagel speaks of “very general human goods” that are “close to home”) 
and 172-3 (where Nagel argues that “we have to give basic impersonal goods more weight when they come from 
other people’s needs than when they compete with personal reasons within our own lives”). I am also indebted to 
the discussion in Scanlon 1975, and to Rawls’s account of “primary goods” as describing citizens’ “needs” (in 
Rawls 1993: 187-90). A complexity I won’t go into here is that both Scanlon and Rawls see themselves as 
defending a “conventionalist,” as opposed to a “naturalist,” conception of urgency or need. (The contrast here is 
discussed in Scanlon 1975: 668.)   
110 The first hundred or so pages of Doris Lessing’s 1999 novel, Mara and Dann, is a gripping portrayal of, among 
other things, what it is like to be chronically thirsty, hungry, dusty, and unable to find adequate shelter.  
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 There is intrinsic interest in investigating need in order to better understand what it is to 
be human, and also to illuminate what humans and other embodied beings share. However, the 
appropriateness of focusing on needs derives largely from the fact that need satisfaction has a 
decided urgency (the “close to home” argument), together with the fact that need is a threshold 
concept. The latter is true in the sense that needs have (at least usually) clear conditions of 
satisfaction. Because of this it is generally possible for us to discern whether a person’s basic or 
vital needs are met. In this sense, need satisfaction/non-satisfaction admits of objective 
assessment. Accordingly, need satisfaction provides a useful, albeit incomplete, basis for making 
third-person, and also comparative, quality of life assessments. (Here I am assuming need 
satisfaction constitutes an important dimension of any individual’s life going well; but need 
satisfaction is only one such dimension, and perhaps not the most important one from the first-
person standpoint.) Such assessments are particularly important in political philosophy, that is, 
for judging how well-off individuals are or would be under different principles of distributive 
justice. 
 The fact that there is a clear point at which a person’s basic or vital needs are adequately 
met is relevant to the question of our obligations to help others meet their needs. If we have 
such obligations they would have a clear cut-off point, meaning, they are not open-ended or 
indefinite obligations. But do we have obligations to help others meet their needs? After all, one 
might think need satisfaction is important, while also maintaining that such satisfaction is not an 
entitlement, such that each person has a claim on others for assistance in meeting their needs. I 
think need satisfaction does provide a reasonable basis for articulating an account of basic 
entitlements each person has. There are two main reasons for this. First, individuals have basic 
or vital needs, and whether or not these are satisfied is a crucial constituent of how well one’s 
life goes. In short, the satisfaction of needs is very important, meaning, we have an impersonal 
reason to care about whether or not others’ needs are satisfied. Second, individuals are not self-
sufficient, and they cannot satisfy their needs by themselves. Therefore they depend on some 
form of social cooperation for meeting their needs. Because the satisfaction of basic or vital 
needs is a clear goal with a clear cut-off point, aiming for this goal does not place undue 
burdens on members of society or on social institutions.  
 There are a number of complexities here concerning the institutional context and extent 
of our need-based obligations to one another. For example, some believe our obligation to help 
others meet their needs is grounded simply in the fact that others are fellow human beings who 
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have needs; accordingly, we are morally obligated to help out insofar as we can reasonably do 
so. Others believe our obligations are mediated by factors more specific than shared humanity. 
Such factors might include whether the others in question are members of one’s political 
community, or whether the others are in need as a result of being subject to a shared pattern of 
social interaction (e.g. we and the others are both subjects of the global economy, though the 
benefits and burdens of such subjection are not distributed equally). All of these complexities I 
will leave aside here.111 The important point is individuals have basic or vital needs, and whether 
or not these needs are satisfied is a crucial constituent of how well one’s life goes. Yet 
individuals are not capable of meeting their needs by themselves. Thus, because the satisfaction 
of basic or vital needs has urgency, and because each of us depends on others for meeting our 
needs, need-based obligations suggest a very important—perhaps the most important—type of 
interpersonal obligation we have. Such an obligation is not open-ended; hence it places 
reasonable demands on us as moral agents. In this regard, need-based obligations compare 
favorably with (e.g.) the much less plausible assumptions that we have obligations to promote 
others’ welfare in general, or the satisfaction of their preferences (whatever these are). For all 
these reasons, it is reasonable to require a scheme of social cooperation to give central 
importance to ensuring that everyone’s needs are met.   
 
1.4.2 Needs and the Specification of a Baseline of Environmental Concern 
 So far my concern has been to indicate why needs are an important focal point for 
moral and political reflection about what we owe each other in a basic sense. But the focus on 
needs is also relevant to the specification of a baseline for environmental ethics. For the 
satisfaction of our basic or vital needs is dependent not just on a scheme of social cooperation, 
but also on nature. Nature, understood as those natural sources and resources on which we 
necessarily depend, has been until recently largely taken for granted and sometimes actively 
obscured in discussions of ethics and political life. Once we have our dependence on nature 
clearly in view, we can better see that we do a profound injustice to future generations if we 
compromise their ability to meet their needs from nature. However, if we don’t have an account 
of what we ought to preserve as a matter of basic environmental concern, it is unclear how we 
would know whether we are compromising the ability of future generations in the relevant 
                                                
111 I return to some of these complexities in Chapters 4. 
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sense. The defense of ecological health (with a supporting role played by biological integrity) is 
meant to specify the nature we should care about as a matter of basic environmental concern.  
 One might read my argument so far as follows: once we clarify our basic or vital needs, 
we can clarify the ecological conditions for these needs to be met over the long-term. 
Accordingly, a need based account of our obligations to present and future generations implies 
a vision of harmony between humans and nature. Which is to say, if only we focused on 
satisfying our needs—rather than, say, on satisfying our insatiable desires or preferences—
nature would provide for us. Although such a view may be attractive, things are not so easy. I 
do not assume that a focus on ecological health, as a way of clarifying the conditions for 
meeting humanity’s present and future needs, entails that nature will necessarily provide for our 
needs. To think that nature is so ordered is a grand teleological, and maybe even metaphysical, 
assumption. Whether or not nature does in fact provide for our needs depends on a number of 
factors, such as the size of the human population, the state of our technological development, 
and the non-occurrence of catastrophic natural or human-caused events. Moreover, natural 
systems are, in fundamental respects, unpredictable. And there are many things we can’t control 
even if we can predict them (e.g. climate change). My concern has been to focus on those things 
we can, if not control, at least direct or affect in some meaningful sense. This was my 
motivation for clarifying the shape of a minimally decent life and our basic obligations to one 
another given our current knowledge of ecological constraints and capacities.112  
 That said, the people of the future may have to face the possibility that nature will not, 
in fact, be able to provide even for humanity’s basic or vital needs. This is a disturbing thought. 
In any case, the focus on basic need satisfaction is far more reasonable than, say, the focus on 
satisfying whatever preferences we happen to have (even if we restricted ourselves to those 
preferences that are not unjust and that we can currently afford to satisfy). By focusing on what 
we need, rather than on what we want or desire (or what we are persuaded to want or desire by 
modern advertising), we envision a life that is more modest in its ecological effects. In the best 
case scenario, this positions us to pass on to future generations of humans and nonhumans a 
less degraded natural world. Unfortunately, the natural world we are currently bequeathing to 
future generations is seriously degraded, and this degradation is driven first and foremost by the 
unsustainable and non-universalizable consumption by the global rich. Further, if we focused 
                                                
112 My remarks in this paragraph were stimulated by the discussion in Soper 1995: 167-9. 
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on living a decent life, one in which our needs are satisfied together with whatever “eco-
friendly” desires we may have, then if it turned out that the people of the future couldn’t meet 
their needs from nature, at least they wouldn’t have cause for resenting us (or some of us) for 
spoiling the earth through short-sightedness and extravagant living.   
 
1.4.3 Nature’s Complexity and Precaution 
 Let me turn to the second consideration regarding what a minimally acceptable ethical 
view would look like. I believe any proposed ethical view that purports to be relevant to 
contemporary realities must acknowledge nature’s complexity, dynamism and unpredictability. I 
alluded to this at different points in the preceding discussion. Recall Leopold’s important claim 
that “[the] biota [is] so complex, so conditioned by interwoven cooperations and competitions, 
that no man can say where utility begins and ends. No species can be ‘rated’ without the tongue 
in the cheek […] The only sure conclusion is that the biota as a whole is useful” (1939: 266). 
This view has not been abandoned by contemporary scientists. Indeed, the latter have become 
perhaps even more sensitive to the difficulties of prediction, given the complexity of natural 
systems that Leopold speaks of.  
 On this matter, we may recall E. O. Wilson’s remarks, noted above in my response to 
Sagoff’s objection to integrity. Wilson maintains that ecosystems are largely unpredictable due 
to the particularity of the species that compose them (1999: 182). Any biologist and ecologist is 
confronted with what Wilson calls “law-destroying idiosyncrasies” (ibid.), which can confound 
our attempts to understand and predict how ecosystems function. Wilson, for his part, is not 
entirely pessimistic about the prospects of “creat[ing] principles and methods that can precisely 
chart the future of ecosystems in the face of the human onslaught” (ibid.). But he thinks this 
will result from natural histories that analyze ecosystems in detail, from the bottom up. It 
follows that, as Wilson says, “there might be an answer to the question I am asked most 
frequently about the diversity of life: if enough species are extinguished, will the ecosystems 
collapse, and will the extinction of most other species follow soon afterward? The only answer 
anyone can give is: possibly. By the time we find out, however, it might be too late. One planet, 
one experiment” (ibid.).   
 Besides complexities inherent in the nature of ecosystems as such, another factor that 
inhibits understanding and prediction is the nature of astronomical, geological and climatic 
events. For example, Soulé writes: “Astronomical, geological, and climatic events are, for 
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practical purposes, random (sometimes chaotic) and beyond our control. Predictability, in most 
cases, is impossible or unlikely in the near future […] Because climate and other large-scale 
physical events are characterized by nonlinear and often chaotic dynamics, long-term 
predictions may never be reliable” (1995: 141).  
 Many such statements from prominent scientists might be adduced here, all reiterating 
the same basic point: nature is tremendously complex, perhaps unfathomable. This fact makes it 
difficult to understand and predict how nature functions in general, and how nature might 
respond to human activities in particular. However, we are not completely at a loss here. For 
example, some human-caused “disturbances” have proven beneficial to ecological health. A 
notable example is the disturbances caused by the traditional land uses of indigenous peoples in 
many parts of the world (for excellent summary discussion, see Dowie 2009: Ch. 10). But there 
remain a host of uncertainties regarding the long-term effects on ecological and human health 
of industrial modifications of nature, and also uncertainties relating to the more recent genetic 
engineering of plant and animal species.113  
 Given these realities, it seems to me that any adequate ethical view, at least one that 
aims to grapple with environmental questions, must acknowledge what may be unavoidable 
limits to our collective capacity to understand how nature functions and remains “healthy.” 
Acknowledging nature’s complexity and our limits suggests that intellectual humility is a 
necessary virtue for any minimally acceptable ethical view. Intellectual humility consists of a 
number of elements: a deep recognition of the limits of one’s knowledge and capacity to 
understand the world; an openness to the possibility that one is mistaken about things that 
matter; and a willingness to revise one’s beliefs and practices faced with new evidence.114 This is 
not an exhaustive list of the constituents of intellectual humility, but it suffices to suggest the 
central importance of this virtue for a contemporary environmentalism.115 As a practical 
                                                
113 With respect to genetic engineering, the issue is clearly not whether the technology to create genetically 
modified crops (or animals) should be developed. Genetically modified crops are already in widespread use, 
particularly in the United States. “In 2000 [genetically modified crops] constituted over one-fifth of the corn 
acreage, over half of the soybean acreage, and nearly three-quarters of the cotton acreage planted in the United 
States. In 2002 over 58 million hectares (or 140 million acres) of agricultural land were sown with genetically 
modified crops worldwide” (Sandler 2005: 215). As Sandler argues, the ethical issue here is “whether, to what 
extent, and under what circumstances the technology [to create genetically modified products] should be used” 
(ibid.). For useful discussion of the issues, scientific and otherwise, relating to genetic engineering, see Anderson 
1999 and Pence 2002: Ch. 8-10, 13-16.  
114 My thinking about intellectual humility is indebted to Robert McKim.   
115 Since intellectual humility seems relevant to several contemporary challenges—dealing with religious diversity, 
entrenched political conflict, etc.—it is tempting to regard this virtue as valuable across the board, so to speak. But 
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expression of intellectual humility, we need to leave room for error in our dealings with nature. 
Hence the appropriateness of the precautionary principle as a guide for environmental policy. 
The intuitive idea here is be risk-averse, “to play it safe,” when what is at issue is maintaining 
the health of the earth’s ecosystems and landscapes.   
 Two points are especially important here. First, there is the issue of where the 
precautionary principle places the burden of proof. Generally speaking, the principle demands 
the proof of safety, not the proof of unsafety. That is, the burden of proving that a given 
product or activity is environmentally safe should lie with those who propose (or the relevant 
regulatory agencies for those who propose) to modify, introduce something into, or otherwise 
develop nature in some respect that raises the question of possible threats to ecological health. 
I’m assuming here that any threat to ecological health is also, directly or indirectly, a threat to 
the health and well-being of humans and that of many other living beings. But rather than focus 
on threats to human health, as is common in discussions of risk, it makes more sense to focus 
on threats to ecological health. This reflects the assumption—which bears repeating—that 
ecological health is foundational for human health.116 Second, the precautionary principle 
should prevent agents from using scientific uncertainty as a pretext for disregarding or 
understating the possible (negative) impacts on ecological health of a proposed or ongoing 
human activity.117  
 While the precautionary principle is often invoked as a way of trying to prevent general 
threats to the environment or to the earth,118 I believe this principle is given a clearer mooring if 
it is tethered specifically to ecological health. Accordingly, what the precautionary principle 
                                                                                                                                                 
I don’t need to defend this stronger claim to argue for the importance of intellectual humility in the environmental 
context. 
116 Again, see Rapport 2007 and the chapters in Chivian and Bernstein 2008 which substantiate this essential point. 
I also recommend the classic, and prescient, account in Howard 2006 (originally published in 1947).  
117 Such an appeal is implicit, for example, in the following statement of the precautionary principle: “In order to 
achieve sustainable development, policies must be based on the precautionary principle. Environmental measure[s] 
must anticipate, prevent and attack the causes of environmental degradation. Where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to 
prevent environmental degradation” (Bergen Ministerial Declaration, May 1990, cited in Wiggins 2005: 42). Here is 
another statement, this one from The Common Inheritance: “Government will be prepared to take precautionary 
action to limit the use of potentially dangerous materials or the spread of potential dangerous pollutants, even 
where scientific knowledge is not conclusive, if the balance of likely costs and benefits justifies it” (cited in ibid., 
note 21). 
118 E.g. see the two statements in the previous note. Wiggins also speaks generically of “threats to the earth” (2005: 
43), though his real concern is, as he says a bit further on, threats to “the earth as that which, directly or indirectly, 
supplies all vital human needs” (ibid.).  
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requires is that our collective actions not threaten or undermine the minimum goal of 
maintaining (or restoring) ecological health. This way of viewing things is directly relevant to 
specifying a useful concept of sustainability. To the question “what are we trying to sustain?” 
the short (and minimalist) answer is: “ecological health.” However, absent a clear statement of 
what it is we are trying to sustain, ecologically speaking, the notion of sustainability can be filled 
in more or less however one pleases. This fact has greatly hampered clear thinking about 
sustainability; it has also hampered the practical usefulness of the concept.119 I discuss in detail 
the merits of different conceptions of sustainability in Chapter 4.  
 The preceding discussion of the precautionary principle as a general guide, and the 
earlier account of the importance of needs, is not meant to preclude the appeal to more 
                                                
119 Having identified the lack of an operational definition of sustainability, Wiggins writes: “If we preserve the 
conceptual purity of the idea of sustainability itself, then we shall be in a position to count a policy as strictly or 
absolutely sustainable if its implementation leaves behind it at least as large and good an environmental resource 
base as it itself inherits from its predecessors” (2005: 49). While I do not object to the basic idea expressed here, I 
think Wiggins’ statement is inadequate for two reasons. First, the present generation has inherited an ecologically 
impoverished world. According to Wiggins’ principle, we would fulfill our obligations if we sustained an 
environmental resource base that is at least as good as the one we inherited. But this may not be good enough, i.e. 
if the resource base we have inherited is an ecologically impoverished one. This calls forth my second point: We 
need an objective way of specifying that which we minimally need to preserve or sustain, ecologically speaking. The 
account of ecological health is meant to provide such a specification. Moreover, if my argument in 1.3 is sound, 
then the notion of preserving an environmental resource base is conceptually inadequate. Even with respect to the 
fairly modest goal of specifying the meaning of sustainability, I think we need an account not only of nature as 
resource but also one of nature as source.  
 My points here are also applicable to the exceedingly abstract statements regarding our obligations to 
future generations that are made by some philosophers. To give one example, Rawls writes: “The correct principle 
[i.e. a just saving principle] […] is one the members of any generation (and so all generations) would adopt as the 
principle they would want preceding generations to have followed, no matter how far back in time” (2001: 160). It 
seems to me statements such as this are too vague to have much meaning for guiding practice and policy. 
Moreover, such statements of “timeless” moral obligation seem inappropriate for thinking clearly about many 
environmental problems. For example, suppose we modified (in light of my arguments in this chapter) Rawls’s 
statement to say the correct principle is one that, at minimum, maintains and restores ecological health. Is it 
reasonable to assume that each generation would have wanted the members of any other generation to preserve 
ecological health “no matter how far back in time”? For one thing, past generations may have been so desperate to 
attain a decent life that it would be unreasonable to expect them to have aimed at maintaining ecological health (or 
whatever functional equivalent). Moreover, our scientific knowledge changes over time. Shouldn’t our normative 
principles reflect these changing realities? It seems to me the present generation, and maybe the immediately prior 
one too, is in a very different position regarding the insidiousness of industrial emissions of (in particular) carbon, 
compared to, say, the generations that lived from the beginning of the industrial revolution up to the 1950s. In 
other words, it seems to me morally unobjectionable that prior generations put the quantity of carbon into the 
atmosphere that they did, that is, on the supposition that they couldn’t have known how ecologically problematic 
this would turn out to be. Which is to say, maybe prior generations didn’t act without due precaution, at least with 
respect to their industrial emissions. (They may have been reckless in other respects.) In short, I don’t see how it is 
plausible to place behind the “veil of ignorance,” as Rawls suggest, our knowledge of which generation we are a 
member of. Though perhaps this is, in the end, a relatively minor objection. For as Rawls says, “the setup of the 
original position forces the parties to focus on the basic needs and requirements, the fundamental interests, of 
those they represent; and given the strains of commitment, they must adopt principles that secure those interests” 
(2001: 110). I have argued above for something more or less along these same lines.  
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stringent principles or norms, based on other desiderata. For example, one might argue that a 
morally appropriate bequest package to future generations should include more than the 
minimal goal of maintaining ecological health and the instrumentally necessary number of 
landscapes that have the property of biological integrity. Or one might argue that we should 
pass on to future generations the maximum amount of biodiversity possible, or that we should 
preserve the greatest amount of habitat possible for wild species, even if doing so goes far 
beyond what is necessary for maintaining or restoring ecological health. I’m sympathetic to such 
goals (see Chapter 2-4120). But my concern in this chapter has been to specify a baseline of 
environmental preservation that everyone should endorse. 
 I should note a further complication here. In saying that everyone should endorse the 
goal of preserving or restoring ecological health, one might wonder what meaning this goal 
would have in landscapes that are beyond repair, or landscapes that, even under the best of 
imagined scenarios, would never be able to support the current populations living on them 
(such as many parts of the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, or the southwestern United States). 
It may simply be implausible to imagine ecological health being an achievable goal for such 
areas. Presumably, the people in question will either need to move somewhere else, or at least 
get their necessary resources from somewhere else. This scenario raises issues of morally 
appropriate aid and may also raise, depending on the context, questions of justice. Without 
elaborating too much here (see Chapter 4 for further discussion), I believe those countries 
capable of producing surplus goods and services, without compromising the ecological health 
of their local landscapes, have the responsibility to aid those who live in parts of the world 
where meeting even basic human needs is impossible without at the same time compromising 
ecological health. In the long-run people are going to have to move to those parts of the world 
where they can actually live without degrading their local landscapes, or (just as bad) relying on 
imports of goods from other places that involve the degradation of the landscapes from which 
these goods originate. 
 
1.4.4 Concluding Remark on the Anthropocentric Defense of Ecological Health 
 Above I claimed that it is sufficient to value ecological health, with a supporting role 
played by biological integrity, in anthropocentric terms. However, in 1.3 I suggested that 
                                                
120 Especially my defense of the fourth conception of sustainability in Chapter 4. 
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evaluative anthropocentricism seems inadequate for a proper appreciation of the value of 
nature, specifically, the sense of nature as source. Since I have claimed that the notion of nature 
as source partly maps onto what is meant by ecological health, this suggests a tension in my 
account. My considered view is that an anthropocentric defense of ecological health provides a 
sufficiently strong reason to motivate environmental concern and a robust environmental 
politics. However, such a defense seems to me to lack something. 
 The lack here can be illuminated by an analogy. Valuing ecological health 
anthropocentrically (i.e. instrumentally) is like valuing the good functioning of one’s physical 
body in a purely instrumental way. Such a view is not incoherent, but it nonetheless seems 
inadequate. Valuing one’s good functioning—in a word, one’s health—only instrumentally fails 
to appreciate the absolutely basic importance of such functioning to how one’s life goes. It 
seems more plausible to hold that one’s own good functioning, and by analogy nature’s good 
functioning, are indeed instrumentally valuable but in a deep and foundational sense. Thus we 
could refer to the value of such complex functional states as bodily and ecological health as 
being “foundationally valuable.” Being foundationally valuable is, in a sense, still being valuable 
as a means (i.e. a “foundation” is for supporting something else). But the important point is that 
not all means are equally significant. Therefore the common category of “instrumental values” 
seems too coarse to track the different kinds of instrumental values, or the different ways in 
which something may be instrumentally valuable.   
 However, even if one is persuaded by this view one must admit there is a notable 
asymmetry between the case of our own good functioning (or that of other humans or other 
animals) and the good functioning of natural systems. Natural systems are not the sort of 
entities that can care whether they are healthy (functional) or diseased (dysfunctional). There is 
no experiencing subject in the case of natural systems—no subject for whom being healthy or 
diseased would be a good or bad thing, even if there is a subject of whom we can predicate health 
or disease (namely, ecosystems, landscapes, and maybe even the biosphere). Accordingly, the 
ascription of health to natural systems is an objective state assessment with no subjective 
element (i.e. “subjective” in the sense that there is a subject capable of experiencing being a 
healthy or a diseased natural system). This fact blocks what might otherwise seem like an 
intuitive extension of concern for human health (or, more broadly, concern for the health of 
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animals) to concern for the health of natural systems.121 One of the fundamental reasons to care 
about the health of humans, or of other animals, is that humans and other animals can care 
whether they are healthy or diseased. For being debilitated—by disease, persistent hunger and 
thirst, great pain, etc.—is suffered first-personally. This fact provides at least a prima facie reason 
for being concerned about health, or good functioning, in the case of humans and other 
animals. But there is not an analogous reason motivating concern for ecological health.122  
 While we should acknowledge the important differences among different types of 
entities that can be healthy (animals, plants, ecosystems, landscapes, the biosphere, etc.), this 
does not, in the end, threaten the appropriateness of regarding ecological health as 
foundationally important. For ecological health refers, in part, to something that is absolutely 
basic—the preconditions for the continued diversity and flourishing of life. Acknowledging 
nature’s value as source and resource means acknowledging our fundamental, and apparently 
inescapable, dependence on natural systems. It also means acknowledging that our flourishing 
is, in certain basic respects, impossible to disentangle from the flourishing of a diversity of other 
living beings. Thus, even if an anthropocentric rationale for caring about ecological health may 
be sufficient to motivate concern and even good environmental policy, such a rationale fails to 
do justice to the nature and value of ecological health as an object of concern. 
                                                
121 James Karr appears to succumb to this naïve view, when he writes: “In my view, health as a word and concept 
in ecology is useful precisely because it is a familiar concept. It is an effortless intuitive step from ‘my health’ to 
‘ecological health’” (2000: 211-12). 
122 On this point, I agree with the motivation objection presented by Jamieson against the notion of “ecosystem 
health” (1995: 217-220). Although Jamieson is not writing as a utilitarian, his critique recalls Peter Singer’s denial 
that ecosystems can have morally relevant interests (see Singer 1993: 283-4). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES BEYOND THE BASELINE: 
AN EXPLORATION AND PARTIAL DEFENSE OF AN HISTORICAL ACCOUNT 
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2.1 INTRODUCTION: THE DIVERSE SOURCES OF ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES  
 In the last chapter I argued for a view of nature’s value grounded in the fact that nature 
is the source of a diversity of environmental goods and services on which we, along with all 
sorts of other living beings, depend. Such value is plainly of great importance. Without nature’s 
variety of goods and services human beings could not live a decent life (leaving aside fantasies 
of successfully colonizing other planets). However, this dimension of environmental value 
captures only one sense in which nature is valuable. Philosophers have noted many other 
senses, and a brief survey of these is useful.  
 Nature exhibits various aesthetic or “expressive” qualities, and can do so to a very high 
degree. It is common, for example, to regard nature (or some aspects of it) as being beautiful. 
Many examples of natural objects or events might support this claim: sunsets, the angles of a 
pine tree, the play of light on a lake, or the graceful curve of a hill. In a more general way, 
nature merits our interest given its remarkable range of characteristics—intricacy, delicacy, 
multi-faceted complexity, recalcitrance, solidity, vastness, grandeur, uniqueness, and 
spontaneity, to name a few prominent examples. These qualities of nature call forth our 
aesthetic responsiveness, and this can engender deep satisfaction, perhaps even a distinctive 
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sense of peace and calm.1 Further, nature is capable of enriching our daily lives in countless 
ways. A fitting response to this fact is to feel grateful (Hill 1983). Though this seems best 
characterized as gratitude for something rather than gratitude to someone.2 Obviously, we 
needn’t assume that the reason to engage nature aesthetically is to experience satisfaction, peace, 
or whatever. Rather, these are, as Aristotle would say, a bonus: they accompany (or supervene 
on) the aesthetic activity itself, but are not the aim of the activity.3 There is, in addition, 
something to the thought that aesthetic engagement with nature, and perhaps also various 
forms of practical engagement such as gardening, can be “restorative.”4    
 An account of the aesthetic-expressive qualities of nature would surely be incomplete if 
it left out the uncanny appeal of nature’s “inhumanity” and “indifference” to us (and to many 
other species, for that matter). I’m not thinking so much of the oft-cited claim that “nature is 
red in tooth and claw,” though that could be mentioned here. There are at least two different 
types of “inhumanity.” Examples of the first type might include the bleakness of certain 
landscapes, such as the arctic tundra or an expanse of ocean on a gray day. The second type is 
more interesting and concerns what some philosophers, following Kant, call the sublime. For 
example, when we experience the power—often crushing power—of certain natural events, 
such as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, hurricanes, and the like, we experience nature as 
sublime. Maybe there is a third, intermediary category here, that includes the response of awe, 
or something like it, faced with terrible events like droughts and pestilences. Such events can be 
awesome in their destructiveness, though I’m not sure they exemplify the sublime. In any case, 
nature is capable of engaging our interest, producing such varied responses as awe, fear, a 
heightened awareness of our senses, and a sense of our “smallness” and vulnerability in contrast 
to nature’s overwhelming and crushing power.5  
                                                
1 Bernard Williams (1992: 238) suggests the link between the emotional-aesthetic responses, such as gratitude and a 
sense of peace, to nature’s beauty.  
2 If one were a theist, then one might feel gratitude to God for having provided for us through nature.  
3 See Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, X.4 (esp. 1174b15-1175a4), for relevant remarks about pleasure “completing” 
or “supervening” on (good) activity. I’m not sure whether Aristotle would regard nature as the sort of object 
capable of producing the best kind of activity possible for our perceptual capacity (aisthesis). But it is sufficient to 
say that nature can be a suitable object of aesthetic contemplation, even if it is not the most suitable or best object 
to call forth and realize our capacities for aesthetic experience.  
4 For discussion, see Brady 2006: 287-8.  
5 Hettinger and Throop (1999: 13) suggest that in an increasingly secular age nature is capable of acting as an object 
of great value in comparison with which we might “feel small.” The view is that we need to feel small in comparison 
with something in order to develop a proper sense of humility. Although the authors do not say so, the argument 
only makes sense if we assume that humility is a valuable character trait; so we need to build in this assumption. 
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 The aesthetic-expressive qualities of nature are interesting in their own right, and surely 
merit the attention of aesthetically sensitive beings like us. But these qualities are also important 
as a reminder that the natural world is in important ways inhuman, indifferent to us, radically 
“other.” To be sure, certain aspects of the natural world do “provide” for us, and I don’t mean 
to discount this. I discussed this in Chapter 1. But in contrast to the various supportive and 
enriching roles played by nature, it does not appear the natural world was “made” for us, nor 
for anything it seems—that is, assuming the non-teleological view of evolution offered by 
Darwin is correct. Further, it appears we can’t control nature in an ultimate sense, no matter 
how hard we might try or wish. As the poet Horace put it: “Though you drive out nature with a 
pitchfork, yet it will always return” (Epistles 10.24). Of course, nature succumbs here and there, 
yet it seems to retain its recalcitrance to any lasting modification. Though the nature that returns 
may not be the same one that was driven out; it may be a more impoverished, less diverse, less 
congenial, nature.    
 Contemplation of these facts about nature is apt to provoke a response qualitatively 
different from those accompanying the contemplation of nature’s beauty. Appreciating nature’s 
otherness requires us to take up a more sobering and realistic view of things. While this view is 
stimulating in various ways, the view is apt to provoke a sense of terror, or something like it. 
There is an important contrast, then, between nature as beautiful, which is apt to engender a 
sense of peace, calm, and gratitude, and nature as sublime, which is apt to terrify, unsettle, and 
humble us.6  
 Given the distinctiveness of the various aesthetic qualities of the natural world, and the 
satisfactions and accompanying values of experiencing and contemplating these qualities, we 
have strong reasons to protect nature on aesthetic grounds. Aesthetic reasons are not trivial, 
even though they are not plausibly thought of as instrumental to self-preservation or to the 
satisfaction of basic needs. Instead, aesthetic experience enables the realization of certain 
(intrinsically) valuable human powers, specifically, our power of perception and discernment, 
                                                                                                                                                 
While I’m sympathetic to the idea that humility is indeed an important virtue, one worry I have here is that nature’s 
value seems to be reduced to something like its capacity to play a functional role. Conceivably, many other objects 
might function to produce the relevant humility. Plus, the fact that nature happens to serve this function now (or 
might plausibly be thought to do so) is just a contingent fact of the widespread loss of faith in other objects, such 
as God, which might have played this role in other periods. I worry that this general line of argument misses what 
is distinctive about nature, and the reasons we have to value it in its own right. For what it’s worth, I believe 
Hettinger and Throop would agree with my worry just expressed. But their argument, as stated, might be playing 
into the hands of a view they would oppose.      
6 Mapping this contrast is one of the important points made in Williams 1992.  
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the exercise of which is good in itself. Aesthetic experience can be vital, invigorating, and life-
enhancing.7 It can enliven our imagination. It may also have, as Kant maintained, a reflexive 
element. That is, engagement with nature may lead to a certain self-discovery and self-
understanding (even if we might disagree with Kant’s own way of filling in the relevant sense of 
self-discovery).8 In these respects, aesthetic experience is an important aspect of living a good 
human life, even if only one aspect.9   
 Setting aside the question of aesthetic experience as partly constitutive of human 
flourishing, one implication of developing our aesthetic powers is that this makes us capable of 
various forms of “attunement” to others and the world, to what is there. Maybe this isn’t always 
a good thing. When I used to live in New York City there were many things I did not benefit 
from being attuned to, such as the incessant traffic noise or the never-ending accumulation of 
trash. But the point is aesthetic sensitivity enables us to be sensitive to the specific qualities that 
objects possess.10 This is important even if the qualities of certain objects may be off-putting or 
disturbing. A set of qualities not yet mentioned is what we might think of as the limits that 
objects present to us, given their characteristic structure and ways of being integrated.11 In this 
regard, aesthetic sensitivity may be integral to forms of concern that are moral, or proto-moral. 
For example, being aesthetically sensitive to the distinctiveness of natural forms would be hard 
to reconcile with performing acts of vandalism that deface or impair natural forms, or acts of 
                                                
7 This seems true whether one endorses the Kantian view of “disinterestedness” in aesthetics (see Kant 2000: 178-
82; Academy edition: 5:298-303), or (e.g.) a more Deweyan view that aims to incorporate aesthetics into everyday 
experience and practice (see Dewey 1980: Ch. 1). For discussion, see Brady 2006: 286-7.   
8 Kant suggests that nature’s sublimity (threatening cliffs, thunder and lightning, hurricanes, etc.) “make[s] our 
capacity (Vermögen) to resist into an insignificant trifle in comparison with [nature’s] power” (2000: 144; Academy 
edition: 5:261). But we are not, according to Kant, left merely with the sense of fear and trembling. Instead, “in our 
aesthetic judgment nature is judged as sublime not insofar as it arouses fear, but rather because it calls forth our 
own power (which is not part of nature) to regard those things about which we are concerned (goods, health and 
life) as trivial, and hence to regard its power (to which we are, to be sure, subjected in regard to these things) as not 
the sort of dominion over ourselves and our authority to which we would have to bow if it came down to our 
highest principles and their affirmation or abandonment. Thus nature is here called sublime merely because it raises 
the imagination to the point of presenting those cases in which the mind can make palpable to itself the sublimity 
of its own [moral] vocation even over nature” (2000: 145; Academy edition: 5:262). Hence the self-discovery 
enabled by experience of the sublime in nature is the recognition that our own mind is superior over nature, even if 
the latter is undoubtedly capable of dominating us physically. I leave it to readers to decide whether this is, in the 
end, a refined way of dominating nature. Though a balanced assessment of Kant’s view would need to incorporate 
his discussion of nature’s beauty, which he unambiguously recognizes (see 2000: 177-82; Academy edition: 5:298-
303).   
9 For interesting discussion of aesthetics (as well as science) as dimensions of a good life that is environmentally 
concerned, see O’Neill 1993: Ch. 5 and 9. Also illuminating is the discussion in Hepburn 1997.  
10 See O’Neill 1993: 159-60, 165. 
11 See O’Neill 1993: 164-5; Hepburn 1997: 69-70.  
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cruelty toward living creatures. I do not mean to imply that the limits presented to us by natural 
objects, given their distinctive integrity, are inviolable. I can’t eat a carrot without destroying its 
integrity. Nor do I believe aesthetic valuation alone would lead us to think of natural objects as 
inviolable in a moral sense. My point is just that such limits would not show up as there at all if 
we do not develop our powers of aesthetic appreciation, with its focused attention and 
discernment. In this respect, there may be an interesting, though indirect and non-causal, 
relation between aesthetic sensitivity and moral or proto-moral sensitivity. 
 Two additional thoughts merit mention here. Valuing objects aesthetically often gives 
expression to a non-instrumental or “disinterested” form of concern. Such concern is valuable 
insofar as the pressure of the practical and the necessary can distort our view of the world, 
leading us to be insensitive and truncated in our relations to particular others, objects, or places. 
“The farmer who sees the world simply in terms of production yields sees not a rat, a kestrel or 
a wolf but different kinds of vermin. He sees not a plant with its specific properties and 
qualities, but a weed” (O’Neill 1993: 160).12 A related second point is that a non-instrumental 
engagement with nature might lead us to be, as John O’Neill says, “content with…mystery” 
(1993: 165). O’Neill is interested specifically in a case in which someone, say a scientist, is 
willing to destroy an environment in order to know it. O’Neill thinks this aspiration reflects a 
misunderstanding of the goods of scientific knowledge.13 The idea is that if the goods of 
knowledge include appreciating the object one aims to know, then a means of knowing the 
object that destroys the object, or destroys some of its specific qualities, would be ruled out. 
The implication of O’Neill’s view is that sometimes we must be content with mystery, with not 
knowing, at least in those cases where the aspiration to know destroys the thing we aspire to 
know. This view raises a host of issues I cannot settle here. But this consideration is worth 
having on our radar as we reflect on the significance of an aesthetic engagement with nature, 
and the ways in which this might bear on our responses to, and actions with respect to, 
particular others, objects, or places. Below I’ll return to various ethical considerations raised by 
this discussion.  
                                                
12 See also Hepburn 1997: 67. 
13 A real-life example, noted by O’Neill, is that of an experiment carried out by E. O. Wilson and one of his 
graduate students to test their model of island biogeography. This required the annihilation (by fumigation) of the 
entire population of insects, spiders, and other arthropods on four very small islands in the Florida keys. The 
experiment was approved by the National Park Service, and was, scientifically, a success. For discussion, see 
Wilson 1999: 223-5.  
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 One final observation on aesthetics and nature. An important dimension of an aesthetic 
relation to nature is that this is a practice that can enrich our lives without destroying things of 
value. “The outstanding characteristic of [aesthetic] perception,” as Leopold observed, “is that it 
entails no consumption and no dilution of any resource” (1949: 173). This has implications for 
how we view nature preservation in relation to recreation, specifically, aesthetic perception as a 
form of recreation. I think Leopold saw this with admirable clarity: “Recreational development 
is a job not of building roads into lovely country, but of building receptivity into the still 
unlovely human mind” (1949: 176-7). There is considerable value in emphasizing non-
consumptive virtues, particularly in a world in which consumption is wreaking havoc on the 
natural world and its nonhuman inhabitants. It would be bad if the goal of promoting or 
enabling an aesthetic relation to nature increased the destruction of the natural world, say, 
because we tried to make nature too readily accessible. This can be an acute problem, for 
example, in managing National Parks. But defending the value of relating to nature aesthetically 
need not have this consequence.  
 The considerations discussed above, which fall under the general umbrella of aesthetics, 
go far beyond the baseline considerations argued for in the first chapter. Yet I don’t mean to 
imply that the non-baseline reasons we have to care about nature are only aesthetic. They are 
not. Some philosophers have sought to attribute value to nature or natural objects in a way that 
is less straightforwardly aesthetic, and instead more ethically charged, or perhaps ambiguous 
between being aesthetically and ethically charged. For example, biocentrists and defenders of 
“pan-psychic” views regard certain natural things as valuable because they “have a good of their 
own,” are capable of being benefited or harmed,14 or are “independent centre[s] with potential 
needs, excellences and claims to flourish of their own.”15 These claims about certain natural 
beings are regarded by many as ethically significant. This is so in the sense that some believe if 
an entity has a good, then this good and its realization (or at least non-destruction) makes some 
sort of claim on us, or presents a barrier to what we can do to the entity in question.  
 Of course, there has been considerable controversy over the apparent move here from a 
descriptive claim (an entity x has a good) to a normative claim (the entity x has an ethically 
significant good that requires some sort of response, such as respect or protection or non-
                                                
14 For classic biocentric accounts, see Taylor 1986 and Sterba 1995, 2000a, and 2005. 
15 See Plumwood 2002: 167. Plumwood defends (in 2002: Ch. 8) what she calls a “pan-psychic” view. 
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interference, from us). Without going too deeply into this controversy here,16 it does seem that 
there is a gap between (a) having a good and (b) having an ethically significant good. In some 
cases we might consider, it seems questionable to move from (a) to (b) without further 
argument justifying this move. Lots of things have a good. But the good of many entities is such 
that we have no reason to respect it, care about, or promote its realization. In fact, we may have 
a reason to try to thwart or destroy the good in question. Reflection on the HIV virus, wheat 
rust, pestilential diseases, and so on, should make this point plain. However, in the case of many 
entities that have a good, such as most plants and animals, we may have reason to regard this 
good as ethically significant. However, if we do have such a reason it is not the bare fact that 
the relevant entity has an identifiable good, but the combination of the fact of having a good 
and other considerations, including one’s overall normative view.  
 Even if it makes sense to think some entities have an ethically significant good, or a 
good that is perhaps ambiguous between being ethically and aesthetically significant, it seems to 
me that bridging the gap noted above ultimately depends on one’s view of what ethics is about. 
Here are a few notable positions to consider, all of which have defenders in the literature. One 
could argue that ethics, in a central or primary sense, concerns beings that can care about what 
happens to them. Accordingly, morally concerned agents should focus on respecting the lives of 
beings that can care (i.e. most sentient beings).17 Alternatively, one could argue that ethics, in a 
fundamental and important sense, is about respecting or promoting the good of beings that 
have a good.18 Of course, such a view requires priority principles for adjudicating between the 
competing claims of different entities that have a good, but whose respective goods may 
conflict. I won’t discuss these principles here, but some philosophers have worked out how 
they might look.19 A third notable view is an Aristotelian one: we should care about the 
                                                
16 See Chapter 3 (3.3.3) for further discussion. 
17 For example, see Jamieson 1998, and my Chapter 3 (3.2.5) for further discussion of this view. 
18 For three different versions of such a view, see Attfield 1987 (which argues for an objectivist version of 
consequentialism, i.e. we have a moral duty to maximize intrinsic value, where the well-being and flourishing of all 
entities that have moral standing is viewed as intrinsically valuable); Taylor 1986: Ch. 2-4 (which argues for a quasi-
Kantian view of “equal inherent value” and the principle of species-impartiality, i.e. “the principle that every 
species counts as having the same value in the sense that, regardless of what species a living thing belongs to, it is 
deemed to be prima facie deserving of equal concern and consideration on the part of moral agents. Its good is 
judged to be worthy of being preserved and protected as an end in itself and for the sake of the entity whose good 
it is” [1986: 155]); and Sterba 2005 (which argues for a textured “libertarian” view defending the rights of all beings 
that have a good, i.e. all beings that can be benefited or harmed). 
19 For a clear statement of priority principles from a biocentrist, see Sterba 2005: 291-7. 
  68 
flourishing of various nonhuman beings, and more generally about the flourishing of the natural 
world, because doing so is (partly) constitutive of our own flourishing. That is, we live better, 
richer, more worthwhile lives when we care about nature and nonhumans for their own sake, 
rather than as mere instruments for human projects and aims.20   
 The various reasons noted above regarding the different ways nature may be a source of 
value are important. There is a considerable philosophical literature defending the importance 
of nature aesthetics and the various ethical ways of thinking about nature which I discussed 
above. Instead of adding my footprints to such well-worn terrain, I want to look at a different 
debate emerging in recent scholarship on environmental values.  
 
2.2 END-STATE VERSUS HISTORICAL VIEWS OF ENVIRONMENTAL VALUE 
 In recent work, John O’Neill, Alan Holland and Andrew Light have usefully 
distinguished two different ways of thinking about environmental values, namely, end-state and 
historical views.21 By “environmental values” I mean the different ways that nature, such as 
particular environments, natural objects, or nature in general, might be valuable. An end-state 
view regards nature as valuable in virtue of certain properties it exhibits, such as complexity, 
beauty, or resilience. An historical view, in contrast, holds that the specific origin and history of 
nature is an important determinant of its value. Being valuable in an end-state or historical way 
is not just another way of being valuable, on a par, say, with being aesthetically valuable or 
ethically significant. Rather, end-state and historical accounts aim to identify the underlying 
reasons why we ought to attribute value to nature. This is so whether these attributions are 
thought of as ultimately aesthetic, ethical, or ambiguous between these categories.  
 Both end-state and historical accounts could probably ground a robust environmental 
ethic and politics. The significance of the contrast between these views does not lie there. My 
suggestion is that the historical views discussed below are capable of captivating our moral and 
political imagination in ways that end-state views fail to. After providing a brief overview of 
end-state views, I introduce the historical view by looking at Robert Elliot’s classic account of 
natural value. I consider various complexities relating to Elliot’s account and offer some 
criticisms of the way Elliot conceptualizes naturalness and its value. The critical discussion of 
                                                
20 John O’Neill gives the best defense of this sort of view. See O’Neill 1993: 23-5, and Ch. 5 and Ch. 9. In Chapter 
4, I consider the relevance of this view for debates about sustainability (see 4.5). 
21 See O’Neill et al. 2008: 144-6.  
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Elliot positions us to explore a modified historical view that does not have the deficiencies of 
Elliot’s view. To help us here, I introduce and critically assess one particular proposal for a 
modified historical account—the narrative view argued for by O’Neill et al. (2008: Ch. 9-11). 
After comparing how the views offered by Elliot and O’Neill et al. propose to instruct us with 
respect to some actual cases, I outline some respects in which these two historical views need 
further refinement. I conclude that historical considerations are important to an account of 
environmental values but they constitute only one of several considerations that need to be 
combined if we aim to articulate a view that does justice to the different ways in which nature 
matters. 
 
2.2.1 End-State Views 
 An object or state of affairs is valuable in an end-state way if it is valuable in virtue of 
the fact that it exhibits or embodies certain desirable properties. For example, a particular car 
may be valuable because it is fuel-efficient, comfortable to drive, and aesthetically attractive. In 
general, the end-state view is particularly good at registering the ways in which commodities, 
and commodity-like things, are valuable. As consumers we are encouraged to think about 
commodities as displaying or embodying various desirable properties—functionality, beauty, 
affordability, and so on. To the extent that such properties are emphasized historical 
considerations, such as where something came from and by what processes it was produced, 
tend to be downplayed or pushed to the background. Of course, there may be vested interests 
that want historical considerations to be obscured or ignored, and we should keep this 
possibility in mind as we proceed. However, my concern in what follows is to clarify the end-
state view as a distinctive view of environmental value. 
 Although an end-state view is particularly good at registering the ways in which tools 
and commodity-like things are valuable, other objects and states of affairs are congenial to end-
state valuation. For example, if a landscape is valued because it exhibits ecological health or 
biodiversity this illustrates the end-state approach to the value of landscapes. Or consider an 
example from philosopher Robin Attfield. Attfield suggests that a basic sense in which nature is 
valuable is that it offers the supportive context for a “blend of creatures each living in 
accordance with its own nature” (1994: 49). We might add, following Attfield, that a further 
aspect of nature’s value is that it does not require our constant management and intervention. 
Faced with the widespread degradation of the natural world, one goal, given Attfield’s kind of 
  70 
view, would be to rehabilitate a natural environment where ecological processes and dynamics 
could play out on their own. As such, we could view the rehabilitation of a degraded 
environment to a state in which a diversity of creatures, each living its life according to its 
nature, could run its course. There is, of course, a temporal dimension to the lives of living 
beings. And the idea of a world “running its course” is plainly temporal. But these elements do 
not negate the overall picture, which is of an end-state. For an end-state view, the particular 
history and processes that produce a given object or environment are basically irrelevant. To 
put the point fancifully: if we could pull an ecosystem out of a hat, one that supported the 
requisite blend of creatures and fulfilled the minimal management criterion, then according to 
the end-state view such a system would have the relevant value.22  
 It is not crucial whether the goal is to preserve or restore environments for people only, 
for (some) other species, or for the natural world in its own right. Both anthropocentric and 
nonanthropocentric motivations can fit with an end-state view. What matters is that an object 
or state is valued because of certain qualities it exhibits, or would exhibit were it to be restored. 
Not only is such a view conceptually coherent, a number of scientists, environmentalists, policy 
makers, and philosophers are committed to such a view.  
 An important disadvantage of end-state views is their inability to recognize the 
normative issues at stake in cases of proposed substitution. The question of substitution arises 
in situations in which we might substitute an object or environment for another that has the 
same, or sufficiently similar, end-state properties. If there is no interesting sense in which 
objects or environments are valuable because they embody a particular history, or because they 
are the product of processes of a certain sort (e.g. natural processes), then substituting one 
object or environment with another becomes very easy. The only difficulties are practical. That 
is, if we can find functional substitutes for these objects and environments, or for the relevant 
services or opportunities they provide (whether these be economic, ecological, recreational, 
aesthetic, etc.), then there may be no objection to making the substitution. The problem is that 
such a view is insensitive to considerations that bear on whether, and in what respects, an object 
or environment is valuable. Specifically, the end-state view misses the significance of origin and 
                                                
22 I’m not sure if Attfield would completely agree with this last statement regarding the implications of an end-state 
view. For he appears to be sensitive to the thought that “what unimpeded nature would have produced” (as he 
puts it) might be relevant to the question of what appropriate rehabilitations of degraded landscapes might consist 
in. However if, as Attfield maintains, the real locus of value resides “in the fulfillment of the capacities of the 
various natural creatures,” then the history that led to the state where such fulfillment occurs seems relatively 
unimportant, although perhaps not entirely irrelevant (see Attfield 1994: 49-50).    
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history for an understanding of environmental values. This inability to deal with the question of 
substitution is a major reason why many writers follow Robert Elliot in defending an historical 
view of environmental value.  
 
2.2.2 Robert Elliot’s Historical View 
 Robert Elliot23 has provided the most elaborate philosophical defense of an historical 
view of natural value, where “natural value” refers to the value various natural objects (plants, 
species, ecosystems, etc.) can have.24 The view, in short, is that origin (genesis) and history can 
be important determinants of natural value. That is, origin and history can be “value-adding,” 
though not necessarily valuable in their own right or in isolation.25 In this section I outline 
Elliot’s view and indicate its explanatory power. Later I will consider some important criticisms 
of the view.  
 Elliot’s 1982 essay “Faking Nature” had a specific focus, namely, the pernicious 
character of what Elliot called “the restoration thesis” (later called “the replacement thesis”26). 
Here is the sort of case motivating Elliot’s view:  
There is a proposal to mine beach sands for rutile.27 Large areas of dune are to be 
cleared of vegetation and the dunes themselves destroyed. It is agreed, by all 
parties concerned, that the dune area has value quite apart from a utilitarian one. 
It is agreed, in other words, that it would be a bad thing, considered in itself, for 
the dune area to be dramatically altered. Acknowledging this the mining 
company expresses its willingness, indeed its desire, to restore the dune area to 
its original condition after the minerals have been extracted. The company goes 
on to argue that any loss of value is merely temporary and that full value will in 
fact be restored. In other words they are claiming that the destruction of what 
has value is compensated for by the later creation (re-creation) of something of 
equal value. I shall call this ‘the restoration thesis’. (Elliot 1982: 76)  
One thing to note initially is that there is a sense in which the restoration thesis is true: restoring 
the dunes in this case would provide some meaningful compensation. Elliot’s point, however, is 
that the restored site does not have equal value to the site that existed prior to the mining. The 
                                                
23 See Elliot 1982 and 1997. Page references to the 1982 article refer to the reprint of this essay in Elliot 1995. 
24 I prefer to speak of “environmental value” rather than “natural value,” but I won’t insist on this here, staying 
instead with Elliot’s vocabulary.  
25 Elliot 1997: 81. 
26 In Elliot’s 1997 revision and expansion of the 1982 article. See Elliot 1997: Ch. 3. 
27 Rutile is a black or reddish-brown mineral consisting of titanium dioxide, typically occurring as needle-like 
crystals. Titanium dioxide is used variously as a gemstone, as a source of titanium, and also as an ingredient in 
paints and fillers. 
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problem with restoration is not that the restored dunes represent an inadequate restoration of 
the various elements and functions manifest at the site prior to the mining. We can grant, for 
the sake of argument, that all the plants, animals, abiotic elements, ecological relationships, and 
so on, that obtained prior to the mining are restored or reinvigorated in such a way that they 
can continue their development free from further human interference.28 The problem, for 
Elliot, is that the restored site has the wrong history. Prior to the mining, the dune landscape 
was “natural,” meaning, it was the product of forces and processes “unmodified by human 
activity.”29 After the restoration, the causal continuity between the restored site and its history 
prior to the mining has been disrupted. The restored site has become, in part, a product of 
human design and engineering—an artifact.  
 Elliot supports his argument by employing an analogy between art and nature. The 
force of the analogy is the idea that we rely on an understanding of the origin (genesis) of both 
artworks and natural objects in order to determine their value. Elliot’s view suggests a spectrum 
whose poles are “pristine” or “original” natural sites at one end and “sullied” or “faked” sites at 
the other.30 Elliot maintains that more pristine natural sites are of superior natural value 
compared to less pristine or restored sites. This claim should be taken in a qualified sense, 
however, since Elliot is sensitive to other considerations that might bear on our evaluation of a 
given site’s natural value. Such considerations include, for example, the size of a natural site (as 
opposed to merely its degree of naturalness), whether the site is biologically complex, diverse, 
rare, the last token of an ecosystem type, or a contributor to a representative range of ecosystem 
types.31 Leaving aside these qualifications, Elliot’s natural value hierarchy is founded on a 
property that pristine sites necessarily have—and that restored sites necessarily lack—namely, 
the property of being naturally evolved. Elliot thinks naturalness in this sense is “the key to the 
explanation of nature’s intrinsic value” (1997: 59). An implication of Elliot’s view is that a 
restored natural site, no matter how successful as a restoration, is a substitution or replacement 
                                                
28 This empirical assumption is of course utterly far-fetched given the present state of our knowledge and 
technology, but that is irrelevant to the argument here.    
29 “I shall take it that ‘natural’ means something like ‘unmodified by human activity’” (Elliot 1982: 79-80; 1997: 82).  
30 See, in particular, Elliot 1997: 108-11. Elliot employs the language of pristine/sullied and original/fake, treating 
these more or less as interchangeable pairs. While I find the language of pristine/sullied plausible as a way to 
describe natural objects or sites, the language of originality (or authenticity) seems inapt. This suggests one of the 
senses in which Elliot’s analogy between art and nature is strained. 
31 See Elliot 1997: 140-1. In my view, Elliot should be more sensitive to such considerations than he in fact is—an 
issue I’ll return to later. 
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of something less than original for something original. Thus, according to Elliot, restoring 
nature is like replacing an original work of art with one that is less-than-authentic, one that is 
somehow a fake or a forgery. For Elliot, the full natural value of a site prior to its disruption by 
human activity—what we can call the site’s original value—is forever lost and can never be fully 
restored.32 
 What is special about origin and history on Elliot’s view is that the relevant history is not 
the product of human activity. In encountering a landscape such as the unmined dunes in 
Elliot’s example, we encounter something we did not create, something natural in a 
paradigmatic sense. Accordingly, whatever beauty, complexity, subtlety, grandeur, exquisite 
adaptation, and so on, the natural objects of the area or the area in general might display, these 
are noteworthy not just in their own right, but also because they are the result of processes and 
forces we did not create. Although Elliot never quite puts it this way, I believe the reason for 
holding natural provenance in such high regard is the desirability of living in a world that is not 
entirely humanized—that is, made to reflect human designs and purposes. I regard this as the 
deep intuition underlying Elliot’s historical view of natural value. I explore this further in 2.2.7. 
 There is a connection between Elliot’s view of “authentically” natural environments and 
what theorists like James Karr mean by environments with their biological integrity intact.33 
While Elliot’s view is not an explicit defense of integrity, his view is nonetheless relevant to the 
question of the possible value of integrity, that is, the value of integrity beyond its instrumental 
value to ecological health (which I argued for in Chapter 1). However, Elliot emphasizes only 
the first of the two properties that define integrity (i.e. the historical property of being relatively 
unmodified by human activity). For reasons given in 1.2.1, I view this as an inadequate 
                                                
32 See Elliot’s fourth example discussed in Elliot 1997: 88; cf. 91, 145. Note, however, that Elliot appears to 
contradict himself at one point when he writes: “Nor does the [anti-replacement] thesis strictly imply that an area 
of land that has been restored cannot eventually come to have the value possessed by that area prior to its 
degradation” (1997: 108).  
33 Mark Sagoff’s (1995) characterization of integrity also appeals to “authenticity.” Sagoff writes: “We have the 
greatest chance of understanding the value of integrity—and therefore the concept itself—in relation to the 
historical qualities of the natural world. This explains why integrity applies to organisms and communities that are 
authentic in nature as distinct from those that we might create through bioengineering” (1995: 173). Although 
Sagoff makes no explicit mention of Elliot’s work, and Sagoff’s theory of value is less developed than Elliot’s, it 
appears Sagoff is employing here a conception of the natural that is very similar to Elliot’s, namely, the natural 
refers to objects that are not the product of human design or engineering. I should note, however, that Sagoff 
seems to have abandoned this view of the natural in Sagoff 2000; though Sagoff’s exact position is not entirely 
clear. 
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conceptualization of integrity, which should be understood to include certain end-state 
properties.    
 One of the reasons an historical account like Elliot’s is important is that it attempts to 
explain the basis for feeling regret or loss when the natural world is developed or altered in 
certain ways. The practical upshot of Elliot’s view is that if historical considerations are 
persuasive, then this gives us a reason to prefer, whenever practically feasible, environmental 
preservation over restoration. In this respect, historical considerations function to block, or at 
least raise the bar of justification for, certain proposed land uses. Historical considerations 
indicate a source of value that cannot be compensated for when it is lost or “sullied.”34 Elliot’s 
view thus sensitizes us to a type of consideration denied or not brought into view by ahistorical 
end-state views of landscapes or natural objects.  
 The view offered by Elliot is undoubtedly romantic. It may also be naïve given modern 
realities. These are issues I’ll return to later. But before doing so I want to further motivate the 
historical view and consider a number of complexities raised by the view. There are a variety of 
cases in which a natural object’s origin and history, and our knowledge of this, might figure in 
important ways in our evaluation of that object. I’ll briefly discuss two different examples to 
indicate the explanatory power of Elliot’s type of view.  
 Consider first the case of the Grand Canyon. To aesthetically sensitive beings, the 
Grand Canyon is a marvel of nature. Which is to say, the Grand Canyon is a fitting object for 
responses such as awe. It is also a fitting object for judgments such as “It would be wrong to 
flood the Grand Canyon for no good reason, because this would ruin something that is unique 
and spectacular.” A person who saw the Grand Canyon and was “left cold,” or was otherwise 
indifferent, could be criticized as being insensitive to something of value.35 From the 
perspective of Elliot’s view, the reason—or at least a reason—it would be fitting to feel awe 
before the Grand Canyon is on account of the specific genesis of the canyon. That is, it’s not 
just the awesomeness of the chasm in the earth, the stark beauty of the landscape, and so on, 
that make the Grand Canyon aesthetically interesting. Also relevant to our judgment regarding 
                                                
34 This claim is compatible with the thought that restoration is very valuable as a natural value restoring activity. I 
return to some normative issues relating to restoration later. 
35 I leave aside here questions of the relative significance of this insensitivity, compared to, say, being insensitive to 
people who need help. I also leave aside questions about the relationship of sensitivity to objects like the Grand 
Canyon to moral sensitivity, although I believe there is, as discussed in 2.1, at least an indirect relation between 
these two. 
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the canyon’s value is the fact that it is a product of natural forces operating with little or no 
influence from human activities. Moreover, these natural forces have been operative for a very 
long time, millions of years in fact. Maybe there are two different ideas at play here: the 
significance of origin and history, on the one hand, and the significance of great antiquity of 
origin, on the other (cf. Elliot 1997: 140). Perhaps the latter amplifies whatever value origin and 
history already confer in the case of natural objects. If we found out that the Grand Canyon was 
painstakingly dug by some ancient people, it would still be a marvel, both of nature and (in this 
hypothetical case) of human design. But one aspect of this marvel would be missing, namely, 
the way natural processes operating without our interference or direction created a distinctive 
and magnificent canyon.  
 The history of an object as a factor that partly accounts for the object’s value is relevant 
in other cases too. Take species, for example. Each species may be noteworthy for a number of 
reasons: its design and adaptive fit to certain ecological niches, its distinctive forms of behavior, 
its role in healthy functioning ecosystems, its beauty or strangeness, its usefulness to us, and so 
on. But each species is also the result of countless trials and errors on the part of evolution. The 
millions of species we see today (and biologists have scarcely begun to describe all currently 
existing species) are the product of millions of years of evolutionary history. Contemplating 
species familiarizes us with the play of chance and natural laws, and above all with the profound 
contingency of life.36 Reflecting on such considerations adds something to our appreciation of 
species as objects of value. Knowledge of an object’s history provides depth and texture to our 
appreciation of that object. I think the basic insight here also applies to our evaluation of many 
other natural objects, such as mountain ranges, old-growth forests, biological diversity, or fertile 
soils (to name a few). 
 
 
 
                                                
36 Mark Sagoff writes: “It is the enormous and timeless labor of evolution that invests its products—the plants and 
animals we encounter—with a dignity and meaning. Their legitimacy is based not in any purpose they may serve—
ours or that of some superorganism that contains them—but in the circumstances of their coming hither. They 
survive to tell the story of random mutation and natural selection, of chance and matter, which turns out to be 
more magnificent and harrowing than anything any one of us could imagine. As E. O. Wilson has remarked, ‘The 
more we know of other forms of life, the more we enjoy and respect ourselves. Humanity is exalted not because 
we are so far above other living creatures, but because knowing them will elevate the very concept of life’” (1995: 
173; the Wilson quote is from Wilson 1984: 115).   
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2.2.3 The Historical View, Intrinsic Value, and the Objectivity of Reasons 
 The historical account of natural value is a specific example of an historical account of 
value that can be characterized as follows: the value of an object or state of affairs partly 
consists in its having a certain origin and history, that is, its being the result of processes of a 
certain sort. Such a view is motivated by the thought that in many cases we have reasons to care 
about the processes that led to an object or state of affairs being what it is in a given present. 
The historical account of value is, more broadly, an instance of a type of value theory which 
holds that an object’s value consists, in part, in its relational properties rather than in its intrinsic 
properties (or more precisely: solely in its intrinsic properties). Relational properties refer to the 
relationships an object has to other objects or events outside or beyond itself. Intrinsic 
properties are those that are non-relational, that is, those internal to the object or state of 
affairs.37  
 The contrast here is not perfect, for there might be properties that are both intrinsic and 
relational under different descriptions. But I think the contrast is clear enough to be 
meaningful. A few examples bear this out. Wilderness could be defined in terms of certain 
intrinsic properties, for example, the presence of certain natural species of plant and animal 
living in a certain locale together with the operation of various biotic and abiotic processes. But 
wilderness can also be defined in terms of relational properties, such as “being places where 
humans are absent” or “being places that are the product of nonhuman processes and forces.”38 
If one valued wilderness for one of these reasons, then one is valuing wilderness for its 
relational properties.  
 Besides wilderness, other common environmental values are also grounded in certain 
relational properties. For example, valuing biological diversity is valuing a natural object—in 
this case, an ecosystem or landscape—because of a relational property it exemplifies. For 
diversity is a property of relations between different biological entities. Or to take another case, 
many environmentalists value rare natural objects. But rarity is a function of relative abundance 
or occurrence. Thus, valuing a rare species means valuing a species because it is rare relative to 
                                                
37 On this distinction, see Elliot 1997: 80. 
38 “Places where humans are absent” is not equivalent to “places that are the product of nonhuman processes and 
forces.” The former could refer to a place abandoned by people after they have exhausted its soil fertility, or 
poisoned the environment with radioactive waste, etc.   
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other more prevalent or common species. Similarly, an unusual rock formation or waterway 
may be valued because it is rare or unique.   
 John O’Neill observes that if natural objects are valuable at least in part because of their 
relational properties, it follows that such objects might be ill-described as being “intrinsically 
valuable” (1993: 13-15). As O’Neill recognizes, however, whether or not this is so depends on 
which conception of intrinsic value is being assumed. For example, if the attribution of intrinsic 
value to x means (a) “x is valuable in virtue of its non-relational properties,” then such a view of 
intrinsic value would indeed miss many important environmental values (such as those 
mentioned above).39 But there are other, more plausible, senses of intrinsic value. For example, 
intrinsic value could be taken to mean (b) being valuable non-instrumentally, (c) being valuable 
in virtue of characteristics that are worthy of admiration, appreciation, and respect apart from 
the uses we may make of them (cf. Sagoff 1995: 163), or (d) “being valuable for itself, for its 
own sake, as an end in itself” (Elliot 1997: 25). These are commonly encountered as claims 
regarding the sense in which nature, or some part of it, is intrinsically valuable. I think such 
claims, properly fleshed out, are intelligible and defensible.40 Thus, we do not need to abandon 
                                                
39 G. E. Moore seems to have subscribed to this view of intrinsic value. Moore writes: “To say that a kind of value 
is ‘intrinsic’ means merely that the question whether a thing possesses it, and in what degree it possesses it, depends 
solely on the intrinsic nature of the thing in question” (1922: 260; de-italicized from original). Consider also 
Moore’s method of isolation (discussed in Principia Ethica) as a test of intrinsic value. In order to decide the 
question “What things have intrinsic value, and in what degrees?” Moore writes that “it is necessary to consider 
what things are such that, if they existed by themselves, in absolute isolation, we should yet judge their existence to be 
good; and, in order to decide upon the relative degrees of value of different things, we must similarly consider what 
comparative value seems to attach to the isolated existence of each” (1993: 236).   
40 It seems to me that a commitment to the idea that there are intrinsic values does not entail any particular 
metaethical view, nor any particular view about the way we are obligated with respect to intrinsically valuable 
objects. I think claims about what it means to be intrinsically valuable, such as those expressed in (b), (c) and (d), 
can fit with both a subjectivist or objectivist meta-ethic. Oversimplifying, the objectivist believes there can be 
mind-independent (intrinsic) values and the subjectivist denies this. Other conceptions of intrinsic value, such as 
(e) “having objective value,” may also be appropriate for describing the way in which certain natural objects may be 
valuable. For example, the biocentric view that all living organisms “have a good,” which entails that there are 
conditions in which said organisms can flourish or be harmed, is a possible way of specifying what it means to say 
that something “has objective value.” As noted in 2.1, however, I do not believe all things that have a good are 
therefore valuable in the sense of being worthy of our respect. But in a qualified sense, many things that have a 
good may be valuable. There are, of course, many other complexities here. For example, O’Neill argues that 
“having objective value” admits of both weak and strong specifications. The “weak” reading holds that evaluative 
properties are real properties of objects, but these properties build in a reference to possible observers (i.e. ideal 
observers). The “strong” reading holds that evaluative properties can be characterized without reference to the 
experiences of human observers, or even that of ideal observers. Good discussion of different senses of intrinsic 
value, with special attention to the case of environmental values, can be found in O’Neill 1993: Ch. 2, O’Neill 
2001, and Elliot 1997: Ch. 1. 
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talk of nature having intrinsic value, despite the trenchant critiques of some philosophers.41 But 
we do need to be clear about what we mean by intrinsic value, for not all characterizations of 
intrinsic value are plausible. Further, there is no dissonance in the idea of valuing an object in 
senses (b), (c), or (d) and valuing the object in virtue of its intrinsic and relational properties (as 
these were characterized above). Hence there need be no tension between appealing to nature’s 
intrinsic value while also grounding this attribution of value, at least partly, in the relational 
properties that natural objects have.  
 In the case of natural objects, Elliot focuses his discussion specifically on the value-
adding relational property of being naturally evolved.42 As remarked on above, Elliot claims that 
this property—the property of naturalness—is “the key to the explanation of nature’s intrinsic 
value” (1997: 59; cf. 144). Further, Elliot conceives intrinsic value as intrinsic moral value (1997: 
61). That is, the sense in which nature has intrinsic value is a specifically moral sense. This 
contrasts, for example, with a view that says nature has intrinsic value in virtue of its aesthetic 
properties, where such properties are viewed as nonmoral in character.43 Elliot’s position raises 
a number of questions on this point, but I’d like to set these aside. It is sufficient for my 
purposes here that the consideration of nature, understood in light of the historical account, 
generates reasons to care about preserving or restoring nature. Whether these reasons are 
ultimately moral, aesthetic, religious, ambiguous between these different categories, or 
something else, is interesting but not necessary to clarify. What is crucial is that nature 
                                                
41 See, e.g., Weston 1985 and Light 2002; also Wallace 1988: Ch. 4. Although Wallace is not discussing 
environmental values, his chapter is relevant to the question of whether we should abandon the language of 
intrinsic value in our discussions regarding what is valuable, or in Wallace’s terms, what is important.  
42 Elliot views value-adding properties, such as relational properties, as nonmoral. He writes: “These nonmoral 
properties are usefully called ‘value-adding properties’. The idea is simply that, other things being equal, value-
adding properties function to increase the overall value of the thing that has them, and indeed to increase the value 
of the universe as a whole. It does not follow, however, from the fact that something possesses value-adding 
properties that it has positive intrinsic value. Things might have value-subtracting properties too, which must be 
weighed against value-adding properties. So, value-adding properties might not suffice to ensure that, all things 
considered, the thing in question has positive intrinsic value but they move the thing further towards the point at 
which it would have positive intrinsic value. The idea is, that from a value point of view, value-adding properties 
tend to make things better or tend to increase value. Where the impact of value-adding properties outweighs the 
impact of value-subtracting properties, a thing has intrinsic value; in the converse case a thing has intrinsic disvalue; 
otherwise, the thing is value-neutral” (1997: 10). I find this view somewhat weird and counterintuitive. 
Conceivably, something (say, a virus) could become intrinsically valuable on Elliot’s view if we could somehow 
show that it has more value-adding properties than value-subtracting properties. But it seems to me we might still 
have reason to ask in such a case whether the thing in question is the sort of object that merits being regarded as 
intrinsically valuable, or valuable in its own right.   
43 For defenses of the view that the proper mode of environmental evaluation is aesthetic not ethical, see 
Godlovitch 1994 and Lynch 1996.  
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understood as an historical particular is the sort of object that can sustain serious attention and 
concern, engaging us rationally and emotionally.44  
 To speak of nature as an object capable of sustaining serious attention and concern 
raises some complexities relating to the nature of the reasons to care about nature. Suppose we 
start with the idea that all normal adult human beings are capable of appreciating reasons for 
cultivating certain attitudes or for acting in certain ways. As such a human being, would I be 
making a mistake, such as failing to track or be aware of (intellectually, emotionally, etc.) some 
basic fact of the matter, if I did not appreciate the reasons to value nature as an historical 
particular? Is it reasonable to expect some significant degree of convergence between people 
with respect to the view that nature merits being valued in this way? Or more to the point: if 
there were such convergence, would this be plausibly characterized or explained as making 
collective progress in our normative thought—that is, making progress in the sense of coming to 
see and appreciate “what is there,” what is worth caring about? Or would such convergence in 
thought and valuation be more plausibly characterized in a deflationary way, say, as the 
contingent sharing of certain interests and concerns, without this indicating anything like 
progress, or seeing more clearly what is there?   
 I can’t do justice to these questions here. But I want to say something in response to 
them. In general, I believe many different types of consideration (prudential, aesthetic, moral, 
religious, etc.) can provide reasons for cultivating certain kinds of attitudes or forms of concern, 
and also reasons for engaging in, or refraining from, certain types of action. Caring about nature 
in its own right as an historical particular seems to me a nontrivial example of a concern worth 
cultivating. But is this the sort of concern that merits universal acknowledgement (regardless of 
whether there would ever be actual universal acknowledgement)?  
 Some might believe reasons for holding certain attitudes and beliefs, and for acting in 
certain ways, admit of a clear rank-ordering in terms of importance and weight. This is true, for 
example, of a view like classical utilitarianism.45 It is also true of some religious conceptions of 
how to live and what to care about, such as a Catholic natural law view. Presumably within such 
                                                
44 To be clear: by “nature understood as an historical particular,” I mean what Elliot means by nature, i.e. nature 
that is the product of forces and processes ummodified, or minimally modified, by human activity. 
45 Though any utilitarian view that tries to accommodate qualitatively different types of activity into the utilitarian 
calculus, such as J. S. Mill’s view, faces the problem of unavoidable incommensurability. I don’t see how a defender 
of Mill’s view can insulate the utilitarian project from this problem. For a persuasive statement of a Millian-style 
view running aground due to incommensurability, see Gray 1991: xxvii-xxviii. 
  80 
views, the particular importance of caring about nature in its own right, as an historical 
particular, would find its place. Take the case of preference satisfaction utilitarianism. Leaving 
aside obvious utilitarian reasons to preserve nature on prudential grounds, the importance of 
nature as an historical particular would presumably be judged by quantifying the strength of the 
preferences existing people have for preserving nature as an historical particular. Perhaps the 
view would make an effort to include the preferences of future people, though doing so adds 
considerable complexity to the utilitarian calculus given the uncertainty regarding what future 
people might want or prefer. For the Catholic, the idea might be that in destroying nature as an 
historical particular we are destroying a portion of God’s creation, which would be wrong. This 
is assuming that God’s creation is good—certainly an assumption any Catholic would have to 
make.46 Of course, the use of nature would be justified for meeting human needs, for the 
Catholic believes God manifests His benevolence and concern for us by providing us with the 
resources of nature to use. But human needs are only one consideration in the overall view of 
nature’s value.   
 Views that aim to provide a universal standard of the good life, or of a life rightly lived, 
strike me as not entirely plausible. I do not say this because I’m a skeptic or a relativist. Rather, I 
say this because it seems people are motivationally complex, and a person’s views about what 
matters and why typically change over the course of his or her life, due to new experiences and 
reflection, among other things. Further, a multitude of things (objects, ideas, causes, etc.) are 
capable of engaging our attention and motivating action. I regard it as obvious that anyone’s 
capacity to be engaged by certain objects or activities is a result, in part, of their educational 
background, access to opportunities to engage in the activity in question, their stage in life, and 
so on. It also seems that any individual’s sense of what matters, of what “feels right” and 
“makes sense,” has an important cultural dimension. Indeed, it may have a more idiosyncratic 
dimension too that does not simply reflect the culture in which one was raised. The complex 
interplay of these factors explains, I think, why many pleas for what we should care about, say, 
pleas from environmentalists, fail to gain any traction with certain people, and perhaps with 
whole segments of society.  
 There are, then, very significant ways in which one’s “motivational set” (to employ 
Bernard Williams’s wording) reflects one’s educational and cultural background, one’s 
                                                
46 See the refrain in Genesis 1 that God sees the created order and natural forms as good.   
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participation in practices that direct and sustain certain kinds of concern, one’s deepest 
commitments, and so on. That said, I assume any normal adult human being has the capacity to 
reflect on what is worth caring about, and it is the nature of reflection that it often leaves certain 
questions unsettled. As a result I think many questions of value and importance tend to have an 
open-ended quality, even perhaps a recalcitrance to being settled once and for all. I’m not sure 
if this is due to the nature of certain questions, or the nature of reflection, or both. (Probably 
both.) That said, I believe some ways of viewing others or the world, and some ways of thinking 
about what we have reason to believe or do, merit our consideration in a general impersonal 
sense—that is, regardless of our particular motivational set. To say that something matters 
impersonally is to say that all beings capable of reflective consideration should recognize the 
impersonal reasons as reasons for them to believe or act in certain ways. For example, I believe 
other people’s basic needs generate reasons for action of an impersonal or objective sort (as I 
argued in 1.4.1). As I argue in Chapter 3, I also believe we have impersonal or objective reasons 
to care about how our actions affect beings who can care about what happens to them (i.e. 
sentient animals).  
 Beyond these types of concern, I’m less confident that impersonal reasons exist to 
motivate concern. For example, Elliot’s kind of reasons for caring about nature do not seem to 
me likely to command reflective endorsement among all conscientious human beings. But even 
if this is right, it does not follow that Elliot’s reasons are irrelevant or not worth caring about. 
But one implication does seem to follow here. If one is sensitive to the thought that caring 
about nature as an historical particular, valuable in its own right, is not apt to generate universal 
support, then the way in which one cares about nature might reflect this. For example, even if 
one is convinced that nature is valuable as an historical particular, it might be appropriate to 
hold one’s view in a more self-conscious, somewhat less confident, way. One may also hold 
one’s view with great sensitivity to the many factors (educational, cultural, experiential, etc.) that 
play into our evaluations of an object like nature. The upshot of these considerations, I think, is 
that even if one disagreed with others about the value of an object like nature (understood as an 
historical particular), one would not move from the fact of disagreement to the assumption that 
those with whom one disagrees are simply wrong about some fact of the matter, or about the 
way things are. The way things are partly determines our evaluative responses, but only partly. 
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Our constitution, combined with the various contingent factors noted above, also play a 
determinative role.47    
 That said, it seems nonetheless fair to think that people who are totally insensitive to the 
possibility that nature is valuable in its own right really are missing something important, or at 
least failing in some way that merits a more elaborate response from an advocate of nature’s 
value (as an historical particular) than, “Well, I guess we just disagree.” In particular, the other 
in question might be failing to embody certain excellences of character, and can be criticized on 
that count.48 For example, perhaps the person insensitive to nature’s value has an overly inflated 
sense of the importance of humans vis-à-vis the rest of nature. Or maybe the person has 
underappreciated the myriad ways in which nature enriches our individual and collective lives. 
Accordingly, it may be a failure of imagination and effort not to foreground these sorts of 
considerations.  
 Also relevant here is the idea that if it is true that people are motivationally complex, 
and that our values and concerns are subject to revision over time—both assumptions I think 
we should make—then we should leave open the possibility that we might become sensitive to 
new sources of value. Here there might be a particular salience to the question of nature’s value 
as an historical particular. If we destroy or seriously degrade nature as an historical particular, 
then we will have lost something that is impossible to recreate after it is gone. This 
differentiates nature as a possible object of interest from other things, such as works of 
literature or philosophy, or even objects of interest like great cities (e.g. Paris) or famed regions 
(e.g. Tuscany). These objects are also historical particulars, but they are the sort of object that, 
barring some catastrophe, one could turn to or visit when the time is right. Nature as an 
                                                
47 In saying this, I’m influenced by the view argued for by Dale Jamieson. In arguing for what he calls “metaethical 
pluralism,” Jamieson writes: “Our evaluative responses are not uniquely determined by our constitution or the 
world.” The upshot, according to Jamieson, is that “once we begin to see how far we can go in appreciating and 
understanding our moral life from the perspective of a metaethical pluralism that takes seriously the idea that 
valuing is a contextualized, constrained, object-driven activity, I believe (and hope) that the attractions of realism 
will wane” (2002b: 238). I am more open to value realism than Jamieson is, yet I am quite compelled by Jamieson’s 
view regarding the virtues of metaethical pluralism.   
48 The classic virtue-theoretic account regarding nature’s value can be found in Hill 1983. In this essay Hill regards 
appeals to nature having intrinsic value as dubious. See also the more recent essays in Sandler and Cafaro 2005. In 
subsequent work, Hill has argued that valuing nature in its own right is important because this is a virtue, 
specifically, the virtue of having “a manifest readiness to appreciate the good in all sorts of things, and not just as an 
instrument or resource for something else” (2006: 334; italics in the original). This revised view seems to open the 
way to something like a value realist view. For isn’t the most plausible way to understand this view to say that “the 
good in all sorts of things” motivates our concern, giving us a reason to care? If so, then this seems tantamount to 
saying that the good of other things commands our concern and respect. This way of talking seems a significant 
departure from a way of talking that focuses on the virtues.  
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historical particular in Elliot’s sense is not like that. Its value is tied to its having a particular 
history, and this history is being undermined in the normatively relevant sense as we speak. 
Elliot thinks nature as an historical particular is impossible to restore once it is gone. If it is an 
excellence of character not to destroy objects that we might value at a later stage in our lives, 
and I think it is, then nature as an historical particular seems paradigmatic of such an object. Of 
course, these considerations are not limited to the future of one’s own individual life, or even 
the futures of all people living today. Rather, these considerations support strong reasons not to 
degrade the natural world we pass on to future generations, for future people may come to 
value nature in a way that is currently only a minority view among some environmentalists and 
philosophers inspired by Elliot. (But then again, they may not.) The important point is that we 
might have weighty reasons for preserving nature as an historical particular even if we are not 
totally confident whether nature in this sense has value in its own right. It is enough that it is a 
serious candidate for having value in the ways Elliot’s argues it does. 
 
2.2.4 Normatively Relevant Senses of Natural 
 In 2.2.2, I introduced Elliot’s historical account of natural value and tried to motivate 
the account with some examples. Here I want to elaborate on several complexities relating to 
Elliot’s view, and consider some difficulties the view faces. Some of these difficulties raise 
issues that might lead Elliot to modify his view in particular respects, while nonetheless keeping 
its basic structure and commitments. Other difficulties suggest the need to refocus Elliot’s view 
in more fundamental ways.   
 As noted above, Elliot focuses on the value-adding property of naturalness, where 
naturalness in the paradigmatic sense means being unmodified by human activity. It follows that 
the contrast class to the natural would be that which is intentional, meaning, that which is the 
product of human art or technology.49 Obviously, this is not the only way to specify the natural. 
Other senses of the natural that might be normatively relevant include: (1) being a biological 
organism that has a life cycle, physical conditions of flourishing, and so on; (2) consisting of or 
instantiating a natural design, that is, a design that is the product of natural evolution, such as an 
ecosystem type; (3) instantiating and/or facilitating various biological, ecological, or 
                                                
49 I leave aside the possibility that what we commonly refer to as natural processes are in fact the result of 
intentional activity, such as that of a creative God. But even if there were such a God, products that result from 
this God’s intentional activity would still be distinct from products that result from human activity, and presumably 
we would want to mark this distinction. 
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evolutionary processes or functions; and (4) consisting of elements or materials found in 
nature.50 
 Some examples help to clarify these different senses. According to sense (1), 
domesticated plants and animals are natural, although they are the product of deliberate human 
breeding and have in most cases developed “second natures” as a result of domestication. 
When combined with historical considerations (i.e. being the product of processes not created 
or directed by human beings) we could imagine a range of entities that manifest naturalness to a 
greater or lesser degree. Thus, a domesticated animal is less natural than a wild one, but not 
therefore unnatural or merely a human artifact.51  
 According to sense (2), a restored environment would be more natural in virtue of 
instantiating an ecosystem type. We could mark a finer-grained distinction here between (a) 
being natural in virtue of instantiating a contextually appropriate ecosystem type (i.e. given the 
natural history of the area in question), versus (b) being natural in virtue of instantiating an 
ecosystem type capable of functional success in a given place, but not necessarily one that is 
historically appropriate. According to (2), one might also claim that the provision of “natural 
habitats” for animals in zoos is non-ironically natural, at least insofar as zoo managers try to re-
create species relevant habitat types within the confines of the zoo. I don’t want to get 
sidetracked here on the merits of such efforts, or on the question of whether it is ethical for us 
to keep animals in zoos. The point is that an ecosystem or habitat type is a product of natural 
evolution—a product, as Elliot says, of “projective nature.”52 It follows that even if restorations 
or re-creations of such ecosystem types are a product of human art and technology, such 
                                                
50 Elliot mentions the second sense explicitly, and he says some things relevant to the first sense too. He writes: 
“Most importantly, it is asserted that a restored natural environment, provided it accords with natural designs and 
is constituted by natural objects, may possess considerable intrinsic value, and certainly much more than the 
degraded environment which was the object of restoration” (1997: 108; cf. 105). Later in the text he echoes this 
point: “An apparently natural ecosystem is faked, to some degree at least, if it does not accord with a natural 
design, is not constituted out of natural items and, crucially, is not the product of natural forces” (1997: 132). Elliot 
elaborates a bit on what he understands by “natural objects” (e.g. trees) and “natural designs,” saying that these 
“are the design-products of projective nature” (1997: 109). In light of these remarks, one could view my 
suggestions in what follows in the text above as friendly amendments to Elliot’s view. But if these considerations 
are taken seriously, they do seem to de-center the importance of having a natural provenance as the decisive value-
adding factor in our evaluation of natural, or partly natural, objects or environments.  
51 For an objectionably facile view of the line between the natural and the unnatural, consider the following remark 
from Baird Callicott’s classic “Triangular Affair” essay: “There is […] something profoundly incoherent (and 
insensitive as well) in the complaint of some animal liberationists that the ‘natural behavior’ of chickens and bobby 
calves is cruelly frustrated on factory farms. It would make almost as much sense to speak of the natural behavior 
of tables and chairs” (1980: 30).  
52 Elliot 1997: 109; 160, note 15. 
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restorations or re-creations can still exemplify naturalness to some degree, maybe even to a high 
degree.   
 An example of (3) would be the functioning of natural processes, such as predator-prey 
dynamics within a given landscape, nutrient cycling, maintenance of hydrological cycles, and so 
on. Such functioning can occur even in environments that have been radically altered by human 
activity and inhabitation. Efforts to restore ecological functioning or health, even in nature-
human hybrid environments (e.g. an intensively managed agricultural landscape), are natural in 
the sense that the goal is the rehabilitation of natural processes and functions. Human efforts 
may increase the restoration of naturalness when historically native species are restored to a 
given site, in addition to the restoration of ecological functioning. (Recall that ecological 
functioning, as discussed in 1.2.6, does not require the existence or restoration of historically 
native species.) 
 Examples of sense (4) are a little trickier, and perhaps less pertinent to questions of 
natural value. A fence constructed out of (naturally present or occurring) stones on a given site 
might be considered more natural than one constructed out of metal fencing bought at a store. 
This may be so even though both fences are products of human design, and even though metal 
is still derived from naturally occurring materials (suitably processed). Similarly, a sweater made 
out of wool might be thought to be more natural than a fleece jacket made out of recycled 
plastic bottles. But it’s unclear why one should prefer the stone fence to the metal one, or the 
wool sweater to the fleece jacket, that is, in the absence of other considerations, such as 
functionality, attractiveness, or whether the production of one of these objects is resource 
intensive, energy-inefficient, or some such thing. Maybe Elliot’s type of view would support a 
preference for the stone fence and the wool sweater in these two cases. The reasoning might be 
that these two products consist of materials that nature made; plus, these natural materials were 
less modified to yield the product in question. But Elliot never discusses this sense of the 
natural so I’m not sure what his view is. 
 The foregoing considerations regarding what naturalness consists in have important 
implications for the value of ecological restoration. A restored ecosystem that exemplifies 
certain properties (e.g. biological diversity, unique flora and fauna, etc.) has less value than an 
ecosystem with similar properties, but which has in addition a causal continuity with the past 
undisrupted by human activity. Which is to say, the latter ecosystem is more “authentic” (or 
“original,” “pristine”) and hence more valuable as a natural landscape on this count (assuming 
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likeness in other relevant respects).53 Restorations that aim to restore native species and 
contextually appropriate ecosystem types (with, we can assume, the relevant supportive 
biological/ecological/evolutionary processes and functions) are exactly the sorts of restorations 
that Elliot favors. Importantly, Elliot maintains that such restorations can succeed in restoring 
considerable natural value.54 
 Restorations of the sort just mentioned are best thought of as rehabilitations more than 
replacements (Elliot 1997: 105). Accordingly, and with respect to the analogy between art and 
nature, such rehabilitations are much closer to art restorations than to art forgeries. Clearly, 
Elliot’s revised and expanded discussion of faking nature in his 1997 book is sensitive to this 
basic claim (though Elliot never quite states things as I just did). But if this is so, then the 
metaphor of “faking nature” seems misleading. It is misleading even if we agree that Elliot is 
right to draw attention to the loss of value when natural provenance is disrupted (which is a fait 
accompli in discussions of actual ecological restorations). This disruption may be profoundly 
regrettable in the case of those increasingly rare landscapes that have a more or less natural 
provenance, and which exemplify other value-adding properties, such as being biodiverse, 
having unique land or water formations, and the like.  
 A perhaps paradoxical implication of Elliot’s view that naturalness is always value-
adding is that natural forces or events, which have natural value in virtue of their nonhuman 
causal origin, can destroy natural value. For example, a natural event may destroy an area of 
great natural value. This happened when the 1980 eruption of Mt. St. Helens in Washington 
State leveled the old-growth forest that surrounded the volcano. Here the volcanic eruption has 
natural value (because of its origin), yet it also destroys natural value (i.e. the natural value of the 
old-growth forest). In situations like this, Elliot’s view is that on the whole more natural 
disvalue results from the volcanic eruption than would have been the case had the eruption not 
occurred. Although in the Mt. St. Helens case, the pristine landscape spoiled by the eruption 
nonetheless retains its causal continuity with a past undisturbed by human activity. This marks 
an important difference between the destruction of natural value by natural events, versus the 
                                                
53 “The anti-replacement thesis claims that [a] replanted forest has somewhat less intrinsic value than [a] naturally 
regenerated forest and much less intrinsic value than the forest originally there [i.e. the forest that was destroyed by 
human activity, and then later restored]” (Elliot 1997: 130-1, and elaboration in note 15 at 159-60; see also 88, 108). 
54 See Elliot 1997: 108 (quoted above in note 49); cf. 90, 145. 
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destruction of natural value by human-caused activities, even though both human and non-
human caused events can destroy natural value. 
 Given Elliot’s degreed theory of naturalness and value, it is clear that less-than-pristine 
natural objects or environments may exemplify considerable natural value. Indeed, Elliot says at 
one point that being naturally evolved is not a precondition for an object to have natural value 
(1997: 110). If one emphasizes this point, then it follows that the origin and history of a natural 
object is only one consideration that enters into our evaluation of that object, and into our 
evaluation of its naturalness. Thus, even if paradigmatic naturalness is important, it would not 
follow that it is therefore the most important factor when we are reflecting on the natural value 
of different objects. Emphasizing this point would enable Elliot’s view to be much more 
relevant to modern realities, given that much of the contemporary world has been seriously 
degraded, that is, if our focus is on natural values. Whether Elliot would agree with this way of 
refocusing his discussion is not clear. Sometimes he says things that support de-centering 
paradigmatic naturalness in our evaluations of natural value; while other times he maintains that 
the property of having a nonhuman causal origin is “key” or “crucial” to the evaluation of 
nature’s value.55 The reason to maintain that having a natural provenance is indeed very 
important is that this is the one sense of naturalness that appears to be irreplaceable once it has 
been lost (see Elliot 1997: 91). The fact that irreplaceable naturalness is being undermined in a 
globally pervasive way might suggest that we should drop everything and try to halt this trend. 
But this is implausible, not least because there are other important things to attend to, such as 
trying to ensure that everyone can live a decent life, or trying to preserve other sorts of 
naturalness. In my view, we should de-emphasize the importance of having a natural 
provenance in our evaluation of naturalness and in our evaluation of nature’s value. This de-
emphasis is supported by the fact that the other senses of naturalness that I discussed above are 
often very possible to restore or reinvigorate. This is an encouraging fact given how much 
environmental degradation has already occurred. 
 I certainly grant that feeling the loss of nature’s original value might be amplified when 
we reflect on those formerly magnificent landscapes that have been destroyed to such an extent 
                                                
55 For example, in his 1982 discussion Elliot writes: “What the environmentalist insists on is that naturalness [i.e. 
being naturally evolved] is one factor in determining the value of pieces of the environment” (1982: 82). And this 
point in echoed in the 1997 discussion when Elliot says of his view that “naturalness or the property of being 
natural [i.e. having a natural provenance] was identified as one basis or determinant of nature’s intrinsic moral 
value” (1997: 116; cf. 109, 144). Yet at other times in the 1997 discussion, being naturally evolved is invoked as the 
“crucial” factor determining natural value (1997: 88, 132), or the “key” to nature’s intrinsic value (1997: 59; cf. 144). 
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that they will likely never, even under the best of circumstances, support the kind of ecological 
structure, complexity, etc., that obtained prior to their degradation. Dwelling on the loss of 
original value might also be understandable in those cases where we are losing the few 
remaining landscapes that exhibit various noteworthy properties (complexity, etc.), and which 
continue to have a natural, or largely natural, provenance. But in general ecological restoration 
(or rehabilitation) holds out, at least in many cases, the possibility of restoring a considerable 
degree of natural value. And this is the reason to support restoration efforts.56 I will explore the 
topic of ecological restoration further in 2.2.6. First I want to elaborate on some questions 
regarding the relationship between naturalness and value.  
 
2.2.5 On Naturalness and Value 
 There is no reason to think that natural values have priority over all other values, all 
things considered. I’ll emphasize two points here. First, natural values may be trumped by other 
important values—a point Elliot clearly recognizes.57 For example, how many natural areas we 
think it is appropriate to preserve or restore will depend on how much land is needed to meet 
the vital or basic needs of existing and future people.58 Although in the case of any putatively 
ecological (or environmental) restoration, the aim of the restoration must include the attempt to 
restore various natural properties (such as contextually appropriate natural objects and natural 
designs, etc.). Absent this aim, it’s hard to see how the restored ecosystem could have natural 
value in Elliot’s sense. It might have some other value (say, aesthetic or recreational value), but 
it would lack or have only minimal natural value. 
 A second point is that a state of affairs may have value in virtue of its naturalness (in 
any of the senses noted above), while nonetheless not being valuable from an all-things-
considered point of view. Elliot writes: “[T]he anti-replacement thesis does not entail that every 
naturally evolved state of affairs has positive value all things considered. At most it entails that a 
                                                
56 Various comments notwithstanding, I think Elliot agrees that ecological restoration is, all things considered, a 
very valuable and vital activity. What Elliot objects to is a certain type of restoration, or a certain understanding of 
what can be achieved in restoration (see the concluding discussion in 1997: 143-9). What I’m objecting to here is 
Elliot’s preciousness about lost original value. It seems to me this attitude is a dispensable element of Elliot’s 
otherwise nuanced and interesting account of a degreed view of naturalness, and corresponding degreed view of 
natural value, which supports much ecological restoration.    
57 Elliot agrees: “Natural values are not the only values. Even though they are very significant values, there are 
cases […] where they are trumped by other values” (1997: 133). 
58 I discuss this issue further in Chapter 4.  
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naturally evolved state of affairs will contain some intrinsic value. But it might also contain 
intrinsic disvalue which neutralizes or even outweighs the intrinsic value” (1997: 137). This 
seems to me a plausible view to hold. But I have some questions here regarding the relationship 
of naturalness and value (or goodness). In particular, I want to put pressure on Elliot’s 
assumption that naturalness (i.e. having a natural origin) is always value-adding. 
 There are some tensions in Elliot’s view regarding the relationship between naturalness 
and value. In his 1982 essay, Elliot appears to reject the claim that the natural is necessarily 
good simply because it is natural. “I do not want to be taken as claiming,” writes Elliot, “that 
what is natural is good and what is non-natural is not” (1982: 80). Thus, Elliot grants that many 
perfectly natural things can be bad in various respects: sickness or disease are often bad for 
living beings; likewise, fires and hurricanes may be bad for natural systems (1982: 82). The 
implication is that the relationship between the natural and the valuable is subtle and not 
straightforward. Which is to say, the natural is not always good or value-adding. Yet Elliot’s 
considered view (in Elliot 1997) is that naturalness, in an unqualified sense, is valuable or value-
adding.59  
 I don’t see why one should accept this claim in an unqualified sense. Still births and 
birth defects are caused by natural processes, but it seems to me these are almost always 
regrettable. Our vulnerability to disease, and our eventual decay in old age (if we live to be old), 
has a natural origin. Yet our vulnerability and susceptibility to decay and death do not strike me 
as sources of value. I’m not saying these are necessarily bad, or sources of disvalue. Various 
sorts of vulnerability and built-in transience are distinctive features of all that lives, whether 
human or not. Such features merit our attention insofar as it is worthwhile to reflect on the 
nature of life, and on the kinds of beings we are. I think we should hold a realistic view of such 
matters. This means seeing such things as elements of what Sartre calls our “facticity”—those 
elements of life that are given, and which can’t be denied or wished away, except through 
questionable acts of evasion. But accepting our vulnerability, etc., to be a feature of our facticity 
is not the same as finding our vulnerability, etc., to be value-adding or value-subtracting when 
we reflect on the value of human life (or on that of other living entities). It seems to me a more 
plausible view to hold is that naturalness is in many imaginable and actual cases a source of 
                                                
59 “I seem committed to saying that naturalness is always value-adding. I stand by this view” (Elliot 1997: 132). 
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value, but it is not, in an unqualified sense, valuable or value-adding. Maybe it is best to say that 
naturalness is value-adding for certain categories of things, but not others.       
 Elliot’s view, in contrast, is that a given state of affairs can be good in virtue of its 
natural origin, but bad in virtue of its effects (1997: 137). If the effects are really bad—imagine a 
natural environment that contains unmitigated suffering and misery for all the sentient beings 
that inhabit it—then the state of affairs may be bad all things considered. Yet, according to 
Elliot, this state of affairs still has intrinsic value in virtue of its causal origin. Maybe this is a 
more plausible, and more consistent, way of approaching the issue here, rather than suggesting, 
as I did above, that naturalness might be value-adding for certain categories of things, but not 
for others. Personally, I find the claim that natural origin is always intrinsically valuable to be 
counter-intuitive. 
 
2.2.6 Foregrounding the Process/Product Distinction in Ecological Restoration  
 Elliot has a standing preference for environmental preservation over restoration. One 
might question this preference given the extent of human disturbance of the natural world. I 
have shown why Elliot would favor ecological restoration rather than, say, despair over 
degraded landscapes. Yet Elliot still seems to cling to the preservationist ideal, which is tied up 
with the goal of preserving wilderness (understood as places where humans are absent).60 I 
think environmental philosophers need to reflect seriously on whether theorizing about nature, 
and about nature’s value, should shift away from the old emphasis on preservation toward an 
emphasis on restoration. 
 I believe this shift is warranted, and in this section I propose (following a suggestion by 
Andrew Light61) that Elliot develop a more explicit process/product distinction. Elliot has the 
resources for articulating a robust process/product distinction that would be helpful for several 
reasons. First, if Elliot were to emphasize the process/product distinction in the ways I propose 
this would soften his critique of restoration proposals, thus distancing Elliot’s view even further 
from the implausible anti-restoration views of philosophers like Eric Katz (see, e.g., Katz 
                                                
60 “While it may be true that restoration is a long-term project, involving monitoring and minor interference, such 
as removing weeds and feral animals, long after the major restoration work has been done, the ultimate aim, 
implicit in the preservationist ideal, is to achieve a situation from which humans are absent, except as respectful, 
careful and unobtrusive visitors. Some time after that stage is reached we can say that nature has again taken 
control of the area” (Elliot 1997: 145). 
61 Light 2009.  
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1992).62 Second, a clearly articulated process/product distinction would allow Elliot to maintain 
his critique of the restoration thesis while also enabling him to resist the view that all 
restorations are inevitably second-rate, or apt to leave us feeling “short-changed.”63 Against this 
pessimistic view, my proposal could support the claim that ecological restoration is actually 
capable of being an integral part of the process which produces natural value. If true, this would 
provide resources from within Elliot’s own view for rejecting the claim that human 
intervention—even in the case of restoration—is always “value-detracting” with respect to 
natural values. As indicated above, Elliot recognizes that restored nature can have considerable 
value. What he misses, however, is the fact that part of the value of this restored nature is 
attributable to the human activity that is integral to any successful restoration. This is the main 
point I want to argue for in this section. All of this, by the way, is compatible with the idea that 
restored nature is not a replacement for original nature that is lost.  
 Support for elaborating a process/product distinction for the purpose noted above 
comes from the analogy Elliot draws between our evaluation of art and of nature. But before 
we can see this, I first need to address a difficulty that arises here. The difficulty is that the 
obvious reading of the analogy supports the claim that restored nature always leaves us short-
changed. For the point of the analogy is that we value both artworks and natural objects partly 
in virtue of their origins. Elliot thinks that we would feel deceived and disappointed if we found 
out that an artwork that we thought was an original was in fact a fake. Similarly, Elliot thinks we 
would feel deceived and disappointed if a natural object that we thought was the result of an 
entirely natural history was in fact the result of a human restoration. In both cases we are 
deprived of the “real thing”—the original—and it is this fact that leaves us feeling short-
changed.  
 There is a different way to understand the analogy, one that supports the proposal I 
wish to make here. In the case of our evaluation of an artwork, Elliot maintains that a number 
                                                
62 For critical discussion of Katz’s view, see Elliot 1997: 109-10. 
63 That Elliot thinks we are “short-changed” by restorations is evident given his discussion of the third case of 
“faked” nature, discussed at 1997: 87-8. Here Elliot imagines a place that was once devastated by open-cut mining, 
but which has since had the plants and species which grew and lived in the area before its devastation replanted or 
reintroduced. The plants and species are flourishing once more. Elliot writes: “Jill [the character in the example] 
knows nothing of this sequence of devastation and restoration. She believes she is in pristine wilderness. Once 
again, she has been short-changed, presented with rather less than what she values most. What she values most is 
wilderness, natural ecosystems that have naturally evolved and that result from an unbroken continuity of natural 
processes extending into the past. What Jill sees around her may have some value but, because a crucial relational 
property to do with genesis is absent, what she sees around her has much less value than she believes it has” (1997: 
88). 
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of process-based (and other contextual) considerations are relevant to normative judgment. 
Such considerations include, for example, the purposes, designs, and feelings of the artist, as 
well as the artist’s stage of artistic development and social milieu (Elliot 1997: 94-5; cf. 85). 
Obviously, there is a disanalogy between art and nature in that nature, as far as we know, is not 
the product of an artist or creator. Yet Elliot acknowledges other historical or process-based 
factors as relevant to the evaluation of natural objects, that is, factors besides the property of 
having a natural provenance. For example, Elliot speaks of the importance of having “an 
understanding of the geomorphological forces, the climatic factors, the ecological progressions, 
and so on, that explain an area’s present condition” (1997: 96). Elliot thinks such understanding 
intensifies our (aesthetic) appreciation of a given natural object. I see no reason why these 
considerations would apply only to environments that have a completely natural origin.  
 When we turn to the case of ecological restorations, additional process-based 
considerations can be brought into focus. Ecological restorations are intentional activities. It 
would therefore seem appropriate that various process-based considerations relevant to the 
normative assessment of art might likewise be relevant in the normative assessment of 
ecological restoration. In particular, the aim of restorations, together with their results, also 
seem important. I do not mean the aim(s) of those who actually carry out the restoration. 
Maybe restoration workers are just in it for the money. I mean the aim behind the restoration 
activity as such. Suppose the aim of a restoration is to resuscitate, or set in motion again, a 
natural process that was interrupted by whatever harm was done to a given site. Suppose, 
further, that this aim is achieved, and that a successful restoration does in fact occur. It seems to 
me that the right way to understand what has occurred here is to say that the restoration activity 
itself is part of the process that produces natural value.64 If Elliot were to acknowledge this, this 
would provide him the resources for valuing ecological restoration much more highly than he 
does. Specifically, it would enable him to value ecological restoration as part of the very process 
that generates natural value, rather than as a value-detracting feature of this process that 
nonetheless eventuates in a valuable result (namely, restored natural value).   
 To move in this direction is to revise Elliot’s view in one crucial respect. For Elliot says 
restoration activities are in themselves “value-detracting” (1997: 93). Actually, Elliot’s view has 
some tensions on this point. In his 1982 essay, Elliot remarks that “[a]rtificially transforming an 
                                                
64 I agree here with a point made in Light 2009: 11.  
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utterly barren, ecologically bankrupt landscape into something richer and more subtle may be a 
good thing. That is a view quite compatible with the belief that replacing a rich natural 
environment with a rich artificial one is a bad thing” (1982: 82). Unfortunately, Elliot is not 
completely clear in his description of this case. But if we suppose the landscape in question 
naturally evolved to be ecologically bankrupt and lacking in subtlety, then Elliot is clearly saying 
human intervention can indeed improve on nature’s original value. In his later work, however, 
Elliot maintains that human beings can never improve on nature’s original value.65 Thus, Elliot 
speaks in an apparently unqualified sense of “the value-detracting force of human intervention” 
and of “the value-retarding fact of human intervention” (1997: 93). If we follow the 1997 
statement, it seems that the most human beings might be able to do is to restore natural value 
after this has been despoiled, namely, by facilitating nature’s reclamation of a given site (cf. 
Elliot 1997: 92).  
 Two points merit comment here. First, restorations can detract from natural value 
depending on the magnitude and intrusiveness of the restoration. For example, a restoration 
that involves extraordinary technical manipulation will, other things being equal, detract more 
from natural value than one that involves more modest forms of restoration (Elliot 1997: 93; 
97-111). I mainly want to flag this point here; I will elaborate below on some finer-grained 
distinctions Elliot draws within the category of what he calls “token-restorations.” While more 
invasive restorations tend to decrease natural value, Elliot grants that whatever disvalue is 
caused by human intervention decreases with temporal distance from the intervention. At least 
this is so insofar as natural processes and forces successfully reassert themselves on the site, in 
effect, “washing out” the stains of human activity.66 Thus, in many imaginable cases the 
restoration of a site can restore natural value (or more precisely: facilitate the return of natural 
value) by facilitating nature’s recovery in a given place.  
 Second, Elliot acknowledges the value of restoration as an act of restitution, or making 
amends for past destruction of natural value caused by human beings (see Elliot 1997: 112-13). 
                                                
65 In a discussion of how his view of restoration is like the degreed view of rehabilitation advocated by others, 
Elliot writes: “Nor should this talk of improving value be thought in any way to imply that nature can be improved 
by human intervention. It cannot. The improvement that is delivered through restoration or rehabilitation derives 
from the fact that these processes strive to follow natural designs, natural patterns: they strive to replace, restore or 
rehabilitate that which nature had created and which was subsequently destroyed or degraded by humans” (1997: 
105).    
66 “The idea is that the passage of time and the lengthening domination by natural forces washes out the value-
retarding fact of human intervention” (Elliot 1997: 93).  
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Strictly speaking, the question of the value of restorations carried out as restitutions is distinct 
from the question of whether such restorations can successfully restore natural value. For in 
seeking to restore a degraded site we might aim at redressing past harm done without 
necessarily succeeding with respect to restoring natural value. And the converse seems possible 
too: a restoration might be carried out solely with the aim of restoring natural value, and not 
with the aim of “making amends.” In the former case, the restorative effort could be valuable, 
in virtue of its motivation, even if it failed to restore much less natural value than is possible on 
the site. Although it does seem that a restoration would have very little, if any, value as a form 
of restitution if it failed to restore some minimum of natural value. Elliot says nothing about 
whether there is some minimum goal we ought to be aiming for in cases of ecological 
restoration understood as a form of restitution. A plausible way to specify the minimum here 
would be the restoration or rehabilitation of ecological health as this was defined in Chapter 1.  
 Elliot is not unaware of how his view might be revised so as to incorporate the proposal 
I’ve been exploring above. He is sensitive to certain process-based considerations, notably, the 
character of the means and techniques used in restoration, and the specific type of intervention 
involved (Elliot 1997: 97-111). Within the category of types of restoration, Elliot makes further 
illuminating distinctions between what he calls “token-restorations” and “type-restorations” 
(1997: 101ff.). The former is most relevant to the normative evaluation of ecological 
restoration. Briefly, token-restoration leaves largely intact the provenance of what is restored. 
This is because token-restorations focus on a single (particular) object. For example, when a 
particular landscape is degraded then restored, there is a single object that in some sense can be 
said to endure through the entire process of being degraded then restored. As such, there is an 
important continuity between the original and its restoration.  
 In contrast, type-restorations are restorations of a given set of general properties that 
instantiate a certain type. Generally speaking, type restorations lack the particularity of token-
restorations. For one thing, a type-restoration need not occur on the site where the original type 
was instantiated; it could be recreated elsewhere if physically and technologically possible. 
Further, if we had the relevant knowledge and means we could restore a type even if all 
instantiations of the type—all tokens—have been completely destroyed. However, in this case it 
seems questionable to call this a “restoration.” This seems more like a replacement or recreation 
of a given type of ecosystem or landscape, rather than a restoration of a particular ecosystem or 
landscape. If we allow that type-restorations are restorations, the line between token-restoration 
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and type-restoration might seem blurred because all token-restorations could also be described 
as restorations of a certain type. But it seems to me this way of talking is not apt. A token-
restoration is distinguished by the effort to restore a single object that in some meaningful sense 
has endured degradation and is now being restored. To call such a restoration the restoration of 
a type is to miss the particularity of what is restored.  
 Within the category of token-restorations, Elliot makes three further notable 
distinctions: “extrinsic restoration,” “intrinsic restoration,” and “mixed restoration” (1997: 106). 
Briefly, extrinsic restoration refers to the removal of matter that has spoiled or impaired the 
qualities of the original object. The removal of invasive species or feral animals from a 
particular ecosystem is an example. Intrinsic restoration involves the addition of matter 
intended as a replacement for some original matter that has been lost or damaged. The 
reintroduction of indigenous or native species to an ecosystem from which the species had 
become extinct counts as an instance of intrinsic restoration. Mixed restorations refer to those 
restorations involving elements of both extrinsic and intrinsic restoration.  
 The lines between these different categories blur at points. Further, there can be degrees 
of degradation and hence degrees of required intrusiveness for the sake of restoration within 
any of these categories. But Elliot’s basic classification of natural values is clear. At one extreme, 
we have faked nature, for example, an enchanting forest made of plastic trees, mechanical 
waterfalls, and pre-recorded bird songs, all of which appear real and compelling. At another 
extreme we have pristine nature, for example, an old-growth forest that has been minimally 
modified by human activity. For Elliot, pristine nature is superior in natural value to faked 
nature, and apparently superior in value to any other form that nature might take. In between 
the extremes of faked and pristine nature falls the case of token-restored nature. This category 
of nature is particularly relevant in our not-pristine world. Within token-restorations, extrinsic 
restorations tend to be less invasive than intrinsic restorations, hence Elliot thinks they tend to 
leave more natural value intact. That said, a successful intrinsic restoration, given enough time, 
may come to have much or perhaps exactly the same value as a less invasive extrinsic 
restoration. What is crucial in the case of all token-restorations is that there is a meaningful 
degree of continuity between the original and the restored site. While this continuity is not an 
undisrupted natural continuity, this may not matter much if there is still a significant degree of 
continuity.  
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 This classification, as Elliot acknowledges, is necessarily crude. It abstracts from other 
considerations, such as the size of the natural area (rather than merely its degree of naturalness), 
its biological complexity, rarity, and so forth. These factors are relevant to an all-things-
considered view of the natural value of a given object or site.67 But the classification also seems 
crude in a way Elliot does not acknowledge. The scheme is missing an account of the way in 
which human restoration activities may in fact be integral to the restoration of natural value. Put 
differently, many human restorations of degraded sites are part of, constitutive of, the 
normatively significant process that generates objects or sites that have natural value. Which is 
to say, it is not merely nature that generates natural value. We, too, can participate in this natural 
value creation. I’m not sure whether Elliot would accept this strong view of the value of 
ecological restoration. But I think understanding the process/product distinction as I have 
above could support this strong view. Since this distinction is fundamental to Elliot’s historical 
view, I think he should accept the proposal I have made.  
 To push Elliot’s view in this direction is to acknowledge what we might call the human 
dimension of natural value. This shift in focus might open the way for Elliot to revise other 
aspects of his view, for example, his preoccupation with wilderness as the ideal of nature. Recall 
that for Elliot the primary goal of any restoration is to restore a site, then stay out of it. Elliot’s 
paradigmatic sense of restored nature, then, is nature restored in such a way that we (human 
beings) are imagined as facilitators of nature’s self-recovery, and later as visitors who do not 
remain once a site is restored. Accordingly, natural value in the paradigmatic sense refers to the 
value of wilderness—that is, places where humans are absent, or at most minimally present. I 
do not regard this paradigmatic sense of natural value as an empty ideal. Before considering 
what a modified historical account might look like, I want to explore why one might think that 
natural value, in Elliot’s paradigmatic sense, is normatively appealing.  
 
2.2.7 On the Normative Appeal of Nature’s “Otherness” 
 In 2.2, I claimed that it is unappealing to live in a world that has been pervasively 
humanized. A pervasively humanized world is one that reflects only or primarily our designs 
and aspirations. The contrast is a world that retains considerable nonhuman “otherness.” Many 
environmentalists recoil at the thought of living in a humanized world. Elliot himself appears to 
                                                
67 See the summary of the classification of natural value in Elliot 1997: 110-11. 
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believe that nature in his paradigmatic sense has some sort of brute appeal that cannot be 
further analyzed. In a note on the value of nature’s naturalness (where naturalness is understood 
to mean being unmodified by human activity), Elliot writes: “Really what is emphasized is that 
there is no explanation for at least part of natural value apart from naturalness itself. That 
nature has value is, so to speak, a brute value fact. Although the fact does not admit of further 
explanation, it requires emphasis and discussion in order to direct attention to its direct, 
unmediated, normative appeal” (1997: 157, note 1).  
 I think we can say more here than Elliot does. Part of the explanation of nature’s value 
is the thought that we do something wrong when we degrade the world in such a way that other 
forms of life, which have a good that is not our good, cannot flourish.68 We also seem to wrong 
future generations when we deny them the opportunity to live in a world that is not pervasively 
humanized. After all, future people might greatly value a world that retains some significant 
portion of nonhuman otherness, even if those living today do not care very much about this.  
 Both of the reasons mentioned are important. And both have a recognizably moral 
dimension. The concern for the flourishing of other species, or the concern not to pass on a 
degraded world to future generations, are both other-directed in a moral sense. But I don’t 
think these reasons suffice to explain what it is about living in a world of our own design that is 
objectionable. I think we can bring into focus another dimension here if we attend to a more 
inward-looking set of considerations. Human beings are morally sensitive beings. An aspect of 
this is that we are deeply social, relational, and communicative beings. We are capable of taking 
an interest in others and in others’ concerns, even if these are not our own. Indeed, much of 
social and moral life would be impossible if we were incapable of putting ourselves in others’ 
shoes, and seeing things from a vantage other than our own. I don’t think this capacity to take 
the perspective of others stops at the species boundary. Many people are deeply concerned 
about the lives of nonhuman creatures. I think this concern reflects, at least in part, an 
interesting fact about human beings: we do not seem completely content to be human. We 
often rebel against our cognitive and physical limits, and aspire to transcend these limits. The 
problem with living in a pervasively humanized world is that such a world blocks our aspiration 
to get beyond ourselves, outside ourselves. A humanized world truncates our possible 
experiences, and shuts us off from sources of meaning and significance that the human world 
                                                
68 In Chapter 3, I explore further the concept of flourishing and its normative significance, focusing on the case of 
sentient animals in particular. 
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necessarily cannot provide. This consideration is not obviously a moral one, though it does 
relate to the general question of what it means to live a good life, which might be categorized as 
a broadly moral question.  
 One thing that is special about the nonhuman natural world, in comparison to other 
examples of a nonhuman reality, is the fact that we have a certain continuity with the rest of 
nature, and hence a continuity with other natural beings. In this respect, the otherness of the 
nonhuman world provides part of the context within which human life, as a distinctive form of 
life, makes sense. It’s hard to say how much this fact explains our interest in nonhuman nature. 
I’m more inclined to attribute this interest to nature’s otherness, considered in its own right. But 
it is significant that we share an evolutionary history with the rest of life on earth. For this 
means human life is part of larger story—a story we did not create, but came in on and can at 
best co-author.69  
 Reflecting on human life in this broader context supports a certain humility, understood 
here as entailing the belief that we are not the most important thing on the planet. Natural and 
evolutionary history displays considerable otherness. Indeed, it may have a future that is 
recalcitrant to many human ends, and to the ends of other currently living species. But this 
history is also our history. Our coming to be, and our commonalities with other forms of life, 
cannot be understood adequately apart from an understanding of this long arc of natural and 
evolutionary history. In this way, the aspiration to know nature (insofar as we can), and to 
respect its independent otherness, has a “lateral” dimension. This contrasts with the more 
“vertical” dimension implied by the aspiration to self-transcendence involved in, say, certain 
religious beliefs that aspire to know a world that transcends the natural and human world we 
inhabit.70 I think this lateral dimension is reinforced by the recognition that the goods of 
humans and nonhumans, some of which are shared and some not, are both real and fragile.  
 While I think there is much to be said for the view just expressed as partly explaining 
our interest in nonhuman nature, adhering to such a view does pose some puzzles. One is that 
under conditions of anthropogenic climate change, modern pollution, etc., there really are no 
                                                
69 Charlene Spretnak makes a relevant observation here: “When deconstructive postmodernists conclude that there 
is nothing to life but arbitrary social construction and utter groundlessness, they continue and intensify the 
diminished conceptualization of the human that was begun by Renaissance humanism, the scientific revolution, 
and the Enlightenment. These foundational movements of modernity cumulatively framed the human story apart 
from the larger unfolding story of the earth community. Deconstructive postmodernists shrink the human story 
even further, insisting that it is entirely a matter of power plays and language games” (cited in Peterson 2001: 60).  
70 The notion of a “lateral” dimension here is suggested by Anna Peterson in Peterson 2001: Ch. 3.  
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places left that can plausibly be said to be unmodified by human activity. Though even if this is 
true, this hardly turns such places into artifacts of human culture. Any plausible value theory 
needs to be more nuanced than that. Elliot’s degreed account of naturalness, and corresponding 
degreed account of natural value, remains useful and is not undermined by the facts of 
anthropogenic climate change, globally pervasive pollution, and the like. 
 More troubling for Elliot’s view is his inability to deal adequately with the human 
dimension of environmental value. The problem, most basically, is that Elliot seems to regard 
the human presence in nature as a problem. At times he bluntly states that human activity 
necessarily detracts from natural value. Of course, it does not follow from such a claim that 
human activity would be value-detracting in general. Elliot, for his part, is attracted to the 
misanthropic view.71 In any case, we can suppose that human activity is very valuable in 
domains of concern where natural values are not at issue, or are of marginal concern. Artistic 
production, entertainment, education, and so on, are domains in which human activity is both 
the source of value and the goal. For example, the aims of artistic production may include 
encouraging the formation of a certain kind of community, the refinement of human 
perception, and so on. But it is very worrisome if an account of environmental values is unable 
to view humans as capable of playing a positive role in natural systems. If my proposal in the 
preceding section is correct, then maybe human activity may in fact be integral to the creation 
of natural value. Accordingly, there would be resources within Elliot’s view for resisting its 
more misanthropic tendencies.  
 I take it to be a given that the world, at least in the short term, is likely to become much 
more humanized, not less. The primary reason here is that the human population is on the rise 
and people are going to need to meet their needs from nature. As is already happening 
                                                
71 Consider the following two passages. (1) “The claim is that, beyond a certain point, the elimination of any 
quantity of natural aesthetic value entails a transition from a more valuable state of affairs to a less valuable one no 
matter what else happens; it entails a loss of value, all things considered. The interesting question concerns the 
point at which the entailed loss cuts in. Maybe it cuts in at the earliest possible point, so that any loss of natural 
aesthetic value entails a loss of value all things considered. Most people would find this view grossly counter-
intuitive, since it entails that human civilization is necessarily value-depleting, depending as it does on the 
destruction of considerable natural aesthetic value. Myself, I find this view somewhat appealing” (Elliot 1997: 73). 
(2) “Maybe human activity is in principle sometimes value-adding in instances where it reduces natural value. 
Whether it is value-adding in practice, given the increasing humanization of the natural and the pervasiveness of 
human impacts on the natural, is a separate issue. Sometimes, certainly, I am tempted to endorse the strong view 
and assert that the reduction of natural value always results in a decrease in value overall. Perhaps it is an 
unfortunate fact that our existence as creatures of culture and technology is at the price of reduced value overall. 
Still, one does not need to endorse such an extreme view in order to endorse most of the value claims that have 
been made so far” (Elliot 1997: 138).   
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worldwide, this will place further strain on already strained natural systems. Faced with this 
reality, any contemporary environmental value theory needs to be able to make meaningful 
distinctions between better and worse forms of humanized or human-manipulated nature. For 
it is increasingly the case that the nature we might care about is a nature that has been 
manipulated by human beings, and in many cases seriously modified by human activity. For 
better or worse, “unsullied” nature doesn’t really exist anymore, save for a few museum pieces 
here and there. In reply Elliot might say that he can make meaningful distinctions between 
better and worse forms of human-manipulated nature. Manipulation that is less invasive and 
totalizing, and which therefore preserves more natural value, is better than manipulation with 
the contrasting qualities.  
 But this reply doesn’t address a different problem. Focusing as Elliot does on the value-
adding property of natural provenance obscures other ways in which particular environments 
and objects in the world may raise interesting questions of environmental value. For example, 
many of the environments we have reason to care about preserving are the complex product of 
natural and human causal origins. The mere fact of having a “mixed” origin should not make 
such environments normatively unappealing, or unworthy of our serious attention. In this 
respect, we need to modify and supplement Elliot’s view in order to make it more responsive to 
the phenomena to be studied, as well as more instructive with respect to contemporary social 
and ecological realities.  
 
2.3 TOWARD A MODIFIED HISTORICAL VIEW 
 I suspect many people share Elliot’s intuitions about nature being valuable as an 
historical particular.72 But this view faces a number of criticisms, some of which I’ve already 
considered. Here I’m interested in a particular line of criticism articulated in the recent work of 
O’Neill, Holland and Light.73 O’Neill et al. regard Elliot’s historical view as in a way right, but 
they disagree with Elliot about what the normatively relevant history is. In particular, O’Neill et 
al. seek to abandon Elliot’s exclusive focus on the value-adding property of having a nonhuman 
                                                
72 As above, an historical particular is an object that is a particular in virtue of its particular history, not just in 
virtue of its particular non-historical qualities (e.g. its uniqueness, complexity, beauty, etc.).  
73 See O’Neill et al. 2008: Ch. 8-9. This is the latest iteration of work previously published by Holland and O’Neill 
(1996, 2003) and O’Neill (1997). 
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causal origin. In what follows I want to explore and embellish this criticism. In the next section, 
I consider the merits of the alternative historical view proposed by O’Neill et al. 
 A basic motivation for modifying Elliot’s view is the thinness of the notion of causal 
continuity that Elliot employs. O’Neill et al. believe there is no good reason to restrict ourselves 
to the normative significance of having a natural provenance, while excluding the possible 
significance of the life histories of humans who have lived in a given place (2008: 140-1). 
“[H]istory matters,” write O’Neill et al., “in the same way both in our evaluation of 
environments that do, and those that do not, embody human activity” (2008: 145-6). That is, it 
is the particular historical identity of a given place that matters. In some cases, this identity may 
be a natural causal continuity with the past, as in Elliot’s view.74 But more often the identity in 
question involves both a natural and a human history. O’Neill et al. agree with Elliot that 
historical considerations, in general, function to block proposals that would aim to replicate a 
particular place or to substitute one place for another. In this respect, O’Neill et al. contend that 
“time and history must enter our environmental valuations as constraints on our future 
decisions” (2008: 156; cf. 145-6, 176). Where O’Neill et al. depart from Elliot’s view is in 
arguing that historical considerations should figure in our valuations and decision-making in the 
case of both cultural and natural landscapes, not just natural (or mostly natural) landscapes.  
 A basic problem for Elliot is that he appears to have nothing interesting to say about 
the value of objects or environments that are the product of both natural and human 
originating processes.75 Yet many of the objects we might take an interest in embody a complex 
intertwining of natural and human causal origins. This is true, for example, of agricultural 
landscapes, or the many everyday objects people care about, such as a local pond or copse. It is 
also true of those undeveloped or abandoned lots that can be found in virtually any urban or 
suburban landscape. Of course, according to Elliot a place with a history of human habitation, 
or an object that is partly the product of human activity, can still embody some degree of 
natural value. Other things being equal, a place that has been less modified by human activity 
has greater natural value compared to a landscape that has been more modified; likewise, with 
                                                
74 See, e.g., O’Neill et al. 2008: 146, 163, 176, 198. However, I think this aspect of environmental value is muted in 
the discussion. 
75 There is some infelicity in speaking of the “natural” and the “human” as I do here, for this might be taken to 
suggest that humans are not part of nature. But we need a way of marking the distinction between nonhuman and 
human causal origins. Hence I follow Elliot is using “natural” to refer to nonhuman causal origins. But this usage 
does not imply any particular view (such as Elliot’s) about the sense in which humans are, or are not, part of 
nature.   
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various objects, such as domesticated species of plant or animal. A problem with this view is 
that it assumes the criterion of naturalness, understood as having a natural provenance, is the 
most important factor determining our judgments of natural or environmental value. But there 
is no good reason why an historical view, in particular, should place so much emphasis on the 
normative significance of having a natural provenance.  
 The objection of O’Neill et al. can be expanded by noticing that a further consequence 
of Elliot’s focus on the value-adding property of naturalness is that many objects of possible 
interest are inadequately conceptualized, and hence inadequately appreciated. I think this is so 
specifically with respect to those objects, including entire landscapes, that embody an 
intertwining of natural and human causal origins. Such objects are distinctive in part because 
they embody both natural and human histories in a single object. It won’t do to regard these 
objects as “deficient” exemplars either of what is natural or artifactual, for both categories miss 
what is distinctive about the objects in question. We need a different account of such objects. 
With this in mind, we might distinguish between three general categories of objects: (1) nature 
in the paradigmatic sense (e.g. an old-growth forest with a history of no or minimal human 
alteration); (2) natural artifacts, or objects that embody an intertwining of natural and human 
causal origins (e.g. agricultural landscapes); and (3) artifacts in the paradigmatic sense (e.g. cars 
and computers). I think the first two categories, not just the first, should interest environmental 
philosophers much more than has been the case.   
 To see the issues at stake more clearly, consider the case of agricultural biodiversity.76 
Agricultural biodiversity is the product of intentional and fortuitous human activity working 
with and against various natural forces and processes. Part of what is distinctive about 
agricultural biodiversity is that it is the result of both natural and human originating processes 
that might be value-adding. This added value comes in addition to whatever value agricultural 
biodiversity may have in virtue of its non-historical properties, such as its instrumental value.  
 But why care about these originating processes? One reason is that agricultural 
biodiversity is not merely a product of nature; it is also the collective achievement of human 
communities. Through much labor and skillfulness particular communities have worked with 
and against nature in a particular place to produce a distinctive object. If we value the object in 
abstraction from its particular history, we miss the fact that the object in question is in part the 
                                                
76 For relevant discussion, see Martinez-Alier 1997; also O’Neill et al. 2008: 172, 178-9. 
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product of considerable human labor and skill. Further, viewing this object as valuable only 
insofar as it exemplifies a degree of naturalness, as Elliot is wont to do, seems to obscure the 
object as a complex whole. The object is in effect partitioned into its “natural” element and its 
“human” element, and valued in virtue of the former.77 Those who might view agricultural 
products as artifacts of culture commit the same error, but in the other direction. In both cases, 
what is missed is the distinctiveness of the product as a complex whole, a product whose 
originating processes and history involve a unique combination of the natural and the human. 
An account of environmental values should be able to reflect and register the distinctiveness of 
“mixed” objects, such as natural artifacts like agricultural biodiversity. Importantly, such a view 
can also account for intuitions about the value of a variety of objects, such as domesticated 
plants and animals, rural landscapes, urban parks, and the like. These objects tend to be 
undervalued by accounts like Elliot’s that focus primarily on the value-adding property of 
having a natural provenance.    
 If an account of environmental value is made sensitive to the human transformation of 
nature, then a further advantage of such an account is that it will be positioned to appreciate the 
collective achievements of particular human communities in having co-created, and also 
preserved, various natural artifacts. A paradigm example is the preservation of in situ agricultural 
biodiversity by subsistence and indigenous communities around the globe. In situ agricultural 
biodiversity refers to biological diversity that has been cultivated and preserved through 
context-specific patterns of agriculture and land use. An account of environmental values that is 
sensitive to the value of objects like in situ agricultural biodiversity is capable of illuminating 
how concern for certain environmental values may dovetail with concern for justice. This is so 
in the sense that a proper recognition of the contributions that particular social or cultural 
groups make (or have made) to a valued good or state of affairs is plausibly thought of as an 
element of justice.78  
                                                
77 Or at least the historical part of Elliot’s theory is capable of registering only the natural history of an object like 
agricultural biodiversity. Perhaps Elliot would agree that such objects have value for other reasons, for example, 
because they contribute to biological diversity, or because they embody human labor and skill. But the fact that 
Elliot does not discuss such cases leaves one with the impression that objects such as agricultural biodiversity are at 
best “sullied” natural objects, or valuable for reasons that have nothing to do with the fact that they are partly 
natural objects, and distinctive on that count. 
78 Theories of justice focused on distributional issues may have difficulty accommodating issues of social/cultural 
recognition. But I see no reason to limit our thinking about justice to distributional issues (though such issues are 
undoubtedly important). In this regard, I follow theorists like Nancy Fraser who explicitly include within the 
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 Another consideration further supports a revision, or at least an expansion, of Elliot’s 
historical account. One potentially unsavory implication of Elliot’s view of natural value is that 
it implies a policy of excluding human activity from landscapes whenever this is practically 
feasible and not in conflict with any other, overriding normative aims. This follows from 
assuming that the preservation or restoration of natural value is an important aim, even if not 
the only or most important one.79 Here we might press against Elliot’s view an objection that I 
considered earlier with respect to the concept of integrity. An account of environmental value 
that marginalizes our dependence on nature, and thereby marginalizes our modifications of 
nature in order to meet our needs and create culture, is theoretically deficient. 
 I think environmental philosophers should make their theorizing sensitive to the various 
respects in which humans engage nature to meet their needs and create culture. One result of 
such engagement is that cultural identities often become bound up with particular places, and 
these places therefore matter as a physical embodiment of certain cultural self-understandings, 
values and aspirations.80 With this in mind, we can illuminate a further historical consideration, 
one that is reducible neither to Elliot’s kind of concern, nor to a concern for natural artifacts. 
This is the idea that people might view local biodiversity, particular natural objects (rivers, etc.), 
or entire landscapes, as part of a heritage that should be passed on to future generations. Part of 
the rationale for this idea is the judgment that it would be unfair and hence wrong to 
impoverish the options of future people if preserving these options does not impose 
unreasonable demands on those of us living today.81 But this is an impersonal reason to care, 
one that has nothing to do with considerations grounded in the history of certain objects or 
environments, and the history of a community’s relationship to those objects and 
environments. Relevant to the historical focus of this chapter is the thought that people might 
view their local history as one of coexisting and interacting with a certain set of objects and 
nonhuman species—this landscape, this stream, these resident species, and so on.82 This local 
                                                                                                                                                 
purview of justice concern for social/cultural recognition, as well as questions of power and political voice, in 
addition to distributional issues. For a recent statement of Fraser’s view, see Fraser 2008.   
79 Certainly Elliot does not argue that the preservation of natural value is the only, or the highest, good. However, 
Elliot does not clarify what proportion of landscapes we might aim to preserve or restore to a state that exemplifies 
natural value. So one is left with an unclear sense of the overall picture that Elliot is envisioning.  
80 See O’Neill et al. 2008: 163, 176, 198. 
81 I won’t provide a criterion of “unreasonable” here, but I assume we could clarify such a criterion without too 
much trouble.   
82 I’m grateful to Robert McKim for helpful discussion on this point.  
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history is an independent source of value that provides a reason to protect the relevant natural 
objects, species, or landscapes.83 
 While I believe Elliot’s view is compelling for reasons discussed above (see 2.2.2), the 
view has difficulty appreciating the significance of the human engagement with nature. For 
example, Elliot either conceives of humans as beings for whom nature is a source of aesthetic 
delight and deontological obligations, or we are envisioned as restorationists who seek to 
remedy the past destruction of natural value.84 In the case of restoration, Elliot views the human 
intervention as inherently value-detracting with respect to natural values.85 This is so despite the 
fact that restoration aims to restore natural value. Our aesthetic enjoyment of nature and our 
restoration activity are both important elements of the human engagement with nature, and as 
such dimensions of any plausible account of environmental values. But opening up our 
conception of environmental values in the ways I’ve suggested allows us to see other respects in 
which particular environments and natural (or partly natural) objects matter to people. 
Including these types of concern makes our theorizing richer and more adequate to the 
phenomena and range of considerations at play.   
 
2.4 THE NARRATIVE VIEW 
 In the previous section, I suggested some of the reasons that might motivate us to seek 
an alternative to Elliot’s view. In this section I want to consider a particular proposal for a 
modified historical account, namely, the “narrative view” put forth by O’Neill, Holland and 
Light (2008: Ch. 9-11). This view merits serious consideration, but in its present form it has 
some notable gaps and unclarities. I think the best way to understand the narrative view is to 
see it as illuminating one of a number of considerations, all of which need to be combined if we 
                                                
83 This consideration does not reduce to either a nonanthropocentric or an anthropocentric concern as it has 
elements of both. The anthropocentric concern is for maintaining/respecting the particular history of the human 
engagement with the objects or environments in question. But this concern is further supported by non-
anthropocentric considerations. For example, if the objects or environments in question were without value in 
themselves, or were of very minimal value, then one might not regard the human engagement with, and valuation 
of, these objects or environments as all that important. This contrasts with a case in which the objects or 
environments in question have considerable value in themselves, beyond their usefulness or meaning to human 
beings. However, I want to resist here the idea that what is really doing the work is the nonanthropocentric 
rationale. This rationale tends to focus too much on such properties as being biologically complex, rare, 
spectacular, and so on, thereby obscuring the significance of those more everyday objects and environments that 
people care about.  
84 On the duty of restitution as a motive for restoring natural value, see Elliot 1997: 112-13. 
85 See Elliot 1997: 93. As I discussed above there are some tensions on this point between the 1997 and the 1982 
accounts.  
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are to articulate an adequate environmental ethic. I will indicate some of the other relevant 
considerations in the discussion that follows. However, it is beyond the scope of this chapter to 
provide an account of how exactly these other considerations should be combined. (In Chapter 
4, I revisit the question of how the different normative considerations raised here, and indeed 
throughout the dissertation, might best be combined or integrated.)   
 O’Neill et al. propose that we replace Elliot’s appeal to the preservation or restoration 
of naturalness with an appeal to a qualitative measure of maintaining narrative significance. 
O’Neill et al. arrive at this view via a consideration of the normative significance of change. Any 
place we might imagine is subject to various forces of change. Places where no people live are 
subject to natural forces and processes that over time can profoundly alter the specific character 
of the place in question. Places where humans live, or have lived, have an additional cause of 
changes, namely those brought about by human activity (whether intentional or not). The view 
of O’Neill et al. is that change as such does not pose any pressing normative question. Only 
certain changes seem to be problematic. The challenge is to explain which changes. We can’t, 
the authors maintain, arrive at an evaluation of problematic change simply by invoking some 
quantitative notion of too much or too little change. Rather, we need some qualitative measure: 
“Change can be too much or too little, not by any simple quantitative measure, but by a 
qualitative measure of degree of disruption to narrative significance” (O’Neill et al. 2008: 157). 
The idea, in other words, is that when we are reflecting on how to deal with a given landscape, 
and considering reasons to do this rather than that, we should not ask (pace Elliot) “How can 
we best restore the natural value of the site?” Instead, O’Neill et al. suggest that a better 
question is “What would make the most appropriate trajectory from what has gone before?” 
(2008: 156), or more simply, “How can we best continue the narrative of the place?”    
 The focus on maintaining narrative significance is meant, as I understand it, to 
foreground the meaning-making and valuing activity of human beings as they relate to, and 
reflect on the value of, different places—whether natural or not. According to the narrative 
view, we are oriented in the world by our active engagement with particular places, and with the 
objects and nonhuman others that exist in those places. This means that our identities are 
constituted, at least partly, by our relations to these particulars. If we were insensitive to the 
narrative dimension of environmental values, we would fail to understand the respects in which 
people can become profoundly disoriented when they lose the ability to perform their identities 
in relation to particular places. This happens, for example, when people are displaced by a big 
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dam project, such as the Narmada Dam in India. What is lost here is not just individual 
livelihoods, physical homes, or plots of land. Rather, a person’s basic practical relations toward 
the world and others, and toward the culturally significant character of the landscape, are also 
thwarted or undermined.86 What makes the narrative view a contribution to thinking about 
environmental values is that our interactions with nature—in the form of particular places, 
however humanized—are given a central focus.  
 The implications of the rather vague but suggestive notion of maintaining narrative 
significance can be better understood through some examples provided by O’Neill et al. One 
example concerns the question of whether to remove “exotic” species from a locale in which 
these had been introduced by human activity. A second example concerns how we might deal 
with an abandoned industrial site. Both cases are interesting because they represent two types of 
practical problem commonly faced by environmentalists and communities trying to sort out 
how to live well, and rightly, on the landscape. 
 The first case involves a harbor on the southwest coast of Finland, called Reposaari.87 
Historically, Reposaari was a shipping port. The export trade from the harbor was primarily 
timber, while the import trade was much lighter cargo, including spices from southern Europe. 
Given the different types of commodities traded, ships sailing to Reposaari needed ballast. This 
was provided by soil from southern Europe whence these ships came. Upon arriving in port in 
Reposaari, the ballast was dumped. The ballast soil contained the seeds of many flora from 
southern Europe, and these flourished in the northern environment. The result today is a flora 
unique to the area of Reposaari. In an interesting way, the history of human activity is 
“inscribed” in the very biology of the area.   
 Judged by Elliot’s standard of naturalness (environments unmodified by human 
activity), the unique flora in Reposaari contains various “exotic” or non-native species. 
Accordingly, a practical conservation question might be whether we should try to remove the 
                                                
86 These considerations help to shed light on the inadequacy of compensation for certain kinds of loss due to 
displacement. This is illustrated well by a member of the indigenous community from the Narmada Valley in 
western India, who was threatened with displacement by the Sardar Sarovar Dam. In a letter to the Chief Minister 
of the state government, this individual wrote: “You tell us to take compensation. What is the state compensating 
us for? For our land, for our fields, for the trees along our fields. But we don’t live only by this. Are you going to 
compensate us for our forest? … Or are you going to compensate us for our great river – for her fish, her water, 
for vegetables that grow along her banks, for the joy of living beside her? What is the price of this? … How are 
you compensating us for fields either – we didn’t buy this land; our forefathers cleared it and settled here. What 
price this land? Our gods, the support of those who are our kin – what price do you have for these? Our adivasi 
(tribal) life – what price do you put on it?” (from Mahalia 1994, cited in O’Neill et al. 2008: 56-7). 
87 See O’Neill et al. 2008: 160-1. 
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non-native species from Reposaari, supposing we could. Although Elliot never considers this 
particular case, we can imagine his response. In one respect, I think the response would be fairly 
straightforward: supposing we were in a position to restore natural value to the area, we should 
try to do so. This would entail, among other things, trying to remove non-native species with 
the aim of restoring the naturalness of the area in question. This would be, specifically, a case of 
what Elliot calls extrinsic token restoration (assuming no other intrinsic features needed to be 
restored, such as formerly existing native species that had gone extinct in the area). The idea is 
that by removing the exotic species this would, other things being equal, contribute to the 
restoration of natural value. Of course, such a restoration would not be able to restore 
completely the original natural value of the site. But with enough time post restoration, the 
restoration could succeed in facilitating nature’s self-recovering, thus allowing a considerable 
degree of natural value to return to the area.   
 While I think this is likely to be Elliot’s default view, there are some complicating 
considerations here. As already noted, Reposaari has a very unique flora given its particular 
history. In addition, the area is still a largely natural area (or we can suppose this for the sake of 
argument). I see no reason why Elliot couldn’t agree that the area in question is valuable in 
virtue of its (degree of) naturalness and in virtue of its biological uniqueness, even if the latter is, 
in part, a product of human activity. I think Elliot would accede to this thought because the 
particular manner in which the exotic seeds took root and flourished was the result of natural 
processes, even if the presence of the “exotic” seeds in Finland was not. Further considerations 
include the fact that the exotic species in question have flourished in the coastal climate of 
Finland, and (I’m assuming) they are flourishing in such a way that they appear not to have 
impaired the flourishing of other native plants, animals, or ecosystems. Nonetheless, the native 
ecosystem in the area of Reposaari has undoubtedly been changed, and in a way that is 
irrevocable. I assume Elliot would believe that once we become acquainted with the history of 
Reposaari whatever positive natural value we might attribute to the local environment would be 
lessened by the knowledge that the unique flora of the region is, in part, a product of human 
activity.    
 The position of O’Neill et al., in contrast, is that any project of trying to eradicate the 
non-native or “exotic” species in the name of restoring naturalness would be entirely wrong-
headed. Their objections are not about practical feasibility, so we can set that aside. Their 
reasoning is that the landscape of Reposaari is unique precisely because it is a product of the 
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interaction of particular natural causes and human-induced changes. According to the narrative 
view, part of what it means to appreciate the particular place that is Reposaari is to appreciate 
both its natural and human history, and how these are intertwined in fortuitous ways. Thus 
O’Neill et al. say that “in considering whether an ‘introduced’ species [i.e. an exotic or non-
native species] constitutes a harm or a good we need to consider the specific narrative we can 
tell about it, not whether its origins happen to be human or not” (2008: 161). We would fail to 
do right by the history of Reposaari as a former harbor were we to aim at eradicating the 
“exotic” species in the name of restoring natural value, understood in Elliot’s sense. Indeed, 
according to the narrative view knowledge of the fact that the unique flora of Reposaari is the 
product of a fortuitous interplay of natural and human causal origins may amplify the value of 
the particular environment in Reposaari. After all, this environment is unlike anything else in 
Finland, and (we may suppose) unlike anything else in the world. The uniqueness of the natural 
forms in this area cannot be disentangled from its particular history. Thus, fully appreciating the 
uniqueness of the area requires knowing about, and appreciating, its particular history. By 
contrast, Elliot’s kind of view would likely have us view the “mixed” history in question as a 
source of regret insofar as we are focusing on natural values.  
 The second case presented by O’Neill et al. concerns a disused slate quarry in Northern 
Wales.88 Ecologically, the abandoned quarry is barren, with few signs of life, certainly nothing 
resembling the former biological diversity of the site prior to its use as a quarry. Aesthetically, 
the site is an eyesore. It is reasonable to suppose that environmentalists would wish to reclaim 
the site in order to restore its natural value, which is currently quite minimal. Yet such a 
reclamation of the site would bury the past of the quarry: “[A reclamation] would involve,” 
write O’Neill et al., “burying the history of the local community and the story of their 
engagement with the mountain – as revealed in the slate stairways, the hewn caverns and the 
exposed slate face […] and most poignant of all, the workmen’s huts […] still in place” (2008: 
155). The facts of this case are typical of many contemporary dilemmas faced by 
environmentalists and communities sorting out how to deal with degraded landscapes, such as 
abandoned quarries or former industrial sites.  
 How, then, do O’Neill et al. propose that we think about this case? The authors do not 
spell out their view with respect to this particular case. But we can imagine that some sort of 
                                                
88 See O’Neill et al. 2008: 155.  
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restoration is appropriate, given the ecological degradation of the site. Redressing degradation 
could mean, for example, rehabilitating the site to a state of ecological health, understood as 
restoring nature’s capacity to renew itself (resilience).89 This would stop short of restoring the 
greatest natural value possible for the site. But it seems one reason to restore the site at all is 
that the slate quarry is just a blip in the history of this particular site. It would be strange to 
think we should try to “freeze” the landscape. In general, O’Neill et al. oppose aspirations to 
“freeze” history in this way.90 I take this to mean that it would be a problem to try to maintain a 
certain landscape exactly as it is, or to try to return a landscape to a certain state that obtained at 
some point in the past, whether this is done in the name of nature’s history or that of a given 
human community. In the case of the disused quarry, because there is a significant human 
history to this landscape any adequate restoration, assuming we are guided by the narrative 
view, would need to be carried out in such a way that this human history is adequately 
preserved. But how would this best be achieved? Would it be enough, say, to preserve a few of 
the workers’ stairways, but facilitate nature’s reclamation on the rest of the site? Or should the 
workers huts also be preserved? If so, should they be preserved in such a way as to allow 
natural decay, or should they be kept up, perhaps acting as shelters or museums for visitors? 
O’Neill et al. do not answer these questions. But what can be said is that they indicate some of 
the guiding considerations, even if these considerations still leave room for considerable 
interpretation depending on the particularities of any given case. 
 While I find the idea of maintaining narrative significance attractive in certain respects, 
the narrative view is misguided if it is meant as a blanket statement regarding how landscapes 
should be evaluated and dealt with practically. In the absence of an explicit appeal to some 
ecologically grounded standard to guide us the narrative account is far too permissive. Surely we 
could tell a good story about why certain landscapes should remain as they are, or be restored in 
such and such a way, even if these landscapes contribute to ecological degradation. For 
example, I have no doubt that defenders of industrial agriculture could provide a compelling 
                                                
89 Below I’ll return to the reason why I think O’Neill et al. would probably support restoring ecological health in a 
case like this. 
90 “One unsatisfactory feature of a great deal of biodiversity management is the way that it attempts to freeze 
history at a certain point – insisting for example on the retention of a particular assemblage of flora and fauna. A 
place then ceases to have a continuing story to tell. When you look at the landscape and ask ‘what happened then 
in the year that the managers arrived?’, all there is to say is that they preserved it and nothing else happened. The 
object becomes a mere spectacle taken outside of history” (O’Neill et al. 2008: 177; cf. 200-1; see also O’Neill 
1997: 25).   
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narrative as to why the current way of growing crops should continue, despite its ecological 
shortcomings. The story might rely, for example, on the impressive productivity of industrial 
agriculture, and the fact that this indicates the triumph of human ingenuity and technological 
prowess in subduing nature for the sake producing commodities that make human life more 
comfortable, secure, or whatever. Were we to aim to break up industrial farms, some could 
argue that this would fail to do justice to various historical considerations that support a 
continuation of the status quo. Many other examples might be offered to reach a similar 
conclusion. So an important question here is whether O’Neill et al. are simply assuming that 
some minimal ecological standard would be built in as a constraint on “appropriate” narratives.  
 I assume the answer here is yes. For example, in a critique of the aim of restoring a 
natural state (pace Elliot), O’Neill et al. suggest that Aldo Leopold’s notion of land health 
suffices to inform us of problematic forms of biotic impoverishment (2008: 160). The 
suggestion is that we don’t need to appeal to something more robust, such as biological or 
ecological integrity, to guide our thinking about restoration.91 Similarly, in their critique of 
itemizing approaches to biodiversity, O’Neill et al. suggest (following Wood 1997) that 
“biodiversity should be understood as a concept that refers to the potentials of environments, 
and not just their state at any point of time: to maintain biodiversity is to maintain the capacity 
of a system to diversify rather than the actual diversity manifested at any point of time” (2008: 
178). In a similar vein, the authors agree with proponents of strong sustainability “that there are 
real physical limits to the capacities of nature to deliver [various ecosystem] services [e.g. 
nutrient cycling, etc.]” (2008: 200). Finally, in their concluding chapter, O’Neill et al. suggest 
that historical considerations are not the only ones that matter (2008: 203). In light of these 
remarks, it is reasonable to think that O’Neill et al. are presupposing some minimal ecological 
standard as a constraint on acceptable narratives. 
 But if this is the considered view of the authors, it is puzzling that when the Reposaari 
and quarry cases are discussed, no explicit mention is made of maintaining land health and the 
capacity of natural systems to diversify as constraints on appropriate narratives. Nor are the 
physical limits to nature’s provision of various useful goods and services presented as 
constraints. In short, the authors do not emphasize to the extent that they should the sense in 
which historical considerations are only one type of consideration that must be weighed against, 
                                                
91 Although the authors do not specify their meaning, I assume they understand biological or ecological integrity in 
the way I define this in Chapter 1. 
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and constrained by, other considerations, such as maintaining land health and the capacity of 
natural systems to diversify. But if historical considerations are not the only ones that matter, it 
seems reasonable to expect that the authors would offer a proposal regarding the relative 
importance of maintaining, for example, land health versus continuing the narrative of a given 
place—assuming these two aims can come apart. Yet no such proposal is articulated. Moreover, 
O’Neill et al. leave it unclear whether it would ever be an appropriate aim to restore natural 
value as Elliot understands this. The authors indicate that it would be inappropriate to have this 
aim in cases such as Reposaari, but it’s left unclear how other cases might be decided. Assuming 
Elliot is not proposing the preservation or restoration of natural value as the only guide for land 
use decisions—which would be absurd—then I don’t see why the aim of preserving or 
restoring natural value would in all cases be invalid. Of course, whether one agrees here will 
depend on how one weighs the relative importance of resisting or “rolling back” the pervasive 
humanization of the natural world.92   
 A different problem faced by the narrative view concerns the fact that most landscapes 
we might consider give rise to conflicting narratives and hence conflicting possible futures. It is 
implausible to suppose that an historical concern for nature and an historical concern for things 
human will generally fit together seamlessly, or without tension. In some cases, such as the 
reasons to preserve in situ biodiversity, there may be a mutual reinforcing of human-regarding 
and nature-regarding reasons. But many other cases, both actual and imaginable, are not so 
neat. How should we adjudicate between conflicting views about how best to continue the 
narrative of a given place? O’Neill et al. acknowledge this possibility of conflicting narratives. In 
fact, they consider it a virtue of their view that it illuminates such conflicts rather than 
obscuring or denying them as other views sometimes do.93 One implication of the narrative 
view is that tragic conflicts between competing narratives of a place become a live possibility. 
The view can explain why a given narrative might make sense in some ways, and yet lead to 
                                                
92 Viewing a pervasively humanized or “artificial” world as unattractive is not misanthropic. To be misanthropic 
the view would have to oppose, or at least regret, any humanization of the world. As noted above, Elliot is attracted 
to the misanthropic view. But one could certainly believe that we should try to curb the pervasive humanization of 
the world, while also believing that certain humanizations of the world are valuable. Indeed, this is my own view, as 
I will explore further in Chapter 4.  
93 For example, as ahistorical itemizing approaches to biodiversity preservation do (O’Neill et al. 2008: 170-2); or as 
“objective list” accounts of human well-being used to specify a conception of sustainability do (ibid.: 196; cf. 39).   
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tragic loss.94 I agree with O’Neill et al. that a plausible value theory should admit of plural 
goods. It follows that such a theory will have to face the possibility of tragic trade-offs between 
competing, and possibly incommensurable, goods. But we need to be clear about exactly what is 
being traded off. The narrative view threatens to obscure the trade-offs that might have to be 
made by assimilating Elliot’s type of concern into a concern for cultural preservation.  
 Let me suggest one final worry here. The narrative view, by attempting to correct for 
certain deficiencies in Elliot’s view, may actually overcorrect. That is, the narrative view seems 
to give too much weight to human engagements with particular landscapes, and by comparison 
too little weight to the fact that various nonhuman sentient animals also share our landscapes. 
We tend to live, collectively if not individually, in ways that make it very difficult to share our 
environments with other sentient animals—with the exception of a few species that do well on 
our terms. If sentient animals merit moral consideration from us, and strong arguments can be 
made that they do, then it seems a problem to say nothing about the way in which concern for 
animals may constrain appropriate narratives.95 In short, I worry that the narrative view in the 
form articulated by O’Neill et al. does not provide much assurance that natural objects or 
landscapes (understood as historical particulars in Elliot’s sense), or sentient animals, will be 
given the attention they deserve.   
 
2.5 CONCLUSION  
 What Elliot, O’Neill, Holland and Light all help us to see is the importance of certain 
historical considerations for our normative thinking about nature. As suggested earlier, 
knowledge of an object’s history provides depth and texture to our appreciation of that object. 
This is true in the case of various natural objects, but it is also true of various natural artifacts 
and artifacts. Landscapes exhibit nature’s “project,” reminding us that we have come in on a 
story that was underway long before we arrived on the scene. In addition, landscapes can 
                                                
94 For example, imagine a narrative that gives expression to a community’s identity but which has as a consequence 
the destruction of a rare and beautiful natural habitat, or the destruction of the species living in a particular place.  
95 O’Neill et al. discuss the moral status of nonhuman animals at various points (see, in particular, 2008: Ch. 6). But 
their view remains elusive. For example, they say at one point that “the very notion of moral consideration itself 
looks too thin to ground the very different type of response that is owed to different kinds of beings” (2008: 107). 
The implication seems to be that an impersonal reason that says sentient animals are owed moral consideration 
does not do much work. Later, the authors suggest that “sentient beings demand from us a particular set of 
relations of benevolence that non-sentient beings cannot evoke – one cannot be cruel or kind to a carrot” (2008: 
109). I agree with the point. But if this is the authors’ view, it would seem plausible to think that moral concern for 
animals should somehow constrain appropriate narratives.    
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embody a culture’s identity and historic activities and labors. This is evident, for example, in 
agricultural landscapes or with respect to the ancient hedges one finds in Europe. Further, 
natural and human histories can intertwine in fortuitous and normatively interesting ways, as 
when nature begins its “reclamation” of abandoned industrial sites. Each of these examples can 
give us reasons to care about the landscapes in question, although there is disagreement about 
what exactly a fitting response would be in each case, and about which history (or histories) 
should be given normative priority in our preservation/restoration efforts. We have a very 
incomplete and truncated understanding of these cases if we are blind to historical 
considerations, and the role they can play in our evaluation of different objects or 
environments. 
 I regard historical considerations as an important source of value. But such 
considerations do not exhaust those that are relevant to our thinking about environmental 
values. I have suggested that certain end-state considerations—notably, concern for ecological 
health and concern for sentient animals—are also important. I spoke to the importance of 
ecological health in Chapter 1, and I will turn to the significance of animals in the next chapter. 
In this chapter my primary aim has been to explore and critically assess two versions of the 
historical view as contributions to our thinking about environmental values. While both of these 
views are vulnerable to criticisms, I hope to have shown that the views nonetheless merit 
inclusion in an account of environmental values that aims to do justice to the complexity and 
variety of ways in which nature matters. 
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BEING AN ANIMAL AND ITS NORMATIVE SIGNIFICANCE 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 In Chapter 1, I emphasized the sense in which we are dependent on nature. One of the 
obvious things this means is that human beings depend on nature for meeting their basic or 
vital needs. I appealed to this fact to justify the claim that we must care, at minimum, about 
maintaining ecological health. However, in Chapter 1 I also mentioned richer ways of valuing 
the natural world, ways that cannot be reduced to a concern solely for human needs. In 
particular, I suggested that one of the notable inadequacies of the resource view of nature (see 
1.3) is that this view assumes all of nature, including nonhuman animals, are resources. There I 
suggested this was an inadequate reason to care about nature, for it fails to take account of 
reasons we have to regard animals as valuable in their own right. I raised this issue again in 
Chapter 2, where one aspect of my criticism of the view offered by O’Neill, Holland and Light 
was that the authors do not provide an account of how concern for sentient animals should be 
integrated with concern for the other environmental values the authors discuss. In my earlier 
discussion, I have not provided an argument as to why we might care about animals in their 
own right, offering instead only promissory notes. In this chapter I want to return to the 
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question of animals, and suggest how they fit into my normative account of the reasons we 
have to care about the nonhuman natural world.  
 The general structure of the chapter is as follows. In 3.2, I begin with the claim that 
being an animal is a way of being someone. What follows is an exploration of what I take to be 
conceptually interesting about being an animal. The idea is to present a philosophical picture of 
animal life that shows why we have reasons to take animals very seriously. In 3.3, I explore what 
it might mean to show proper respect for animals given the kinds of beings they are. Here I 
introduce a new concept, the concept of flourishing, which I regard as indispensable to an 
adequate account of what respect for animals would mean. In 3.4, I consider how we might 
situate concern for animals in relation to other important concerns, such as finding cures for 
human diseases, enabling people to live decent lives, or trying to maintain ecological health. I 
also explore the normative significance of capability variation among animals. I conclude, in 3.5, 
by considering whether my emphasis on the ethical significance of being an animal reinforces 
an objectionable sentientism. I argue that it does not. The reason, in short, is I do not assume 
that being an animal is the only relevant basis for being valuable in an important sense.  
 
3.2 BEING AN ANIMAL 
 All living beings are dependent, vulnerable, and subject to growth and eventual decay. 
In this basic sense, each living being is “on a par” with all others. However, I do not believe 
nonconscious (nonsentient) beings, e.g. plants and insects, are moral subjects, or morally 
significant in a sense central to ethical concern.1 But this does not mean nonconscious living 
entities are without value, or that they are “indifferent” from an ethical point of view. The same 
point applies to certain nonliving entities, such as ecosystems. Nonsentient objects, whether 
alive or not, can be valuable in a sense that our ethics, broadly understood, should track. A 
plant, for example, may be valuable for a variety of reasons: because it is beautiful or unique; 
because it has a biological integrity and needs; or because the plant plays an important role in 
                                                
1 Biocentrists (e.g. Paul Taylor, James Sterba) argue that all beings that “have a good of their own” are moral 
subjects. Which is to say, biocentrists believe it is question-begging not to give equal moral consideration to all 
beings that have a good. Equal consideration does not mean equal treatment, of course. For discussion, see Taylor 
1986; and Sterba 1995, 2000a, and 2005. In my view, and as implied in the text that follows above, biocentrists are 
mistaken in thinking all beings that have a good merit equal moral consideration. I think all beings that have a good 
should interest us in some sense, but this interest might not be very significant in many cases. In the case of 
animals, I think the case is very strong for the reasons given later in this chapter. But here the reasons to care are 
not reducible to the very spare notion of “having a good,” which biocentrists appear to regard as decisive. 
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ecosystems that are productive and resilient. I regard these reasons as moral in a broad sense of 
“moral.” Which is to say, morally motivated individuals should be sensitive to such reasons in 
their moral-practical reasoning.  
 In contrast to the case of nonsentient entities, such as plants, I believe developing an 
appropriate concern for animals is a critical aspect of living an ethical life. Of course, we may 
have very weighty—even urgent—reasons to protect entities that are not animals. I have in 
mind reasons to preserve biodiversity or the health of ecological systems. But the reasons for 
this may refer back, ultimately, to concern for humans and other sentient life forms. This is a 
matter about which people can reasonably disagree. The important point is that the view 
presented in this chapter is not meant to suggest that animals are the most important beings. 
But the reasons to develop an appropriate concern for animals is merited by what animals are, 
and I want to try to show why one might see this as the right view to hold.  
 Let me begin by considering the idea of being someone. Most basically, being someone 
involves being conscious. To be conscious is to be a subject of experience such that there is 
something it is like to be the being in question.2 Being conscious means inhabiting a perspective 
from which one’s life can go better or worse first-personally. That is, conscious beings can care, at 
least in some sense, about what happens to them. The significance of this fact, or the fact itself, 
does not seem to depend on others’ acknowledgement of it.3  
 The paradigm case of conscious beings is animals. This will be my focus in this chapter. 
It might be that there is an entity, such as an disembodied soul, that exhibits a way of being 
someone, but that differs in fundamental respects from the way of being exhibited by animals. 
For example, such an entity might not be capable of behavior (or of certain types of behavior), 
given that it lacks a body. This possibility is very difficult to imagine. But I don’t want to rule it 
out without an argument, and it is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide such an 
argument. I’m going to focus on the case of being an animal, though I’m inclined to regard this 
                                                
2 See Nagel 1974. 
3 There are a number of metaethical complexities raised here, though I’d like to keep these mostly to the side in 
this chapter. I will note that, on my account, conscious beings have objective value. However, I remain agnostic 
here as to whether this objectivity should be understood in a weak sense (i.e. conscious beings have objective value 
in a sense that builds in a reference to ideal, if not actual, observers of such beings), or whether it is objective in a 
stronger sense (i.e. conscious beings have objective value even in the absence of ideal observers). I’m inclined to 
think both senses of “objective” are valid. But even if one agreed that conscious beings had objective value (in 
either the weak or strong sense, or both), one might nonetheless think there is a gap between having objective 
value and being morally considerable or ethically significant. I return to this issue at the end of this section, and 
discuss it further in 3.2.5 and 3.3.3. 
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as an instance of the more general case of being someone. But I won’t attempt to defend this 
particular claim here. 
 As we move down the phylogenetic scale we might doubt whether certain beings—even 
some of those classed by biologists as animals—are conscious, or subjects of experience. For 
example, the vast majority of invertebrates seem to fall into this category (making an exception 
for cephalopods—octopuses, squids, and cuttlefish). Probably consciousness comes in degrees; 
it does not seem to be an all-or-nothing affair. If true, then there may be borderline cases. In 
this section I will focus on what I take to be the paradigm cases of animals: for example, birds, 
rats, dogs, apes, dolphins, humans. For every animal (in this paradigmatic sense) we can be 
reasonably confident there is something it is like to be that animal. However, what the character 
or quality of this subjective experience is may be very difficult, and probably impossible, for us 
to determine. Even so, animals appear to be distinctive in the order of nature in virtue of being 
subjects of experience. In the case of plants, and presumably other minimally sentient beings, 
there is no subjective experience—no “being a plant,” “being an ant,” “being a worm,” etc.—
that corresponds, in a clear way, to “being a bird” or “being a chimpanzee.” But to repeat a 
point made earlier, we may have very good reasons to be concerned about entities that are not 
experiencing subjects. My aim is to show why we have particularly strong reasons—normative 
reasons of a certain kind—to care about animals. 
 What all animals share is a certain way of being in the world. Before turning to the 
normative significance of this (in 3.3), I want to give the idea of being an animal more content. 
In doing so, we can become sensitive to the ways humans and other animals compare, as well as 
sensitive to how various animals compare to other animals. This enables us to resist 
homogenizing the category of animal, while still holding on to the idea that being an animal is 
an ontologically distinctive way of being in the world.  
 Conceptually, being an animal is shorthand for a circle of closely related abilities: being 
conscious and aware; being sentient and self-moving; being able to engage in a variety of more 
or less intentional behaviors.4 In saying animals engage in intentional behavior, I mean to say 
                                                
4 There are questions here about the relationship between these abilities, which are characteristic of being an 
animal, and the notion of being someone. One way to think about this is to regard animals as beings that exhibit a 
way of being someone, but which have an additional set of features (sentience, etc.) that are not implied by the 
notion of being someone. With respect to the question of the normative significance of being an animal (discussed 
in 3.3ff.), I am doubtful to what extent what I say there can be seen to follow from, or to be implied by, the 
conceptually spare notion of being someone. I don’t think this is a problem for my account of animals, but it 
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that all animals (of the paradigm class) have desires and beliefs. These can be more or less 
complex (and probably more or less desire-like and belief-like). Therefore, we should imagine 
different animal desires and beliefs as being situated along a continuum of animal capabilities. 
At one end of this continuum is the capacity for fully articulated practical reasoning (i.e. the 
capacity to reflect on one’s ends, the means to achieving them, and being capable of taking the 
means to one’s ends; or, being capable of attending to the reasons one has to do, or refrain 
from doing, certain actions). At the other end of the continuum are primitive states, such as the 
capacity to register a threat and to try to do something about it (such as scurry or slither away). I 
assume desires and beliefs are intimately connected, and that they interact to produce action.5 In 
this respect, the assumption of animal desires and beliefs has an explanatory role. That is, it 
seems extremely difficult, even impossible, to make sense of animal behavior if we do not 
assume that animals have desires and beliefs (or at least something like what we call desires and 
beliefs). Moreover, it seems desires and beliefs cannot really be separated, meaning, we cannot 
invoke one without invoking the other. I would add that none of the abilities noted—
consciousness, awareness, sentience, self-movement, intentional behavior—seems reducible to 
the others. Therefore I regard these abilities as explanatorily basic. These constitute the 
structural characteristics of what I mean when I speak of “being an animal.”  
 
3.2.1 Sentience and Self-Movement  
 All animals actively explore and perceive their worlds. They consciously attend to 
objects in space and time, and thus consciously distinguish, recognize, etc., these objects as 
suitable or unsuitable for various purposes. Such abilities suggest two basic and connected facts 
about animals: they are sentient and capable of self-movement. The connection between these 
two capacities admits of an evolutionary explanation. It would have made little sense for nature 
to produce a being that could feel pain without being able to do anything about it. Imagine a 
tree that could feel pain, but had to stand by idly as its branch was being sawed off.6 The 
important point about animal self-movement is that it is motivated: an animal fleeing a threat 
                                                                                                                                                 
would be a problem if I were to claim that these normative implications were something we could extract, so to 
speak, from an analysis of the idea of being someone.  
5 Here I follow Searle 1994: 212, and DeGrazia 1996: Ch. 6 (esp. 153).  
6 Here I paraphrase a remark from Marian Dawkins, cited in Dennett 1991: 451. Although, as Dennett reminds us, 
“one must be careful in framing such evolutionary arguments about function, for history plays a big role in 
evolution, and history can play tricks” (1991: 451).  
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desires to get away from the threat. Such behavior needs to be distinguished from unmotivated (i.e. 
undesiring) movements, such as the stimulus-response patterns characteristic of nonconscious 
(or very minimally conscious) beings like insects. (I discuss insects further below.) 
 I believe sentience (i.e. having some sort of sensory apparatus) is a necessary condition 
for being able to experience a range of possible mental states: (a) perceptual states (such as 
hearing a clap of thunder or feeling an earthquake); (b) bodily sensations (such as feeling 
hungry, hot, cold); (c) emotional or passionate states (such as experiencing fear, lust, 
aggression); and (d) certain moods (such as being anxious or calm). Even very simple sentient 
animals are capable of experiencing perceptual states and at least primitive bodily sensations 
(e.g. pain). Less clear is whether such animals are able to experience emotions, passions, or 
moods. Can snakes or lizards be “in a mood” or “in the grip of a passion”? Maybe they can be 
anxious; presumably they experience fear, insofar as they can perceive threats. So probably they 
can experience some form of moods and emotions. All mammals, non-mammalian vertebrates 
such as birds, and some invertebrates (such as octopuses), appear able to experience, in a 
relatively clear sense, all four of these types of states.7 This fact is revealed by commonsense and 
scientific accounts of the behavior of these animals, and also by comparative neurophysiology.  
 Neurophysiological accounts are an important supplement to observation. The case of 
insects bears this out. Insects appear to engage in purposive behavior, and one might think they 
are therefore conscious and sentient, i.e. that there is something it is like to be a spider or an 
ant. But neurophysiological evidence suggests this is probably not true: insects lack the 
extensive central nervous system processing mechanisms (or their functional equivalent) which 
appear necessary for consciousness.8 However, it could be that observation combined with 
neurophysiological evidence doesn’t convincingly settle certain cases one way or the other. 
Hence there may be borderline cases. It seems to me we should give the creature the benefit of 
the doubt in such cases. Meaning, if you’re going to kill the cockroach, do it quickly and be sure 
you succeed. 
  
3.2.2 Intentional Behavior: Animal Desire  
 Animals engage in intentional behavior. This behavior seems best understood as an 
indication that animals have desires. Desiring behavior has two main aspects. It involves certain 
                                                
7 Concerning invertebrates, see Mather 2001 and Scigliano 2003. 
8 On this see DeGrazia 1996: 111, and Eisemann et al. 1985. 
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action tendencies or goal-oriented behaviors, for example, being disposed to “go for” 
something, or being averse to something. It also has an affective dimension: an animal is not 
just disposed to do or avoid certain things, it also cares about doing or avoiding the thing in 
question.9 Put differently, it matters to the animal whether its aims are thwarted or realized. In 
this respect, I think it is appropriate to say animals have desires, however primitive, and that 
these desires can be satisfied or fail to be satisfied.  
 The concern animals show for various objects or states is not (at least not in most cases) 
self-conscious. Moreover, it’s unclear whether animals have higher-order desires, such as a 
second-order desire that some particular first-order desires be met.10 For example, suppose an 
animal has the desire to eat, but also the desire to groom itself. Imagine that some food 
becomes available. If the animal goes for the food, does this mean that it has prioritized its 
desire for food over its desire to groom? If so, would such prioritization count as an instance of 
a higher-order desire, or would this just be a case of two different first-order desires where the 
stronger one wins out?11  
 I don’t know the answer to this question, and I’m not going to try to settle this here. 
But what we can say is that if nonhuman animals do not have higher-order desires, this both 
spares and deprives them of a number of mental states that are possible for normal functioning 
human beings. A wombat presumably can’t desire to be a better wombat (in one of Val 
Plumwood’s memorable remarks12). If true, then a wombat can’t be pleased at living up to this 
ideal, or troubled by constantly falling short of it. But even if animals do not have higher-order 
desires, such desires are not a necessary condition of having subjective experience. It matters to 
an animal whether it succeeds in finding something to eat when it is hungry, or whether it 
escapes a predator to live another day. That said, I think we should leave open the possibility 
that animals do have higher-order desires.  
 These brief remarks on desire suggest animals manifest some capacity for choice or 
preference. We can clarify not only what an animal cares about, but how much it cares about it. 
                                                
9 Regarding these two aspects, I follow DeGrazia 1996: 129.   
10 I’m not saying being capable of self-consciousness means actually having second-order desires. Rather, being 
capable of self-consciousness means being capable of having second-order desires. 
11 Robert McKim prompted me to consider this case.  
12 See Plumwood 2002: 182. In thinking about this I’m reminded of a Farside cartoon. In the cartoon, a dog, 
having just departed from his master, walks away dejectedly saying, “Why is it always ‘Good dog’, never ‘Great 
dog’?”  
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This can be investigated by testing whether animals are prepared to make an effort, spend time, 
forego comfort and convenience, take risks, and so on, to attain certain objects.13 The reason to 
highlight animal choice is to remind ourselves that animals are not automata. This marks an 
important difference between animals and other living, self-moving, and seemingly intentional 
beings, such as insects, or plants which exhibit phototropic behavior. Of course, many insects 
can find sources of food, dart out of the way of potential threats, spin webs to catch prey, and 
so on. But unlike the paradigm case of animals, insects do not appear capable of motivated 
behavior. Insect behavior is explicable in terms of stimulus-response mechanisms.14 Moreover, 
insects typically do not try to protect injured body parts, say, by taking weight off a damaged 
limb.15 Many examples of this sort might be adduced, all suggesting the same thing: insect 
behavior has a mechanical and rigid quality, compared to the more flexible, innovative, and self-
concerned character of conscious animals.16 In this respect, appealing to stimulus-response 
explanation in the case of animals totally fails to capture what is distinctive about animal 
behavior, namely, its motivated character. But, again, the line between stimulus-response 
behavior (characteristic of insects) and motivated behavior (characteristic of animals) may be 
blurry in some cases. 
 
3.2.3 Intentional Behavior: Animal Belief  
 As I suggested above, having certain concerns (or desires, wants, preferences, etc.) 
implies having certain beliefs. By “belief” I understand an intentional state that represents, or at 
least purports to represent, something about the world, or how things are. I assume that beliefs 
have content and meaning, and that beliefs can be true or false.  
                                                
13 Marian Dawkins, for example, has conducted such research regarding animal preferences (see Dawkins 1993: 
147-9).  
14 The case of caterpillar behavior is illustrative: “caterpillars, right after hatching […] climb to the tops of trees to 
eat the leaves there. They can do this because, when more light enters one of their two eyes, the legs on that side of 
the body move more slowly so that caterpillars move toward light. When trees are artificially lit at the bottom, 
caterpillars descend the trees and remain until starving; blinding one eye causes them to move in a circle until they 
starve” (DeGrazia 1996: 111). 
15 DeGrazia 1996: 111.  
16 For example, a locust will keep eating while being devoured by a preying mantis (see Eisemann et al. 1985: 164-
7.) This is not because locusts are capable of being “happy on the rack.” Insects lack, as noted above, the complex 
processing mechanisms of conscious beings that appear to be necessary for feeling pain. 
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 I think John Searle states well the sense in which animals appear to be capable of 
distinguishing between true and false beliefs, at least in cases involving direct perception. Searle 
writes: 
Typically, for animals as well as humans, perception fixes belief, and belief 
together with desire determines courses of action. Consider real-life examples: 
Why is my dog barking up that tree? Because he believes that the cat is up the tree, 
and he wants to catch up to the cat. Why does he believe the cat is up the tree? 
Because he saw the cat run up the tree. Why does he now stop barking up the 
tree and start running toward the neighbor’s yard? Because he no longer believes 
that the cat is up the tree, but in the neighbor’s yard. And why did he correct his 
belief? Because he just saw (and no doubt smelled) the cat run into the 
neighbor’s yard; and Seeing and Smelling is Believing. The general point is that 
animals correct their beliefs all the time on the basis of their perceptions. In 
order to make these corrections they have to be able to distinguish the state of 
affairs in which their belief is satisfied from the state of affairs in which it is not 
satisfied. And what goes for beliefs also goes for desires […] In such cases 
animals distinguish true from false beliefs, satisfied from unsatisfied desires, 
without having the concepts of truth, falsity, satisfaction, or even belief and 
desire. (1994: 212; italics in the original) 
Even if one granted that beliefs and desires can be fixed by perception, this is not to deny, of 
course, that it may often be very unclear what the content is of a given animal’s beliefs and 
desires. This is so even in the case of Searle’s dog. What does the dog desire in desiring to 
“catch up” with the cat? To take a bite out of the cat? To be immersed in the smell of the cat? Or 
something else, say, that the pleasure and amusement derived from chasing the cat continue? 
And the same problem of content exists when we consider the dog’s beliefs: when we say the 
dog believes that ‘the cat is up the tree’, what corresponds, in the dog’s web of belief, to what 
we understand by ‘cat’, ‘tree’, and so on? But even if these are fair questions for us to ask, we 
should resist the skeptical implications of such questions. For they do not seem to threaten the 
appropriateness of attributing intentional states, such as desires and beliefs, to other animals (at 
least in the paradigm cases of animals). Unclear or indeterminate content, or content possibly 
very different from the content of our beliefs and desires, does not mean lack of content.17  
 One of the advantages of having language is we can experience a range of intentional 
states unavailable to nonlinguistic animals. For many intentional states are language-dependent. 
For example, states that represent facts remote in space and time, or subjunctive 
                                                
17 This is a point emphasized by Searle 1994, and reaffirmed in the insightful discussions in DeGrazia 1996: Ch. 6, 
and MacIntyre 1999: Ch.4. My discussion above is greatly indebted to Searle, DeGrazia, and MacIntyre.   
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counterfactuals, are of this sort.18 Language also makes it possible for us to reflect on our web 
of beliefs, and to consider whether our particular beliefs are plausible, prejudiced, consistent 
with other beliefs we hold, and so on. We can also distinguish between different psychological 
modes of belief, that is, between believing p, versus supposing p, hypothesizing p, having a 
hunch that p, being certain that p, being merely inclined on balance to think that p, and so on.19   
 
3.2.4 A Spectrum of Animal Concern 
 Animal concern falls along a spectrum of more or less complex forms. I’ll mention a 
few points along this spectrum to give a sense of the range here. A rat may have a “pro-eating” 
desire when it is hungry. Or a dog may have a desire “not-to-get-kicked,” such that when the 
dog sees someone who has recently kicked him, he will avoid or try to hide from the person. 
Notice that such a desire presupposes memory, and having memories may expand the range of 
desires, fears, and so on, that a being can have. Further, having memories means having beliefs, 
for presumably one believes what one remembers.20 Having a pro-eating desire or a desire not-
to-get-kicked, together with whatever corresponding beliefs these desires entail, suggests that 
animals have some sense of themselves as active beings or subjects of experience. Other animal 
desires and beliefs can be much more complex, thus pointing to a more complex sense of self. 
For example, in her classic study of chimpanzee behavior, In the Shadow of Man, Jane Goodall 
makes a compelling case that certain chimpanzees appear to have a strong desire to become 
dominant in their groups.21 Goodall recounts the rise in the social hierarchy of one chimpanzee, 
whom Goodall called Mike, who appeared to plan his ascendancy by ingenious and strategic 
displays of power and courage. These displays were carried out over an extended period of 
time, ultimately culminating in Mike’s successful ascent in the social hierarchy of his group.22  
                                                
18 Regarding the latter, Searle imagines that perhaps a dog can think: “If [my master] gives me that bone I will eat 
it”; but not: “If only [my master] had given me a bigger bone I would have enjoyed it more!” (1994: 213). Searle 
may be right here, but it’s not clear that we can know this for sure. 
19 See Searle 1994: 210. 
20 See DeGrazia 1996: 160. 
21 See Goodall 2000: Ch. 10, esp. 112-119. Goodall hypothesizes that this desire is probably connected with 
superior intelligence. In presenting her observations Goodall speaks of “desire” in quotes; but I think we can drop 
the quotes. 
22 For example, when the dominant male (and his clique) were in Goodall’s camp, Mike (not yet the dominant 
male) would enter camp, study the situation, and in an unassuming way, go over and collect empty kerosene cans 
that were in camp. Then, at an opportune moment, Mike would charge the other males while carrying the cans, 
thus making his displays much louder and more impressive than the usual chimpanzee displays (which involve 
merely dragging branches and pounding the ground).  
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 An especially interesting type of animal concern might be put under the heading of rule-
following. Many animals can learn to follow certain commands; this is familiar in the case of 
dogs. But other animals seem able to comprehend certain rules or “etiquettes” within their 
group. Animals of the latter sort have a social self, or a sense of themselves as a member of a 
group or clan. Again, the case of chimpanzees is illustrative. Goodall suggests each individual 
chimpanzee “comprehends” his or her place in the social structure, meaning, each chimpanzee 
knows his or her status in relation to any other chimpanzee in the group. As evidence, Goodall 
considers the wide range of highly specific greeting gestures used by chimpanzees, as well as the 
fact that chimpanzees almost always do in fact greet each other in the conventionally 
appropriate ways upon meeting after a separation.23 And other data are relevant here too: for 
example, chimpanzees learn when it is their turn to eat or from whom they can request food; 
individuals understand which other individuals it is appropriate to groom or be groomed by24; 
and so on.   
 Of course, humans not only follow certain rules, we can also (if conditions permit) 
question the appropriateness or plausibility of rules, protocols, etiquettes, laws, etc., and try to 
change these in light of our goals, moral or otherwise. This points to the capacity Kant captures 
with his claim that rational beings are capable not only of attending to the maxims of their 
actions, but of formulating and choosing to act on certain maxims (e.g. moral maxims).25 Or, 
following Thomas Nagel, we could say that at issue here is having the capacity to see oneself as 
one (person) among others, all equally real.26 This capacity indicates a reflective sense of self, or 
being self-conscious.   
 The capacity for self-consciousness is of course very interesting and notable in the order 
of nature. The importance of self-consciousness for explicit moral reasoning I take to be 
obvious. However, my claim here is this human capacity is on a continuum with other animal 
capacities, ranging from the relatively simple capacity to follow certain commands, to the more 
                                                
23 See Goodall 2000: Ch. 10, esp. 120ff. 
24 DeGrazia discusses a case of baboons that is also relevant here. He writes: “A troupe of baboons were resting 
when, over a period of about twenty minutes, a female gradually moved about two meters, ending up behind a rock 
where she groomed a male. Had the dominant male observed the grooming, he would have attacked both 
baboons. But from where he sat, he could see only the female’s back and tail and the top of her head. He could not 
see the male being groomed, who had bent down behind the rock, presumably so the dominant male could not 
observe what the female was doing” (1996: 162).  
25 For Kant, this is a condition of being an author of one’s actions in a rich sense of “author,” i.e. one to whom 
actions can be imputed as deeds. See Kant 1996: 16; Academy edition: 6:223.  
26 See Nagel 1970: Ch. 11-12; Nagel 1977: 126-7; and Nagel 1986: Ch. 8 (esp. 159) and Ch. 9.  
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complex capacity to acknowledge certain group protocols or etiquettes, to the still more 
complex capacity to attend inwardly to the maxims of one’s actions (which is connected to the 
capacity to see oneself as one among others all equally real).  
 I want to introduce a distinction I find useful here. In his reading of Kant, Arthur 
Melnick distinguishes between “outer attending” (or outer sense) and “inner attending” (or 
inner sense). Outer attending is outer perception, i.e. attending to objects in space and time. All 
animals have this capacity, as discussed above. Inner attending refers to “pure perception,” and 
has two connected aspects that can be distinguished. One aspect of inner attending is attending 
to the way we are being affected by certain perceptions. For example, rather than attending to 
what we are seeing, we “inner attend” when we attend to the fact that our eyes hurt, or that our 
fatigue is making it difficult to see clearly. The second aspect of inner attending can be 
characterized as attending to the reasons we have to do or believe something. It is this second 
sense that reflects our capacity to attend to, and choose, the maxims of our action; this is a 
necessary condition for being capable of moral autonomy (in Kant’s full blown sense).27 We 
know humans share with other animals the capacity for outer attending. But is the capacity for 
inner attending exclusive to us?  
 The answer here will depend on how we interpret certain cases of animal behavior. I 
think the case of deceptive behavior is particularly relevant here. I regard deceptive behavior as 
proto-moral in character. Moral behavior, most basically, involves being able to imagine what it 
is like to be someone else—“putting yourself in another’s shoes,” as we sometimes say.28 Being 
able to deceive another means having a sense of how the other (to be deceived) perceives, or at 
least customarily perceives. For example, to communicate in a deceptive way, one must not only 
have a sense of how to communicate, but also a sense of appropriate or customary 
communication. Otherwise one would not be able to misuse the means of communication for 
one’s own ends.  
 Consider a case. Different species of monkeys employ alarm calls to alert other 
monkeys when predators are in the area. The leopard alarm call says, in effect, go to the 
                                                
27 Presumably, there are other senses of inner attending as well. For example, suppose that a certain experience—
say, rain falling on a roof—reminds you of an earlier experience. The memory of this earlier experience affects the 
way you experience the falling rain, and you are aware of this as you perceive the rain. (I’m paraphrasing here an 
example given to me by Robert McKim in discussion.) Maybe this case is appropriately categorized within the first 
sense of inner attend; I’m not entirely sure about this. There is, in any case, a lot more to say about the different 
senses of inner attending. 
28 See Nagel 1977: 126. 
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branches of trees least accessible to leopards (since leopards can climb trees). A call signaling an 
eagle in the vicinity sends monkeys into dense vegetation for cover. Upon hearing the snake 
signal, monkeys will stand on their hind legs and look around at the ground, for if they see a 
snake first they can run away.29 It has been documented that some monkeys misuse an alarm 
call in order to obtain a desired object.30 If such deception is possible, can the monkey also 
refrain from deceptive behavior out of something like (tacit) respect for appropriate uses of 
communication? I’ll leave this undecided here. Perhaps we could test this, for example, by 
testing whether a monkey chooses not to deceive others when doing so would bring some clear 
benefit or advantage.31  
 Other cases also suggest a capacity for inner attending among nonhuman animals. For 
example, the chimpanzee and the mirror case is relevant here. Two American scientists, Allen 
and Beatrice Gardner, trained a young chimpanzee, Washoe, to use sign language. Having 
become familiar with mirrors, Washoe was asked (in sign language) “Who is that?” as she was 
looking into the mirror. She signed back, “Me, Washoe.”32 What is it that Washoe understands 
here? The least we can say is that Washoe is sensitive to herself as producing the image in the 
mirror. That is, she is conscious of herself as an active being (or at least conscious of her 
actions).33 This is different from being an active being who is conscious (which is true, on my 
account, of all animals). What is less clear is whether Washoe is capable of being conscious of 
herself as a perceiving being. On a Melnick-inspired reading of such cases, for us to be 
confident about attributing this sort of inner sense to Washoe (i.e. being conscious of herself as 
a perceiving being, as opposed to merely being conscious of her perceptions, including her 
perception of her own bodily actions in the mirror) Washoe would need to show she has some 
sort of (tacit) rule for guiding her sensory apparatus. For example, suppose Washoe had the 
rule: to get a better view of something in bright sunlight, one first tilts one’s head, then makes a 
                                                
29 On this see DeGrazia 1996: 184, and Cheney and Seyfarth 1990: Ch. 4. 
30 See the Nature program, “Clever Monkeys.” In the documentary, the white-faced capuchin uses an alarm call to 
deceive others of his troop, in order to enjoy a coveted food item for himself. 
31 Deceptive behavior is perhaps not limited to the “higher” mammals. Invertebrates, in particular octopuses and 
cuttlefish, might also engage in deceptive behavior. Scigliano writes: “Male cuttlefish adopt female coloring, 
patterns, and shape—to mate surreptitiously with females guarded by larger rivals. And the Indonesian mimic 
octopus fools predators by impersonating poisonous soles and venomous lionfish, sea snakes, and possibly jellyfish 
and sea anemones” (2003: 171). These cases are under-described, but they are suggestive. 
32 This is recounted in Goodall 2000: 250-1. 
33 My thinking about this case has benefited from discussion with Arthur Melnick. 
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“visor” with one’s hand, and so on. Such behavior is very significant, for it suggests Washoe is 
aware of how her sense-organs affect the way she perceives or is perceiving. If we saw Washoe 
teaching such a rule to another chimpanzee, this would be even more significant, thus 
strengthening the case for attributing to Washoe a significant capacity for inner sense. 
 Acknowledging that all animals (of the paradigm class) behave intentionally, and that 
some of these animals engage in possibly proto-moral behavior, helps to situate humans within 
the world of animals. This unsettles the hyper-separation between humans and nonhumans 
which is characteristic of certain philosophical views.34 This hyper-separation is a major barrier 
to appreciating what we share with other animals. It’s also a barrier, I believe, to appreciating 
what is distinctive and normatively significant about being an animal.  
 Let me summarize what I take to be the upshot of the foregoing discussion of animal 
subjectivity. All animals actively explore and engage their environments, forming 
representations of different objects or states of affairs, and actively pursuing and avoiding 
various objects or states. Such behavior ranges from the relatively simple (e.g. pain-avoidance 
behavior or pro-eating attitudes), to the complex (e.g. being able to comprehend one’s place in a 
social order, or to engage in deceptive behavior). Depending on the animal, this intentional 
behavior may be more or less “flexible”—that is, ingenious, resourceful, innovative. Animal 
behavior is often very impressive, both in itself and as a way of coping with the world. Animals 
merit our interest for this reason alone. But I think we can say more. All animals (of the 
paradigm class) indicate through their behavior that they care about themselves (and also about 
those for whom they show affection, try to protect, etc.). I believe this should be understood to 
mean that animals value their lives, or at least animals place value on themselves.35 This valuing 
is not necessarily self-conscious or reflective. While it may be difficult in most cases to “get 
inside” the subjectivity of other animals, particularly those animals very different from us, the 
argument sketched suggests animals are valuable in their own right in virtue of their capacity for 
self-concerned behavior. In this respect, animals are “ends,” meaning, they are not merely 
                                                
34 Paradigmatically, Descartes’ view, and perhaps also neo-Cartesians like Donald Davidson and many common 
interpretations of Kant’s thought. But, as noted above, Kant may have resources for resisting such reductive 
readings.  
35 Here I agree with what I take to be Korsgaard’s view. Korgaard speaks of (e.g.) pleasure and pain being 
“expressive of the value that an animal places on itself” (1996: 152).  
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means (say, for human projects).36 It seems to me the critical point is that what happens to an 
animal matters to the animal in question, whether or not we are around to take note of this. But 
the fact that we are around, and that we are often a primary cause of impoverishing animals (e.g. 
by destroying their habitat), should concern us greatly. Of course, some people exemplify care, 
solicitude, and respect for at least some animals. It is these attitudes I want to affirm and 
reinforce.   
 
3.2.5 Facts, Values, and Ethics 
 I want to say something about the relation of facts, values, and ethics as this pertains to 
the case of animals. This is a complicated issue, and I do not propose to deal with it in a 
comprehensive way. But I do want to suggest three possible ways of thinking about the 
connection here between facts, values and ethics. It seems to me that each of the positions I 
will sketch has something to be said for it. 
 Suppose one granted that being an animal is a way of being that involves a particular 
kind of self-concern, what I have referred to as caring about what happens to oneself. Suppose 
further, that this means that what happens to animals matters to them, whether or not anyone 
else cares. This description of animals suggests that animals are valuable in their own right, 
which is to say, being an animal is a fact that is also a value. But what follows from this? At this 
point, one might say that even if being an animal is a fact that is also a value this alone does not 
establish any reason for ethically motivated people to care about animals. In other words, one 
might think there is a gap between an entity being valuable in its own right (being an “end”) and 
that entity deserving or meriting some sort of ethical regard from ethically sensitive beings like 
                                                
36 I believe being an “end” captures one plausible sense of intrinsic value, namely, “intrinsic value” understood as 
“having non-instrumental value” (as discussed in 2.2.3). In referring to animals as “ends,” I obviously borrow 
language from Kant’s moral philosophy. One might wonder whether a committed Kantian (not just a quasi-
Kantian like Tom Regan) should recognize animals as being ends in Kant’s sense. It seems to me the answer is 
yes—which is in agreement with the view of at least certain prominent Kantians, notably, Christine Korsgaard. 
Korsgaard (2004: 95) distinguishes two senses of being an end-in-itself in Kant: (1) being a source of legitimate 
normative claims, and (2) being capable of moral self-legislation (i.e. being someone, as Korsgaard puts it, “who 
can give the force of law to his claims, by participation in moral legislation”). Animals are ends-in-themselves in the 
first sense, just as, say, mentally disabled (i.e. nonrational) humans are. But animals and nonrational humans are not 
ends-in-themselves in the second sense. One might object that these two senses of “end” cannot really be 
separated, but I won’t pursue this objection here. I do not regard myself as defending Korsgaard’s view, or more 
generally a Kantian view, though I believe there are significant similarities between my view and certain Kantian 
views like Korsgaard’s.  
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us.37 The question is: Does the fact that animals can care about how their lives go generate an 
impersonal reason for ethically sensitive beings like us to care about animals? One possible way 
to answer this question is to appeal to an independent notion of what ethics is about. Suppose 
one thought that ethics, in a basic and fundamental sense, is about beings that can care.38 Or, to 
put this a little differently, suppose ethics is primarily about people and their relations to other 
beings that can care. According to this sort of view, humans and other animals share a way of 
being someone that is morally significant. I’m not sure whether this view bridges the (alleged) 
gap, or instead defines it away so that there never was a gap.39 
                                                
37 John O’Neill argues that with respect to the claim that an entity has a good, one that is independent of human 
interests, it does not follow that that entity therefore merits moral consideration (cf. 1993: 22). Richard Kraut 
makes a similar point: “the mere fact that an act would do some good is never, by itself, enough to support a 
conclusion about what should be done” (2007: 212). Building on the basic claim made by O’Neill and Kraut, one 
might argue that from the fact that animals care about what happens to them—a fact that is independent of human 
interests—it does not follow that animals are therefore owed moral consideration. Accordingly, one might think 
there is a gap between an entity being valuable in its right (i.e. having non-instrumental or objective value, or being 
an “end”) and that entity being morally considerable. O’Neill, for his part, bridges the gap here by appealing to an 
Aristotelian argument that says, in short, caring about the good of (at least some) nonhuman beings is constitutive 
of human flourishing. That is, our lives go better when we care for (at least some) beings that have a good (where 
“having a good” means “having intrinsic value”). Kraut bridges the gap here by emphasizing two points: the 
particularities of the being in question (whether, for example, the being in question is grand or humanlike, not 
merely the fact that it is capable of flourishing), and our social roles and how we are situated with respect to the 
other in question.  
38 David Sussman suggested this idea to me. 
39 I’m a little wary of labels here, but we could call this a Kantian view. Here are three important sources for this 
view. The classic source is from Tom Regan. Regan claims that the basic similarity between humans and at least 
some other animals is that “we are each of us the experiencing subject of a life, a conscious creature having an 
individual welfare that has importance to us whatever our usefulness to others” (Regan 1985: 22). Regan continues: 
“We [i.e. humans and at least some other animals] want and prefer things, believe and feel things, recall and expect 
things. And all these dimensions of our life, including our pleasure and pain, our enjoyment and suffering, our 
satisfaction and frustration, our continued existence or our untimely death – all make a difference to the quality of 
our life as lived, as experienced, by us as individuals” (ibid.). Regan thinks that the fact that humans and at least 
some other animals share the condition of being experiencing subjects of a life is morally relevant. Indeed, Regan 
asserts that all beings that are subjects of a life have equal inherent value (1985: 23). He is unsure whether other 
beings, besides subjects of a life, have inherent value (ibid.). For Regan, the fundamental wrong that we commit 
toward animals (those which are subjects of a life) is viewing and treating them as “lacking independent value, as 
resources for us” (1985: 25). Thus Regan favors the abolition of all uses of animals (who are subjects of a life). 
 A second source comes from Christine Korsgaard’s discussion of animals in Korsgaard 1996 (esp. 149-54 
and 157-8). Korsgaard writes: “Another animal can obligate you in exactly the same way another person can. It is a 
way of being someone that you share” (1996: 153). Remarking on the case of plants later, Korsgaard says: “Since a 
plant is not conscious, being a plant is not a way of being someone, so it is not a way of being someone that we 
share with them” (1996: 156). See also Korsgaard 2004 and 2008. 
 A third source is Dale Jamieson who deploys a distinction between “primary” and “derivative” value, 
seeing animals as having “primary” value. Jamieson writes: “Creatures who can suffer, take pleasure in their 
experiences, and whose lives go better or worse from their own point of view are of primary value. Failure to value 
them involves failures of objectivity and impartiality in our reasoning or sentiments” (1998: 204). Later Jamieson 
adds: “Non-sentient entities are not of primary value because they do not have a perspective from which their lives 
go better or worse. Ultimately the value of non-sentient entities rests on how they fit into the lives of sentient 
beings” (1998: 205). See also Jamieson 1995: 220, where the language of beings that can care is explicitly invoked 
with regard to humans and animals.  
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 Consider a second possible view. According to this view, it’s not the bare fact that 
animals can care that gives us a reason to care about them. Nor is it the case that ethics is best 
understood as being concerned about beings that can care, which gives us a reason to concern 
ourselves with animals and human beings at least. Rather, according to this second view it is 
something more specific about what animals care about, or have reason to care about, that 
matters. In particular, animals have reason to care about being in certain states and in avoiding 
others. It is in the interest of a sentient animal not to be in a state it dislikes, such as a state that 
is very painful. Thus, actions or events that produce states that animals dislike should be 
thwarted or minimized wherever possible. Further, when an animal is in a bad state, such as 
being in great pain, we have a reason to try to help the animal get out of that state and into a 
better one. The fact that animals can care about the states they are in is of course still important 
on this view. If animals couldn’t care about the states they are in, then we would have no reason 
to care about these states either. But presumably animals could care about a lot of things, and 
surely we don’t have reason to care about all those things that animals happen to, or might, care 
about. Ethics should remain more minimalist in what it requires of us. In particular, ethics 
enjoins us to minimize the pain and suffering of animals, on the assumption that animals dislike 
being in a state of pain and suffering. If it turned out that animals did not object to pain and 
suffering, then our reason to care about animal pain and suffering would be seriously 
weakened.40 Or, one might hold a different view of the matter, saying for example that pain and 
suffering are intrinsically bad and wherever they occur this gives us a reason to try to alleviate or 
minimize them. Here it is the intrinsic badness of pain and suffering that is reason-generating, 
not whether or not sentient beings dislike or object to pain and suffering.41 
 Let me consider a third possible view. Suppose that we look closely at what is involved 
in animal life. For example, we attend to the way that animals take care of their young—finding 
                                                                                                                                                 
 Although Jamieson is self-conscious about his debts to Regan’s work, his remarks in the passages just 
cited are remarkably similar in focus to Korsgaard’s view as well. More generally, there is considerable overlap 
between the views of Regan, Korsgaard, and Jamieson, at least on the basic point of which beings count morally in 
a central or primary way, and why. An interesting project would be to clarify the key differences between the views 
of these three authors, though it is beyond the scope of this chapter to pursue such a project here. In any case, I 
am indebted to these three views, which have shaped the way I view animals and their normative significance. 
40 For relevant discussion of the normative significance of whether or not a being “minds” pain, see Jamieson 
1995: 218-20, and Korsgaard 1996: 153-5.  
41 This is Peter Singer’s view. On the assumed interest of all sentient beings in not suffering, see Singer 1995: 8. For 
the claim that “[p]ain and suffering are in themselves bad and should be prevented or minimized, irrespective of 
the race, sex, or species of the being that suffers,” see Singer 1995: 17 and 21.  
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places to hide them, fighting off threats, searching for food, teaching their young various things, 
and so on. Add to this all the effort animals expend to find, or construct, places in which to live 
and rest. Think of all the effort expended to build nests, fortify dens, dig holes for shelter, and 
the like. Maybe we also think about how animals react when they are threatened, or, say, when 
another animals takes its food. The reactions of fear or aggression are familiar. Perhaps we also 
recall the way animals—say, birds, squirrels, and deer—endure storms, and repair damage to 
their familiar spaces after the fact, not unlike people cleaning up their yards or rebuilding their 
damaged homes. Consider, too, those less anxious and more casual aspects of animal life: for 
example, the playfulness and curiosity displayed by so many animals. There is also the fact of 
how various and interesting the animal world is, for example, how distinctive the different 
forms of animal life are—some like ours, while others are foreign and difficult to access and 
understand. Now imagine someone who says: “Look, when we reflect on all this, you can see 
that there is something here that we should take very seriously, something that calls forth from 
us a certain response, such as a serious concern for the well-being of animals and an interest in 
their lives and forms of life.”42 
 These three views are not exhaustive of the possible positions one might hold here, and 
later I will consider a fourth view, one that appeals to flourishing. But I do think these views 
suffice to suggest that we have good reasons to take animals very seriously. Perhaps it is the 
cumulative import of these views that is decisive, not any one of them. In the following 
sections, I want to explore what proper concern for animals might mean. I also clarify how a 
concern for animals fits with other important (and sometimes conflicting) concerns, for 
example, maintaining ecological health or the aim of helping people to live minimally decent 
lives. In the previous sections my primary aim has been to clarify what is conceptually and 
normatively interesting about being an animal. At issue here is not just correcting what may be 
our obliviousness and insensitivity to other animals as significant beings. The account offered 
also helps explain why we do in fact take such an interest in other animals (both domesticated 
and in the wild). Certainly one of the deep reasons why people think, or should think, beings 
that are experiencing subjects are interesting and compelling is the fact that we share something 
                                                
42 I’m grateful to Robert McKim for discussion of the points made in this paragraph, and for urging me to clarify 
the view just sketched.  
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in common with them—a way of being an animal. While such a mode of being is not the only 
reason something may merit our interest, this mode is distinctive in the order of nature.43  
 
3.3 NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS: RESPECT FOR ANIMALS AND FLOURISHING 
ACCORDING TO KINDS 
 In this section, I want to explore a way of thinking about the normative implications of 
the view offered in 3.2. Animals are experiencing subjects that inhabit the world with us. Many 
animals have basic needs—for nourishment, companionship, play, and so on—that are 
significantly similar to some of our own basic needs. Sometimes animals try to occupy the same 
spaces, or use the same resources, as we do. This can lead to conflicts between humans and 
animals, and of course to conflicts between some animals and other animals.44 It seems to me 
that an appropriate response to the recognition that animals inhabit our world is that we should, 
in our practical reasoning and social policies, aim to treat animals with due respect. More 
specifically, we should pay careful attention to how our individual and collective actions and 
practices affect the ability of animals to live their lives in their own way. I understand the notion 
of an animal “living its life in its own way” to mean “each animal engaging in the characteristic 
activities of its kind,” or “each animal flourishing according to its kind.”45 This notion of 
flourishing according to kinds focuses our attention on a given animal’s needs, preferences, and 
distinctiveness as these are expressed in the animal’s characteristic way of life. Respecting 
animals means respecting these characteristic ways of life. Of course, there is a lot more to say 
about what this means in practice, and I will turn to this shortly. First, I want call attention to a 
certain shift in attention that seems warranted by the idea of an animal flourishing according to 
its kind. 
 Rather than focusing solely or primarily on the content (or character) of an animal’s 
subjective experience, we should focus on the context in which animals make their way in the 
                                                
43 I’m not saying people who take great interest in nonsentient beings are somehow misguided. Though if they only 
took an interest in such beings while remaining insensitive to sentient beings, they would be missing something 
important, and hence failing to cultivate an important kind of concern. 
44 Some of these conflicts are ineliminable. Think, for example, of conflicts between predator and prey. This 
strongly suggests that the world has an inescapably tragic character. 
45 My view has some similarity to Jennifer Everett’s deontological form of animal welfarism. See Everett 2001: 54 
and 66, note 13. In the note, Everett invokes the notion of “flourishing according to one’s nature.” Later in the 
passage she says that “[f]reedom from the frustration of natural instincts is key to my conception of ‘flourishing 
according to one’s nature’,” but this idea is not further explored.  
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world.46 Put differently, respect for animals, in virtue of their capacity for subjective experience, 
may require us to move from an isolated view of animal experience to a view of animals as 
situated in their species and ecological contexts. This amounts to seeing animals in situ. I say 
“may require” because I think this shift is appropriate in the case of wild animals, but it may be 
unwarranted in the case of domesticated animals or wild animals in captivity. Before discussing 
these different cases, I need to clarify the concept of flourishing. For the notion of flourishing 
according to kinds does work in my account of how we should think about what we owe 
animals.  
 
3.3.1 The Concept of Flourishing 
 The basic idea of flourishing can be characterized fairly easily, though the actual 
achievement of flourishing for any being that can flourish may be very difficult. This is due to a 
number of contingent factors, some of which I discuss below. The main point of this section is 
to explore the meaning of flourishing and its importance for ethical thought. A diversity of 
contemporary thinkers have found appeals to flourishing philosophically useful.47 I think there 
are two basic reasons for this. The first is that the concept of flourishing can do important 
normative work helping us to conceptualize and illuminate certain ways in which the lives of 
living beings can be degraded or harmed. If we know what it means for a living being to 
flourish, anything that thwarts this flourishing is bad for that being. This doesn’t mean it is bad 
all things considered, but that possibility doesn’t affect the basic point I’m making here. 
Secondly, the concept of flourishing—and the related idea of natural goodness48—provides a 
widely applicable concept for thinking about the lives, goods, and well-being of a great diversity 
of beings. The account of what is good for human beings, for rabbits, and for peach trees, may 
                                                
46 I take a cue here from Bryan Norton (1995: 383).  
47 This is especially so for writers in the Aristotelian tradition, for example, James Wallace (1978), John O’Neill 
(1993), Alasdair MacIntyre (1999), Philippa Foot (2001), Martha Nussbaum (2000, 2006), Richard Kraut (2007), 
and O’Neill, Holland and Light (2008). But the concept of flourishing is also important in the work of 
philosophers who explicitly attack certain aspects of Aristotle’s view, for example, ecofeminist philosophers like 
Chris Cuomo (1998: Ch. 3). Flourishing—or having a natural good that can be realized or stunted—is also 
important in the view of contemporary biocentrists such as James Sterba (1995, 2000a, 2005). The idea of having a 
natural good, at least in the case of animals capable of subjective experience, is normatively important in the 
Kantian account offered by Christine Korsgaard (2008: 1-4). Although Korsgaard does not regard the natural sense 
of good as reason-generating until we take up a certain attitude towards it (2008: 3, note 5). This contrasts with 
most (but not all) writers in the Aristotelian tradition, who tend to hold a form of substantive realism about the 
value of flourishing. An excellent example of the latter is Kraut (2007: 8-10).  
48 A phrasing employed, for example, by Philippa Foot (2001: 26).  
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differ dramatically in each case. But what unifies the account in each case is the idea of 
flourishing: there are certain facts about human beings, about rabbits and about peach trees, 
that allow us to say what is good for each, or conversely, what is bad for each. More 
controversially, the concept of flourishing might also be used to evaluate the condition of 
holistic entities, such as ecosystems. Even though I rejected the idea that ecosystems are 
superorganisms in Chapter 1, it is not scientifically or philosophically suspect to say that 
ecosystems can be healthy or sick. Certain accounts of what it means for an ecosystem to be 
healthy or sick may be completely implausible. But this doesn’t mean a plausible account can’t 
be given; I tried to offer what I take to be a plausible account in Chapter 1 (1.2.4). The concept 
of flourishing, then, seems to have much to recommend it. Here I want to try to elaborate on 
what flourishing means, and why it merits a place in an analysis of our relations, in particular, to 
other living things. Later (3.3.4-3.3.5), I will return to the particular case of animals to consider 
what work the concept of flourishing might do.  
 There are certain facts about living things that can be described in propositions whose 
form is normatively interesting. The relevant propositions take the form of “S’s are X” (e.g. 
“Deer are swift”), or “S’s do Y” (e.g. “Deer eat leaves”).49 What is notable about such 
propositions is that they state something general about the characteristic powers, traits or 
behaviors of members of different species. “Characteristic” powers, traits, or behaviors are 
normatively interesting in the sense that a being that has or exemplifies these is, other things 
equal, able to flourish or thrive as the kind of thing it is. (I return below to the importance of 
the ceterus paribus clause here.) Conversely, if an individual lacks or is unable to exemplify the 
powers, traits, or behaviors characteristic of its kind, then the individual is in that sense defective. 
Being defective means being less able to flourish as the kind of thing it is. A deer that was not 
swift would be defective, just as a deer that had poor eyesight, or that was unable to digest 
leaves, would be in that respect defective. In contrast, a deer that is swift, that has good eyesight 
and the ability to digest leaves, exemplifies characteristics that tell us something not only about 
what it is to be a deer, but also what it means for a deer to flourish as the kind of being it is. 
Swiftness, good eyesight, etc., are characteristics that are good for the individual deer that has 
them. The general idea is that we could describe those characteristics that are good for any 
given animal we might consider. Of course, this may be time-consuming, and may require 
                                                
49 I take a cue here from Michael Thompson (1995: 280ff.). 
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considerable field work and careful observation of animals living their lives. In addition, we 
would need to know a good deal about the species life of different animals in order to 
understand their nutritional needs, forms of sociality (as relevant), forms of coping with the 
world, conditions of reproduction, and so on. I assume all of this could be achieved, so this is 
not a problem for an account of flourishing. 
 To say that certain characteristics are good for the individuals that have them is to 
employ a sense of “good for” that makes no reference to the needs or interests of others (e.g. 
other species) apart from the individual in question. The sense of “good for” here is intrinsic: it 
is good for the being that has the relevant characteristics, in contrast to being instrumentally 
good for someone or something else. Philippa Foot refers to this sense of intrinsic goodness as 
“natural goodness” (2001: 26), a phrase I find useful. 
 Nothing about this account presupposes that motivated behavior (in the sense 
characteristic of animals) is a necessary condition for having a natural good. An oak tree that 
has deep roots can be said to have good roots, because deep roots are necessary for oak trees to 
thrive. This does not mean that oak trees “have” it as a purpose to grow deep roots, or that they 
“aim at” growing deep roots. Nonetheless, deep roots are necessary for an oak tree to flourish 
as an oak tree. The fact that oak trees need deep roots to thrive does not in any way depend on 
others acknowledging this. If there were no humans, and no other valuers either, it’s hard to see 
what difference this would make if the question is what oak tree flourishing consists in. As long 
as there were still oak trees, it would be in their interest to have deep roots. Nothing about this 
fact seems to depend on there being valuers. Imagine there is an oak tree, and there is a human 
being. Imagine the human being is a biologist whose research specialization is oak trees. 
Imagine this biologist says: “I’ve studied the matter and, yes, oak trees need deep roots to 
thrive.” What does this add? Nothing it seems. At least nothing insofar as the question is what 
is good or bad for oak trees.  
 To be necessary for flourishing is not to be sufficient. Here I return to the significance 
of the “other things equal” clause employed above. Deep-rooted oaks in the central valley of 
California thrived until the water table was pumped so low by farmers that the roots of the oaks 
could no longer reach water. In this sense, flourishing has a fragile aspect, one that is missed if 
we focus exclusively on those intrinsic features of living things—e.g. their capacities for 
development, self-maintenance, and reproduction—that are indicative of their natural goodness 
or defect. In the case of living things, the other necessary elements of flourishing include, most 
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basically, a suitable environment in which a given individual being can realize its characteristic 
form of life.  
 Besides having a suitable environment, an adequate normative description of the 
different forms of life will often include such necessary features as being able to live with others 
of one’s kind. Being with others of one’s kind is necessary for any successful reproduction in 
the case of (most) animals. It is often necessary in other ways too: for example, wolves are 
deeply social and cooperative beings, and could not flourish without a pack. This point allows 
us to make more textured descriptions of what the good consists in for particular species of 
animal. Dolphins, for example, are members of different social groups at different times in their 
lives—groups of females with their calves, groups of subadult males, groups of older males and 
females.50 Dolphin flourishing over the course of a life is dependent on the success of these 
different groups in which, at different times and at different developmental stages, dolphins are 
members. Other animals, such as snakes, might be able to flourish alone, provided they are able 
to be with others of their kind at least during periods of reproduction. To reiterate a point made 
above: animal life is complex and highly varied. The more one attends to this complexity and 
variety, the more it becomes dubious to speak of animals as though they are a homogeneous 
group.   
 Obviously, the various external or environmental conditions necessary for a given 
being’s flourishing will vary by species. In general plants do not usually need others of their kind 
in order to develop, maintain themselves (defend against pests, secure nourishment, etc.), and 
reproduce. But they will still need various external goods—for example, healthy populations of 
pollinating insects, the right soil conditions, and so on—if they are to flourish. All this is just to 
say that flourishing is a notion that presupposes that a being possesses certain intrinsic 
characteristics—natural powers that can be developed and realized—as well as certain extrinsic 
or external conditions, such as a suitable habitat. Because flourishing is profoundly dependent 
on a variety of internal and external factors, it can be quite fragile. But this contingent aspect of 
flourishing should not detract from the general point being made here: we can describe 
conditions in which living things thrive or fail to, according to their natural good. These 
conditions refer to facts about what is good or bad for the being in question. This is the core 
idea suggested by flourishing. 
                                                
50 See MacIntyre 1999: 63. 
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3.3.2 The Aristotelian Lineage 
 There are two main aspects of Aristotle’s thought that lend support to the preceding 
account of flourishing. I want to briefly comment on these here to acknowledge an intellectual 
debt. However, my primary interest is to highlight the Aristotelian lineage in order to set up a 
discussion of how fact and value are entangled in the account of flourishing. This entanglement 
is explicit in Aristotle’s normative ontology, and I want to use this as a foil for exploring some 
points germane to the account of flourishing I have sketched above.  
 One Aristotelian source for the view of flourishing is the human function argument in 
the Nicomachean Ethics (hereafter NE) (Book I, Chapter 7). The basic idea here is that there is a 
systematic connection between human life, goodness, and certain virtues or excellences. Three 
general “theses” illuminate the normatively relevant connections here. Discussing Aristotle’s 
view, James Wallace writes: “(1) It belongs to the nature of some kinds of things that they do a 
certain ‘work’ (ergon); for example, an eye sees, a carpenter makes things of wood. (2) A good one of 
such a kind is one that does its work well; a good eye is one that sees well, etc. (3) An excellence 
of a thing is a condition of the thing that ‘makes the work of that thing be done well’ [see NE, 
I.7 and II.6]” (1978: 36). Aristotle thought that humans had a function, namely, “activity of the 
soul in accord with reason or requiring reason” (NE, I.7, 1098a9-10). I will leave aside the 
disputes that have arisen regarding the precise meaning of this phrase, and its possible 
intellectualism.51 My concern is the general form of argument which is relevant to the account 
of flourishing: certain beings have functions, or characteristic activities; a good thing (eye, etc.) is 
one that fulfills or realizes its function, or realizes its characteristic activity. In the case of human 
beings, Aristotle thought that the virtues, or excellences of character, aid us in achieving our 
distinctive human end. Without the virtues, we fail to flourish.  
 One difficulty with the Aristotelian lineage just outlined is that while it is true that 
Aristotle’s concern is eudaimonia, or flourishing, he thinks that only humans (or more precisely: 
only some humans, e.g. not children, women or slaves) can be eudaimon. Nonetheless, what 
Aristotle’s view provides is a way to describe what it is that we should pay attention to when we 
reflect on how to take nonhuman living beings seriously as possible members of our moral 
universe.52 As Chris Cuomo writes: “Anything that possesses characteristic activities or qualities 
                                                
51 One that appears to be in tension with Aristotle’s more social and politically engaged conception of human life 
in the Nicomachean Ethics, and in his other ethical writings. For discussion, see Nussbaum 2001: 373-7.  
52 This is an important point made by Chris Cuomo (1998: 68-9) in her otherwise critical discussion of Aristotle.  
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has the theoretical capacity to exist with health and integrity” (1998: 69). (I read “to exist with 
health and integrity” as “to flourish.”)  
 A second strand of Aristotle’s thought even more clearly supports extending the 
account of flourishing to nonhuman living beings. This strand finds support in the ontology of 
the Metaphysics (Books 7-10) and On the Soul (Books 2-3). In these texts, Aristotle argues that 
natural beings have the capacity (under the right conditions) to realize their potential in 
distinctive forms of actuality. In Book 10 of the Metaphysics Aristotle offers a normatively laden 
account of potentiality in relation to actuality. The basic idea is that the realization of a potential 
that something has is good, though not in an unqualified sense. Part of the reason for this is 
captured by Sheldon Cohen: While every realization (energeia) of a potential (dunamis) can be said 
to be a completion (entelecheia) of that potential, not all realizations of a potential are a 
completion of the substance that has that potential (1996: 164). Moreover, not all potentials are 
good, therefore not all realizations of such potentials are good. The potential of any living being 
to die prematurely comes to mind. Aristotle was aware of this point.53  
 Admitting this enables us to distinguish between actualizations of potentials that may or 
may not be good, or that may be context-dependent, and unqualifiedly good realizations of 
potentials, that is, those that conduce to or exemplify the actualization of a substance as a 
complete substance. The sense of unqualifiedly good realizations of potentials is judged relative 
to those functions, behaviors, and so on, that enable the substance to reach a healthy and 
mature form of its kind.  
 Aristotle’s account of the goodness of those actualized potentials—those that enable a 
substance to be what it is—is of general application. Importantly, the notion of goodness here 
does not presuppose that substances can care about the realization of their good potentials, 
whatever they are. Plants are substances, on Aristotle’s account, and we can make sense of 
things going better or worse for them. Extending the account, I think we can make sense of 
things going better or worse for holistic entities (not considered by Aristotle), such as 
ecosystems. With this last point in mind, it seems we should not limit ourselves to judging as 
possibly good only the realizations of potentials that conduce to, or exemplify, the completion 
of natural substances, such as plants and animals. That said, it does seem implausible to regard 
the realizations of many potentials (e.g. to heat, to be flammable, to die, etc.) as good or 
                                                
53 This is clear, for example, given Aristotle’s formulation: “That the good actuality is better and more valuable 
than the good potentiality is evident [...]” (Metaphysics, IX.9, 1051a4-5). 
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valuable in a perfectly general way, without this being tethered to specific contexts or to 
particular substances. Aristotle does not say enough about the need to contextualize our 
understanding of the goodness/badness of the realization of potentials.54 But he offers the 
resources for a general account of flourishing that is still useful today. 
 
3.3.3 Flourishing and the Entanglement of Fact and Value 
 In this section, I want to step back and reflect on the entanglement of fact and value 
that is involved in appeals to flourishing. To do this, I will look briefly at some different types 
of entities that can flourish in order to clarify if, and if so to what extent, the fact that 
something can flourish gives us a reason to care about it. I believe flourishing is normatively 
significant. However, the extent to which this is so seems to depend on what entities we’re 
talking about. Which is to say, the more something matters, the more its flourishing matters.  
 A few examples bear this out. When we attend carefully to an animal—to its capacity 
for self-development and self-maintenance, its characteristic behaviors, its distinctive ways of 
coping with the environment, and so on—can we really see the animal for what it is without 
sliding into an awareness that the animal has value in its own right, and that its flourishing 
matters? I don’t mean to be rhetorical or question-begging here. But I’m inclined to think that a 
clear apprehension of what is there, of what we see, tips the balance not only toward 
understanding and a deepened wonder, but also toward a sense that the being in question has 
value and that it is good that it flourishes as the kind of thing it is. This suggests the 
impossibility of cleanly separating fact and value in cases like this. As Iris Murdoch says, “[o]ne 
is often compelled almost automatically by what one can see” (1971: 36).  
                                                
54 Take a simple example that might seem controversial to some: engaging in the characteristic activities of human 
beings (engaging in social life, a life of practical reason, contemplation, reproduction, etc.) is, for Aristotle, good for 
human beings. But if there are too many humans on the earth, then humans, as a valuable species, might also be 
judged relative to their impact on some other good, such as maintaining the conditions conducive to animal 
flourishing, or to the flourishing of life on earth. 
 We might also have reasons to extend Aristotle’s account in a different way, namely, by giving ontological 
priority to something other than Aristotelian substances. In particular, certain processes (i.e. ecological processes, 
energy flows) might be regarded as ontologically basic. J. Baird Callicott interprets Aldo Leopold as being an early 
advocate of what amounts to a process-based ontology, one grounded in thermodynamic principles. Regarding 
Leopold’s view of nature, Callicott writes: “Individual plants and animals become less autonomous beings than 
ephemeral structures in a patterned flux of energy” (1987: 90). Maybe this kind of ontology would not be as 
foreign to Aristotle as one might initially think: “[Aristotelian] [s]ubstances,” writes C. D. C. Reeve, “are not quite 
Heraclitean patterns in a flow of matter, as eddies are patterns in a flow of water, but they are sometimes helpfully 
seen as such” (2000: 123). 
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 This general line of thought also seems applicable in the case of various nonsentient 
beings. Plants have a biological integrity and a natural good. In general, a plant flourishing in its 
own way, realizing its natural good, is normatively compelling, at least to some extent. This 
means we have a reason not to wantonly destroy a plant. Why? Because it would harm the 
plant. So plant flourishing matters, but maybe only in a relatively modest sense.  
 This claim does not imply that nonsentient beings are, in general, less important than 
sentient beings. To see this, consider the case of an ecosystem of nontrivial size, for example, 
the old-growth forests and river ecosystems in Washington or Alaska, or the Amazon 
rainforest. I assume such ecosystems are nonsentient. Yet such ecosystems display several 
notable features: longstanding, self-sustaining, processes that have played out in a particular 
place; a diversity of living things, all flourishing in their own way; complex and varied relations 
between these living things, and between them and their physical environments; great structure 
and complexity at the level of the whole; and so on. In reflecting on such an object is there an 
imperceptible slide from “this is what is” to “this is marvelous, and merits our respect”? I think 
the answer is yes.55 Of course, even if one agreed here there is no reason to regard this type of 
consideration as being, or as needing to be, decisive with respect to clarifying the relevant 
reasons we have to care about ecosystems. As discussed earlier, there may be anthropocentric 
reasons of the sort argued for in Chapter 1, or historical reasons of the Elliot sort argued for in 
Chapter 2. These reasons might augment, or in some cases further explain, the normative 
significance of the various properties displayed by ecosystems of nontrivial size.    
 For my part, I seem to be committed to a kind of intuitionism about the course our 
reflection would or should take, at least with respect to certain types of object. I’m not 
completely uncomfortable with this. Indeed, I’m inclined to say that in attending carefully to the 
reality of other forms of life, and of holistic entities like ecosystems, structures of value get built 
                                                
55 There is a difficulty raised by the idea that flourishing ecosystems might command our ethical-aesthetic regard 
for reasons having to do with what they are in themselves, rather than what they can do for us, or for other valued 
beings. An important aspect of any thriving ecosystem is complex interdependencies, such as that exemplified by 
predator-prey relations. Many predator-prey relationships involve animals capable of subjective experience. It 
follows that things can go better or worse from the perspective of the animal in question. Indeed, one might think 
it is an excellent case of things going very badly for an animal when it is hunted and eaten alive by another animal. 
This raises questions about conflicting goods, and more generally about the fact of suffering in nature. Many 
philosophers have thought that the case of suffering in nature poses a moral challenge for us, one about which we 
should try to do something. I will consider this question later (3.3.5). 
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up around us.56 It seems inadequate to regard this value as merely the product of increased 
familiarity or sympathetic attachment (both of which may nonetheless be true). Rather, it seems 
more accurate to say we are recognizing that things in the world, or that certain aspects of the 
world anyway, compel our attention and respect in virtue of what they are.57 
 I think the normative interest of flourishing is particularly strong when we reflect on the 
case of sentient animals, while being somewhat weaker when we reflect on nonsentient beings, 
such as plants. It might be quite weak, or entirely absent, in the case of ticks, wheat rust, and the 
like, when these are considered in their own right. As I said above, the more important the 
thing in question is, the more its flourishing matters.  
 This last point requires some elaboration. In some cases, relative significance or 
importance is grounded in a recognition of what these beings are in themselves. For example, 
the fact that sentient animals exhibit complex intentional behaviors and can experience their 
own flourishing, or its degradation, first-personally is normatively significant. In general, and 
considered in their own right, animals seem more respect-worthy than plants. And within the 
category of animals further normatively relevant distinctions might be made. For example, if a 
given animal possesses capacities that make it capable of living a “richer” life, this might give us 
a reason to value the good of that animal more highly than that of other creatures which lack 
the relevant capacity.58  
 In some cases, importance might be better explained in terms of the role a given being 
plays in the flourishing of other valuable entities, or in the lives of beings whose value and 
respect-worthiness we are confident about (e.g. humans and other sentient beings). Two 
                                                
56 Iris Murdoch writes of how “the work of attention [...] imperceptibly [...] builds up structures of value round 
about us” (1971: 36). 
57 Even if one were open to the value realist line I’m suggesting here, it might remain unclear where the proper 
locus of value is or should be. Staying with the case of natural beings: Is value located in individual beings, or 
perhaps in those beings qua kinds? There is a difference; the former is a kind of individualism, while the latter 
focuses on the value of wholes, but not individuals per se. It seems to me we have reasons to view both individuals 
and kinds as valuable. In recognizing the value of an individual, one presumably recognizes the value of the species 
as well, as it would be strange to value a token without also valuing the type.  
58 Richard Kraut argues for this (see 2007: §56, esp. 212). See also Cuomo 1998: 75; 52-3. Martha Nussbaum, 
another defender of flourishing, appears to disagree. She says: “We should not follow Aristotle in saying that there 
is a natural ranking of forms of life, some being intrinsically more worthy of support and wonder than others” 
(2006: 360). At least this is so insofar as our focus is on basic justice, which is Nussbaum’s focus (cf. 361). 
Nussbaum concedes that understood as part of a comprehensive conception of the good life some things might be 
viewed as “higher” or “lower.” Nussbaum’s view is reminiscent of the anti-rank-ordering of biocentrists like Taylor 
(1986) and Sterba (1995, 2000a, 2005). I would note that even if one follows a view like Kraut’s, I don’t think this 
commits one to the idea that one can, as Aristotle seems to have thought, work out a detailed and complete natural 
ranking of forms of life.  
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examples illustrate this point. Flourishing plants can play very important roles in the flourishing 
of ecosystems. This gives us a reason to care about a plant’s flourishing above and beyond 
whatever reason we might have to care about this considered in its own right. A similar point 
applies to other nonsentient, or minimally sentient beings, for example, earthworms, beetles, 
and the like. A second example is that the flourishing of some beings, e.g. oak trees or Douglas 
firs, can exhibit a property we could call grandness.59 The contribution made by the existence of 
such beings to our aesthetic experience and general quality of life may be very significant. 
Imagine neighborhoods with no grand trees in them at all. Such neighborhoods are less 
compelling on that count, compared to those neighborhoods that do have grand trees. As such, 
we might have special reasons to care about the conditions of flourishing for certain trees, 
namely, those capable of becoming old-growth trees (something that is not generally true of 
trees). Both of these examples are meant to show that importance or significance does not 
simply correlate to such facts as being sentient, or being capable of living a “rich” life. Thus, the 
normative significance of flourishing can be complex.  
 An attractive feature of thinking in terms of flourishing is that this provides a general 
rubric under which one can bring an assortment of things—plants, animals, ecosystems, and so 
on. Accordingly, concern for flourishing would provide a fourth reason to care about animals in 
particular (this is in addition to the three reasons noted in 3.2.5). For animals are beings clearly 
capable of flourishing in their own way. If we have a general reason to care about flourishing, 
then we have a reason to care about animal flourishing in particular. But, again, there is no 
reason to think that concern for flourishing must do all the work in explaining why animals are 
ethically significant. I want to leave these issues and elaborate on what we might owe animals 
given that they are beings not only capable of flourishing, but beings that can experience their 
own flourishing, or its degradation, first-personally. 
 
3.3.4 Respect for Animals: The Case of Wild Animals  
 Above I suggested that we should treat animals with due respect. I suggested that we 
should focus on how our individual and collective actions and practices affect the ability of 
animals to live their lives in their own way. Here I want to attempt to further specify what 
respect might mean with regard to two cases that should be treated differently: animals in the 
                                                
59 Following Kraut 2007: 211, note 6. 
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wild versus animals that have been domesticated. I believe a principle of noninterference with 
the lives of animals in the wild, or minimization of interference (when interference is 
unavoidable), is appropriate, except in cases where such interference is necessary for human 
survival or to meet essential human needs.60 For example, hunting for subsistence can be 
justified, while hunting for sport cannot be.61  
 Second, we need a principle of maintaining adequate habitat for wild animals.62 A 
corollary to this second principle is a responsibility to restore animal habitat that has been 
degraded by human activity. This degradation typically takes the form of habitat fragmentation 
(usually due to urbanization, intensive resource extraction and industrial agriculture). I believe 
we sufficiently respect wild animals when we put into practice the principles of noninterference 
and habitat preservation, and, as appropriate, the principle of restoring animal habitat. To avoid 
possible confusion here, I would add that maintaining (or restoring) adequate habitat for 
animals does not necessarily exclude humans from, or human uses of, the habitat in question. 
For example, we can create habitat for many species of wild animals by diversifying our farm 
landscapes, and by creating more greenbelts and habitat corridors to connect fragmented 
habitats. The point is animal habitat does not necessarily mean “wilderness,” that is, habitat 
entirely free of human beings.63 
 I think the principle of noninterference in the case of wild animals is supported by two 
primary considerations. First, the significance of the subjective experience of animals is not 
simply that such animals are capable of experiencing various subjective mental states that might 
be viewed in isolation and rated as good or bad from the animal’s point of view. I’m not 
questioning whether we can actually judge this, for I imagine we can (even if inadequately and 
partially). My claim is that these mental states seem to matter insofar as they are intimately tied 
up with living a certain kind of life. That is, the psychological states per se are not what is of 
                                                
60 I leave aside here what may be estimable moral actions, such as helping out injured wild animals when one is in a 
position to do so without any great cost to oneself. Generally speaking, I regard such acts as supererogatory.   
61 There are other considerations here, such as whether the animal being hunted is a member of an endangered 
species, or whether hunting might be appropriate as a way of controlling overpopulation of certain animals. In the 
latter case, if this is justified it is for environmental reasons. 
62 I won’t provide a criterion here for what constitutes “adequate habitat.” Presumably this is a matter to be 
determined by wildlife biologists, not philosophers. 
63 There are other issues here, such as who should bear the cost of putting these principles into practice, and what 
practices might be developed, along with what “internal” attitudes or virtues, to give expression to these principles. 
Elaborating on these important matters is beyond the scope of the present discussion. See Chapter 4 (4.7) for 
relevant discussion.  
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paramount importance, at least not exactly. If it were possible for these states to occur in a 
Nozickean experience machine we should not judge these states as on par with—that is, of 
equal value to—psychological states that occur as part of an animal living an active life 
characteristic of its kind.64 In this respect, the significance of the first-personal experience of 
animals (and of humans, I would add) is ambiguous. It is and is not crucial. It is crucial in the 
following sense: the fact that an animal is capable of experiencing itself and the world first-
personally seems very important. Any account of what we owe animals should give prominence 
to this consideration by focusing, in particular, on situations in which our actions and decisions 
do or might affect the ability of animals to live their lives in their own way. But I think we need 
a notion of experience here that is richer than the mere “having” of various mental states (e.g. 
of pain, pleasure, anxiety, fear, etc.). In this regard, respecting animals requires us to ask, What 
does it mean for animal X to flourish? As already suggested, I believe the answer to this 
question is living an active life characteristic of its kind in an appropriate environment.  
 The second aspect of the rationale for noninterference is best explained by stating why, 
as a general rule, I do not think we should support interventionist policies with respect to wild 
animals. Interventionist policies would include, for example, intervening in the natural order to 
try to minimize animal suffering (a temptation in utilitarian animal liberation views), intervening 
to protect animal rights (as in Tom Regan’s view), or intervening to protect certain presumed 
animal entitlements to life, bodily integrity, and the like (as in Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities 
approach as applied to animals). I think there are a variety of reasons to balk at such views. In 
order to clarify these reasons I want to consider the issue of suffering in nature (due to 
predation, disease, parasitism, cold, etc.), in particular, whether this suffering generates a serious 
ethical problem for those, including myself, who think we owe animals respect. First I will show 
how the problem is generated for three contemporary views that regard animals as meriting 
direct moral concern: Peter Singer’s utilitarian view, Tom Regan’s animal rights view, and 
Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach as applied to animals. After considering each view, 
and possible replies to the issue of suffering from within each view, I will turn to what I think is 
the most promising way to think about this matter.  
 
 
                                                
64 On Nozick’s famous experience machine thought experiment, see Nozick 1974: 42-5. 
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3.3.5 Suffering in Nature 
 Suffering in nature generates a serious moral problem for the view offered by Peter 
Singer (1995). This is because Singer assumes that suffering is bad, regardless of whose 
suffering it is. Given his utilitarian commitments, Singer thinks we ought to at least try to 
minimize the bad, even if he shies away from enjoining us to promote the good (1995: 17, 21). 
Since there appears to be considerable suffering in nature, it is natural that someone who 
follows Singer’s view would think it is a meaningful, even urgent, question to ask whether we 
ought to do anything about this suffering, that is, supposing we could do so without great cost 
to ourselves and without violating any other important moral rules or norms.  
 Singer himself does not regard it as an implication of his view that we should intervene 
in nature to try to alleviate the suffering of wild animals. His reasoning, in short, is that when it 
comes to intervening in nature our track record is not very good. We tend to screw things up, 
causing more harm than good (i.e. causing a larger net balance of suffering than if we did not 
intervene) (Singer 1995: 22665). Writing as a utilitarian, Singer obviously has to worry about 
causing more harm than good. If an action causes, or has a significant risk of causing, more 
harm than good, then this is a reason not to perform the action. Notice, though, that Singer’s 
reply is not an in principle reply, but rather one that depends on certain empirical contingencies. 
Were we able—say, sometime in the future—to develop the knowledge and technologies for 
eliminating suffering in nature without thereby causing more harm than good, then we would 
have a reason to do so.  
 This reply is unsatisfying. This is so even if one granted—which I am willing to grant—
that the pervasive suffering in nature is bad. One problem is that Singer’s view leaves no room 
for the thought that the flourishing of nonsentient beings, whether of individuals or of holistic 
entities, matters in its own right and gives us a reason not to intervene in nature to alleviate 
suffering—even supposing we could without risk of dire consequences. The fact that Singer 
takes very seriously the question of whether we should try to eliminate carnivorous species (see 
Singer 1995: 226) further suggests that his view is flawed. There is little space, within Singer’s 
view, for the thought that carnivorous species—hawks, wolves, grizzly bears, and so on—are 
distinctive and magnificent creatures, even if they also happen to be predators. These animals 
embody a form of life that merits our ethical-aesthetic regard because of what they are. Taking 
                                                
65 In the text, Singer is discussing the case of predation in the wild. However, I view predation as an instance of the 
more general case of suffering in nature. 
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seriously the question of eliminating carnivorous species, as Singer does, suggests that Singer 
views predators first and foremost as causers of pain and suffering, rather than as animals that 
have their own good, and which are distinctive and magnificent. Singer’s view represents an 
impoverished account of animals. The view misses much, if not all, that makes animals, 
including predators, distinctive and respect-worthy as forms of life.66  
 Let me turn to Regan’s view. Regan makes three assumptions that, taken together, 
generate the ethical quandary of whether we should help suffering animals in the wild. The first 
assumption is that certain animals are “subjects of a life” (Regan 1985: 22; 1983: 243-8). Being a 
subject of a life (hereafter SL, or SL’s when plural) means being conscious; having feelings, 
desires, beliefs; recalling and expecting things; and so on.67 The basic point is that for all SL’s it 
matters to them how their lives go. A second assumption made by Regan is that all SL’s have 
inherent value and have it equally to all other SL’s. In other words, humans have the exact same 
inherent value as, say, chimpanzees or dogs or mice.68 The third assumption is that all SL’s have 
strong moral rights, specifically, rights to respectful treatment and non-harm. Regan defends a 
respect principle that says that SL’s should be treated in such a way that is respectful of the kind 
of value they have (i.e. inherent value) (1983: 277; cf. 259). This principle is meant to block any 
uses of SL’s that would treat them as mere “receptacles” of valuable experiences (e.g. pleasures), 
which is a view, Regan thinks, that opens the door to allowing some SL’s to be harmed to 
promote better overall consequences (1983: 277). The harm principle says that we have a direct 
prima facie duty not to harm those beings that have inherent value (i.e. all SL’s) (1983: 187).  
 Regan’s view clearly faces a problem given the pervasive suffering in nature. This is 
because even on a minimalist interpretation of what rights SL’s have—e.g. a right to physical 
security, maybe also to subsistence—if animals have rights, then others (e.g. moral agents) have 
corresponding duties to protect animals in the possession of their rights.69 In nature, the rights 
of animals are routinely threatened and violated. The case of suffering in nature (whether 
                                                
66 This same defect mars the view recently argued for by Jeff McMahan (2010).  
67 Regan’s view of SL’s has some similarity to the view of “being an animal” that I presented earlier. (See my 
discussion at note 39.) However, Regan’s view is more restrictive than mine, as I think “being an animal” in the 
normatively relevant sense corresponds to the class of all sentient beings, whereas Regan’s notion of SL denotes a 
subset of sentient beings, paradigmatically, mammals over one year of age. 
68 This view contrasts sharply with Singer’s scale of value, which holds that more mentally complex beings have 
greater value in virtue of their mental complexity (Singer 1995: 19-21). For a non-utilitarian view that is on this 
issue similar to Singer’s, see Warren 1986. The question of the value of different lives is relevant to the ethics of 
killing, a matter to which I will return later in my discussion of eating animals. 
69 Sagoff (1984) states the problem here very clearly. 
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caused by predation, drought, disease, etc.) would seem to give us very strong reasons to aid 
rights-holding animals in the wild.  
 Regan offers two replies to this apparent implication of his view. The first reply is that 
the duty to aid rights-holders only arises in cases of wrongful attack, that is, cases in which the 
rights of SL’s are violated by moral agents.70 To see the implication of this reply, imagine two 
cases: (a) a human hunter attacks a deer; (b) a mountain lion attacks a deer.71 According to 
Regan, we would have a reason to intervene to protect the deer (as a rights-holding SL) in (a), 
but not in (b). The reason: the human hunter is a moral agent, thus (a) constitutes a case of 
wrongful attack. In contrast, the mountain lion is not a moral agent, and cannot therefore act 
wrongfully. So (b) is not a case that generates a duty to aid the deer, even though the deer is 
clearly harmed, or threatened with serious harm, in (b). This view is utterly implausible. If 
possessing rights is to mean anything, then we would have a reason to intervene to protect 
rights-holders who are threatened with serious harm, whether this is caused by another moral 
agent, a nonmoral agent (an animal, an infant, etc.), or by a nonmoral force or event (a 
hurricane, earthquake, etc.). 
 In later work, Regan offers a different reply to this dilemma. He says that we have an 
obligation to aid potential victims (i.e. rights-holders) threatened with serious harm only in 
situations in which “the potential victim is not only at risk of serious injury but also less than 
capable of mounting a defense” (Regan 2001: 19). He gives as examples the case of an elderly 
woman who is attacked by a psychotic killer and a puppy who is being tormented by children. 
According to Regan, both cases justify our intervention. The problem with this reply is it still 
suggests that we would have very extensive obligations to intervene on behalf of animals in the 
wild—barring some other serious reason not to intervene. In a great number of imaginable and 
actual cases in which the rights of wild animals are threatened, the animals in question would 
clearly seem to meet the incapacity-of-mounting-a-defense criterion. After all, predators often 
stalk and kill the weak, sick, and infirm. So this reply would seem to affirm the idea that we 
                                                
70 The relevant text reads: “Only moral agents can have duties, and this is because only these individuals have the 
cognitive and other abilities necessary for being held morally account for what they do or fail to do. Wolves are not 
moral agents. They cannot bring impartial reasons to bear on their decision making—cannot, that is, apply the 
formal principle of justice or any of its normative interpretations. That being so, wolves in particular and moral 
patients generally cannot themselves meaningful be said to have duties to anyone, nor, therefore, the particular duty 
to respect the rights possessed by other animals. In claiming that we have a prima facie duty to assist those animals 
whose rights are violated, therefore, we are not claiming that we have a duty to assist the sheep against the attack of the 
wolf, since the wolf neither can nor does violate anyone’s rights” (Regan 1983: 285, italics in the original; cf. 357). 
71 I borrow these two cases from the discussion in Everett 2001: 51. 
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have a duty to intervene, rather than show why such intervention is not morally required by the 
view. 
 Probably the best reply Regan can make, given the constraints of his view, is something 
like what Singer says: were we to intervene in a wholesale way on behalf of rights-holding 
animals in the wild, this would likely have serious, perhaps even catastrophic, effects on the 
health of natural systems. This, in turn, would create a situation in which things would likely go 
very badly for those SL’s that do, or will, inhabit the wild. This consideration is subject to all the 
usual contingencies regarding our state of knowledge, our technological capacities, and so on. 
In the absence of specifically environmental concerns, or concern for the flourishing of beings 
besides SL’s, it appears that Regan’s view would support policies that could have very untoward 
consequences for the character of natural systems. 
 Let me turn to a third contemporary view, one that arguably provides an even stronger 
reason to intervene in nature on behalf of animals. This is the view of Martha Nussbaum (2006: 
Ch. 6). Extending her capabilities approach to the case of nonhuman animals, Nussbaum claims 
that all animals are entitled to continue their lives, entitled to a healthy life, and that they also 
have direct entitlements against violations of their bodily integrity by violence, abuse, and other 
forms of harmful treatment (2006: 393-5). I believe such entitlements are plausible when 
applied to the case of domesticated animals (with which many of Nussbaum’s examples are 
concerned). However, I believe these entitlements are implausible in the case of wild animals 
not under our control. Yet Nussbaum also maintains that “[a]nimals ‘in the wild’ are entitled to 
an environment that is the sort in which they characteristically flourish: so protecting this 
capability also means protecting animal environments” (2006: 397). However, the goal of 
protecting animal habitat is in serious tension with two other remarks Nussbaum makes. 
Nussbaum claims that we are still obliged to intervene—even in the wild—to prevent the “most 
egregious harms to weaker species members,” while we can overlook “other forms of 
hierarchy” which might be objectionable to us (2006: 399).72 More problematically, Nussbaum 
                                                
72 The fuller text reads: “Animal cultures are full of humiliation of the weak by the strong and of sometimes violent 
competition for sexual advantage. Animals do not always, or even commonly, pursue the human capability of 
‘being able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others’. It seems clear that humans 
cannot intervene to change all that, especially ‘in the wild’, without greatly upsetting the economy of species life. 
Probably this is a case in which we must say that only the most egregious harms to weaker species must be 
prevented, and other forms of hierarchy may be tolerated, though they will not be protected as central animal 
capabilities” (Nussbaum 2006: 399). It seems clear that the last sentence sanctions widespread interventions in 
nature on behalf of protecting animal capabilities. Despite Nussbaum’s apparent commitment not to sanction 
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calls for “the gradual supplanting of the natural by the just,” meaning, “the gradual formation of 
an interdependent world in which all species will enjoy cooperative and mutually supportive 
relations” (2006: 399-400). Although it is very unclear what the realization of this goal would 
mean exactly, if this goal were implemented it would be potentially disastrous for the health of 
natural systems.73 This seems like a good reason to reject this aspect of Nussbaum’s view.  
 One might also wonder here how the idea of supplanting the natural with the just is 
supposed to square with the view of animal flourishing argued for by Nussbaum. In my view, 
one of the most interesting aspects of animal flourishing, an aspect that is deeply challenging for 
us to think about, is that animal flourishing is in various respects very different from human 
flourishing. There is much that is profoundly “other” about animal flourishing. Taking seriously 
animal flourishing requires us to hold in check many assumptions we might make about what 
flourishing consists in for beings like us. It would be inappropriate to assume that animals 
would object to many of the things we might object to. I take it that the idea of flourishing 
nonhuman nature, of which animal flourishing is an instance, does in fact represent 
considerable otherness. This is one of the reasons it is so interesting. It challenges us to reflect 
seriously on what respect for other forms of life would really mean. If respect only means 
respect for forms of life that are “like us,” this doesn’t seem like respect, but more like 
intolerance, incuriosity, and an unwillingness to deal with the fact of diversity that the living 
world presents to us.  
 Respect for other forms of life, and for animals in particular, is difficult precisely 
because other forms of life often have a good that is not our good, and this good may be hard 
to appreciate from the perspective of our form of life. But if we take seriously the thought—
and I think we should—that our form of life is not the only standard to be used to assess the 
value of things in the world, then we have to grapple with the fact that the good of other forms 
of life might be respect-worthy, even if, and perhaps sometimes because, it is radically other. I 
see this as linked to the view I argued for Chapter 2 regarding the value-adding properties of 
environments that are natural in the paradigmatic sense—i.e. environments that do not reflect, 
or are not the result of, human aims, purposes, or designs.     
                                                                                                                                                 
principles that would “upse[t] the economy of species life,” I worry that her interventionist view is potentially 
deeply at odds with the goal of maintaining the healthy functioning of ecological systems.  
73 See also Nussbaum’s discussion of predation (2006: 369-71), and of positive/negative duties with regard to 
animals (2006: 373ff.). The latter, in particular, is beset by the same tension noted above. 
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 So what should we say about the fact of suffering in nature—does it pose an ethical 
challenge? If so, should we try to do anything about it? The view of animal flourishing that I 
have been exploring suggests an answer here. This view says that we respect animals when we 
allow them to flourish according to their kinds in an appropriate environment. From this 
perspective, the fact of suffering is not obviously a problem if it is part of an animal’s 
characteristic way of life in which it flourishes. Of course, there can be suffering that is not part 
of an animal’s characteristic way of life, such as that caused by habitat destruction due to 
uncontrolled urbanization, sickness and disease due to industrial pollution, and so on. But this 
doesn’t affect the point I’m making here. If much (how much?) of the suffering in nature can 
be plausibly viewed as compatible with animals living lives characteristic of their kind, then the 
respectful treatment of animals in the wild does not imply an obligation to aid animals that are 
suffering. It implies, in most cases, leaving wild animals alone so they can live their lives in their 
own way.74 
 While I think this view is basically right, and that it coheres with the noninterference 
principles outlined above, I’m not entirely satisfied with what I just said. For one thing, nature 
has been so modified by human activity that much of the suffering that animals now experience 
can actually be regarded as not intrinsic to their form of life. And if we assume that such 
suffering is bad—particularly if it results in serious harm, disease, sickness, vulnerability, and the 
like—then it seems we still might sometimes have reasons to intervene on behalf of animals. 
But here I think the primary task is to try to maintain and restore animal habitat so that animals 
can life their lives in their own way to the greatest extent possible. Commonsense consideration 
for the “ought implies can” principle is also relevant here. That is, if it were too burdensome for 
moral agents to have to concern themselves with animal flourishing, then this might be a reason 
against such concern. But, generally speaking, I don’t see why the aim of maintaining and 
restoring animal habitat would violate the “ought implies can” principle. Although this aim 
would certainly constrain the pursuit of our own good in a number of ways. I discuss this 
further in the next chapter (see 4.7).   
 A reality for some of us is that we come into contact with suffering wild animals in a 
number of situations. I find unsatisfying the idea that we should, always and in all cases, leave 
wild animals alone. Sometimes we can quite easily, and with no reasonably foreseeable negative 
                                                
74 My thinking in this paragraph is indebted to the discussion in Everett 2001: 54-5.  
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effects on ecosystem health or such, help out suffering animals, even if this suffering is entirely 
natural. Consider one of many real cases that might be relevant here. Last winter, a moose fell 
into one of the naturally occurring pools of scalding hot water in Yellowstone Park. The moose 
managed to get out of the pool, and was caught on video running through the woods, pursued 
by a black bear. The moose was very badly burned, but it was managing to evade the bear. Even 
though Yellowstone is classified as a wilderness area, which means nature is allowed to take its 
course in cases such as this, park rangers decided to shoot and kill the moose, thus ending what 
we can imagine to be a terrible state of suffering. Was this an appropriate act? Well, maybe 
something other than killing the moose could have been considered. But under the circum-
stances it seems to me that killing the moose was a humane thing to have done.  
 A number of more everyday encounters with injured or sick wildlife in neighborhoods 
or backyards might be mentioned here. What about a badly wounded animal, who recently 
escaped a predator, that comes stumbling into your backyard? What if a deer becomes caught 
on river ice, and is unable to free itself? What about a whale or dolphins that become trapped in 
ice? All these cases raise the same basic issue of whether we should provide some sort of aid, 
supposing we are in a position to do so at no great expense, and with no other reasonably 
foreseeable negative impacts. I think we often should. Obviously, such interventions have to be 
judged on a case by case basis. But I don’t see the merit in a dogmatic policy of 
nonintervention, when we can often intervene to help out suffering animals without causing any 
great harm, and while mitigating what may be terrible suffering (or a life threatening situation, 
etc.) for individual animals. Such interventions would seem befitting of human beings—
allegedly the most social animal, and, so far anyway, the only clear case of a moral animal in 
nature. 
 
3.3.6 Respect for Animals: The Case of Domesticated Animals 
 I’ve been exploring the case of animals in the wild and what it would mean to respect 
them as beings capable of flourishing in their own distinctive ways. The status of domesticated 
animals differs from that of wild animals in normatively relevant respects. We are responsible, 
in a direct and sometimes intimate way, for domesticated animals being in the situation they are 
in: they are bred, fed, and sheltered by us. While it is increasingly the case that we are also 
directly responsible for wild animals being in the situation they are in, due to our patterns of 
development and land use, there is an important difference between wild and domesticated 
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animals. This difference consists in the fact that the instincts, needs, habits—in short, the 
characteristic activities—of domesticated animals have been directly altered through the history 
of co-habitation between humans and domesticated animals.75 Moreover, our position in 
relation to domesticated animals is such that we often have a fairly clear, even if still imperfect, 
sense of what these animals need and prefer. This knowledge, combined with the fact that many 
domesticated animals simply could not survive outside human communities—a situation, again, 
that we have co-created—justifies, other things being equal, a more textured set of duties 
and/or responsibilities to such animals.  
 I say “other things being equal,” for it is a reality of the contemporary world that human 
beings are devastating the habitat of many wild animals. In addition to the wrongness of causing 
the various harms we are currently causing to wild animals—harms grounded in the direct 
degradation of animal lives—it is increasingly the case that threatened populations of wild 
species may have very disturbing effects on biodiversity and the health of ecological 
communities, and hence potentially disturbing effects on human welfare or on that of other 
animals. The assumption that human welfare is deeply intertwined with the health of natural 
systems is certainly not new—this is an old saw of agrarian writers, for example.76 But modern 
scientific research has made this link perspicuous and difficult to deny.77 That said, if we are 
faced with situations of limited resources, we may well have reason to focus on the protection 
of wild animals, rather than focusing on domesticated animals. Complicating matters, it is also 
the case that we depend in a variety of ways on the continued health and well-being of 
domesticated animals, particularly those raised for food. Therefore caring for such animals is 
warranted on moral-prudential grounds (e.g. to maintain the healthfulness of the current food 
supply), in addition to the nonanthropocentric moral reasons emphasized above. In short, we 
have very strong reasons to show proper regard for both wild and domesticated animals out of 
respect for such animals themselves and out of concern for our own collective health and well-
being. Being concerned about human health, and its complex connections with the health of 
wild and domesticated species, is not a “shallow” motive for action. For this view embodies a 
deep recognition of interconnectedness and ecological realities. 
                                                
75 Some human communities (e.g. indigenous communities) may have long and complex histories with wild animals 
as well, but I don’t think this threatens the meaningfulness of the distinction I am making between domesticated 
and wild animals. 
76 E.g. see Howard 2006, and Berry 1990 and 1996.  
77 E.g. see Beasley 2009 and the essays in Chivian and Bernstein 2008.  
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 So far I have only touched on the ethics of eating meat (i.e. when I acknowledged the 
permissibility of hunting for subsistence). This complex issue merits elaboration, not least 
because it is so “close to home.” After all, most people in affluent countries like the U.S. 
consume large quantities of meat. This fact tends to hamper intelligent discussion of the ethics 
of eating meat, for people are apt to feel defensive when an activity they are deeply invested in 
is called into question. It seems to me the question of whether or not it is ethical to eat animals 
cannot be answered in the abstract. It can only be answered if we consider a number of 
contextual questions. If we start from the status quo in which animals are being raised for food, 
the key questions include: Are animals consumed out of necessity? Are there healthful, 
affordable, and cruelty-free alternatives to consuming animals? What are the living conditions of 
the animals raised for food? Are the animals treated with proper respect while alive? When 
killed for food, are animals killed as painlessly and quickly as possible? After slaughter, are 
animals used in a way that is not wasteful? When eating the flesh of animals, does one do so 
with understanding and proper gratitude? After all, it is not a small thing to take the life of an 
animal.  
 On this topic, I think Gary Snyder frames things well in an essay on the First Precept in 
Buddhism.78 The First Precept states we should “cause no unnecessary harm.” This reflects the 
Buddhist ideal of ahimsa, or “non-harm,” “nonviolence.” Snyder suggests the Precept might 
best be viewed as an “existential koan”—that is, as a deep challenge to each of us, and as a call 
for us to sort out the meaning of ahimsa in practice, rather than merely thinking about the 
meaning of ahimsa in the abstract. Of course, I haven’t defended the First Precept here, and to 
do so would require a different focus. What interests me about Snyder’s view is the central 
insight that food and eating is a very important place to explore questions of ethical practice. 
After all, most of us eat several times a day. “Food is the field,” Snyder observes, “in which we 
daily explore our ‘harming’ of the world” (1990: 70). The cumulative effects of our daily choices 
of what to eat can be considerable, both in good and bad ways. This is a reason to be concerned 
about what we eat. But there are other reasons too. Having to eat is a constant reminder of our 
embodied existence, of our dependence and neediness. These are characteristics we share with 
all other living beings. Appreciating our embodied nature, and the ecologically “embodied” 
                                                
78 See Snyder 1990. 
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nature of our embodiment, is important if we are to develop a view of ourselves and of our 
being in the world that is not needlessly simplified and deprived of depth and understanding.  
 If our focus is on respecting animals, there is a serious question whether animals could 
be properly respected even when raised for food. Personally, I’m skeptical about the alleged 
compatibility of respecting animals while also raising them for food. But I want to explore why 
one might think there is a compatibility here. Here is an initial consideration. If the benchmark 
for proper respect is animals being free to flourish according to their kinds, then some patterns 
of animal husbandry might meet this benchmark.79 If domesticated animals have appropriate 
nourishment, suitable habitat, can live with others of their kind, raise their young, play, and so 
on, then these conditions suggest that we are doing right by these animals, or at least not doing 
wrong by them. A further consideration might be that if animals do not know that they are 
being raised for food (which we can assume, for the sake of argument, to be true), then this 
might diminish what might seem to be an obvious tension between respecting animals and 
raising them for food. The idea being that we do no harm or wrong to animals if we treat them 
well, while nonetheless using them as part of a scheme of production that will eventuate in their 
premature death and consumption as food. Animals are not harmed by the knowledge that they 
are being used in this way, and so this sort of use may be ethically unproblematic. Moreover, if 
animals could be slaughtered without knowing that they are going to be slaughtered, and also 
without suffering from the slaughter itself, then this might further remove any thought that 
there is an ethical question or problem here. This last point seems to me quite doubtful, as a 
matter of empirical fact, but I won’t pursue this further here.80  
 I want to look more closely at the question of whether we harm animals if we treat them 
well, while nonetheless causing them to die prematurely in order to eat them. Utilitarians like 
Peter Singer can support the production of so-called “happy meat.” For Singer, the question of 
the wrongness of taking an animal’s life differs from the question of causing an animal to suffer, 
                                                
79 See, for example, the extended discussion of Joel Salatin’s farm, Polyface Farm, in Pollan 2006: Ch. 8 and 10. 
80 Here is an anecdote in support of my doubt. A few years ago I was discussing the meaning of meat marked as 
“humanely raised” with the manager of the meat department in a food co-op in Redmond, Washington. The 
manager said he had personally visited, and observed the practices of, each of the farms that provided meat sold in 
the co-op. In the case of one sheep farm in Oregon, the owners had switched to the practice of slaughtering sheep 
two at a time, because they (the owners) had observed that when sheep were slaughtered one by one, they 
exhibited behavior that suggested they were extremely agitated, fearful, and the like. Once the practice was begun 
of slaughtering the sheep in twos, the behavior in question ceased. Even supposing the situation was correctly 
observed and reported, I don’t know whether this establishes that sheep no longer suffer from being slaughtered or 
not. All that seems warranted is the claim that the sheep appear to suffer less than they did before the slaughtering 
practice was altered.  
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and the former may be ethically unproblematic depending on the nature of the animal whose 
life is taken. According to Singer, if we take the life of a mentally complex being, such as normal 
adult human, we do something much worse than if we take the life of a less complex being, 
such as a mouse.81 The reason is that humans, in virtue of certain capacities we have—notably, 
for self-awareness and for having desires for the future—lose something when we are killed that 
beings who lack these capacities do not have and therefore cannot lose (Singer 1995: 19). Any 
sentient animal, when killed, would be deprived of its life, and thereby deprived of whatever 
goods that life entails (being with others, raising its young, etc.). Singer’s claim is that in the case 
of a being incapable of having desires for the future, the loss of its life is not as morally 
significant as the loss of a life of being that does have such desires. Thus, it is worse to kill a 
normal human adult than to kill a mouse (the mouse is Singer’s example).82 Singer provides a 
clear example of a view in which the wrongness of killing a being tracks the value that that 
being can be said to have. The attribution of value, in turn, in grounded in the various mental 
capacities that beings have.83 
  The significance of having desires for the future, and whatever other capacities this is 
thought to imply, calls out for scrutiny. The normative significance of having desires for the 
future seems to be this: only more complex beings, such as normal human beings, can have a 
desire to continue living that will not be fulfilled if we are killed. More generally, only humans 
can have the type of desire that, for example, certain projects they are engaged in should come 
to fruition in the future. Let us suppose, further, that only humans take an active interest in 
their ongoing lives. We grasp ourselves as having “a life,” one that extends over a period of 
many years, and even perhaps beyond our physical death.84 In contrast, nonhuman sentient 
                                                
81 Here I leave aside complexities such as justified punishment, or killing in a just war, that might entail the 
permissibility of taking the life of a normal adult human being. 
82 “We may legitimately hold,” writes Singer, “that there are some features of certain beings that make their lives 
more valuable than those of other beings; but there will surely be some nonhuman animals whose lives, by any 
standards, are more valuable than the lives of some humans. A chimpanzee, dog, or pig, for instance, will have a 
higher degree of self-awareness and a greater capacity for meaningful relations with others than a severely retarded 
infant or someone in a state of advanced senility” (1995: 19). 
83 Singer assumes that a precondition of having morally relevant interests is being sentient, that is, capable of 
suffering and/or enjoyment (1995: 7).  
84 Avner de-Shalit (1993) offers a suggestive non-religious conception of how our “selves” might transcend our 
embodied physical existence. According to de-Shalit, we have intentions and desires relating to states of the world 
that are beyond our personal happiness (narrowly understood), and which may occur after we are dead (1993: 34-
5). If posthumous events can fulfill or respond to our present intentions and desires, then our “selves” can be 
thought to continue beyond our physical death (1993: 39). 
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animals, or the vast majority of them anyway, do not have this type of a self-understanding. 
Such animals have, as it were, a more disconnected experience of being alive, one that is more 
like a moment to moment mental existence.85  
 While I would certainly not deny that more complex beings can have more complex 
desires, including desires for the future, it’s hard to see how this provides support for taking the 
life of a less complex animal, particularly for a non-essential purpose (such as eating meat when 
non-meat nourishment exists). Perhaps Singer agrees. With respect to those beings whose lives 
can be characterized as living from moment to moment, Singer writes: “Granted, even here, 
killing seems repugnant. An animal may struggle against a threat to its life, even if it cannot 
grasp that it has ‘a life’ in the sense that requires an understanding of what it is to exist over a 
period of time” (1995: 228-9). The problem is what Singer says next: “But in the absence of 
some form of mental continuity it is not easy to explain why the loss to the animal killed is not, 
from an impartial point of view, made good by the creation of a new animal who will lead an 
equally pleasant life” (1995: 229). The problem here is the appeal to the impartial point of view. 
Losing one’s life is one of the most important things one can lose. From the standpoint of the 
being whose life is ended, I don’t see how this could be a good thing, except in cases where the 
being in question is seriously infirm, in great pain, or the like.  
 Perhaps there is something to the idea that from a detached, impartial point of view, 
taking the life of a human is vastly worse than taking the life of, say, a pig or cow. But I don’t 
see why the impartial point of view should be decisive. For one thing, presumably we could take 
up a sufficiently detached impartial view of human life, such that the premature taking of 
human lives was really not that significant either. More to the point: from the perspective of the 
pig or cow, losing its life amounts to losing everything it has. Even if one granted that this is 
less significant for a pig or cow, than for a human, it still seems very significant. This is clear as 
long as we don’t erase the first-personal perspective of the sentient animal.   
 The preceding discussion suggests that there might be a serious form of wrongness 
involved in killing animals for food, even if these animals are able to live lives characteristic of 
their kind before being killed. But even if one thought that the production of “happy meat” was 
morally unproblematic, I don’t see how one could seriously justify eating meat produced by 
                                                
85 This picture of beings whose way of being alive might be characterized as a discontinuous, moment to moment, 
mental existence is suggested by Singer (1995: 228-9). It’s not clear to what extent Singer thinks this view 
characterizes the mental life of nonhuman sentient animals in general.  
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modern factory farms, which is where the vast majority of meat comes from in places like the 
United States. Confined Animal Feeding Operations, or CAFOs, are incompatible with respect 
for animals. The problem here is not simply that the lives of animals are degraded, but also that 
we are knowingly causing and maintaining this situation. Of course, as discussed above, animals 
in the wild suffer from discomfort, parasitism, disease, and so on. But it makes a moral 
difference that we are not the cause of this in the case of wild animals.86 In any case, CAFOs 
appear to be morally problematic, and as such they ought to be phased out in favor of farms 
that show proper concern for the characteristic activities and biological distinctiveness of 
animals. Of course, there are well-known environmental and human health hazards associated 
with modern CAFOs as well. These hazards provide moral-prudential reasons to phase out 
such farms in addition to the considerations grounded in respect for animals in their own 
right.87 
 
3.4 CONFLICTING VALUES AND THE MORAL RELEVANCE OF CAPABILITY 
VARIATION AMONG ANIMALS 
 Respect for animals may be outweighed by other considerations. I’ll mention a few 
cases of the relevant sort. As suggested above, it might be that using other animals in various 
ways, including raising them for food, is consistent with respect for animals. For reasons already 
stated, I doubt that this is so in the case of raising animals for food; therefore I favor giving 
animals the benefit of the doubt in this case. Readers will likely wonder how my view would 
address the issue of the moral permissibility of animal experimentation. I believe animal 
experimentation can be justified when (1) the aims and potential benefits to humans (and 
possibly other animals) are clear and weighty, and (2) to the greatest extent possible, alternatives 
have been pursued (e.g. in silico experimentation88) that do not require new experiments on 
animals at all. Finding a cure for cancer or AIDS is a weighty aim; experimenting on animals for 
yet another cosmetic or household cleaner is not. In cases where we do collectively decide to 
                                                
86 But, again, with the likely negative effects of anthropogenic climate change on countless wild animals, we cannot 
really be said to be free of complicity even in the case of wild animals. And of course we alter the habitats of 
animals in countless ways that negatively affect some animals. 
87 On the environmental and human health hazards of modern CAFO’s, see FAO 2006.  
88 In silico experimentation refers to the use of computer modeling (often based on previously gathered data from 
actual experiments) to predict likely effects of various chemicals, etc., on human and/or animal health.  
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experiment on animals, clear guidelines need to be used to ensure that the animals in question 
can live as good a life as possible under these very non-ideal conditions.   
 On a different front, I can imagine cases in which it might be necessary to fail to respect 
animals in order to enable human beings to live minimally decent lives. I have in mind societies 
that have very limited resources. Obviously, it is important to show proper concern for fellow 
human beings, in addition to striving to be ethical in our relations to nonhuman animals. But in 
general, I see no reason to believe that the aim of living decent—even rich and varied—human 
lives must involve failing to respect animals.89 In thinking about this we are naturally led to a 
higher order principle to guide us here, namely, avoiding and/or reversing patterns of 
development that make it difficult or impossible to properly respect animals. This is similar to 
the duty to avoid life boat situations, given their inescapably tragic character.90  
 I’m aware that this is an inadequate answer, given the fact that these situations are 
increasingly commonplace in many parts of the world. One of the most significant drivers of 
such situations is injustice. We live in a world in which the global rich are vastly better off than 
the global poor, and were there to be a more equal sharing of resources, one cause of 
environmental destruction, and thereby of animal degradation and suffering, would be 
diminished. To truly address the tragic situations I mentioned above would require working 
toward a more just world, both locally and globally. Clarifying what this would mean is a huge 
and complicated task, one well beyond the scope of this chapter. A comprehensive account of 
how to do right by animals, and by nature more generally, would require clarifying how 
considerations of social justice would be best combined with the types of concerns I been 
arguing for in this and the preceding chapters. I return to this issue in Chapter 4.  
 I want to consider a different issue—capability variation among different animals. We 
need to be sensitive to different levels of capability in our accounts of animals and what they are 
owed. This involves avoiding what I referred to earlier as the homogenization of the category 
“animal.” I think this point is only really relevant in the case of animals under our control 
(whether domesticated animals or wild animals in captivity). More complex animals may often 
merit more attention (and hence more resources, etc.) from us. For more complex animals have 
more complex and varied aims, and can thus be harmed in a greater variety of ways compared 
                                                
89 Insofar as possible, I believe we should support patterns of aid and development that can help achieve minimally 
decent human lives without having to sacrifice or degrade the lives of nonhuman animals.  
90 On this, see Sterba 1995: 189-90, and note 15 in the text.  
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to less complex animals. Our ethical principles and policies should be sensitive to this fact. 
However, depending on the context, complexity may point in the opposite direction. More 
complex beings are often quite ingenious and hence able to innovate strategies for coping with 
their situation. As such, there are many cases where it might be best to leave such animals to 
their own devices. Consider a vexed case: the struggle to do right by wild animals under 
conditions of anthropogenic climate change. As remarked on above, I think it is best to focus 
here on creating animal habitat (including migration corridors between currently fragmented 
habitats) and then let animals fend for themselves as best they can. This contrasts with 
proposals that advocate taking a selection of the threatened animal species into captivity for 
purposes of maintaining their genetic lines. Of course, these need not be mutually opposed 
policies, and different strategies may be appropriate in different contexts. In the case of 
seriously threatened or endangered species it makes sense to augment the first step with the 
second.      
 When the preservation of ecological health is at stake, it could be that we have to 
prioritize concern for certain animals, including perhaps less cognitively complex animals (e.g. if 
these less complex animals play essential roles in fragile or threatened ecosystems). We may also 
have reason to give priority to nonsentient beings, including nonliving beings or various 
ecological processes. Empirically, I don’t know if this would ever be the case, but it seems 
conceivable. In cases of this sort, the reason for prioritizing concern for less complex animals, 
or for beings that aren’t animals at all, is not that animal mental complexity has been rendered 
irrelevant, but that another important value—preserving ecological health—requires urgent 
attention. This means, for example, that we might have to engage in ecologically motivated 
killing, such as culling herds of overpopulated deer in order to preserve or restore ecological 
health. Such culling is regrettable, as I think it is generally wrong to kill a sentient being. In such 
cases, I think it is best to rely on expert sharp shooters to try to minimize animal suffering. We 
owe this to animals, given that the whole problem of necessary culling is the product of our 
previous modifications of natural environments, typically the removal of top predators, such as 
wolves, cougars, and grizzly bears.  
 
3.5 CONCLUSION: DARWIN’S WORMS, ANIMALS, AND FLOURISHING 
 Anyone familiar with scientific writings on soil cannot fail to notice the high praise 
given to various soil organisms. For example, Sir Albert Howard, the great scientist and apostle 
  161 
of organic agriculture, writes eloquently of the mycorrhizal association—that mutually beneficial 
relationship between soil fungi and the roots of plants (2006: 24). E. O. Wilson rejects the idea 
that such associations are the mere curiosities of biologists: “Most life on land depends 
ultimately on […] the mycorrhiza” (1999: 17891). “Without the plant-fungus partnership,” writes 
Wilson, “the very colonization of the land by higher plants and animals, 450 to 400 million 
years ago, probably could not have been accomplished” (1999: 179). In her environmental 
classic, Silent Spring, Rachel Carson also takes an exalted view of minute entities. Carson 
describes the innumerable bacteria, fungi, algae, and microscopic insects inhabiting the soil as 
“the principal agents of decay” (2002: 54). This is not to overlook, of course, the indispensable 
activities of larger insects—ants, termites, beetles—that aerate the soil, helping to improve its 
drainage and enabling the penetration of water. Yet all writers who take up the subject of soil 
seem to agree that there is one soil agent that merits special praise: earthworms.  
 Unassuming and often hidden from view, earthworms are important in a way almost 
impossible to overstate. In his book on the subject, Darwin remarked: “It may be doubted 
whether there are many other animals which have played so important a part in the history of 
the world, as have these lowly organized creatures” (cited in Phillips 2000: 58). Echoing 
Darwin, Rachel Carson suggests that “[o]f all the larger inhabitants of the soil, probably none is 
more important than the earthworm” (2002: 55). The case of earthworms is of course just one 
example of a nonhuman “agent” of almost unfathomable significance for life on earth. But I bet 
if you were to randomly ask someone who has been steeped in humanistic thought (e.g. 
Western philosophy), “Who or what do you think is most responsible for making the world 
livable for us?” They would probably reply, with not a little incredulity, “Human beings, of 
course.” Or just as likely: “Human technology.” After all, according to a common story we tell 
ourselves, it is we—human beings—who subdue a recalcitrant nature, thus creating a world we 
can live in, a human world.   
 Critics of humanism claim there is something deeply mistaken about this view of 
humanity. It’s not just that this view is self-aggrandizing, although that is true. The view is 
seriously deluded. Although perhaps strange to our ears, it’s really not far-fetched to say worms 
make the world livable for beings like us. After all, without the subterranean labor of 
earthworms, there would be no fertile topsoil, hence no diversity of plants, and thus few, if any, 
                                                
91 Reflection on the mycorrhizal association, and on other microbial activities in nature, might lead us to overcome 
what Wilson calls our “big-organism chauvinism” (1999: 178).  
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animals—and very likely not animals of the complexity and variety we actually find in our 
world. As of the twentieth century, human beings have become geologic agents as well.92 But 
still we cannot create healthy soils. We can only create the conditions for worms (and other soil 
microbes) to create healthy, productive soils. Don’t be confused here: industrially produced 
fertilizers do not create healthy soil. They only import productivity in the form of manufactured 
nitrogen (along with potassium and phosphorous). Manufactured fertility is not real fertility, for 
industrial fertility comes at the long-term expense of the environment. Taking a larger view, it 
appears that modern industrial agriculture—with its fertilizer, pesticide, and technology 
treadmills, and its causal role in the degradation of soils and waterways—has made food 
production more vulnerable and unsustainable, rather than more resilient and sustainable.93 
Hence the aptness of Adam Phillips’s remark: “Man is a poor imitation of a worm” (2000: 50). 
Or more to the point: “we can perhaps learn something from nature, and especially by noticing 
and so valuing those at the bottom of the hierarchy” (2000: 51).  
 While I sympathize with the critique of human self-aggrandizement, I have focused this 
chapter on animals in order to illuminate that which is distinctive, conceptually and normatively, 
about being an animal. Further, I have implicitly endorsed what is probably a widely shared 
judgment: it is worse to deprive your dog of food and water, or appropriate medical care, than it 
is to fail to properly care for your plants.94 This is a simple and in some ways misleading case, of 
course. But I think it highlights something important. How you regard and treat your dog and 
your plants both raise issues of ethics, broadly construed. But it makes a moral difference that 
there is something it is like for your dog to be hungry, thirsty, or ailing. Which is to say, the dog 
suffers your neglect, first-personally. Plants, too, of course, can be malnourished or diseased, just 
as ecosystems or economies can be said to be “unhealthy.” But plants, ecosystems, economies, 
and other such entities, are not experiencing subjects. Appeals to health and flourishing in such 
cases are intelligible and even normatively compelling, as I claimed above. But it is important to 
see that such appeals express an objective state assessment that has no corresponding subjective 
component. This fact is normatively significant. How significant? Well, we have very serious 
and urgent reasons to concern ourselves with the health of, say, economies and ecosystems. 
                                                
92 See McNeill 2000: 21.  
93 See Paul Thompson 1995: Ch. 2, and the sobering account in McNeill 2000: Ch. 7.  
94 “[W]e might think that someone who ignores the fact that her house-plants are persistently diseased is lacking in 
horticultural ethics, but our response is dramatically different to someone who fails to get veterinary treatment for 
his ailing dog” (Jamieson 1995: 220). 
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And sometimes these reasons conflict with the reasons we have to care about animals in their 
own right.  
 As I argued above, I believe concern for animals cannot stand in isolation from a more 
holistic (or contextual, situation-sensitive) form of concern. Holism is the characteristic concern 
of environmentalists in contrast to animal welfarists. It is misguided to try to think about the 
conceptual and normative significance of animals in abstraction from the context within which 
animals live their lives. This is why I pointed to the need to see animals in situ, to consider the 
ways in which animal flourishing depends on supportive ecological contexts. All animals, 
humans too, are part of an incomprehensibly complex web of life—“whose interwoven 
strands,” to quote Rachel Carson, “lead from microbes to man” (2002: 69). All animals are 
embedded in an ecological reality. We do well to keep this in mind. This gives us one reason to 
be concerned about the flourishing of whole ecological systems. But we have other reasons to 
care about this flourishing that do not reduce to a concern for animals, or for humans. The 
flourishing of these whole systems is interesting and respect-worthy in its own right.  
 Unfortunately, acknowledging this does not suggest a resolution to what may be 
conflicts between the flourishing of different entities—plants, animals, humans, ecological 
wholes. What may be good for the whole may be bad for some parts of the whole, and vice 
versa. For example, what is good for ecosystems is that they have healthy predator-prey 
relationships. While this might also be good for predators, and good for nature’s functioning, it 
is not good for the prey who must die. Although even here, it can be good for the prey, 
considered as a population or species, that predators control their populations and contribute to 
natural selection. But this is still bad for the individuals of the prey species who are stalked, 
chased, and killed by predators.  
 In thinking about this, it seems to me one thing to avoid is simply giving priority to the 
good of the whole over that of its constituent parts or individuals.95 Prioritizing wholes shows 
inadequate concern, in particular, for the sentient individuals that are part of the wholes. But as 
I said, we may have to engage in ecologically-motivated killing of animals so as to preserve the 
health of ecological systems. I think this aim could be, perhaps paradoxically, supported by 
someone whose primary concern was the flourishing of sentient animals. In any case, there 
remains ineliminable conflicts between the goods of different respect-worthy beings and 
                                                
95 As for example, Callicott (1980) does. 
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entities. Given the way the world is, and given what we have reason to value and find respect-
worthy, I don’t see how such conflict can be eradicated. For our part, it seems best not to 
exacerbate these conflicts where they exist, and to do what we can to maintain or restore 
something like a “natural balance.”96  
                                                
96 I say more about how we might integrate and balance the various concerns here in Chapter 4 (see, in particular, 
4.6ff.). 
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 In the previous chapters, I have explored and argued for the importance of various 
normative considerations. In Chapter 1, I emphasized the fundamental importance of certain 
end-state values for environmental ethics, focusing on ecological health. I claimed that 
ecological health, with a supporting role played by biological integrity, is indispensable for 
specifying a baseline for environmental ethics. The baseline was understood as an absolute 
minimum of environmental preservation below which we should not fall in our collective 
interactions with nature. In Chapter 2, I explored the significance of certain historical 
considerations for our thinking about environmental values. I believe that reasons both of the 
Elliot and O’Neill et al. variety merit a place in a contemporary environmental ethic. Such 
reasons highlight certain ways in which nature, natural objects, and particular environments 
matter, and our account is enriched if we include such considerations. In Chapter 3, I focused 
on the conceptual and normative significance of being an animal, concluding that we have very 
serious reasons to be concerned about how our decisions and actions affect the lives of animals 
that can care about what happens to them. These considerations provide useful standards by 
which we can assess the ethical quality of our relationship to nature and various nonhuman 
beings.  
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 So far I have not aimed to provide an account of how the different considerations 
should be integrated or assigned relative importance. No one that I’m aware of has provided 
such an account, at least not one that is philosophically and ethically satisfactory. In my view, a 
primary fault of the efforts so far is that authors have attempted integration, or have offered 
judgments of relative importance, before having adequately explored what the relevant 
considerations are that we are supposed to be integrating or balancing. I have focused my 
attention on the latter task, which seems to me perhaps the more fundamental one. Before we 
can integrate or balance various goods or considerations, we need to be confident that we have 
first clarified what the relevant goods and considerations are. Otherwise our attempt at 
integration or balancing will be premature and deficient.  
 There are a number of factors that complicate any attempt to achieve a complete 
integration or balancing of the relevant normative considerations regarding our relationship to 
nonhuman nature. The task of integration or balancing is itself an evaluative task, one that 
depends on careful judgments that have an unavoidably context-dependent character. Further, 
the judgments in question should, ideally, be the result of deliberative practices. That is, these 
judgments should be the result of individuals and communities coming together to think hard 
about how we might best live well and rightly. A philosophical account cannot replace 
deliberative judgments that must be made by individuals and communities. What a 
philosophical account can provide is a sense of what the key considerations are, what reasons 
support these considerations, and how different views might integrate or show due concern for 
these reasons. The rest is up to people, both in private and as part of public deliberative 
practices, to reflect on these considerations, their supporting reasons, and to make up their own 
minds about what to think and do.  
 That said, I assume that we can give an account of those reasons that merit our most 
serious consideration in thinking about how best to relate to nature. I assume, further, that 
these reasons need not already be reasons that do in fact motivate people to think and behave 
differently. People are capable of reflection and therefore of changing their mind about things. 
If this weren’t so, then normative inquiry would be largely superfluous. Or, in any case, if 
normative inquiry is not about clarifying relevant considerations, and the reasons that support 
them, then it might reduce to something like rich descriptions of values people already hold, or 
consideration of their relative importance. Or it might become something akin to high rhetoric 
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aimed at persuading people through something less than, or other than, rational means. Neither 
of these possibilities seems adequate. I think normative inquiry can offer more than this. 
 In an attempt at integration, I want to look specifically at an issue of great concern to 
many today: the meaning of sustainability. I think the discussion in the preceding chapters has 
clear and interesting implications for how we might think about sustainability, and it is a 
valuable exercise to explore the possible meanings of sustainability in light of what has already 
been argued.     
 
4.2 SUSTAINABILITY: INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
 Sustainability has undoubtedly become a buzzword of our time. As such it has become 
subject to all the familiar power plays. For those who have vested interests in the status quo but 
who need to veil their interests in the jargon of the day, sustainability has become a nice-
sounding word to hide behind, or from which to try to make money. Indeed, the fact that 
everybody seems to be in favor of sustainability might make one suspicious about the concept’s 
meaning and usefulness. While such skeptical sentiments are understandable, and not without 
some foundation, they are also glib. Much of consequence depends on how sustainability is 
understood. I think philosophers should enter the debate as constructive interlocutors—
mapping different conceptions of sustainability and the reasons that lend them support.  
 Before looking at particular conceptions of sustainability, I want to provide some 
general remarks about what counts as a concept of sustainability. Clearly, sustainability is about 
the future. It’s about sustaining something in order to pass it on to the future. It matters that 
others will live in the future and the question of sustainability is partly about whether we owe 
these future others anything in particular, such as some particular environmental goods or 
bundle of goods. This is a topic of considerable controversy. Some insist that we do not owe 
future generations any particular environmental goods.1 While others think we owe future 
generations a highly structured bequest package.2 The debate here turns, in large part, on the 
question of substitutability. The issue, most basically, is whether a certain good A can be 
substituted for or compensated by another good B without there being any loss of value. To 
even begin to understand the issues raised by substitution requires us to clarify a number of 
                                                
1 E.g. Solow 1993. 
2 E.g. Norton and Toman 1997; O’Neill et al. 2008: Ch. 11. 
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additional questions: what things have value that can be lost? loss of value to whom? what 
exactly counts as a loss? And so on. I will discuss all of this in detail later.  
 Another important question here is who the relevant others are that we are supposed to 
have in mind when we aim to achieve sustainability. Are we talking about humans only? All 
humans (e.g. near and distant future generations)? Only some humans (e.g. near future 
generations)? However these questions are answered, debates about sustainability are at least 
partly debates about distributional justice between present and (at least some) future generations 
of humans. A complication is that concern for justice between generations can sometimes push 
from view concern for justice within the present generation. (And the reverse seems true as 
well.) This is a problem we need to avoid, but it is not a problem with the concern for 
sustainability as such. One of my main interests in this chapter is to explore what concern for 
sustainability means, assuming, as I do, that this concern merits a prominent place in any 
account of what living an ethical life means in our time and world. 
 These brief remarks indicate that the question of sustainability is really three questions: 
sustainability of what, for whom, and why? Any plausible account of sustainability needs to 
answer these three questions. One of the main reasons why debates about sustainability matter is the 
fact that they are partly debates about what we should care about when it comes to nonhuman 
nature. Let’s go further and say that different conceptions of sustainability are attempts to 
clarify what we can call “the environmental goal.” An account of “the environmental goal,” as I 
will understand this, is one that aims to specify (1) what nature we should preserve or restore, 
and (2) the importance of human welfare relative to concern for the nature specified in (1). 
These two concerns—for nature and for human welfare—are both fundamental concerns of 
ethics. Because sustainability is about these two concerns, and about their relative importance, 
the debate is one that merits philosophical investigation. 
 In what follows I explore four different conceptions of sustainability that can be 
understood as attempts to specify the environmental goal. In considering these different 
conceptions I hope to achieve two basic aims. One is to clarify what a minimally acceptable 
conception of sustainability would be. The second is to consider richer, more elaborate and 
demanding, conceptions of sustainability. Employing the terminology introduced in Chapter 1, 
my aim is to indicate a baseline conception of sustainability, and then to consider comparatively 
richer conceptions of sustainability that suggest an overarching ideal toward which we have 
reason to strive. 
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 I will begin the account with two conceptions of sustainability argued for in the 
literature, so-called “weak” and “strong” sustainability. I will indicate the relevance of my earlier 
discussion, especially in Chapter 1, for the debate generated by these two conceptions. Next I 
turn to a third conception, what I will refer to as “the welfare pluralist account.” This 
conception provides a framework for integrating the types of concerns discussed in Chapter 2. 
Although I believe the third conception marks an improvement over the first two, I find all 
three conceptions wanting. Thus, I offer a fourth conception. I believe this conception is the 
best one, and I explore various complexities and objections that it generates. 
 
4.3 FIRST CONCEPTION: WEAK SUSTAINABILITY 
 There is a distinction made in the literature between “weak” and “strong” sustainability. 
While there is not complete agreement regarding how to mark the distinction, there is sufficient 
consensus to make the distinction serviceable. The distinction turns, most basically, on differing 
views of substitutability. Advocates of weak sustainability are said to regard natural capital and 
human-made capital as substitutable, perhaps even infinitely so.3 In contrast, advocates of 
strong sustainability are said to regard natural capital and human-made capital as basically 
complements.4 Strong sustainability is viewed as preferable to weak sustainability in the eyes of 
several authors, for it is thought that only strong sustainability embodies a minimally adequate 
sense of nature, or at least nature understood as natural capital.5 Before we can assess this claim, 
we need to look more closely at a representative of the weak sustainability view. I will turn to 
this in the next paragraph. I assume that if a view does not at least endorse the relevant features 
of the weak sustainability view, then it does not even merit our consideration at all as a view of 
sustainability. (It might merit our disdain or scorn, but that is a different matter.) For reasons 
discussed later, I view both weak and strong sustainability to be weak. Both types of view have 
serious normative deficiencies. Yet both types of view do propose some minimal constraints 
                                                
3 Michael Jacobs sees weak sustainability as committed to the idea that human-made and natural capital are 
“infinitely substitutable” (1995: 59; cf. 62). Herman Daly, however, speaks more modestly, saying that “weak 
sustainability assumes that manmade and natural capital are basically substitutes” (1995: 49). For critical discussion 
of both weak and strong sustainability, see Beckerman 1994 (esp. 194-5, 202). El Serafy (1996) dissents from the 
way the contrast between weak and strong sustainability is drawn by Beckerman, Jacobs and Daly. For helpful 
discussion of this debate, see Holland 1997.  
4 “In the literature, weak sustainability assumes that manmade and natural capital are basically substitutes […] 
[While] [s]trong sustainability assumes that manmade and natural capital are basically complements” (Daly 1995: 
49). Daly is a prominent defender of strong sustainability.  
5 See, for example, the discussion in Jacobs 1995: 61, and in Daly 1995 and 2003. 
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that, as it were, get the ball rolling. And we have every reason to take such views seriously given 
that our public policies, by and large, are not even meeting the minimalist criteria argued for by 
advocates of weak sustainability.  
 Let me turn, then, to what we can call “the weak sustainability view.” This view answers 
the three questions of sustainability as follows:  
1. of what: an appropriate level of human welfare (which presupposes a non-declining 
stock of total capital assets) 
2. for whom: present and future human beings 
3. why: (a) to satisfy the demands of distributive justice between generations, or (b) to 
maximize welfare over time 
This is a common view among contemporary economists. There might be somewhat different 
implications if one understood the “why” question in terms of maximizing welfare over time, 
versus satisfying the demands of intergenerational distributive justice. But I want to set that 
issue aside, and focus on the general conception of sustainability being offered here.6 I will treat 
the view of Nobel Laureate economist, Robert Solow (1993), as a paradigm of this first 
conception of sustainability. In taking a closer look at Solow’s view, my aim is to explore the 
key assumptions, and consider the implications of, this first conception. 
 Let me begin with the view of welfare assumed by this conception. Solow writes that 
sustainability means we have “an obligation to conduct ourselves so that we leave to the future 
the option or the capacity to be as well off as we are. It is not clear to me that one can be more 
precise than that. Sustainability is an injunction not to satisfy ourselves by impoverishing our 
successors” (1993: 181). Solow does not provide an account of what the constituents of welfare 
are. But it’s pretty clear (for reasons explored further below) that he more or less endorses a 
preference satisfaction account. According to such an account, the capacity to be well-off 
                                                
6 Wilfred Beckerman (1994) rejects the concept of sustainability, or sustainable development, as useless. His 
reasoning is that this concept is either morally repugnant (i.e. it suggests that we must make costly efforts to 
preserve nature even if people are starving or lack basic goods); or it is redundant (i.e. it adds nothing to our 
thinking that cannot already be accommodated within an appropriate view of welfare maximization). According to 
Beckerman, welfare maximization, properly understood, can easily accommodate distributional considerations 
between generations. If true, this means that there is no real difference between the idea of satisfying the demands 
of intergenerational justice and maximizing welfare, for they would appear to have the same policy implications. 
But one might doubt whether the idea of welfare maximization can adequately incorporate distributional concerns. 
If it cannot, then the aim of satisfying the demands of distributive justice between generations would suggest a 
different policy goal compared to the idea of maximizing welfare over time. I want to leave aside here the possible 
implications of this divergence for how we understand the meaning of the initial conception of sustainability. I will 
return to Beckerman’s criticisms of sustainability later after introducing the concept of strong sustainability.  
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means having the capacity to satisfy one’s preferences (or at least those preferences not 
incompatible, in practice, with a minimum of respect for the preferences of others).  
 Solow emphasizes how problematic (his word choice) the conception of sustainability 
just offered is. He thinks it is extremely difficult to say anything much more precise or elaborate 
than what he has already said. There seems to be one primary obstacle standing in the way of 
elaboration here: our ignorance about the future. Solow writes, “the tastes, the preferences, of 
future generations are something that we don’t know about” (1993: 181).7 This is a commonly 
remarked upon feature of our situation in relation to future generations. Another aspect of our 
ignorance concerns the technologies that future people might have at their disposal (ibid.). 
Obviously, depending on what these technologies are, this may have great significance for 
whether future people will have the option or the capacity to be as well off as we are.  
 Suppose, for example, that we continue to undermine the fertility of soils, with the 
result that we bequeath to future people soils less suitable for growing crops. It is natural to 
think that this would be a case of making future generations worse off, thus violating Solow’s 
statement of what our obligations to future generations involve. However, a closer look 
suggests that the idea of “soils less suitable for growing crops” does not have a timeless or 
context-independent meaning. The meaning is dependent on a number of factors, including the 
state of our agricultural knowledge, technologies, what people eat, and how many people there 
are. According to Solow’s kind of view, we would not be making future people worse off 
provided they were capable, say through some new agricultural technologies, of growing 
adequate food from the soils they inherit from us. This would be so even if these soils were 
seriously depleted from the standpoint of our current agricultural technologies. Assumptions 
about the development of new technologies can therefore be very significant. Of course, one 
cannot just assume that new technologies will solve future problems. Solow’s point is that 
assumptions about the likely development of new technologies shifts the discussion of what we 
owe the future from an account of particular goods (e.g. fertile soils) to a discussion of adequate 
savings and investments that would benefit future generations. Solow’s own proposal is that we 
should funnel the return from the use of non-renewable resources into investment for the 
future, specifically, into capital formation (1993: 185). 
                                                
7 This remark, together with the conspicuous absence of any discussion of needs in Solow’s account, supports the 
view that Solow is assuming a preference satisfaction account of welfare.
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 Both cases of our ignorance with respect to future generations are thought to pose 
serious difficulties for any specification of what sustainability means, that is, beyond the vague 
remarks Solow has already made. But let’s take a closer look at the problem of ignorance 
regarding future preferences. This is only really a problem if we assume, as Solow appears to, 
that the right way to think about welfare is in terms of preference satisfaction. Preferences are 
commonly thought to be very malleable and subject to change, with the result that it is basically 
impossible to know what future people will want or prefer. It follows that we can’t be obligated 
to anticipate future preferences. This would violate the basic “ought implies can” principle that 
constrains any minimally acceptable view of obligation—i.e. we can’t be morally required to do 
what it is practically impossible for us to do.  
 This principle is reasonable enough. However, even if we granted that a preference 
satisfaction account of welfare was the right one, a few points can be made that raise questions 
about whether we are as ignorant as Solow suggests. First, future generations includes those 
that are both near and distant. There are normatively important differences between these two 
categories of future people. It seems fairly plausible, or at least not implausible, to think that we 
could imagine and anticipate what the preferences would be, or at least might likely be, of those 
who will live in the near future, say, one or two or three generations out. In contrast, it seems 
much less plausible to try to imagine the preferences of distant future people. If true, then 
Solow’s view about the unknowability of future preferences is only convincing in the case of 
distant future generations.  
 A second point suggests that Solow overstates the idea of our ignorance regarding the 
preferences of future people. Each generation is in a position to influence the preferences of 
subsequent generations. This occurs through the patterns of social life and practice that we 
maintain and pass on to future generations, including, for example, our educational institutions, 
our patterns of consumption, our forms of collective deliberation about what matters, and so 
on. Indeed, it is entirely plausible to think that we have an obligation to sustain and pass on 
certain practices and institutions, for example, those that are justice-preserving or those that 
conduce to people being able to form their preferences under conditions that are not 
objectionably coercive (which might “distort” individual preferences, thus disqualifying them 
from consideration).8 These points suggest that the preferences of at least those who will live in 
                                                
8 It seems plausible to imagine that even a defender of a preference satisfaction view of welfare might think we are 
under no obligation to respect or count those preferences that were formed under conditions of objectionable 
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the near future are not something about which we are completely ignorant. This is because we 
are in a position to influence the shape these preferences will take. If this is right, then it would 
seem that our obligations to future people might be more demanding than Solow suggests, that 
is, even if we stay within the parameters of a preference satisfaction account of welfare.  
 Let me turn to a different issue raised by Solow’s account. Solow explicitly endorses 
what we can call “the principle of substitutability.” Solow writes:  
[G]oods and services can be substituted for one another. If you don’t eat one 
species of fish, you can eat another species of fish. Resources are, to use a 
favorite word of economists, fungible in a certain sense. They can take the place 
of each other. That is extremely important because it suggests that we do not 
owe to the future any particular thing. There is no specific object that the goal 
of sustainability, the obligation of sustainability, requires us to leave untouched. 
(1993: 181) 
Clearly, assumptions about substitutability have a direct bearing on the “what” question of 
sustainability. This issue is extremely contentious and requires careful attention. Much of 
consequence hangs on how we understand the principle of substitutability. 
 It seems to me that Solow’s endorsement of the principle of substitutability is the most 
problematic aspect of his view. There are two basic issues here. One is the empirical question of 
how far substitution is possible. The other concerns the extent to which a given substitution is 
acceptable.9 These are distinct and need to be understood as such if we are to clarify what 
follows from the view of substitutability that Solow is assuming (or at least the view that can 
plausibly be attributed to him). Needless to say, Solow himself is unclear about this, as his 
discussion of substitutability is insufficiently developed. What follows is my attempt to 
understand, and embellish where necessary, the view Solow is presenting. If I attribute to Solow 
certain commitments that he might not readily endorse, I don’t think this is necessarily a 
problem. My main interest here is Solow’s view as a representative of a certain position one 
might take on the meaning of sustainability.   
                                                                                                                                                 
coercion, or those preferences that are distorted (regardless of how they were formed). There is, in other words, a 
certain pressure toward providing a more, rather than less, objective account of what preferences should matter, 
that is, if preference satisfaction is to be plausible aim of social policy. (Notice, with this in mind, Rawls’s move 
from the notion of desire to rational desire, in his gloss on utilitarianism: “I shall understand the principle of utility 
in its classical form as defining the good as the satisfaction of desire, or perhaps better, as the satisfaction of 
rational desire. This accords with the view in all essentials and provides, I believe, a fair interpretation of it” [1999: 
22-3].) There is obviously more to say about what exactly counts as a distorted preference, but that goes beyond 
the scope of the discussion here. For relevant discussion on this matter, see Nussbaum 2000: Ch. 2. 
9 I follow O’Neill et al. in distinguishing these two questions. For useful discussion, to which my own remarks that 
follow are indebted, see O’Neill et al. 2008: 187-92.  
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4.3.1 Substitutability 
 Let’s start by distinguishing two different senses of substitutability: technical versus 
economic substitutability.10 If B can be substituted for A, one thing this might mean is that B 
will serve a sufficiently similar function or purpose as A with respect to some specified end. For 
example, artificial sweetener might serve as an adequate substitute for sugar in coffee, if the goal 
is to sweeten coffee. This exemplifies the technical sense of substitutability. With respect to the 
substitutability of human-made goods or services for natural goods or services, it is an empirical 
question whether the former are capable of serving the same function or purpose, or of doing a 
similarly good job, as the latter with respect to some end. It is plausible to suppose that this 
would sometimes be the case, and sometimes not. For example, decking made out of recycled 
detergent bottles may be a perfectly good functional substitute for decking made of wood. And 
so on for many other cases we might imagine. All such cases are fairly specific: presumably 
there is a clear answer whether one good or service can or cannot be an adequate technical 
substitute for another with respect to some specific end. 
 One thing we should notice here is that this view of substitutability can accommodate 
the idea that there may be certain aspects of nature that we won’t likely find human-made 
substitutes for. Or, to put the point differently, we would presumably not be able to substitute 
human-made goods and services for natural goods and services across the board. But we might be 
able to do so in a number of particular cases. It follows that, according to this view, some 
particular parts or aspects of nature might need to be preserved after all. If this is correct, then 
it is misleading to suggest, as Solow does, that sustainability puts us under no obligation to 
preserve any particular parts or aspects of nature. For this seems very likely to be empirically 
false.11  
 This is an important point because a charge sometimes made against this first 
conception of sustainability (weak sustainability) is that it has nothing in particular to do with 
nature: it is not concerned to preserve or sustain any particular aspects of nature.12 (This is 
reflected in the fact that I answered the “what” question above in terms of maintaining welfare 
rather than some particular aspects of nature.) Solow’s own presentation of the view lends 
                                                
10 I follow O’Neill et al. (2008: 189-90) in making this distinction. 
11 A difficulty here is that we can’t tell in advance what these parts or aspects of nature are. 
12 For example, Jacobs (1995: 61) raises this worry with respect to a type of weak sustainability view similar to 
Solow’s. 
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support to this charge. But a closer look suggests that this view, properly understood, does 
seem to imply the need to preserve particular parts or aspects of nature. This is because it is 
plausible to assume that maintaining human welfare presupposes maintaining an adequate stock 
of capital assets (understood to include such varied things as physical items, e.g. roads and 
buildings, but also knowledge, skills, etc.). This stock of capital assets, in turn, can be assumed 
to include some specifically natural assets—say, the productive potential of biological diversity, 
or the waste assimilation capacities of intact ecosystems. At least there is no reason to deny this, 
given our current knowledge and technologies, and plausible assumptions about their future 
development. This suggests that the bequest package we owe future generations as a matter of 
sustainability is likely to be more highly structured than Solow claims.13  
 Maybe Solow agrees. Consider, for example, a passage from an earlier essay, in which 
Solow writes: “If it is very easy to substitute other factors for natural resources, then […] [t]he 
world can, in effect, get along without natural resources” (1974: 11). This passage is sometimes 
quoted by environmentally-minded critics in order to demonize Solow and the view he 
represents. Notice, however, that Solow begins his remark with an “if.” Thus the passage is 
hardly a ringing endorsement of the view that the world can get along without natural 
resources. We should note further that the context following Solow’s remark indicates that the 
relevant sense of “natural resources” here is “exhaustible resources.” The latter are at best a 
sub-set of the former, and maybe not a very large sub-set (though this is a matter of debate). 
Regarding natural resources, there might be certain resources that could never be substituted 
for. A view like Solow’s seems able to grant that possibility. Solow’s considered view in the 
article in question (and in general, as far as I can tell) is that the question of substitutability is, in 
the end, an empirical question.  
 It’s worth noting that other economists, such as El Serafy, defend a notion of weak 
sustainability14 that is similar to Solow’s, though one that is much clearer about the issue of 
substitution than Solow’s view is. El Serafy argues that weak sustainability is meant to 
encourage a correct measurement of income, which in turn is necessary if we are to have a 
correct measurement of economic growth. El Serafy writes: “By drawing attention to the fact 
that proper income measurement is a sine qua non for the accurate gauging of growth, I, as well 
                                                
13 That is, even given Solow’s own understanding of sustainability.  
14 Against, e.g., Beckerman 1994, Jacobs 1995, and Daly 1995.  
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as others, have insisted that capital, including natural capital, must be kept intact” (1996: 77; italics 
in the original). Later, El Serafy adds:  
The longer a country avoided incurring the cost of cleaning up its environment, 
and the faster it cut down its forests, eroded its soil, depleted its aquifers, and 
exhausted its mineral deposits, the faster it appeared to grow. Economists 
seldom stopped to question the numbers turned out by faulty national income 
accounting methods, and have continued to use such numbers in all kinds of 
otherwise sophisticated analysis, leading them frequently to misjudge an 
economy’s progress, and to prescribe inappropriate, and even harmful, 
economic policies. To economists, ‘weak sustainability’ in the sense of getting 
the accounts right, is by no means a redundant luxury. (1996: 78-9) 
I think El Serafy’s remarks, combined with my own regarding Solow’s view, suffice to suggest 
that this initial conception of sustainability is not as weak as some have argued.15 Those who are 
said to, or who actually do, defend weak sustainability—i.e. Solow and El Serafy, respectively—
are not committed to the implausible view of substitutability that critics of weak sustainability 
attribute to them. Nonetheless, what proponents of weak sustainability are committed to is the 
idea that substitutions of human-made for natural capital can be made provided there is no 
decline in welfare. For Solow this means no decline in the capacity for present and future 
generations to be well off, while for El Serafy this means no decline in income.16  
 Perhaps Solow would resist a view like El Serafy’s, which is more explicit about the 
preservation of natural capital as an ineliminable part of the total fund of capital to be preserved 
over time. Whether or not this is so will likely depend on how robust the assumption is that we 
will be able to find suitable human-made technical substitutes for those natural assets that are 
depleted, degraded, or otherwise made unavailable for use. The fact that Solow does not trouble 
himself at all to consider whether there are parts or aspects of nature that we might not be able 
to find substitutes for could be taken to suggest that he is very confident about the capacity of 
future generations to find adequate substitutes in all cases (due to the development of new 
technologies, novel forms of socio-economic organization, etc.). This depends, of course, on 
our making investments now for the sake of future capacity, as noted above. We owe this to 
future generations. It follows that even if we deplete exhaustible resources, or even use up some 
                                                
15 E.g. as Daly 1995 and Jacobs 1995 argue. 
16 El Serafy does not indicate whether he thinks there is an optimal level of income, or even a minimum acceptable 
level, that societies should be trying to secure for people. But clarifying this is not crucial to the discussion here. 
And even if El Serafy did answer these questions, naturally one might question whether income is at all an 
adequate indicator of welfare. 
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irreplaceable parts of nature, we would not be disadvantaging future generations in doing so, 
provided we compensate them in the way indicated. I think this view is inadequate, at least with 
respect to some parts or aspects of nature adequately described as “irreplaceable,” but I’ll save 
discussion of this issue for later. 
 There is a second, quite different sense of substitutability that needs to be clarified here. 
This is the idea of economic substitutability. This implies a much more general sense of 
substitutability, a sense that is implicit in neoclassical welfare economics (the tradition Solow is 
writing from within). Regarding this sense of substitutability, O’Neill et al. write: “For any 
particular person a good, A, is said to be a substitute for another good, B, if replacing B by A 
does not change the overall level of welfare of that person. A loss in one good, B, can be 
compensated by a gain in another good, A, in the sense that the person’s level of welfare 
remains unchanged” (2008: 189). This view is not concerned about the specific question of 
whether a given substitute, A, functions or serves the same end as B. Rather, the economic 
sense of substitutability asks whether the end that A serves is as good for a person’s overall 
welfare as the end that was achieved by the other good, B. In other words, the relevant issue is 
not whether artificial sweetener serves just as well as sugar as a sweetener for one’s coffee; but 
whether having sweetened coffee contributes as much to one’s overall welfare as something 
else, say, watching a soccer match or playing a game of darts.  
 Clearly, an assumption is being made here about the commensurability of what might be 
very different goods or activities. For example, suppose that consuming a sweetened coffee 
contributes five units to one’s overall welfare, and that this is equal to the contribution made by 
playing a game of darts. If so, consuming the coffee and playing a game of darts would be 
substitutes in the economic sense. This means that if one were deprived of having sweetened 
coffee (say, because all of the sweetener and sugar in the world was destroyed), this would not 
amount to a loss in one’s welfare as long as five units could compensate from somewhere else.  
 With the distinction between technical and economic substitutability in mind, I’d like to 
return to Solow’s remarks about substitution (“If you don’t eat one species of fish, you can eat 
another species of fish”) to consider a number of additional issues raised by this view. The fish 
example Solow gives is of course very under-described, and was perhaps made flippantly. In any 
case, one might think that the view of substitutability Solow offers is beset by ambiguities, even 
if we try to understand things on his own terms. Should we assume that the relevant purpose to 
be fulfilled by the substitution of one species of fish with another is a nutritional one? Or is it 
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perhaps a matter of taste, but not nutrition per se? No doubt a sushi chef would say that tilapia is 
simply not a substitute for tuna, supposing tuna were to become scarce or be rendered extinct.17  
 Suppose it is the taste question, rather than the nutritional one, that is our concern. In 
this case, Solow might reply to the sushi chef something along the lines of: “too bad.” That is, 
we can’t be expected to preserve the conditions for what may be highly specific existing 
preferences, in this case for tuna, particularly in a world in which things change and many goods 
are ephemeral. (Imagine the cause of the tuna’s demise was not overfishing, but a natural 
source. The issue of empherality is not necessarily causally linked to human behavior.) 
Presumably the issue of ephemeral goods might be especially true for food resources, and so 
Solow’s imagined reply here might be apt. Suppose, alternatively, that the relevant end is the 
nutritional one. In that case, Solow might reply that even if we had to stop eating all species of 
fish this could be compensated for by other sources of food that contribute equally to our 
overall welfare as eating fish currently does.   
 Maybe such replies are reasonable, particularly in the case of food items, and 
presumably others, such as sources of energy. After all, the demand for blue fin tuna for use in 
sushi is an important driver of the overfishing of blue fin tuna. It is natural to think that sushi 
connoisseurs are simply going to have to accept a sushi world without blue fin tuna, or at least 
one with vastly less amounts of it than is now common. But what about the general sort of view 
Solow is offering? It seems to me that this kind of view has some serious problems, even if it 
might be a reasonable view to hold in certain cases (such as the tuna or the energy cases). There 
seems to be no room in the view for the idea that particular goods might answer to particular 
aspects of human welfare, such that they cannot be substituted for, or compensated by, other 
goods without a corresponding decline in welfare. Often this feature of welfare is articulated in 
terms of needs. If we need something, say, clean water, then more entertainment will not do. 
The notion of things people might need is conspicuously, and perhaps not innocently, absent 
from Solow’s discussion. If there are things we need from nature that might not have 
substitutes, then this would presumably be very relevant to specifying a plausible conception of 
sustainability. Of course, what such things might be—beyond some modicum of natural 
capital—is a matter of debate, and I will say more about this later.  
                                                
17 Which is something that might happen given the current overfishing of blue fin tuna. 
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 One might think that the introduction of the notion of need into the discussion here is 
not decisive against Solow. For example, Solow might be able to accommodate the notion of 
need, or at least speak to the motivation for appealing to need in this context. Maybe the point 
of Solow’s fish example is that one species of fish can substitute for another, and if not, then 
something else can, say, chicken or tofu or some yet to be created form of food. Obviously, 
people need to be adequately nourished, and I don’t mean to suggest that Solow would deny 
this. Although Solow’s idea of welfare understood as having the capacity to be well off is under-
described, it is entirely reasonable to think that being capable of nourishing ourselves would 
count as a very important instance of the capacity in question. What I assume Solow would 
insist on, however, is that there is no reason to think that people are entitled to be nourished by 
particular goods, say, fish. Thus if we deplete ocean fish stocks, we do not harm or wrong 
future generations, provided we adequately compensate them (e.g. with capital and 
investments), or find a substitute (e.g. tofu “fish”).  
 
4.3.2 Substitution, Harm, Injustice 
 Supposing what I said above is an accurate representation of Solow’s view, I want to 
comment on some additional normative considerations that the view seems blind to. Let’s stay 
with the case of fish, which is actually an interesting and timely case to consider. A number of 
traditional communities around the globe are dependent on fish as an important source of food. 
Fish, and fishing, may also be intimately tied up with their way of life. Due in large part to the 
shift toward industrial fishing and aquaculture since the 1970s, aquatic ecosystems have become 
degraded to the point that in some places traditional fishing communities can no longer catch 
the fish they need. To think, as Solow urges us to, that the only issue here is compensating 
people so that they can find a suitable food substitute for fish is to miss a number of specific 
harms and injustices experienced by the people in question. The people and communities in 
question are not only losing their access to an important food source, though that is obviously 
true. They are, more generally, losing their ability to self-provision from nature in order to meet 
their needs. They may also be experiencing the destruction of their way of life. All of these 
losses may be very significant harms to the people involved. There may also be serious 
injustices, for example, if the people in question are being unfairly disadvantaged by a pattern of 
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industrial development to which they are subject, despite the fact that they are not beneficiaries 
of this pattern.18  
 A further injustice typical of this particular type of case is that the people negatively 
affected by industrial aquaculture have had little or no say in the decisions—about funding, 
regulations, implementation, etc.—that enabled the shift toward industrial aquaculture. Projects 
in support of industrial aquaculture are often government-led and financially supported by 
international lending agencies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World 
Bank.19 There is a lot that could be said about such cases. But the main point here is Solow’s 
claim that “If you don’t eat one species of fish, you can eat another species of fish” seems naïve 
and perhaps disingenuous. This view masks a number of serious harms and injustices that might 
result from the endorsement of a robust principle of substitutability.  
 Perhaps Solow could say, in reply, that he can account for these harms and injustices. 
That is, if the replacement of one species of fish with another goes hand in hand with the 
demise of traditional fishing practices, and if the demise of these practices makes the people in 
question worse off, then the substitution has resulted in a diminution of welfare. The problem 
is that this reply assumes the loss in question is one for which there could be adequate 
compensation. But this is far from obvious. We can see this by recalling the narrative reasons 
discussed in Chapter 2. A way of life is not just a way of meeting one’s needs, or maintaining an 
abstract set of options for oneself and one’s descendents. A way of life (or at least one relevant 
to the case at hand) is a lived relation to a particular environment and to particular objects (e.g. 
fish). The relevant environment and objects are suffused with meaning and cultural significance. 
To think that the people in question are—or in principle could be—adequately compensated so 
long as a substitute is found for fish, fishing, and for the specific environments in question, is to 
miss, or to inadequately appreciate, the specific type of harm caused, with its attendant losses. 
                                                
18 Would this problem be solved if the industrial pattern produced benefits to the economy at large, thereby 
enabling the local government to redistribute wealth (say, through tax increases) so as to compensate those, such as 
the traditional fishing communities, who are harmed by the industrial pattern? This would be better than nothing. 
But even in this case, there would seem to be particular harms that simply would not, and could not, be 
compensated for. We should recall the narrative view of O’Neill et al. which helps us to illuminate the relevant 
harms here.  
19 Vandana Shiva describes exactly this sort of situation with regard to the fate of traditional fishing communities 
around the globe as a result of the trend toward industrial aquaculture since the 1970s. Shiva focuses primarily on 
the case of industrial shrimp production in southern India, an alternative form of production aimed at replacing 
traditional patterns of aquaculture in the coastal areas. The Indian government, backed financially by the World 
Bank, supported industrial shrimp production in an attempt to boost Indian shrimp exports. This case exemplifies 
each of the harms and injustices that I discuss in the text above. For discussion, see Shiva 2000: Ch. 3. 
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However, if the people in question actually did regard compensation as acceptable, then this 
rejoinder to Solow’s imagined reply would recede in importance. Although even in that case, we 
might still inquire whether people are “accepting” the compensation because really they have no 
alternative, which seems very likely to be true in cases of this sort. So there is a whole set of 
considerations here—about the nature of harm, about injustice, about power—that the 
substitution paradigm obscures. 
 I believe these considerations pose a general problem for the principle of 
substitutability, and perhaps also for the view of welfare assumed by Solow. But one might 
wonder what any of this has specifically to do with sustainability. I think there are three main 
issues here. First, harm and injustice, such as that caused by industrial aquaculture, is often a 
driver of environmental degradation. The people who are no longer able to subsist as they had 
may be forced into environmentally destructive patterns of land-use to make up for losses 
elsewhere (e.g. moving on to marginal lands to try to grow crops). Insofar as we are concerned 
about environmental protection, then we have good reason to be concerned about injustice, as 
injustice is an important cause of environmental degradation. This, of course, is in addition to 
the other reasons to care about injustice, such as the negative effects for the people involved.  
 Second, I assume that we need models, or paradigms, of ways of life that are 
sustainable. Indeed, I would say that an important aspect of our obligation to future generations 
is to provide them with models of how to live sustainably. When industrial aquaculture 
displaces traditional aquaculture, this often destroys sustainable ways of life. This is bad, first 
and foremost, for those whose way of life is undermined.20 But it is also bad in the sense that 
we lose a paradigm from which we might learn how to live in particular places, meeting our 
needs and creating culture, while not destroying biodiversity, soil fertility, and so on. So more is 
at stake here than one might initially think.  
 A third point merits special emphasis. There is a common feature of philosophical 
debates about injustice, particularly about injustice at the global level. Authors employ 
categories such as “the global rich” and “the global poor.” Debates then become about what 
those who are comparatively well off might owe those who are comparatively less well off, or at 
least to those who are counted as “poor” or “least well off.” These debates typically assume an 
account of welfare that emphasizes certain absolute, rather than relative, dimensions in order to 
                                                
20 A complication here is that in some cases life might become easier for the people in question, and they might 
welcome this. 
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designate who is badly off or poor.21 Being badly off is understood in terms of being unable to 
have adequate calories or protein, unable to access clean air and water, and so on. Typically, and 
sometimes appropriately, the characterization of those who are badly off is in terms of their 
being victims. That is, certain groups of people have been victimized by multinational 
corporations, global free trade regimes, overconsumption by the global rich, or some such 
thing. Obviously, this is often true, and I don’t in any way want to take away from the 
importance of such observations when they are apt.  
 However, one thing seldom mentioned in such discussions is how some of those 
designated “poor” are poor according to certain measures (such as having the power to 
purchase modern consumer goods), but are decidedly not poor in other respects. For example, 
many subsistence communities around the globe, including some in the United States,22 are very 
capable of self-provisioning. They have plenty to eat, are healthy, have access to clean water, 
and so on. This is important because it means that, at least in these cases, people designated as 
“poor” are not necessarily poor in a sense that justifies a poverty-removal project. Poverty-
removal projects too often assume a questionable notion of human welfare, such as being able 
to participate in modern consumer society, while failing to recognize the negative effects of 
such projects on the lives of those whom they (putatively) aim to help—not to mention the 
considerable negative effects of such projects with respect to environmental preservation.23 
Here we should distinguish between poverty as subsistence and poverty as (absolute) 
deprivation (see Shiva 1993: 180). Only the latter may justify a poverty-removal project, and 
that may not even be true. (It is often a complicated question what the right sorts of poverty-
removal projects are.) When poverty-removal projects have the effect, as they often do, of 
forcing people off their lands and into urban areas to work as laborers, this is often bad for the 
people in question. For these people go from a condition of being able to meet their basic 
needs, to a condition of having to live in (often degraded) urban environments and being 
                                                
21 As discussed in 1.4.1, an adequate account of welfare or well-being will include an account of both absolute 
(non-relative) and relative needs. Non-relative needs refer to such things as the need for clean air, water, a 
sufficient number of calories, and so on. Relative needs refer to such things as the social bases of self-respect, the 
need for a car or computer, and so on. Amartya Sen is responsible for clarifying the distinction between the 
absolute and relative aspects of well-being (see, e.g., Sen 1983). See also the illuminating discussion in Lichtenberg 
1998, regarding the significance of this distinction for the question of how much consumption is “enough.”  
22 For example, some Amish communities. But we may also include the growing number of “eco-communities” 
and local economies created by people trying to meet their needs without having to engage in the consumer 
economy.   
23 On both types of negative effect, see the discussions in Daly 2003 and Shiva 2003. 
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dependent on the fluctuations of industry and consumer demand. Such circumstances are made 
worse by very inadequate social provision (e.g. government assistance) for those rendered 
needy.  
 The point is not to romanticize subsistence living (though its merits are often under-
appreciated24), but to recognize that this is often a much better option than that which occurs 
when people are forced off their land and are no longer able to self-provision from nature. 
Moreover—and this is an important point here—these subsistence ways of life solve a social 
problem (people being able to meet their needs) while also preserving intact what are often 
ecologically and socially sustainable ways of life.25 Obviously, we have very good reasons to 
support the preservation of subsistence communities insofar as they represent “win-win” cases. 
 
4.4 A SECOND CONCEPTION: STRONG SUSTAINABILITY  
 As I indicated above, views like Solow’s are taken as representative of weak 
sustainability. The crucial feature of weak sustainability is its apparently liberal view of 
substitutability: to a considerable extent (how far exactly?), human-made capital could substitute 
for natural capital without any decline in welfare. In fact, such substitutions might even be 
necessary in order to increase welfare, for example, when various projects not only provide jobs 
for people, but make available new sources of energy, useful minerals, and the like. Due to the 
liberal nature of this view of substitutability, weak sustainability is often considered to be not 
even minimally acceptable. I’m very sympathetic to this judgment, but I think the critique made 
of weak sustainability is overstated, as I tried to show in the case of Solow’s view. The criticism 
of weak sustainability is even more inapt when we consider views like El Serafy’s.  
 In contrast to defenders of weak sustainability, advocates of strong sustainability are 
said to take the view that natural capital and human-made capital are basically complements. 
Strong sustainability is viewed as preferable to weak sustainability in the eyes of several authors 
for it is thought that only strong sustainability embodies a minimally adequate sense of the 
                                                
24 See, in particular, Guha 1997a and Martinez-Alier 1997. The pro-subsistence view implicit in the essays by Guha 
and Martinez-Alier is very reminiscent of the agrarian view of Gandhi. Guha (1997d) suggests that Gandhi’s 
agrarian vision, appropriately fleshed out, is an important contribution to environmentalism, one that deserves a 
place in contemporary discussions of environmental ethics. I think this judgment is deeply right.  
25 The essays by Guha and Martinez-Alier (1997) are indispensable for showing the ecologically sane and 
sustainable character of traditional subsistence and agrarian communities in parts of India and Latin America (the 
two areas that are the primary focus of the essays in question).  
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nature we should care about, i.e. natural capital.26 While the view attributed to weak 
sustainability theorists by those committed to strong sustainability is largely a straw man, there 
is still reason to attend to the debate about weak versus strong sustainability. What interests me 
is whether there is even a distinction between weak and strong sustainability. To explore this, I 
will treat Herman Daly’s view (1995 and 2003) as a representative of the strong sustainability 
position, while supplementing, when appropriate, Daly’s view with insights from other 
defenders of strong sustainability (notably, Jacobs 1995). 
 The key to Daly’s view is the idea that there are certain aspects of natural capital, or 
certain natural resources,27 that can never be substituted for. The implication is that there are 
certain aspects of natural capital or resources that must be preserved if we are to achieve 
sustainability. Although I think Solow is forced into holding something like this view too, that 
is, if his view is to be made plausible, there is at least a notable difference in emphasis between a 
view like Solow’s and a view like Daly’s. Advocates of strong sustainability, like Daly, think we 
need to be clear about those aspects of the natural world that we cannot lose or degrade or 
impair. These aspects can be referred to by the umbrella phrase “critical natural capital.” 
Treating Daly’s view as a second conception of sustainability, then, we can answer the three 
basic questions of sustainability as follows: 
1. of what: critical natural capital 
2. for whom: present and future human beings 
3. why: (a) to satisfy the demands of distributive justice between generations, or (b) to 
maximize human welfare over time  
 The key to Daly’s view is the assertion that natural and human-made capital are 
complements. Three points are offered as an explanation of what complementarity means. 
Taken together, these points are meant to show that the basic relation of human-made and 
natural capital is one of complementarity, not substitutability. 
(1) “One way to make an argument is to assume the opposite and show that it is 
absurd. If manmade capital were a near perfect substitute for natural capital 
then natural capital would be a near perfect substitute for manmade capital. But 
if so, there would have been no reason to accumulate manmade capital in the 
first place, since we humans were already endowed by nature with a near perfect 
                                                
26 See, for example, the discussion in Jacobs 1995: 61, and in Daly 1995. 
27 Natural capital is usually regarded as a “fund” or “stock” from which natural resources are particular “flows” or 
“streams.” Accordingly, one might deplete certain natural resource flows without necessarily depleting the fund of 
natural capital. So these two concepts are distinct (although commonly used interchangeably in casual discussion).  
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substitute. But historically we did accumulate manmade capital – precisely 
because it is complementary to natural capital” (Daly 1995: 51). 
(2) “Manmade capital is itself a physical transformation of natural resources 
which are the flow yield from the stock of natural capital. Therefore, producing 
more of the alleged substitute (manmade capital), physically requires more of 
the very thing being substituted for (natural capital) – the defining condition of 
complementarity!” (ibid.). 
(3) “Manmade capital (along with labour) is an agent of transformation of the 
resource flow from raw material inputs into product outputs. The natural 
resource flow (and the natural capital stock that generates it) are the material 
cause of production; the capital stock that transforms raw material inputs into 
product outputs is the efficient cause of production. One cannot substitute 
efficient cause for material cause – as one cannot build the same wooden house 
with half the timber no matter how many saws and carpenters one tries to 
substitute” (ibid.).  
 A few critical points can be made in response to these arguments. Take first the claim 
about the symmetry relation between human-made and natural capital that would have to be 
assumed if these two forms of capital were truly substitutable. Alan Holland points out some 
flaws with this argument.28 I’ll note two points in particular. While it may be plausible to think 
that the substitution relation is symmetrical when it obtains, it does not follow that there always 
is a substitute available. Some forms of human-made capital (e.g. the wheel) have no natural 
equivalent. So it’s false to say that an advocate of the principle of substitutability would have to 
assume that natural capital could always substitute for human-made capital. Second, (1) proves 
too much. As Holland writes: “The fact is that some human-made capital can substitute for some 
natural capital. But according to the argument, such human-made capital ought not to exist. 
Since it does, the argument must be wrong” (1997: 125). 
 Daly’s second point seems reasonable enough for some cases, but false as a general 
statement. It’s not clear that, as Daly’s statement implies, all “[m]anmade capital is itself a 
physical transformation of natural resources which are the flow yield from the stock of natural 
capital.” A similar point applies to (3). Daly’s main point here seems to be that any production 
process requires us to view material, agents, and products as complementary elements. Further, 
he appears to assume that the material element must always be a natural resource. But it’s not 
clear why this should be so. All that seems minimally necessary here is that at some point in the 
                                                
28 See Holland 1997: 124-6. 
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past there was a natural resource that provided the relevant element in the production process.29 
It does not seem false to suggest, as supporters of substitutability might, that human-made 
products can increasingly substitute for natural resources in a given production process. If so, 
this suggests that Daly has misleadingly described what the material element of the production 
function must be.30 It seems that Daly would have nothing to say to this possible reply by a 
defender of substitutability.  
 What does seem right in Daly’s view is the general point that, at least in some 
imaginable and actual cases, there is no human-made substitute for certain natural resources 
flows that come from the fund of natural capital. Fair enough. But if this is what strong 
sustainability means, there seems to be no obviously important distinction between this position 
and weak sustainability.31 This is evident even if we take Solow’s view as a representative of 
weak sustainability. As argued above, Solow is not best thought of as committed to the idea that 
we can get by without natural resources (or natural capital) at all. El Serafy’s defense of weak 
sustainability expresses an even clearer view regarding the need to protect natural capital as part 
of protecting the total fund of capital assets.  
 Perhaps this conclusion is too hasty. Perhaps there are differences between the two 
positions. But if there are, these seem to be more a matter of emphasis than of substance. It 
won’t do to insist, as Daly appears to, on some sort of a priori idea that natural resources, or 
natural capital, can never be substituted for. Whether substitutability can occur would seem to 
be, as Solow maintains, an empirical question. At least this would be so in the absence of 
further argument as to whether, and if so what, other considerations might constrain 
substitutions. (I will consider such an argument on behalf of strong sustainability below.) So if 
the answer to the “what” question is critical natural capital, then the reasons to care about this 
are empirically contingent. The force of these reasons will change in accordance with changing 
human interests, technologies, and so on, with the result that the question of substitution will 
remain open.  
 Maybe there is a clearer difference between a view like Daly’s and one like Solow’s when 
we look at the different attitudes each author takes toward natural capital. Daly is much more 
                                                
29 See Holland 1997: 126.  
30 See also the discussion of the production function in Daly and Farley’s textbook on ecological economics (2004: 
148-52), which is liable to the same objection. 
31 Here I agree with Holland (see 1997: 126-7). 
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concerned, despite the a priori aspect of his view noted above, to clarify what particular aspects 
of nature we have reason to preserve or restore. In more recent writing, Daly focuses his 
answer to the “what” question on physical throughput, understood to mean “the entropic 
physical flow from nature’s sources through the economy and back to nature’s sinks” (2003: 
62).32 In thermodynamic theory, entropy refers to the unavailability of a system’s thermal energy 
for conversion into mechanical work. The basic idea is that a low entropy system is one that still 
contains a lot of usefulness (e.g. productive potential), while a high entropy system is one that 
has been wasted, used up. In saying that we should be preserving physical throughput, then, 
Daly is saying that we should be preserving nature’s usefulness (i.e. low entropy states). Daly 
also emphasizes the need for us to recognize “the constraints of physical/biological laws on 
economics” (2003: 64), and the sense in which “[t]he macroeconomy is not the Whole—it is 
Part of a larger Whole, namely the ecosystem” (2003: 65). I do not regard these remarks as 
representing a departure from the focus on critical natural capital, but as an elaboration on what 
critical natural capital means.  
 In Solow’s outlook, there is nothing like Daly’s sensitivity to the importance of 
maintaining low entropic states as a matter of sustainability. Nor is there anything in Solow’s 
thinking about sustainability that emphasizes the need to understand the human economy as 
embedded in the broader “economy” of nature. Solow, as I argued above, explicitly discourages 
us from thinking about sustainability in this way. This is clearest in his remark discouraging us 
from thinking that there really are particular aspects of nature that we ought to be preserving 
for future generations. Nonetheless, I argued that Solow’s view, properly understood, does not 
rule out the idea that we might, as a matter of fact, have to preserve particular aspects of the 
natural world. If it turned out that the relevant aspects were the low entropic states or various 
ecosystem capacities that Daly draws attention to in his work, then presumably Solow could 
accommodate these into his framework. But as a matter of emphasis, it is clear that a view like 
Daly’s “takes nature seriously” in a way that Solow’s view doesn’t. This is true at least if we 
understand the normatively relevant sense of “nature” as that which provides the supportive 
context, as well as the constraints, for sustainable economic activity. 
 A gap in many discussions of both weak and strong sustainability (if we grant that these 
are distinct) is that advocates of neither view typically have much to say about what exactly 
                                                
32 See also Daly and Farley 2004: Ch. 4-7.  
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natural resources, or natural capital, are as an object of concern. As indicated, Daly is more 
explicit about this than Solow (or El Serafy, for that matter). Here I want to connect the 
discussion explicitly to what I argued in Chapter 1. It seems to me that the right way to think 
about critical natural capital is in terms of ecological health, as this was defined in Chapter 1. 
Ecological health refers to two basic properties of natural (or partly natural) systems: (1) the 
counteractive capacity of such systems to withstand stress or change, and (2) the capacity of 
such systems to function normally over the long-term, thereby providing a variety of ecosystem 
services (1.2.4). In this regard, a minimally acceptable view of the nature we should care about, 
as a precondition for maintaining human welfare over time, is nature’s health. I regard 
ecological health as a clarification of what “critical natural capital” means.33 
 Moreover, we need to bear in mind, as I argued in Chapter 1, that if we are serious 
about maintaining ecological health over the long term this commits us to maintaining at least 
certain areas in which biological integrity is preserved. Biological integrity, or integrity for short, 
refers to a property of landscapes that are relatively unmodified by human activity and that have 
their native biota largely intact. Earlier I suggested two reasons integrity is important to health. 
First, areas with their integrity intact provide paradigms for how nature functions successfully, 
i.e. resiliently, in a given place. The point here is an epistemological one: we need areas of 
integrity so that we can assess the ecological functioning of areas we use and inhabit. Moreover, 
it would make sense to think that we should preserve a range of different ecosystems or 
landscape types that have integrity, or something like it, since nature is not everywhere the 
same. The more the better. A second reason to care about integrity is that landscapes with their 
integrity intact are understood to have causally effective properties that human-dominated 
systems lack, or might lack. The idea is that integrity areas are a storehouse of biological 
resources that health areas might need in order to be replenished, and kept vital over time. In 
this respect, integrity is instrumentally important to health.  
 If we assume, as I think we should, that the most plausible way to understand “critical 
natural capital” is in terms of health, then this presupposes concern for integrity, or something 
like it. Further, if we assume, as defenders of both strong and weak sustainability do, that the 
reason to care about nature at all is because its yields resource “streams” that are instrumentally 
                                                
33 In his defense of strong sustainability, Michael Jacobs argues that “sustainability is an injunction to maintain the 
capacities of the natural environment: its ability to provide humankind with the services of resource provision, waste 
assimilation, amenity and life support” (1995: 62). This refers to only one important aspect of ecological health as I 
understand this notion. 
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important to maintaining human welfare over time, then any defender of strong or weak 
sustainability is committed, in practice, to caring about the preservation of health, and as 
appropriate, integrity. The important point is that even if one thought preserving health was the 
right answer to the question of what nature we should care about—i.e. that it is the right way to 
understand the idea of critical natural capital—and, further, that the reason to care here was 
straightforwardly anthropocentric, then preserving/restoring a number of areas with something 
like integrity would still be important because integrity is important to health in at least two 
senses. I want to argue for something stronger than this in the case of sustainability, and I will 
turn to that argument later. But before doing so, I want to consider two objections to strong 
sustainability. 
 
4.4.1 Two Objections 
 The first objection I will consider comes from a sharp essay written by Oxford 
economist Wilfred Beckerman (1994). Beckerman is dismissive of the policy goal of 
“sustainable development,” though the context of his remarks suggests that his target is what I 
have referred to as strong sustainability.34 Beckerman interprets sustainability (or sustainable 
development) “as a requirement to preserve intact the environment as we find it today in all its 
forms” (1994: 194). Beckerman proceeds to ask: “Is one supposed to mount a large operation, 
at astronomic cost, to ensure the survival of every known and unknown species on the grounds 
that it might give pleasure to future generations, or that it might turn out, in 100 years time, to 
have medicinal properties?” (ibid.). And a bit further on he suggests that an instance of the 
relevant type of case he is worried about would be “using up vast resources in an attempt to 
preserve from extinction, say, every one of the several million species of beetle that exist.” The 
rub here is that, according to Beckerman, “the cost of such a task would be partly, if not wholly, 
resources that could otherwise have been devoted to more urgent environmental concerns, such 
as increasing access to clean drinking water or sanitation in the Third World” (1994: 194-5).  
                                                
34 Beckerman takes issue with the definition of sustainable development offered in the well-known Brundtland 
Report. Since the view expressed in this report is plausibly understood as a defense of strong sustainability, 
Beckerman’s objection can be understood as an objection to strong sustainability. According to the Brundtland 
Report, “[s]ustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED 1987: 43). Beckerman objects to this, in part, 
because he thinks the notion of “needs” is subjective, therefore the Brundtland Report’s criterion of sustainability 
is “totally useless” (1994: 194). It’s hard to see how Beckerman’s own definition of “welfare” would fare any better 
on this point, since Beckerman claims that “[o]ne is always free, of course, to define welfare however one wishes” 
(1994: 200). 
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 There are two questions here that need to be separated. Does (strong) sustainability 
imply that we ought to “preserve intact the environment as we find it today in all its forms”? 
Second, does (strong) sustainability require us to preserve nature (understood in terms of 
ecological health) even if doing so conflicts with the aim of ensuring that poor people have 
access to clean water, sanitation, and the like?  
 Obviously, the first question is not an objection to strong sustainability as this has been 
defined. So I’ll set this aside. However, the question of conflicts between maintaining ecological 
health and meeting urgent human needs (e.g. for clean water or sanitation) merits some 
comment. Beckerman is right to raise the question of how conflicts between these competing 
goods might be adjudicated. However, it’s doubtful that the sort of example Beckerman gives 
(the beetles-versus-drinking water example) provides a serious objection to strong sustainability.  
 There are several things to keep straight here. First, the defense of strong sustainability 
offered (e.g. by Daly and Jacobs) is premised on the importance of maintaining critical natural 
capital precisely insofar as this is necessary in order to preserve the “flow” of goods and 
services beneficial to humankind.35 Jacobs, for his part, is very explicit that we need to appeal to 
a need-based conception of welfare (a point on which I agree36). This suggests one reason to 
think it is misleading to regard concern for strong sustainability as producing conflicts between 
the preservation of nature and meeting vital human needs (such as that for clean water or 
sanitation). For the relevant natural capacities that strong sustainability is enjoining us to 
preserve are precisely those that are beneficial to humankind. If we interpret “beneficial” to 
mean that which enables people to meet their needs from nature, then there is no reason to 
think that preserving every species of beetle would ever have priority over concerns such as that 
for clean water or sanitation for the poor. If it turned out that some species of beetle was 
absolutely critical to maintaining ecological health, then that would give us a reason to preserve 
it (staying with the assumption that preserving ecological health is the primary focus of the 
strong sustainability view). But that is different matter, and certainly a far cry from anything like 
a wholesale prioritization of beetles over drinking water for the poor, as Beckerman implies.  
                                                
35 It is fairly common in the literature to defend ecosystem services as those that are beneficial to us. But obviously 
it is also the case that the relevant services are beneficial to many other species, and to the biotic community more 
generally. For the provision of such services indicates a relatively healthy functioning natural, or partly natural, 
system. Accordingly, one could just as well speak of ecosystem services as good for both us and nature. I suspect 
the appeal to ecosystem services is often focused on us because this appeal is being made as part of an 
anthropocentric argument. This is clear in the case of strong sustainability.  
36 As I argued in 1.4.1.  
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 This reply is nonetheless incomplete, and I suspect it wouldn’t satisfy Beckerman. For 
we could imagine cases in which conflicts would exist between environmental and human 
goods, even if these are not likely to be of the beetle-versus-drinking water variety. Maybe the 
difficult case of ensuring the survival of elephants in certain parts of Africa or of the orangutan 
in Indonesia, provides examples. So suppose that it is this more general sort of conflict that 
Beckerman is worried about.  
 There are two things to say here. First, insofar as the interpretation of what it means to 
maintain critical natural capital is to maintain ecological health, this could be achieved even 
while populations of African elephants or Indonesian orangutans are imperiled, and perhaps 
even rendered extinct. Whether or not this is so would be an empirical question. The fact that a 
major species of tree did basically go extinct in the example I noted in Chapter 1,37 but without 
thereby undermining ecological health in the relevant area, suggests that ecological health is 
compatible with the displacement, even extinction, of certain species from certain landscapes. 
Further, human-dominated areas can exemplify the property of ecological health. Since at least 
some of the human-dominated areas that might be healthy no longer contain species (e.g. 
wolves and bears) that used to inhabit the areas, this further supports the point that certain 
species displacements or extinctions are compatible with the maintenance of health. 
 Of course, the possibility of this compatibility here will bother many environmentalists, 
and perhaps also some animal welfarists. This suggests a reason to object to a view of 
sustainability that is focused exclusively on the maintenance of health. But it’s not a reason to 
object to strong sustainability as this has been defined above. So Beckerman’s objection is off 
the mark if his target is strong sustainability. However, his objection might apply to more 
demanding views of sustainability, such as the fourth conception I offer later. Therefore, we will 
have occasion to return to this issue again. 
 Another difficulty here, one that Beckerman’s objection allows us to bring into focus, is 
that the idea of sustainability so far considered does not seem to provide us with any rules for 
adjudicating conflicts, such as those that might occur between the aims of maintaining 
ecological health and meeting human needs (e.g. for clean water, etc.). Presumably, there could 
be cases of this type of conflict in practice, even though it is easy to overstate these for 
polemical purposes. After all, the whole point of strong sustainability is to preserve nature for 
                                                
37 In which a blight in the southeastern U.S. removed the American chestnut as a component of the eastern 
deciduous biome. 
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the sake of humankind. If we interpret this to mean preserving nature in the relevant sense in 
order to meet human needs, now and in the future, then sustainability is aimed at preserving 
those fundamental environmental capacities within our natural-cultural-economic systems. This 
would—in a great many, if not all, cases—directly benefit the poor, who often lack access to 
basic environmental goods.  
 However, it seems conceivable that there could be cases in which meeting the needs of 
the poor is incompatible with preserving ecological health, at least in certain places. I’ll save 
discussion of this possibility for later when I consider some challenges facing the fourth 
conception of sustainability. Here it is sufficient to note that there is not at present a global 
shortage of potable water, of adequate grain to meet human nutritional needs, and so on for 
other basic human goods. The issue we face, as has been pointed out by numerous writers, is 
one of distribution, not supply.38 Of course, there are a number of local or regional shortages of 
the relevant goods. Moreover, even the global situation may change, for example, were we to 
have some catastrophic crop failures, increased incidence of drought, or a human population 
that continues to grow unabated. There is also the issue of the ongoing waste of grain that is 
being fed to animals raised on factory farms. Currently, 70 percent of the grain and cereal 
produced in the U.S. is consumed by animals39; worldwide, the figure is 37 percent.40 If this 
practice continues to expand, as is happening, then there could be grain shortages in the future, 
at least for the global poor. Obviously, these considerations give us a reason to eat less meat, to 
critique factory farming, and to try to decrease the vulnerability of our current way of producing 
food (e.g. by moving away from the pattern of industrial food production which is inherently 
vulnerable41). I would add that if there are reasons to help people to sustain themselves 
locally—notably, reasons relating to food security—then this further strengthens the case for 
moving away from the industrial model of food production.42   
                                                
38 For recent comment, see Ehrlich and Ehrlich 2009: 67. 
39 See Ayres 1999. 
40 See Sterba 2005: 288, citing World Watch Institute, Vital Signs 2003. 
41 For discussion, see McNeill 2000: Ch. 7.  
42 Here it is worth noting that the claim made above—that we do not face a food supply problem, but rather a 
food distribution problem—rests on a problematic assumption, namely, that the task at hand is merely one of 
figuring out how best to transfer the grains produced in highly productive agricultural lands, such as the 
Midwestern United States, to places where people are hungry. But this is a very unstable arrangement, vulnerable to 
(e.g.) political maneuvering, the fluctuations of global grain markets, and the continuation of a global shipping 
pattern that is dependent on cheap fossil fuels. Such an arrangement does not seem likely to decrease the food 
insecurity of already vulnerable populations, but instead likely to increase food insecurity. This strongly supports 
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 There is a further issue here that merits comment. I take it to be obvious that, over the 
long term, we need to try to decrease the size of the human population. This point does not 
strike me as particularly controversial. Where there is controversy is with respect to the politics 
of discussions about population (e.g. worries that the focus on population distracts us from the 
more pressing problem of overconsumption by the global rich).43 There is also considerable 
disagreement about how best to achieve decreases in population, as well as disagreement on the 
question of where exactly reductions in population would be most helpful. A common view is 
that birthrates in the “South,” or less well off countries, are too high. But a child born in an 
industrial and technologically advanced country has a much greater impact on the environment, 
compared to a child born in a poor country.44 Controversy regarding these matters does not 
mean that interlocutors necessarily disagree about the end at which we should be aiming—a 
smaller population of human beings. Even an unrepentant anthropocentrist, who could care 
less about nature or animals in their own right, should care about decreasing the size of the 
human population given the considerable stress currently being placed on ecosystems 
worldwide. If the situation were to change, then the human population might be able to rise 
again. However, this seems to me doubtful, that is, if one thinks there is anything to be said for 
integrating into our conceptions of sustainability concern for sentient animals, or for the natural 
world understood in terms of integrity. I will explore these considerations later.   
 I want to turn to a second objection to strong sustainability. This objection is generated 
by the interpretation of critical natural capital that I gave above. If critical natural capital is 
understood in terms of ecological health, then this means that concern for nature is primarily 
about concern for certain capacities nature has (viz., the capacity to maintain itself, and to 
continue to provide over the long-term a range of ecosystem services). To this, one might 
object that if natural capital is thus understood as a capacity, then natural capital could decline 
in absolute terms without it being the case that there is a corresponding loss in the relevant 
                                                                                                                                                 
the ideal of enabling people to meet their needs from their local lands to the greatest extent possible. This ideal is 
at the heart of the agrarian environmentalism of Gandhi, and there is much to be said for it. For relevant 
discussion, see Guha 1997d; also Shiva 2003 and Freyfogle 1998.  
43 This issue needs more careful analysis than I will provide here. For helpful discussion, see Cuomo 1994.  
44 Vandana Shiva remarks: “‘Population explosions’ have always emerged as images created by modern patriarchy 
in periods of increasing social and economic polarizations […] What this focus on numbers hides is people’s 
unequal access to resources and the unequal environmental burden they put on the earth. In global terms, the 
impact of a drastic decrease of population in the poorest areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America would be 
immeasurably smaller than a decrease of only five percent in the ten richest countries at present consumption 
levels” (1993: 190). 
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capacity. For example, suppose clean drinking water used to come from intact natural 
watersheds or free flowing rivers, but now it comes from desalinization plants. After all, there is 
no shortage of sea water. As long as the relevant capacity is maintained—in this case, the 
capacity to produce clean water—then there would appear to be no violation of the strong 
sustainability view. To ward off the natural reply that desalinization plants are very capital- and 
energy-intensive, and thus not really equal substitutes for the natural provision of clean water, 
we could just tweak the example. Imagine, instead, that a different pattern of resource sharing 
were to be evolved, with the result that even if there were less potable water available on earth, 
it could still be shared in such a way that everyone who needed water had access to it.  
 These possibilities are riffs on an argument considered earlier: new technologies, or 
perhaps redesigned socio-economic institutions, could compensate for impairments of natural 
capital (understood as a capacity to provide various resource flows), without there being a 
corresponding loss in the provision of the relevant good (e.g. clean water). As long as this is 
true, then there would be no reason to complain, at least no reason that follows from the 
principles subscribed to by defenders of strong sustainability.   
 Of course, it is, and will remain, an empirical question to what extent substitutions of 
the sort just imagined can actually provide substitutes, or otherwise compensate for diminutions 
in the health of natural (or partly natural) systems. Because it seems reasonable to suppose that 
there will be serious limits to whatever substitutions are possible here (limits that would include 
the fact that such substitutions might be prohibitively costly, politically unsalable, etc., even if 
technically possible), I do not regard this objection as a very serious one.45  
 While I think this objection is not serious, it does nonetheless bring into focus 
something important. The views of sustainability, whether of weak or strong (if these are 
distinct), are inadequate. Both views rest, ultimately, on empirical questions about if, and if so 
how far, substitutions are possible in the relevant cases. There is something therefore deeply 
contingent about such views, leaving them vulnerable to those critics who maintain that 
sustainability only requires us to provide adequate capital assets to the future so that future 
generations will be able to sort out whatever environmental problems might arise. It seems, 
then, that in the end defenders of both weak and strong sustainability risk collusion with those 
who insist on the continuation of the status quo, in which a variety of environmental values are 
                                                
45 Here I disagree with Holland (1997: 127), who presses this objection against defenders of strong sustainability.  
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deeply underappreciated. In this respect, defenders of either weak or strong sustainability are 
involved in a sort of betrayal of the environmental cause. This suggests a reason to look to 
other ways to think about sustainability.  
 
4.5 STRONG SUSTAINABILITY MODIFIED: A WELFARE PLURALIST ACCOUNT 
 Michael Jacobs suggests a way in which strong sustainability might be defended against 
the worry just raised. I want to clarify Jacobs’s view here, and then embellish it in light of the 
recent work of O’Neill, Holland and Light. My aim is to search for a view that is more 
satisfactory than Daly’s version of strong sustainability presented above. I’ll be exploring in 
particular a view that I’ll call (following Jacobs) “the welfare pluralist account.” I think there is 
something to be said for this view. Yet I believe we can do better. In the next section, I’ll offer 
a conception of sustainability that I think is superior to the welfare pluralist account. 
 In the previous sections, the discussion of nature’s value has been focused on nature’s 
importance for maintaining human welfare, or at least the capacity for welfare, over time. This 
is an ethical concern, not an imperative inherent in the idea of incomes or some other economic 
concept presumed to be “value free.” For the most part, the economists considered so far 
recognize this fact.46 Further, I have indicated that any minimally plausible view of welfare 
certainly includes having access to basic environmental goods, such as clean air, water, and the 
like. Although this sense of welfare is most easily articulated in terms of things people need, one 
could avoid the language of needs (as, for example, Solow does) and still reach more or less the 
same conclusion.  
 The problem is that this conception of the importance of environmental goods for 
welfare falters, as we have seen, on the empirical question of substitution. If our concern is 
maintaining access to such things as clean air, water, and so on, then this could conceivably be 
achieved through increased technological capacities or changes in our socio-economic 
institutions, with the result that people’s access to the relevant goods would not necessarily be 
                                                
46 El Serafy appears to be an exception. He writes: “This totally objective (and ‘positive’, i.e. value neutral) 
requirement, that capital, in its fundist sense, be kept intact for the purpose of properly measuring income and its 
growth, came in time to be called ‘weak sustainability’” (1996: 79). I assume, for reasons already given, that El 
Serafy regards this view of weak sustainability as correct. But naturally one wants to ask: Isn’t the concern for 
maintaining capital in its fundist sense an inescapably normative concern? I assume the usual answer, given by 
economists, is that capital is necessary to satisfy or promote welfare. This is a normative aim. Or maybe someone 
thinks that preserving capital intact is an intrinsically valuable goal. In this case, one would be claiming that 
preserving capital intact matters or is worthwhile for its own sake, or perhaps that the activity of preserving capital 
intact is worthwhile because (e.g.) it requires discipline or other excellences. All of these claims are normative.   
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diminished or impaired, even if natural capacities as such were seriously diminished or impaired. 
Personally, I’m skeptical that such substitutions or forms of compensation can in fact be 
worked out. Moreover, to base policy on the thought that we will always be able to find 
substitutes for those environmental goods and capacities we ruin or degrade seems to me both 
naïve and reckless. But this reflects an attitude about what is empirically likely. It is not an in 
principle argument against the substitution paradigm. Without such an argument, the defender 
of strong sustainability is inevitably vulnerable to those who play the substitution card. This 
vulnerability is a problem. In the real world defenders of the substitution view are extremely 
well-funded and can therefore steer public discourse and policy in their favor. This results in the 
eclipse of concern for nature, even if the relevant sense of “nature” here is merely nature 
understood in terms of certain natural capacities that have proven beneficial to human beings.  
 I assume that environmentalists will likely lose the battle of persuasion if environmental 
concern is reduced to a debate about empirical questions regarding the extent of our 
dependence on natural goods and whether it is likely that we can find substitutes for these 
goods. For this reason alone it is worth asking whether there is another way to approach these 
issues. One possibility here is to search for a reply on behalf of strong sustainability that would 
show that the issue of substitutability is not, in the end, empirical—at least not in the sense 
discussed above. This would prove beneficial to the environmentalist’s cause for it would 
refocus discussion on where it should be focused anyway: on what those environmental goods 
or capacities are that matter, and that cannot be substituted or compensated for without great 
loss. Another important issue here is clarifying what risks it is reasonable to ask people in the 
future to bear. Both of these are important issues, though I will focus on the first issue in what 
follows.  
 So how might such an argument proceed? Jacobs makes a helpful start when he 
suggests that we would do well to analyze the meaning of welfare as it is supposed to function 
in arguments regarding the respects in which nature is beneficial to us. Of course, part of the 
story here is that people, now and in the future, need access to certain environmental goods 
(clean air, etc.). Any meaningful view of welfare must include this. But if we stopped there, this 
view of welfare would still be vulnerable to those who advocate substitution. So the question is 
whether there is a different way of talking about the relevant benefits that avoids this particular 
vulnerability. Jacobs suggests that “the source of strong sustainability is an ethical and/or 
empirical belief in what we might call welfare pluralism. By this is meant the belief that human 
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beings need a variety of different kinds of goods, services, experiences and relationships in order 
to achieve wellbeing. One might say that the welfare function is multidimensional” (1995: 64). 
Later, Jacobs adds: “The environment […] provides humankind with goods (social and cultural 
as well as individual) which are necessary for wellbeing; without them both individual lives and 
societies are impoverished, an impoverishment for which no substitution of human-made 
benefits can make up” (ibid.).  
 Here Jacobs departs in an important way from the view offered by Daly. Jacobs is right 
to do this, but he says nothing more about what the relevant goods are so the implications of 
this move remain unclear. Absent such an account, we still do not yet have a reason to think 
that strong sustainability does not, in the end, collapse back into weak sustainability, while also 
remaining fundamentally vulnerable to advocates of substitution and their powerbrokers. A 
critical task, then, is clarifying how to think about this view of welfare pluralism.  
 One can look to the recent work of O’Neill, Holland and Light (2008) to help us here. 
O’Neill et al. write:  
To live well is to have or realise particular objective states – particular forms of 
personal relation, physical health, autonomy, knowledge of the world, aesthetic 
experience, accomplishment and achievement, sensual pleasures, a well-
constituted relation with the non-human world, and so on. If one allows a 
plurality of such goods to be constitutive of well-being, then there is no reason 
to assume that goods are substitutable across different dimensions of well-
being. (2008: 194) 
The authors claim that the different components of welfare are incommensurable in the sense 
that (e.g.) more autonomy cannot compensate for the lack of the capacity to have a well-
constituted relationship to nature. It follows that there cannot be different substitutions across 
the different dimensions of well-being in the economic sense of substitutability discussed 
above. The idea of economic substitutability is that, for example, more entertainment could 
substitute for inadequate food, provided that one’s overall welfare does not decline. Imagine 
that one lost, say, 10 units of welfare due to food shortages, but gained 10 units due to 
increased access to desirable entertainment. In this case, there is no loss in overall welfare. 
O’Neill et al. reject this view of substitutability, and also the assumption of commensurability 
with regard to the different components of welfare that the view presupposes. 
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 In its essentials, the view offered by O’Neill et al. is a familiar form of an objective state 
conception of welfare.47 Despite its lack of originality, such a conception might have particular 
relevance for debates about sustainability, that is, if it clarified in the ways I propose below. The 
purported advantage of the welfare pluralist view, and its claim to being a superior view of 
sustainability, is that it gives us reason to preserve the natural world in ways that block 
substitutions that would be acceptable to Solow, El Serafy, and Daly, given their theoretical-
empirical assumptions.  
 One place to focus attention is on the dimension of the view concerned with “having a 
well-constituted relation with the non-human world.” This aspect might be the most novel 
dimension of the view, and it is in any case the dimension most obviously relevant to the 
discussion of sustainability, and to the question of substitutability in particular. O’Neill et al. 
suggest that “[m]aintaining the capacity to appreciate the natural world and to care for other 
species requires us to sustain particular environments” (2008: 195). If this claim is to provide us 
with a reason for sustaining particular environments, we need to clarify what having a well-
constituted relationship to the natural world consists in. Otherwise, it is unclear why we would 
have reasons to protect particular environments. And even if we do discover that we have such 
reasons, there will still be a question regarding which or what kind of particular environments we 
should be preserving and passing on to future generations. 
 I think there are two different ways of clarifying what having a well-constituted 
relationship to the natural world consists in. One is to appeal to narrative reasons, as these were 
discussed in Chapter 2. The other is to clarify why we might think that the natural world is 
distinctive as an object of concern, such that it cannot be substituted for by any other object 
without a loss in welfare. I will consider each of these points in turn.   
 First, let’s recall the basic idea behind narrative reasons, and why these might be thought 
relevant to a discussion of environmental values. Individual and cultural identities are 
constituted in part by their engagement with particular environments. This engagement involves 
meeting our needs and creating culture. Because of this engagement, particular environments 
can come to embody the collective labors and history of particular peoples or cultures. 
Accordingly, such environments can take on special significance. This is perhaps clearest if we 
                                                
47 The debt to Aristotle and Marx (i.e. the Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts) should be obvious. In his earlier work, 
O’Neill is explicit about this debt and its meaning is explored in more depth compared to the account offered in 
O’Neill et al. 2008. See O’Neill 1993: 68-81, 159-67. 
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take the point of view of someone who is a member of the community in question. The idea is 
that being able to perform one’s identity in relation to particular environments may be partly 
constitutive of what it means to live a good life. Whether or not this is so in any particular case 
might be disputed. But the general point is that “an individual’s identity, their sense of who they 
are, is partly constituted by their sense of belonging to particular places. Particular places, 
whether ‘natural’ woodlands, streams and ponds, or ‘urban’ city streets, parks and quarries, 
matter to individuals because they embody the history of their lives and those of the 
communities to which they belong. Their disappearance involves a sense of loss of something 
integral to their lives” (O’Neill et al. 2008: 39; cf. 66-7).48 
 This view raises some difficulties. First, I have no doubt that Woody Allen’s identity is 
partly constituted by New York City as a physical and cultural environment. But this fact does 
not obviously support environmental values, and may even tell against their importance. If the 
claim about the constitution of one’s identity were to be given priority in our ethical-political 
deliberation, and if Woody Allen’s view here was widely held (which is perhaps empirically likely 
in the case of New Yorkers), then this would seem to support an argument against, for example, 
trying to restore parts of New York City in order to make it more ecologically healthy. Second, 
suppose a particular environment has in fact constituted one’s identity. Couldn’t this be so in 
the sense that, for example, one hates the place where one grew up and couldn’t be happier to 
have left it? If so, then the normative implication of the descriptive point is under-determined 
at best. Put differently, what normative conclusions you get from facts about how a person’s 
identity is constituted will depend on what matters to that person. Further, I take it that many 
people do not, as a matter of fact, understand their identities to be constituted by the particular 
places they are from, have lived in, or are currently living in. So if the point is a descriptive one, 
it might well be false. (I would say it is often false for many people who live in a highly mobile 
society like ours.) To this, one could reply that there might be something there to be felt, such 
that if a particular object or environment that had cultural significance was destroyed, we can 
understand why this might be a source of loss, even if it isn’t actually experienced as loss. It’s this 
latter idea that seems to me the right way to talk here. But if one takes this line, then it’s no 
longer clear what work is being done by the claim about how our identities are constituted. 
                                                
48 Elsewhere, the authors write: “the value of specific locations is often a consequence of the way that the life of a 
community is embodied within it. Historical ties of community have a material dimension in both the human and 
natural landscapes within which a community dwells” (O’Neill et al. 2008: 176).  
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Rather, the argument becomes about why we should care about certain things, in this case 
particular objects or environments. 
 The problems raised here are exacerbated, rather than resolved, in O’Neill et al.’s 
discussion of sustainability and human well-being. For example, in indicating the connections 
between the different constituents of welfare, the authors claim that “[s]ustaining affiliation 
requires sustaining the cultural and physical conditions for community, including particular 
environments that are constitutive of communities” (2008: 195). Do these particular 
environments necessarily have to be natural environments? I don’t see why the answer must be 
yes. And the fact that O’Neill et al. include urban environments (in the quote above) further 
supports the worry that the natural world is falling out of the account, or at least not being 
included in a sufficiently robust way. This is a problem because if the authors cannot provide a 
good reason as to why concern for specifically natural environments is constitutive of human well-
being, apart from the utilitarian senses noted above, then the welfare pluralistic account will fail 
to state a reason that might block proposed substitutions regarding the natural world. The 
account might provide reasons that block substitutions regarding various non- or minimally 
natural environments, such as urban landscapes, but that is another matter.   
 A second possible way to think about the natural world as a constituent of human well-
being returns us to some issues discussed in 2.1 regarding the aesthetic value of nature. Here the 
earlier work of John O’Neill (1993) is more elaborate than the discussion in O’Neill et al. 
(2008). O’Neill’s argument rests on a general claim that the contemplation and appreciation of 
that which is wonderful and beautiful “extends our own well-being since it realizes our 
characteristic human capacities” (1993: 159). O’Neill adds: “There is a relationship between our 
capacity to appreciate the value of the natural world and human well-being” (ibid.). Building on 
this Aristotelian claim, O’Neill suggests a further point, this one concerning what Marx called 
the “humanization of the senses” (ibid.; cf. Marx 1994). What O’Neill wants from Marx is the 
idea that certain activities, such as art and science, “humanize the senses in that they allow 
humans to respond to the qualities that objects possess. We respond in a disinterested fashion – 
and it is a characteristic feature of humans that they can thus respond to objects” (1993: 159-
60).  
 Marx’s point has two aspects: being able to appreciate objects as they are in themselves, 
in light of their uniqueness, beauty, peculiarity, and so on; and being able to do this free from 
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any practical need.49 On this sort of view, appreciating certain objects, such as natural 
environments or other species, humanizes our senses in the sense that the engagement with and 
contemplation of these objects trains us to see more deeply, to attend to the world, to 
appreciate distinctions, and to generally delight in forms of refined sense perception and 
contemplation. I take it that this is a perfectly general point and that this could be achieved with 
respect to any number of objects (food, works of art, practices like scientific inquiry, etc.). So 
one question here is why we should think that this consideration has special import for the 
appreciation of the natural world in particular. 
 One might press the point here differently. What if it turned out that human well-being 
was not promoted by appreciating the natural world? Or what if, upon reflection, people decided 
that the dimension of well-being concerned with appreciating the natural world was just less 
compelling than some other dimensions, such as appreciating art or space travel or basketball? 
What then? The account would seem to lose any critical edge with respect to illuminating those 
environmental values relevant to articulating a better account of sustainability. What we need is 
an account of why we should think that the natural world in particular is an object of concern 
that no other object can possibly substitute for without a loss in welfare. As far as I can tell 
O’Neill (1993) and O’Neill et al. (2008) do not provide such an account. The authors say a 
number of suggestive things, but they do not, in my judgment, adequately address what is at 
issue here. This leaves the view vulnerable and under-developed in a crucial respect. 
 Let me make a suggestion here based on the view I offered in Chapter 2. One 
normatively interesting sense of the natural world is that it refers to those places that are 
paradigmatically natural, i.e. unmodified by human activity. I claimed, in a sympathetic 
interpretation of Elliot, that the nonhuman natural world might be considered valuable precisely 
because it does not embody human designs, purposes, or aspirations (2.2.7). The natural world 
matters because it does not reflect ourselves back to ourselves, but instead opens us up to a 
world of nonhuman otherness, which is challenging and interesting to grapple with. An 
important aspect of the natural world is that it contains all sorts of beings which have a good 
that is not our good. With this in mind, one might try to analyze the normative significance of 
nature’s otherness in terms of the intuitive appeal of the flourishing of those beings and entities. 
                                                
49 The latter point parallels Marx’s view (in the Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts) of what true human production 
would mean, i.e. production that is not for meeting immediate physical needs. Marx saw the latter form of 
production as characteristic of animals, and hence unbefitting of human beings. 
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I considered reasons to care about flourishing in Chapter 3. But I think such an analysis would 
still miss something, namely, that our interest is motivated by nature’s otherness—its foreignness, 
the absence of human design, the absence of intentional design as such—not simply by the fact 
that it contains beings that have a good. Of course, I argued in Chapter 3 that the natural world 
also contains a number of intentional beings—sentient animals—but that does not take away 
from the basic point here. For many animals are extremely other to the human. This is so not 
only in the sense that such beings exhibit forms of behavior radically different from ours, and 
which are therefore hard to access and appreciate. But also that the good of these other beings 
is other than, even at odds with, our own good. It seems counterintuitive, but one could argue 
that appreciating the otherness of the natural world is constitutive of living a good human life. 
It seems to me that something like this has to be argued if we are to support the claim that 
appreciating the natural world is a particular good that cannot be substituted for by other 
goods, no matter how much we get of whatever other goods are being offered. 
 The view just considered provides us with a third conception of sustainability. 
Advocates of this view, the welfare pluralist conception, answer the three basic questions of 
sustainability as follows: 
1. of what: a disaggregated bundle of goods that maintain welfare across the different 
dimensions of human life50  
2. for whom: present and future human beings 
3. why: (a) to meet the demands of distributive justice, and (b) to respect/promote 
human flourishing 
With respect to the “what” question, O’Neill et al. suggest that their account should be 
construed as being in the tradition of the Brundtland formulation, which is written in the 
language of needs. (Recall that the Brundtland formulation says “[s]ustainable development is 
development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs.”) This is plausible insofar as the components of welfare 
include such things as the conditions of livelihood and good health (O’Neill et al. 2008: 195). 
This recalls the concern for people having access to basic environmental goods, such as clean 
water, healthy food, fertile soils, and so on. But to imply, as the authors do, that the other 
aspects of well-being, such as “engaging with the wider natural world” (ibid.) are needs in the 
same sense seems a stretch. It seems that many people in places like the United States willingly 
and happily move from air-conditioned homes, to cars, to places of work, to movie theatres or 
                                                
50 See O’Neill et al. 2008: 195.  
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malls, and so on, all without really “engaging the wider natural world.” To say that such people 
are failing to flourish on account of the fact that they are failing to “engage the wider natural 
world” seems debatable, to say the least.  
 I think the most we can get here from the reasoning offered by O’Neill et al. is 
something along the following lines: a connection with the natural world can be reasonably 
understood as making an important contribution to the well-being of many people. But the 
question of whether it does so in any particular case seems to be an empirical one. Further, if 
one includes within the objective account of human well-being such goods as autonomy, then it 
seems that respect for autonomy will likely generate serious conflicts over exactly what the 
constituents of well-being are. After all, respecting others’ autonomy would surely include 
respecting others’ freedom to make up their own minds about what their own good consists in. 
Of course, this also poses a difficulty for my suggestion above regarding the value of nature’s 
otherness, that is, a difficulty that would arise if my suggestion were to be integrated into the 
welfare pluralist view.  
 To be clear, I have no problem with the claim that there are need-like constituents of 
welfare. I argued for this in Chapter 1. Such things would surely include our need for adequate 
food, shelter, clean water, certain relations with others, and so on. But the account of welfare 
offered by O’Neill et al. also includes constituents that are not need-like in this sense. These 
would include such things as having a well-constituted relationship to nature or other species. It 
also includes the narrative reasons discussed above and in Chapter 2. I’m certainly willing to 
grant that (as per a favorite example of O’Neill et al.) at least some of those who are displaced 
by big dam projects, such as the Narmada Dam in India, experience losses that go far beyond 
disruptions to their livelihood, or to their capacity to be adequately nourished, and so on.51 If 
our concern were merely with the basic needs of these people, then presumably these could be 
met even while these people were living in refugee camps, or even better, in neighborhoods 
with all the modern conveniences paid for by the revenue generated from the dam project. But 
as discussed in Chapter 2, and above (4.3.2), this way of thinking misses important types of 
harm, and even injustice. Historical and narrative considerations are therefore an important 
supplement to objective list accounts of welfare. For history and narrative, as we have seen, are 
relevant to any adequate appraisal of how well a person’s life goes.  
                                                
51 The Narmada Dam case is discussed in a number of different contexts. See O’Neill et al. 2008: 50-3, 56-7, 60, 
62-3, 78-9, 194-5. 
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 To briefly elaborate on this point here, O’Neill et al. give the example of an old man 
struggling to look after himself on an isolated farm, one that has been farmed by his family for 
generations (2008: 196). Suppose that a visiting social worker were to suggest that the man 
move to a retirement home. From the perspective of a non-historicized objective account of 
welfare, this might make complete sense. But this suggestion would miss the significance for 
this man of living out his life in the particular place he currently lives, given its 
historical/narrative meaning for him. I agree that we need an historicized objective account of 
welfare. All this can be included in the idea of welfare pluralism as discussed above. But to think 
that such inclusions can be accommodated within the notion of what people “need” is to 
stretch the meaning of need implausibly. One might reply that at issue is what people need to 
flourish. But in this case, the idea of flourishing is doing the normative work, not the notion of 
need per se.   
 I think there are two main virtues of an historicized welfare pluralist account of 
sustainability. The first is that the account does highlight some considerations that would likely 
block, or at least raise the bar of justification for, certain imaginable substitutions that might be 
proposed with respect to the natural world. If, for example, appreciating particular 
environments or other species answers to particular dimensions of human welfare that we have 
reason to care about, then this would provide a strong prima facie reason against replacing these 
environments or species with something else. In this regard, the view seems an improvement 
over the form of strong sustainability argued for by Daly. Daly’s view (and even more so the 
views of Solow and El Serafy) is unable to appreciate how certain environmental goods might 
answer to certain aspects of human welfare, such that replacing those goods with human-made 
goods may involve a significant loss in welfare.  
 A second possible virtue of the welfare pluralist account is that it does not require 
radical revisions in our assumptions about what matters, who counts, and why. The view is a 
form of anthropocentrism, albeit a “rich” and complex form. Given that the view tries to work 
within the familiar anthropocentric framework, even while trying to revise the meaning of 
anthropocentrism, it might therefore have a greater chance of engaging public interest and 
influencing public policy.  
 But these virtues also point to a fundamental weakness. I think the most basic problem 
here is the focus on human welfare as decisive when we are trying to sort out what sustainability 
might mean. As long as the argument is about human welfare only, then conflicts between 
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environmental values and human welfare, or between the flourishing of animals and human 
welfare, are going to be downplayed and perhaps ignored altogether. They will be downplayed 
in the sense that concern for human welfare is thought to adequately incorporate the relevant 
environmental values, thereby preventing conflicts from arising in the first place. However, it 
seems to me that there is no reason to think that this view would actually eliminate conflicts, at 
least not without begging the question against views that, if plausible, would generate conflicts.  
 For example, if animals matter in their own right, or if the integrity of nature matters in 
its own right, then we have reasons to care about animals and/or about integrity that do not 
reduce to the claim that caring about such things enables our lives to go well. It would be nice if 
this were true, and if this were how people understood their well-being. But even if this were 
true, it seems to get the order of reasons wrong. Let me be clear: it is true—and this point 
merits emphasis—that the reasons we have to care about animals, about ecological health, and 
even about integrity, do connect with human welfare in all sorts of ways. Some of the 
connections are direct, others less so. This was the point of appreciating the foundational 
importance of ecological health for human welfare, argued for above and in Chapter 1. But I 
think this important point is insufficient. I believe animals and integrity make a claim on us 
independently of human interests. If this is plausible to believe, then it gets the order of reasons 
backward to claim, as O’Neill et al. do, that the reason to care about the natural world and other 
species is, ultimately, because such caring is constitutive of human well-being. 
 One might agree with this point but wonder why concern for animals and integrity must 
be reflected in an account of sustainability. I have some sympathy with this thought. But as I 
said in 4.2, discussions of sustainability are discussions about what we should care about when it 
comes to nonhuman nature. Further, even if advocates of different conceptions of sustainability 
did not regard themselves as trying to clarify the general question of what we should care about 
when it comes to nonhuman nature, it doesn’t seem to me wrong to critique views that answer 
the “what” question in a truncated or deficient way—a way that leaves out important normative 
considerations. To elaborate a bit on this, suppose one thought that a conception of 
sustainability should restrict itself to answering only the modest question of what nature we 
need to preserve in order to sustain those economic activities that are supportive of human 
welfare. We would then have to ask how concern for sustainability, understood in this limited 
sense, is to be integrated or balanced with other concerns regarding the value of nonhuman 
nature (e.g. concern for animals, integrity, etc.). In other words, an overly narrow construal of 
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the debate about sustainability would leave absolutely crucial questions unanswered. To me, it 
makes more sense to view different conceptions of sustainability as attempts to answer the 
crucial question of what we should care about, environmentally speaking, and how this concern 
should be viewed relative to concern for human welfare. This is the important issue, what I 
referred to above (in 4.2) as specifying the environmental goal. 
 In the end, I don’t think it really matters whether one views my inquiry either as an 
attempt to clarify the meaning of sustainability, or as an attempt to clarify the environmental 
goal. It seems to me that the issues at stake in either case are basically the same. Moreover, 
many writers seem to be trying to give an account of the environmental goal. This appears to be 
true of the view offered by O’Neill, Holland and Light.52 Whether advocates of so-called weak 
or strong sustainability view their contributions in the same way is unclear. But even if they 
didn’t view their own contributions as attempts to specify the environmental goal, I think they 
should be criticized on this count. For what really matters here is trying to specify the 
environmental goal. 
 
4.6 TOWARD A RICHER VIEW OF SUSTAINABILITY: DEFENDING NATURE’S 
INTEGRITY 
 I have considered three conceptions of sustainability, and found each of these wanting 
in different respects. However, this should not be understood as a wholesale dismissal of these 
conceptions. In particular, I think strong sustainability, understood in terms of maintaining 
ecological health, defines a minimally acceptable baseline of what sustainability should mean. 
Clarifying a baseline is important and has obvious relevance for crafting social and 
environmental policy. The welfare pluralist account might mark an improvement over the 
strong sustainability view, in the sense that the former at least tries to integrate concern for the 
natural world beyond the fact that the natural world provides various goods (clean air, etc.) that 
we need. Of course, I pointed out a number of difficulties regarding this aspect of the welfare 
pluralist view. But I grant that the welfare pluralist view at least suggests a richer sense of nature 
than that presupposed by advocates of strong sustainability. Still, I believe our thinking about 
sustainability would be incomplete and impoverished if the preceding views were all we had to 
work with.  
                                                
52 I think it’s also true for the view argued for in Holland 1997. 
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 Suppose we wanted a better account, where should we look? It seems to me that a very 
interesting place to look is at the idea of biological integrity, or integrity for short. As discussed 
in Chapter 1, integrity refers to a property of landscapes that are relatively unmodified by 
human activity and that have their native biota largely intact. By “native biota,” I mean the 
native plant and animal life in a given place, and whatever ecological relationships these 
instantiate. Under the banner of integrity we can integrate a number of the concerns that I have 
explored, and argued for, in Chapters 2 and 3.   
 In my discussion of strong sustainability, I suggested that one of the reasons to care 
about integrity is that landscapes with their integrity intact are instrumentally important to 
maintaining ecological health. If ecological health is viewed as valuable because it supports 
human well-being, then integrity could also be viewed as instrumentally valuable to human well-
being. Such an instrumental defense of integrity has the virtue of calling into question what is 
sometimes a facile and misleading dichotomy between preserving integrity and using nature to 
meet human needs. Yet I think the instrumental defense raises problems of its own. The most 
obvious problem is that this defense reduces the ideal of integrity to something practically 
necessary, and thereby pushes to the background non-instrumental reasons for caring about 
integrity.   
 Before elaborating on non-instrumental ways of understanding the value of integrity, let 
me comment on one difficulty that accompanies the instrumental defense noted above. It might 
be empirically questionable whether sites with integrity are in all cases instrumentally important 
to maintaining ecological health, where the latter is understood as instrumentally important to 
human well-being. For there seems to be nothing inherent in the idea of integrity to suggest that 
a state in which integrity obtains would necessarily conduce, whether directly or indirectly, to 
human well-being.53 Maybe it would; maybe it wouldn’t. In this respect, integrity theorists like 
James Karr, Laura Westra, and others, seem to assume a reason to care about integrity that is 
perhaps empirically questionable.  
 So maybe integrity doesn’t conduce to human well-being—at least not in the 
straightforward way imagined by Karr and others. But maybe the instrumental defense isn’t the 
best one anyway. Alan Holland helps to bring into focus the important point here: “It may be 
                                                
53 Recall David Rapport’s remark regarding “wilderness” (as the base-datum for Leopold’s conception of land 
health): “there may be no reason to accept in all cases that a priori wilderness is healthy in the broad sense of being 
supportive of human health and economic activity” (1995: 297). 
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worth holding out,” says Holland, “for the point that what is important [about integrity] is 
precisely the fact that nature goes its own way—not which way it goes—and that this is 
important even if, and probably because, it makes things uncomfortable for humans” (2000: 51; 
italics in the original).  
 I think Holland is basically right. The question is what reasons support this view.54 It 
seems to me we’re not likely to find one basic reason here, but instead a cluster of mutually 
supporting reasons that, taken together, support a robust non-instrumental view of integrity’s 
value. So let me offer what seem to me the relevant reasons.  
 One group of considerations is broadly aesthetic, and recalls some of the points made in 
the previous section. Landscapes that have their integrity intact exhibit a number of properties 
that merit and sustain an aesthetic response. Some relevant properties include: the intricacy, 
multi-faceted complexity, and uniqueness of landscapes that have their integrity intact. The 
value of the aesthetic experience of nature is not trivial. It enables us to realize certain valuable 
human powers, such as our powers of perception and discernment, the exercise of which is an 
intrinsic good. Aesthetic experience can enliven our imagination, and can be vital, invigorating, 
and life-enhancing. Areas of nature that have their integrity intact might be especially suitable 
objects of aesthetic contemplation. I would also remind readers here of a point made in Chapter 
2: a noteworthy dimension of an aesthetic relation to nature is that this is a practice that can 
enrich our lives without consuming or diluting nature.55  
 There is also a way of connecting integrity with the points made above about nature’s 
“otherness.” A world that has a non-trivial amount of integrity is one that exhibits considerable 
nonhuman otherness. The value of nature’s otherness consists at least partly in the fact that 
nature exhibits a spontaneity that can be a source of surprise, awe, challenge, and mystery. The 
fact that it can also be a source of terror might partly motivate our interest as well.56  
 I want to set aside these reasons and bring into focus some more distinctly ethical 
considerations. As defined in Chapter 1, integrity consists partly in the presence of various 
species of plants and animals living in suitable ecological contexts. Maintaining the existence of 
these forms of life in the wild is a central focus of defenders of integrity. In this regard, integrity 
                                                
54 Holland, for his part, says too little about the supporting reasons here. However, Holland 1997 (128-33) is very 
suggestive, and has inspired some of my own remarks in what follows above.  
55 “The outstanding characteristic of [aesthetic] perception,” as Aldo Leopold observed, “is that it entails no 
consumption and no dilution of any resource” (1949: 173). 
56 On this, see the suggestive discussion in Williams 1992: 238-9. 
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gives expression to the idea of a variety of other forms of life flourishing in their own way. The 
fact that these forms of life have a good that is not necessarily our good is a point that the 
defender of integrity recognizes and views positively. We don’t grasp the idea of integrity if we 
understand this as nature simply playing by our rules or necessarily conducing to our needs and 
interests. Rather, the core idea of integrity is to make or leave room for nature to go its “own 
way.” The point here is that the defender of integrity thinks, or should think, that we do 
something wrong when we degrade the world in such a way that we make it impossible for a 
variety of other forms of life to flourish.  
 I think this point is particularly persuasive when we consider the case of sentient beings. 
For all animals of the paradigm class, there is something it is like to be the animal in question. 
This means that animals can care about what happens to them, regardless of whether or not 
anyone else does. I view this fact as one that is also a value. Which is to say, this fact generates 
an impersonal reason for ethically sensitive beings like us to care about animals. Of course, this 
applies to both wild and domesticated animals, but only the case of wild animals is relevant to 
the defense of integrity. 
 The reason I think integrity should include a prominent place for animals is connected 
to what I think is the right view about our obligations to animals in the wild. In practice, what it 
means to show due concern for wild animals is to give them the space to live their lives in their 
own way. Basically, I hold a noninterference view (see 3.3.4), though I am open to the idea that 
certain interventions in nature might be justified, or at least estimable (see 3.3.5). I understand 
the notion of an animal “living its life in its own way” to mean “each animal engaging in the 
characteristic activities of its kind.” As I suggested in 3.3, this way of viewing animals shifts 
attention away from a focus on the specific content (or character) of an animal’s subjective 
experience, and focuses attention on the context in which animals make their way in the world. 
In my view, the ethical significance of animal subjectivity is intimately tied up with living a 
certain kind of life. The notion of an appropriate ecological and species context is crucial to 
filling out what this idea means. When animals live a life characteristic of their kind, this 
exemplifies one clear sense in which nature responds for itself. For example, a wolf in the wild 
is going to respond on its own terms, and this response is valuable as an expression of nature 
responding in its own way. So one clear sense in which we can leave room for nature to 
respond for itself is to preserve extensive habitat for animals so they may live their lives in their 
own way. This is exactly what the defense of integrity calls for.  
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 Let me note a final consideration here by returning to a point touched on earlier. When 
I discussed the idealization of the absence of humans as an objection to integrity (in 1.2.2), I 
suggested that one aspect of this objection was the idea that we are part of a living totality—
nature. The motivation for the objection was the thought that because we are part of this living 
totality it is objectionable to think that humans can’t modify nature to meet their needs and 
create culture. I certainly grant that we are justified in modifying nature toward these goals. But 
in doing so, I think we should be guided by the thought that we are part of a living totality that 
includes all of the elements that have been discussed: great complexity and uniqueness both at 
the level of forms of life, and of ecological wholes; the idea of forms of life that have a good 
that is not necessarily our good; and the thought that some of the forms of life in question are 
experiencing subjects which raises the stakes of concern. 
 For the reasons given, then, I think respect for nature’s integrity is an important part of 
the environmental goal. Which is to say, the restoration of significant portions of the world to a 
state of integrity should be a long-term goal for collective action. Integrity can give expression 
to the idea that we are part of a living totality that merits our interest and protection, even if 
respect for integrity can make things difficult for us.  
 Suppose one agreed that areas of nature with their integrity intact are of considerable 
value, and capable of engaging our interest and motivating action. Even so, I take it to be 
obvious that concern for nature’s integrity becomes possible, perhaps paradoxically, only within 
the context of a certain stage of cultural and economic development, a stage in which we are no 
longer completely subject to nature’s capriciousness and indifference to our aims. However, 
there is no reason at all to think that the relevant stage of cultural and economic development 
must refer to the consumptive and resource-intensive life of, say, contemporary Americans. I 
think the relevant stage can certainly be, and indeed has been, reached by various indigenous 
and agrarian communities around the globe. In any case, the idea that we must achieve a 
minimum of control and independence from nature in order to care about nature does not 
negate the reasons to care about integrity. What it does suggest, however, is that the aim of 
preserving or restoring nature’s integrity is not likely to make any sense for people who are 
struggling to meet their basic needs. For such people, nature is likely something to be subdued, 
not something to save from too much human domination. This has implications for how we 
view the relative importance of respecting integrity; I discuss this in the next section. 
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 In light of the preceding discussion, we can state a fourth conception of sustainability. 
This view answers the three basic questions as follows: 
1. of what: (a) ecological health in areas people need to live and work, plus (b) 
biological integrity for the rest of the world 
2. for whom: (a) present and future human beings, and (b) present and future animals 
and/or states of nature  
3. why: (a) to satisfy the demands of distributive justice between generations, (b) “rich” 
anthropocentric reasons (an expanded welfare pluralism) (?), and (c) non-anthropo-
centric reasons  
I am not entirely certain how to think about the “why” question. Specifically, I’m not sure 
whether to include (b). It might seem that the obvious answer to the “why” question (once our 
conception of sustainability includes concern for integrity) is: for nonanthropocentric reasons. 
But I think this might be too easy, and insufficiently comprehensive. It seems possible that one 
might defend integrity as part of an expanded welfare pluralist conception of sustainability. The 
idea being that concern for integrity would fill out what having a well-constituted relation to the 
natural world would mean. In particular, it would answer the question of what the normatively 
relevant sense of “natural world” is. I noted in the previous section that O’Neill et al. are not 
clear about this, and the defense of integrity might therefore help to clarify matters. However, 
O’Neill et al. reject the aim of preserving or restoring integrity,57 which tells against defending 
integrity as part of an expanded welfare pluralist conception. But I don’t agree with O’Neill et 
al. (or others, such as Sagoff) that integrity should be abandoned as a conservation concept. In 
any case, were we to defend integrity as part of a welfare pluralist account the sense in which 
such an account is “anthropocentric” would become very complex and counterintuitive to most 
people. Given my remarks above about not needlessly stretching the meaning of “need,” one 
might think we should not needlessly stretch the notion of “anthropocentrism.” Probably this 
tells against trying to defend integrity as part of a welfare pluralist conception. 
 However it is defended, the appeal to integrity aims to give expression to the basic idea 
that nature makes a claim on us beyond the call of human interests (at least as the latter are 
typically construed). What this means is that we should constrain the pursuit of our good 
(however understood) out of respect for nature’s integrity. I explore further the meaning of this 
claim in the sections that follow.  
                                                
57 Based on the discussion at O’Neill et al. 2008: 158-61. However, there are a few places in the text that might 
open up space for considering the preservation or restoration of integrity as a worthwhile aim. But it seems to me 
that the overwhelming drift of the argument is to deny the value of integrity. This is not true of Holland’s 
independently published work. 
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4.7 CHALLENGES FOR THE FOURTH CONCEPTION OF SUSTAINABILITY 
 Earlier58 I suggested that different conceptions of sustainability should be understood as 
attempts to specify the environmental goal at which we should be aiming. That is, different 
conceptions attempt to specify the nature we should care about and how concern for this 
should be integrated or balanced with concern for human welfare. I have argued that the first 
three conceptions face serious criticisms. In my view, it is only the fourth conception that 
adequately conceptualizes the environmental goal at which we should be aiming. In what 
follows I elaborate on the meaning of the fourth conception, and attempt to address the 
question of how concern for health and integrity should be integrated with concern for human 
welfare.  
 In my presentation of the fourth conception of sustainability, I argued with respect to 
the “what” question that we should aim to maintain and restore ecological health and integrity. 
Health is the norm for areas in which humans live and work, while integrity is the norm for the 
rest of the world. A sufficient reason to care about health is that the health of human-occupied 
areas is necessary if we are to preserve the capacity, now and in the future, for human beings to 
meet their needs from nature. Maintaining or restoring some areas of integrity is necessary even 
if our goal is only, or primarily, maintaining the health of human-occupied areas. However, in 
the previous section I considered a set of additional reasons, some nonanthropocentric in 
character, for caring about integrity. Before we can explore further what maintaining and/or 
restoring health and integrity would mean practically we need a clearer sense of the overall goal 
that the fourth conception is offering. Obviously, how many (merely) healthy areas of nature we 
need will be a function of how many people there are, and what they need to live decent lives. 
The question of how much integrity we need is somewhat different. Actually, the question itself 
is ambiguous. This question might be asking any of the following: (a) How many different areas 
with their integrity intact should we aim to preserve or restore? (b) How extensive should 
integrity areas be? (c) What degree of integrity is necessary for an area (of whatever size) to 
qualify as having integrity? I think each of these questions is relevant, though in some contexts 
one of these questions may have more salience than the others. As relevant, I will indicate when 
I think this is the case. 
                                                
58 I.e. in 4.2, and at the end of 4.5. 
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 Some defenders of integrity seem to think that we can’t, or shouldn’t, try to answer the 
question of how much integrity we need.59 But this is implausible. We can in fact sketch what an 
adequate answer would look like, and we need to if the practical meaning of respect for integrity 
is to be brought into focus. (“Respect for” integrity is shorthand for “maintain and, as 
necessary, restore” integrity. The same point can apply to health.) 
 Let’s recall the argument I gave for integrity in the preceding section. I argued that one 
of the reasons to care about integrity is that this gives expression to the ethical aim of respecting 
wild animals. Whatever else it means, respect for wild animals surely must include maintaining 
or restoring their habitat so that they can maintain viable populations and can live their lives in 
their own way. I assume that integrity in the fullest sense includes respect for those large 
carnivores, which are native to virtually all natural ecosystems (were such ecosystems intact).60 It 
follows that we need areas of integrity sufficiently large as to maintain viable populations of 
whatever large carnivores—bears, cougars, wolves, and so on—are natives to different 
ecosystems. Obviously, the habitat requirements here will vary according to the species we 
consider. Therefore estimates can range widely. However, two conservation biologists, Reed 
Noss and Allen Cooperrider, have thought about this carefully and systematically. They suggest 
that the historically and ecologically appropriate habitat necessary for large carnivores would 
range from 25-75 percent of the total land area of the earth (Noss and Cooperrider 1994: 161-
                                                
59 For example, this appears to be the view of Alan Holland (2000: 54-6). Holland supports his reticence with a 
number of reasons, but I’ll mention the two that seem most crucial. First, he thinks it is misleading to believe or to 
suggest that it is possible to attain precision and accuracy about how much integrity we need. Here Holland appeals 
to the unpredictability of natural systems and of our impacts on them. He is also concerned that harms to nature 
are becoming less and less specific, as are the assignable agents of such harm. I agree that nature is unpredictable, 
and that many human actions have or may have cumulative and insidious effects. I also share Holland’s worry that 
the causes of negative effects in particular can be very hard to trace or understand. But I think Holland overstates 
the implications of these claims in his discussion. Holland’s second reason is that the question of how much 
integrity we need cannot be determined, not because integrity is “unfathomable” but because needs are. The point 
is that the answer to the question of how much integrity we need depends on our conceptions of what makes life 
worthwhile. Thus, Holland appears to think that integrity, in the end, is really about us and our needs. I think this 
way of thinking about integrity reflects only one sense in which integrity matters. To conceive of integrity’s value 
exclusively in this way, as Holland appears to, is to miss the nonanthropocentric reasons to care about integrity. I 
think the nonanthropocentric reasons to care are very important, and recognizing this has important practical 
implications which I discuss in what follows above. Holland’s discussion is, in the end, puzzling. Following his 
discussion that includes the reasons just mentioned, Holland says some things that suggest he would agree with the 
points I go on to make above. (On this, see Holland 2000: 56, last paragraph.)   
60 Let’s assume we are only talking here about ecosystems of the sort we can reasonably restore. This means that 
we have no reason at all to think about restoring ecosystems for which the relevant carnivores are now extinct. But 
where the carnivores still exist (e.g. in captivity or in wildlife parks), then it is a meaningful question whether such 
carnivores might be restored to their historic landscapes, or at least to ecologically appropriate ecosystems. 
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5). For the sake of simplicity, let’s say that a land area sufficient to support the ambitious aim of 
respecting integrity will be something like 50 percent of the earth’s landscapes. 
 This percentage is supported by a second consideration. Concern for integrity includes 
concern for the preservation of a range of ecosystem types. The preservation of the relevant 
range may be valuable for a variety of reasons (e.g. instrumental value to health, aesthetic value, 
historical value of the Elliot sort, and/or habitat for a diversity of respect-worthy animals). If 
we are serious about protecting a meaningful range here, then this too will mean protecting 
something like 50 percent of the earth’s total land areas, maybe more (Noss and Cooperrider: 
165-7). Of course, the percentage necessary for particular ecosystem types will vary, just as in 
the case of the large carnivores. But in general you can’t protect an ecosystem type unless you 
protect areas sufficiently large as to allow disturbance-recovery regimes to operate within these 
ecosystems. So the fundamental design of any ambitious program of respecting integrity will 
have to make due allowance for this.  
 To give some perspective here, in the case of the United States only about 1.8 percent 
of the lower 48 states is preserved in a way that exemplifies integrity. If we include Alaska, the 
percentage jumps to about 4 percent (Noss and Cooperrider 1994: 172). Thus, the proposal on 
offer is radical. This, of course, might lead many to reject it out of hand. But I think that 
reaction is too simple. In thinking about what it means to maintain and restore integrity, we 
obviously have to distinguish between short-term and long-term goals. Restoring something like 
50 percent of the total land areas on the globe to a state of integrity is a long-term goal. 
Although this goal will require considerable adjustment in the way we currently live, I believe 
we should nonetheless keep this goal in mind. Whether one agrees, of course, will depend on 
how one evaluates the strength of the reasons I have offered in support of integrity. That said, 
in the short term, our conservation goal should probably be to maintain or restore ecological 
health in those areas that people need to use or live in. This would be a considerable challenge 
in its own right.  
 Importantly, one could achieve the goal of maintaining or restoring health in ways that 
are more, or less, conducive to the long-term goal of restoring integrity. Which is to say, if a 
long-term goal is to restore integrity, then this goal should guide the way we maintain or restore 
health. For example, we could maintain or restore health in ways that leave open the possibility 
of restoring more, rather than less, integrity in the long term. If integrity is not on our ethical-
political radar, then it cannot guide the restoration of health. I think the restoration of integrity 
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is an important aim, with much to be said for it. Therefore, I think we should keep this aim in 
mind even if our short-term focus is on maintaining or restoring health. Having the restoration 
of integrity in mind as our long-term goal could have a host of implications. For example, it 
might encourage small local restorations and all manner of steps in the direction of restoring 
integrity, even if our main focus in the short term were on maintaining or restoring health.  
 Obviously, we face profound challenges here in trying to bring our cultural ideas, values, 
private property regimes, decision-making structures, and more, into alignment with the dual 
goal of maintaining and restoring health and integrity. I’ll have to leave discussion of these 
challenges for future work. Here my interest is to clarify the environmental goal at which we 
should be aiming and the considerations that support this goal. For reasons already given, I 
think the fourth conception of sustainability specifies the goal in the right way.  
 We can now turn to various complexities regarding what it would mean to implement, 
or at least strive toward the realization of, the fourth conception. I believe the right way to think 
about the maintenance or restoration of health and integrity as ethical-political objectives is 
basically as follows. Maintaining (and as necessary, restoring) the health of those parts of the 
world that we have to inhabit and use to meet our needs should never be traded off against any 
other goal, economic or otherwise. Which is to say, the goal of maintaining health (at a 
nontrivial scale) should provide a fundamental constraint on how we use the world. Maybe in 
some imaginable emergency situations, say of urgent socio-economic hardship, ecological health 
can be sacrificed in some places, to some degree, and over the relatively short term.61 But I 
think we should be very cautious about opening the door to thinking that it is acceptable to 
compromise (or continue to compromise, as it happens) ecological health. The basic reason 
here is that maintaining ecological health at nontrivial spatial scales is a condition of humans 
being able to meet their needs now and in the future. Preserving health is therefore a matter of 
prudential self-concern in the present, and very importantly, also a matter of intra- and 
intergenerational distributional justice.   
 Maintaining ecological health is consistent with what I think is the best way to 
understand the requirements of strong sustainability. But I have also argued that we should aim 
for more than the maintenance of ecological health. This was the point of articulating a fourth 
                                                
61 As noted in Chapter 1, there are complexities here relating to the question of scale. For example, health ought 
not to be compromised at a large or nontrivial spatial scale (say, the state of Illinois), while it might be justifiably 
compromised at a more local spatial scale (say, the city of Chicago). This issue requires more discussion.  
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conception of sustainability, one that goes beyond both the strong sustainability view and also 
beyond the welfare pluralist account. I view the latter as a fairly marginal improvement over 
strong sustainability. Both the second and the third views leave out normative considerations 
that matter, and I attempted to correct for this omission in my statement of the fourth 
conception.  
 If we endorse the fourth conception, an important and unavoidable question is how 
exactly we should view the aim of maintaining or restoring integrity. For example, is this aim to 
be understood as an absolutist constraint on how we use nature? Or is it better understood as a 
serious or important constraint, but one that is defeasible? Or should the aim be understood in 
some other way? My view at present is that the aim of restoring integrity (to the, at minimum, 
50 percent of all land areas goal) should be understood as a defeasible constraint on, and also as 
a long-term goal for, collective action. Integrity is meant to be a constraint in the sense that we 
need some serious reason to compromise or fail to restore integrity. Which is to say, respecting 
integrity should have a prima facie importance in collective decision-making.  
 It seems to me that the most obvious barrier to our taking respect for integrity seriously, 
whether as a defeasible constraint or as a long-term goal, is the fact that respect for integrity is 
likely to entail substantial economic losses, or foregone development opportunities, for certain 
people, and perhaps entire nations. If true, this raises questions of justice. Indeed, the question 
of justice here is magnified in those cases where the people or nations that incur a loss, or are 
expected to forego a development opportunity, are those who are currently impoverished and 
in need of some sort of meaningful development. Things are complicated here by the fact that 
in the actual world many areas that currently have something approximating integrity intact are 
in parts of the world that are also socio-economically impoverished. While I believe maintaining 
or restoring integrity is in general a worthwhile aim, there is some reason to prioritize 
maintaining areas of integrity that are particularly biodiverse. This makes the matter at hand 
even more urgent. This is because, as Michael Wells notes, developing countries contain a 
disproportionately large share of the world’s biodiversity (1992: 237). In what follows, I want to 
try to say something about this considerable difficulty, focusing on the normative issues at stake 
in conflicts between the important aims of environmental protection and the mitigation of 
poverty. My discussion will be incomplete, but I hope to suggest an approach to the issues that 
can lay the groundwork for further work in the future. 
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4.7.1 “Meaningful Development” and a Basic Needs Exception 
 Let’s stipulate for purposes of argument that “meaningful development” means, at 
minimum, people being able to live decent lives. Further, let’s stipulate that the sense of 
“decent” should be understood as giving priority to people being able to meet their basic needs. 
I assume that the relevant notion of “basic needs” includes absolute and relative needs (as these 
were discussed earlier62). I think we can be confident about including all absolute needs (for 
nourishment, shelter, clean air and water, etc.), as well as some relative needs (e.g. social bases 
of self-respect). In contrast, we might be much less confident about other relative needs (e.g. 
for certain types of transportation or technology). In any case, I assume we can specify a core 
group of basic needs, even if we continue to debate whether other needs should be included.  
 Of course many may wish to define meaningful development in some other way, for 
example, as being able to live as the average American lives. But I assume that such a lifestyle 
is—for anything more than a small minority anyway—unsustainable from an environmental 
standpoint, that is, if we aim to maintain and/or restore both health and integrity. Whether or 
not we want to stipulate a view of meaningful development that is richer than meeting basic 
needs, but much more modest than the average American’s way of life, is something we can 
argue about. But I assume that being able to meet one’s basic needs is at least a critically 
important aspect of what living a decent life entails. The difficulty is that even if we restrict 
ourselves to this fairly minimalist interpretation of meaningful development (and to a fairly 
minimalist interpretation of how to understand basic needs), conflicts between development 
and environmental protection may be acute and widespread, particularly when we take a global 
perspective. 
 Before turning to cases of conflict, we should first note that at least in some cases we 
might be able to pursue policies that have the result of helping people to meet their basic needs, 
while also protecting the environment in relevant respects. A favorite example of some writers 
today is development that promotes ecotourism in ecologically valuable, yet socio-economically 
impoverished, areas. Such development seems to have been successful in a few countries, 
notably, Kenya, Rwanda, Costa Rica and Nepal.63 But there are reasons to doubt the possibility 
of broader success. One set of problems is noted by Wells: “the majority of protected areas 
                                                
62 In 1.4.1 and above at note 21. 
63 For discussion, see Wells 1992: 240-1. 
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have limited tourism potential due to lack of infrastructure, difficulty of access, political 
instability, ineffective marketing, or simply the absence of spectacular or readily-visible natural 
features” (1992: 240). An additional problem here is that a livelihood based on tourism is 
obviously contingent on people visiting the area in question. This, in turn, is contingent on all 
sorts of other factors, such as economic stability in the home country, having disposable 
income, affordable fuel costs for travel, and so on. I assume that in the world of the future 
people are going to travel much less than is now common. I also think there is something 
distasteful about poor people having to accept relatively low paying ecotourism jobs in order to 
cater to rich people who are on vacation. Wells has also noted that, on the whole, the economic 
benefits of ecotourism are very limited at the local level, that is, in the immediate vicinity of the 
reserves or parks (1992: 241). This is a problem in that it is the local people who usually suffer 
most from the establishment of the reserves or parks. In particular, the establishment of the 
reserves and parks often inhibits the ability of local people to self-provision from nature. Wells 
notes that the economic benefits are somewhat better at the national/regional level, but they are 
often greatest in the case of the home country or with respect to the global tourism industry. All 
of this suggests that there are serious limits to ecotourism as a solution to the dual problem of 
promoting environmental conservation and socio-economic development for the people and 
areas that need it most.   
 Perhaps a more promising place to focus attention is on those subsistence and 
indigenous ways of life that have proven to be ecologically and socially sustainable. I have 
remarked on this at different points in my discussion above. These ways of life do not preserve 
integrity in all cases, though in some they do. But such ways of life do generally preserve 
ecological health (though not without exception), and that is a sufficient reason to see the goal 
of preserving these ways of life as warranting an extremely high ethical and political priority in 
terms of what we should be trying to do right now, and in the relatively near future. As Mark 
Dowie says, summarizing his book devoted to the topic of conflicts between environmental 
conservation and respect for indigenous peoples around the globe: “Indigenous peoples’ 
presence, it turns out, may offer the best protection that protected areas can ever receive” 
(2009: xxvii). After all, lands that have been historically occupied by indigenous peoples are, and 
have been, selected for conservation reserves precisely because these lands are in such good 
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shape, ecologically speaking.64 In this regard, a clear case of so-called “win-win” policies would 
be to protect the ability of those peoples who are living successful subsistence lives to continue 
to do so.65 This would halt those problematic development programs that result in the removal 
of indigenous peoples from their lands, sometimes for the sake of creating wildlife preserves 
but more often to open such lands to resource extraction.66 Such programs often have the result 
that the displaced people become destitute and desperate, often being essentially forced to 
reenter the reserves as poachers or timber thieves for lack of other options. Respecting the 
claims of indigenous peoples to continue living on their historically occupied lands allows these 
people to continue to meet their needs from nature, while also (in the vast majority of cases at 
least) promoting the cause of environmental protection.67 
 Unfortunately, this solution will not address the situation of many of those who are 
living lives below any meaningfully standard of decency, and who are not capable of successful 
subsistence (primarily due to lack of access to land). This raises the following difficulty: if we are 
serious about maintaining and/or restoring health and integrity, then this will likely mean that 
some, perhaps many, people and/or countries will have to forego socio-economic development 
for the sake of this goal. This will be very likely be so in the case of maintaining/restoring 
integrity, while less likely in the case of health (since health is compatible with a much wider 
range of land uses). This difficulty, as noted above, raises fundamental issues of justice 
regarding the effects of environmental protection. For it is commonly observed that the 
benefits of environmental protection go to the world as a whole (human and nonhuman), while 
the costs of such protection are borne by particular peoples, communities, and sometimes 
                                                
64 Of course, they may also have been selected because local governments have viewed their indigenous 
populations as dispensable and as not having any rights to continue living on their historic lands. 
65 There is a difficulty here: what if the people who had been living subsistence lives wish to avail of the various 
modern conveniences and benefits after contact with outsiders? I won’t discuss this here except to say that one 
notable fact about many contemporary indigenous communities is that they are highly mobilized politically. An 
important aspect of this mobilization is that they aim to protect their historical ways of life—rather than opting for 
the modern alternative. Of course, we should assume that there will be variation depending on the particular cases 
we consider. I’m not an expert on this, so I must defer to others. For general discussion, see Dowie 2009.  
66 Two contemporary cases include the Indian government’s war on the indigenous Adivasi forest people (see 
Dowie 2009: Ch. 9 and Griffiths 2010), and the eviction of the Kalahari Bushmen in Botswana (see Griffiths 
2011). Many other examples could be given. 
67 I would even go further and say that we should argue for the right of return of displaced indigenous peoples to 
their historical lands in cases where they have been forcibly removed. But this proposal raises a number of issues 
and complexities that I can’t discuss here. Another proposal (argued for, e.g., in Nabhan 1995) is to give displaced 
indigenous people a claim to be co-managers of areas from which they have been evicted, but which are now 
managed as national parks or nature reserves. 
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entire nations. According to Wells, “[t]he heaviest burden [of environmental protection] tends 
to be borne by poorer countries, and especially by impoverished people living in remote rural 
areas of these poor countries in the proximity of protected areas. This has proven to be a 
powerful disincentive to effective conservation” (1992: 237). This is a huge challenge for any 
ambitious program of environmental protection, such as that which I have proposed. 
Presumably, the more serious challenge here concerns the preservation or restoration of 
integrity, rather than health. So I will focus in what follows on the case of integrity.68  
 There are different responses to the challenge here. One possibility is to fall back on an 
absolutist position, saying in effect that respecting integrity is so important that it must 
sometimes, or even most of the time, trump the aim of people meeting their basic needs, that is, 
in cases where meeting needs is at odds with respect for integrity.69 Of course, not all cases of 
humans meeting their needs is at odds with respecting integrity. But presumably there would be 
a number of situations in which this would be the case. Even though I have presented 
                                                
68 However, what I say about the case of integrity might also be applicable to the case of health as well. 
69 This is the position argued for in Rolston 2001 (although Rolston does not specifically argue for integrity, 
focusing instead on the more general aim of nature and wildlife preservation). Rolston offers his position as an 
alternative to James Sterba’s “principle of human preservation,” which says, in essence, that people can aggress 
against nature and nonhumans in order to meet their basic needs. (I discuss Sterba’s view in what follows above.) 
Regarding Sterba’s principle, Rolston writes: “I am now arguing that environmental ethics and law ought, at times, 
to run counter to this principle” (2001: 361). Later Rolston adds: “[B]asic needs unmet is no unchallengeable 
exception. We might not make this argument for every endangered beetle or nematode worm, but the lithe, supple 
cat, epitome of feline power, joined with the other charismatic species, displays richness in value that one ought 
not to sacrifice for a temporary and ultimately futile solution to […] deep human problems” (2001: 365). The cat in 
question is the endangered tiger in Royal Chitwan National Park in Nepal, one of the cases that Rolston discusses 
(2001: 364). The “deep human problems” Rolston has in mind are those relating to vexed poverty in which people 
cannot meet their basic needs without destroying nature or other species. This issue is most relevant to the 
Nepalese example, as well as that of the critically endangered African black rhinoceros in Zimbabwe, whose 
primary threat is from poachers who kill the rhinoceros for its horns. 
 Laura Westra also appears to argue for an absolutist position, although her position is not entirely clear to 
me. Support for reading Westra as holding an absolutist position comes from claims such as the following: “[A]ll 
competing economic, social, and developmental claims should be understood in the context of the primary 
necessity of large wilderness preservation” (1995: 16). Of course, much will depend on how we understand the 
phrase “understood in the context of.” Later, Westra says: “Integrity [understood as wild areas of nature] must be 
viewed as the control measure: Nothing can be either moral or appropriate to public policy that contravenes the 
requirements of noninterference and the protection of wild areas […] and appropriately sized buffers” (1995: 20). 
This seems to support the strong reading of the first quote, namely, that protecting large wilderness areas is a 
policy aim that cannot be traded off for any reason. Yet elsewhere Westra argues for the maintenance of more or 
less what I call ecological health in human-inhabited areas, which would appear to tell against the strong reading of 
wilderness preservation. However, Westra appears to regard the maintenance of integrity (understood as 
wilderness) as the baseline for all social and environmental policy. Hence she speaks of integrity as “foundational” 
because it is thought to be necessary for the protection of nature’s “life support” properties (1995: 14). The latter 
idea seems to support the absolutist reading of her view.   
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nonanthropocentric reasons in support of integrity, I think the absolutist option is not the way 
to go. Such a view shows inadequate concern for people. 
 A second option would be to say that respecting integrity is very important but only in a 
prima facie way. That is, integrity can be compromised, or we can fail to restore integrity in the 
ways called for above. The question is what sort of situations might justify compromising, or 
failing to restore, integrity. In the case of health, I expressed reluctance to view the value of 
maintaining ecological health as one that can be traded off for other values, except perhaps 
under emergency conditions. But integrity seems harder to justify in the same way, not least 
because achieving integrity in the way specified is a much more demanding goal. Hence my 
suggestion earlier that the goal of maintaining/restoring integrity should be viewed as 
defeasible.   
 But if practical concern for integrity is defeasible, then we need an answer to the 
question of what would justify compromising, or failing to restore, integrity in particular cases. 
To be clear, it is often acceptable, on my view, to compromise integrity. This is because 
integrity has been suggested as a goal for (at minimum) 50 percent of the globe. But I assume 
that we are far below the relevant 50 percent goal at present, so the question of what it means 
to respect integrity will often be whether we should expend resources to restore integrity in 
various parts of the world. Suppose, for example, that an area has been modified by human 
activity in ways that have resulted in integrity being compromised. If so, then the question of 
whether or not to compromise integrity is irrelevant. Nonetheless, the norm of integrity might 
still matter here in at least two ways. We could ask whether restoring integrity in this area is a 
reasonable goal (e.g. because of the proximity of the area to other areas that have their integrity 
intact, or relatively intact). Or we might ask whether maintaining/restoring health in this area in 
such a way that it conduces to the restoration of integrity—somewhere down the road—
justifies extra resource expenditures, that is, expenditures above and beyond what would be 
minimally necessary to maintain health in the area.  
 Setting aside this case, suppose we imagine a different case in which integrity to some 
significant degree does exist in a given area, and then we ask whether in that area it would be 
permissible to compromise integrity. I think the answer here is yes, that is, if the only way 
people can meet their basic needs and live a decent life is by compromising, or contributing to 
the degradation of, integrity. So the idea is that a basic needs exception can be made to the goal 
of respecting integrity. This exception would support, for example, a lower standard of 
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environmental care in situations where economic (or other) activities that are incompatible with 
respect for integrity, and maybe even incompatible with respect for health, are necessary to 
enable people to meet their basic needs. 
 The idea of a basic needs exception has been argued for by James Sterba (2000a, 2005; 
see also Schrecker 2000). Sterba, in his defense of what he calls “the principle of environmental 
integrity,”70 says that humans are justified in aggressing against the basic needs of nonhumans 
(i.e. individual plants and animals) if doing so is necessary to meet their basic needs (2000a: 
343).71 In subsequent work, Sterba adds that the attempt to meet one’s basic needs can also 
justify aggressing against whole species or ecosystems (2005: 292).  
 I think this view is basically right, but it raises some questions. If we are going to take 
basic needs seriously (as the basic needs exception does), are we thereby committed to taking 
them so seriously that concern for integrity, and maybe even for health, can shrink in 
importance, perhaps to zero? This seems too permissive. It seems appropriate to add some 
further constraints on the basic needs exception. Schrecker (2000) is helpful here. He suggests 
that a low standard of environmental care can be justified in order to meet (basic) human needs 
provided “(a) that the activities in question do not directly threaten to undermine provision for 
those needs in the future and (b) that there is no other feasible and environmentally preferable 
way of doing so within a comparable time frame” (2000: 306; italics in the original). I think (a) 
supports the basic point behind maintaining ecological health, as I have argued for this above. 
Or maybe we wish to say with respect to really vexed cases that people and countries should 
aim insofar as possible not to undermine health so completely that it will be really hard and 
costly to rehabilitate later. Schrecker’s italics in (b) are meant, as he says, to “guar[d] against the 
rhetoric of short-term pain for long-term gain […] and against the prospect that the interests of 
today’s most vulnerable populations will be sacrificed in order to provide for their counterparts 
tomorrow” (ibid.). This seems to me reasonable. 
 A different question raised by the basic needs exception is whether it would ever be 
permissible to destroy or imperil nonhuman species, or entire ecosystems, for the sake of 
                                                
70 The principle of environmental integrity states: “Other things being equal, we ought not to interfere with non-
human living nature” (Sterba 2000a: 335). Sterba’s view of integrity is essentially Westra’s—i.e. integrity means 
wilderness, or areas where humans are absent (or at most minimally present). This is of course different from how 
I have defined integrity. Nonetheless, Sterba’s view is obviously relevant to the discussion above.  
71 I’m glossing here Sterba’s “principle of human preservation,” which states: “Actions that are necessary for 
meeting one’s basic needs or the basic needs of other human beings are permissible even when they require 
aggressing against the basic needs of nonhumans” (2000a: 343).  
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satisfying non-basic needs or preferences. Sterba takes a hard line here. He invokes a “principle 
of disproportionality,” which says: “Actions that meet nonbasic or luxury needs of humans are 
prohibited when they aggress against the basic needs of individual animals and plants or even of 
whole species or ecosystems” (2005: 294). I’m not sure if I agree entirely with the principle of 
disproportionality, but I’m deeply sympathetic to its main point. I want to leave open for now 
the question of whether some nonbasic needs (or “needs”), or other human preferences, might 
justify certain types of environmental destruction, including the compromising of, and/or 
failure to restore, integrity. But even if this question is left open, I do believe that many patterns 
of preference and consumption should be ruled out as inconsistent with proper concern for 
integrity. This would include much, but not necessarily all, that is characteristic of modern 
consumer society.  
 
4.7.2 The Argument for Compensation 
 Suppose we focus on a clear case of the basic needs exception justifying a low standard 
of environmental care. It seems to me that any ambitious account of the environmental goal, 
such as that offered by the fourth conception, will have to include a basic needs exception, or 
risk being accused of holding an ethically repugnant misanthropic view. But this raises another 
serious problem. Given the widespread poverty in the world right now, presumably there could 
be many cases in which people, in order to meet their needs, will imperil or contribute to the 
undermining of environmental care—certainly care for integrity, and maybe even for health. 
The result, in reality, might be increased degradation of the natural world with respect to both 
health and integrity. In other words, the basic needs exception might continually justify 
overriding the aim of respecting health and integrity—an aim that is central to the fourth 
conception of sustainability.  
 My response to this dilemma is basically the following. If we lived in a world in which 
people aimed at living a decent life—one that gives prominence to meeting basic needs together 
with other human aspirations that are compatible with robust environmental care—then we 
would, I think, have to accept environmental degradation as an apparently inescapable feature 
of the world we live in. But this would be a totally false description of contemporary reality. At 
present, some people—e.g. the global rich—are living well beyond anything resembling a way 
of life aimed at sufficiency (i.e. the minimum necessary for a decent life). Given this fact, if 
environmental degradation (either of health or of integrity) is being caused by some people who 
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are striving to meet their basic needs, while others are living well beyond any meaningful sense 
of sufficiency, then it seems to me that it is too simple to say that the basic needs exception 
justifies actions that conflict with the aim of maintaining and/or restoring health and integrity. 
Rather, if we aim to achieve the environmental goal specified by the fourth conception, then 
this favors redistributions of wealth and resources from the global rich to the global poor. Such 
redistributions could provide crucial support for people to satisfy their needs, thus removing at 
least one possible cause of environmental degradation.72  
 To this I would add the following: If successful environmental protection entails, in 
practice, substantial economic (and perhaps other) losses to certain peoples, groups or nations 
who are already less well off, then it seems to me that the only ethical way to address this is to 
support compensation for those who lose out. I don’t see how we can be serious about 
maintaining or restoring health and integrity if we don’t support compensation for those who 
lose out for the sake of this goal—where “losing out” is understood to mean “not being able to 
meet their basic needs.”73 I view compensation in such cases as necessary as a matter of justice. 
The underlying thought is that if some, who are already disadvantaged, are further 
disadvantaged by programs aimed at environmental protection, then it would be unfair to offer 
nothing by way of compensation to the relevant parties.74 This is because, as mentioned above, 
                                                
72 Several reasons support, or might support, redistributions from rich to poor. For example, there is gross 
inequality of life prospects when we compare the social and ecological starting positions of differently situated 
people. One might think this merits some sort of redress as a matter of justice. Further, there is the fact that 
existing global inequalities are the result of shared social institutions which have unfairly advantaged some at the 
expense of others. Again, this seems to support an argument that those who have been advantaged owe some sort 
of compensation to those who have been disadvantaged. Finally, there is the fact that those living in the developed 
countries owe their absolute and relative advantage in no small part to the fact that they have benefited from past 
exploitation of the global environment and, in many cases, from the past exploitation of other peoples (e.g. 
colonialism). One might therefore think that this historical reality supports the claim that those who have benefited 
from the forms of exploitation highlighted have an obligation to compensate those who were harmed by this 
exploitation. This historical argument is obviously important in debates about environmental justice, particularly at 
the global level. For the rich countries have disproportionately contributed to the destabilization and degradation 
of the global environment.  
73 There may be other ways of losing out, but not all of these would merit our attention. This issue obviously 
requires more discussion. 
74 I should note that although compensation will likely take the form of transferring wealth, or perhaps technology, 
it should also be understood to include opportunities for those who are disadvantaged in relevant respects to 
immigrate to those countries that are better off. At least this is so insofar as the comparatively better off countries 
could actually support an increased population on their lands without compromising health and integrity in the 
relevant ways. I take it to be a given that, in the future, people are going to have to vacate many areas in which they 
currently live in order to be able to meet their needs from nature. People may also have to move for the sake of 
restoring integrity to certain parts of the world. These considerations raise a number of further issues that I can’t 
address here. 
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the benefits of environmental protection are general (they benefit all or at least many people 
and nonhumans), while the costs of protection fall to particular parties.  
 Further, I think compensation is necessary if serious environmental protection is to 
have any chance at all of succeeding politically on a global scale. If some sort of compensation 
scheme is not worked out, then there is no reason at all to think that poor or underdeveloped 
countries will agree to forego environmentally destructive development. Of course, my earlier 
argument implies that each country has an obligation to develop in such a way that it does not 
undermine its capacity to meet its citizens’ needs over time. This means development must be 
constrained, to the greatest extent possible, by the aim of maintaining ecological health (at 
relevant spatial scales). But when we consider the case of integrity, it seems to me unreasonable 
to ask poor or underdeveloped countries to respect integrity if this would mean that they could 
not meet their citizens’ needs, now and in the future. 
 Compensation is thus justified for both ethical and political reasons. Of course, the 
nature and amount of compensation required will vary according to what our conception of 
sustainability is. If we are only concerned about maintaining/restoring health, then this will be 
less demanding. If, on the other hand, we are concerned about maintaining/restoring integrity 
too, then the compensation required will be much more demanding. As I’ve argued, I think 
both health and integrity matter. So I favor the more demanding compensation view that would 
be required to implement a conservation program aimed at maintaining both health and 
integrity.75   
 
 
 
                                                
75 It’s worth noting that “more demanding” does not necessarily mean excessively costly. Two examples bear this 
out. Goodland and Daly write: “One can make a persuasive case […] that achieving per capita income levels in 
low-income countries of U.S. $1500 to $2000 […] is quite possible. Moreover, that level of income may provide 
80% of the basic welfare provided by a $20 000 income—as measured by life expectancy, nutrition, education, and 
other measures of social welfare” (1996: 1004). A second example is from Shyamsundar and Kramer, who carried 
out a study of the adverse economic impacts for the local subsistence economy following the establishment of a 
protected area, Mantadia National Park, in eastern Madagascar. The authors write: “The cost analysis undertaken 
indicates that there are significant losses that local peoples bear as a result of the park. Households on average bear 
an annual (net) cost of USD 49 as a result of the park, which amounts to 18% of their total gross income in 1991. 
If all the households in the immediate vicinity of the Mantadia National Park are impacted by the park, the 
aggregate NPV [net present value] of costs resulting from conservation is USD 305 590” (1997: 183-4). As 
Schrecker aptly remarks, one of the benefits of quantifying the economic losses to people, especially in poor 
communities, due to environmental conservation is that this “provide[s] a basis for provocative comparisons 
between the costs involved and such figures as the amounts that national governments routinely spend on weapons 
and preparations for war” (2000: 310). 
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4.7.3 Two Objections to Compensation 
 I hope to have said enough about the general shape of the argument for compensation 
to show that it is warranted for reasons of justice. I assume that compensation is, in addition, 
politically necessary, that is, if any ambitious conception of sustainability is to have even a 
chance of being implemented on a global scale. In what follows I want to consider two 
objections to the proposal for compensation.76 Both objections are “practical,” which is to say 
they might not be of great interest to philosophers. But I think it’s important to comment on 
these, at least briefly. For many might think that if there are insurmountable practical objections 
to a normative proposal, then this suggests that the proposal is deeply flawed.77  
 The first objection consists in the claim that there is no obligation to compensate other 
countries in the absence of a guarantee that the recipient countries will in fact use the 
compensation in ways that are environmentally and socially beneficial. After all, the whole point 
of compensation is to enable people to meet their needs without having to use nature in ways 
that are inconsistent with respect for health and integrity. It follows that if a recipient country 
will likely use its received compensation to engage in environmentally, socially, and perhaps 
other, destructive activities, then it would seem that there is no reason to pay compensation. A 
further problem is that if one places conditions on the compensation package, there is no way 
to ensure that compensation is being used in the right manner, at least no way that does not 
threaten the sovereignty of the recipient countries.78 One might add a further worry, namely, 
that the countries providing the compensation will do so only in ways that further their own 
(narrowly construed) national interests. In sum, any workable compensation argument would 
seem to presuppose conditionality; but conditionality violates the sovereignty of recipient 
nations. The result is that the argument for compensation looks a lot more like a new form of 
imperialism, rather than a way of helping others meet their needs in ways that are environment-
preserving in the relevant respects. 
 It seems to me that this is a fairly serious challenge, but one that is not decisive. One 
thing to say in response is just to insist that the rich countries have an obligation to provide 
compensation for the reasons given above. Nothing about the objection challenges this basic 
                                                
76 What I say in this section is indebted to the accounts in Schrecker (2000: 310-12) and Jamieson (1994). 
77 This is in accordance with the “ought implies can” principle, understood in this case to mean “If you can’t, then 
it is not true that you ought.” 
78 See Jamieson 1994: 303.  
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idea. In addition, it is reasonable to think that the recipient countries have an obligation to use 
the resources in the ways intended by the compensation program. Of course it is certainly 
possible that the recipient countries will fail to use the compensation in acceptable ways (we can 
assume some parameters here that permit a variety of acceptable ways). If there is reasonable 
evidence that this is in fact the case, then the relevant transfers can be put on hold. Presumably, 
there would be some relatively non-invasive, not sovereignty-undermining, way of checking 
whether in fact compensation is being used in the permitted ways. For example, there could be 
outside inspectors (say, sponsored by the United Nations) that would periodically investigate 
the state of the environment and of citizen welfare in the relevant recipient countries. I don’t 
see why this must involve any violation of the sovereignty of the recipient countries. It is 
reasonable to expect that there will be some minimum conditions placed on any compensation 
paid. But such conditionality need not translate into violations of sovereignty or some other 
form of imperialism. Nonetheless, the objection does raise serious worries that any 
compensation program would have to carefully monitor.    
 Here is a second objection. Given the considerable corruption and intra-national 
inequality of many states that would be candidates for receiving compensation, an ambitious 
compensation program could have the effect in practice of creating a high-stakes environmental 
protection racket. This would simply further enrich and empower already corrupt political and 
military elites, gangster rulers, extremely large-scale landowners, and corporate share-holders 
that may not even live in the country that receives the compensation. A further factor here is 
that compensation is justified if development opportunities have been foregone for the sake of 
environmental protection. But there is little reason to think that these development 
opportunities, had they not been foregone, would have in fact contributed to meeting the needs 
of the relevant citizens within the country in question. So there are two implications here. 
Compensation would likely fail to reach those who need it even if it were paid. Further, there is 
little reason to think that development foregone would have been for meeting the needs of the 
relevant parties, which is what justifies compensation in the first place.  
 There is no question that this is a considerable difficulty. I think there are two main 
replies that can be made here. One has been suggested by Schrecker, who writes: 
“Compensation should be contingent on a credible case that substantial and widely shared 
improvements in the conditions of life, with special emphasis on the meeting of basic needs, 
would have been associated with the development that is being restricted in the pursuit of 
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conservation objectives” (2000: 312). As Schrecker notes, however, this may set the bar so high 
that compensation for environmental protection will never be justified in the real world. This is 
discouraging, but maybe not decisive.  
 Let me remark on the problem that transferring resources to corrupt regimes will only 
further enrich those regimes and their cronies, thus never reaching the intended beneficiaries. In 
response to this problem, I would say that those countries who should provide compensation 
have no reason to recognize corrupt regimes as legitimate. But this claim does not change the 
fact that the rich countries still have obligations to compensate the people who live in the 
countries that have corrupt and illegitimate regimes. The relevant transfers are therefore still 
warranted, but they should be held in trust, say, by a designated international authority 
answerable to the United Nations.79 Once the conditions in the intended recipient country 
change in relevant ways, then the funds can be made available for use.     
 
4.7.4 Prospects for Implementing the Fourth Conception 
 I wish I could offer optimism about the prospects of the above proposal working out in 
practice. The pervasiveness of corruption within nations, the power of multinational capital, the 
absence of any supranational body that can regulate those forces that oppose and undermine 
basic human rights and environmental protection—all of these realities tell against optimism. 
Add to this the fact that many people in the world do not seem to care very much about nature 
or animals, therefore they will likely be unmoved by the idea of restoring integrity. There is also 
the problem that we (i.e. in the “North”) need to discover and create an alternative way of life, 
one that is likely to be less comfortable and much more modest in its means if not necessarily in 
its ends. Whatever the merits of this alternative, it will require cultural evolution. But cultural 
evolution takes time, and that is not something we have a lot of in this case.  
 In light of these considerations, the prospects do not look very good. Yet I do not mean 
to counsel despair. Against the demons of hopelessness and discouragement that plague anyone 
who thinks seriously about whether nature and humanity might co-exist more successfully than 
at present, I would say the following. If my arguments are convincing, then there is something 
deeply right about a way of life that enables the natural world to flourish in a state of health and 
integrity. With this in mind, we can suppose that the reasons to move toward such a way of life 
                                                
79 This is the solution Peter Singer offers with respect to a similar objection he considers regarding his argument 
for a carbon emissions trading regime. See Singer 2004: 48-9.  
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will hold up to our most careful scrutiny. This will encourage us as we try to bring our lives into 
accord with the moral and ecological realities I have been exploring. 
 
4.8 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
 Some thinkers reject the whole discussion of sustainability on the grounds that it is 
dominated by narrow-minded economists, such as those who defend the first and second 
conceptions. I think this is a mistake. Those who are dissatisfied with the first two (hegemonic) 
conceptions, and I certainly include myself here, should clarify alternative visions. In doing so, 
we can highlight those normative considerations that seem important, but that are not being 
integrated into the views of sustainability that dominate in the literature. However impoverished 
many conceptions of sustainability may be, debates about the meaning of sustainability are 
critical because they attempt to specify the nature we should care about, and the relative 
importance of concern for nature and for human welfare. 
 People need to debate the issues discussed above and continue to reflect on those 
normative considerations that seem crucial. A philosophical account won’t likely settle matters. 
But what it can provide is an account of the reasons that support different considerations, and 
it can suggest how these considerations might be combined or integrated. Ultimately, we need 
to envision a way of life that does right by humans while also respecting the nonhuman natural 
world. I hope my efforts have contributed something toward this end. 
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